

CURRENT ASPECTS OF BULGARIAN PARTICIPATION IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

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Today's world events mandate a need to project all available and legitimate methods to enable our war-fighters and leaders to effectively deal with a host of traditional as well as nontraditional threats and the newest challenges. The success of each Security Forces Assistance mission, during the period of post-conflict restoration, depends on their capabilities, particularly on the Homeland Security Forces, to overtake the challenges to guarantee the security and stability in their own territory.

Key words: *Peace Support Operations, Resolute support, application of force, advising, mentoring.*

1. INTRODUCTION

Today's world events require a need to project all available and legitimate methods to enable war-fighters and leaders to effectively deal with traditional as well as nontraditional threats and the newest challenges. Now, more than ever, the minimal level of tolerance for collateral damage and loss of human life, coupled with the tendency for the typical adversary to exploit the rules of engagement (ROE) to his benefit, necessitates an effective and flexible application of force.

2. LAW FOUNDATIONS

Law foundations are based on two general principles of Peace Support Operations (PSO):

a. All military operations must comply with the principles of distinction, prohibition of unnecessary suffering, and humane treatment;

b. Military necessity has already been taken into account in the formulation of these rules.

Therefore, where not mentioned explicitly, as an exception in the rules, military necessity cannot serve as a justification for their violation.

These principles are based on customary international law. They are derived from the fundamental tenet that the right of belligerents to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited. This tenet was expressed in the 1874 Brussels declaration and the 1880 Oxford Manual. It was first formally codified in the 1899 Hague Regulations, and reaffirmed in the 1907 version thereof. It subsequently appeared in additional protocol I as well as other instruments, such as the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention. Convention is of particular relevance in light of the 2001 extension of the entire agreement to non-international armed conflicts. Thus, it represents the first treaty acknowledgement of the tenet in the context of such conflicts [1].

According to these principles the following capstone documents, which established the framework for the conduct of PSO, have been created:

- 1949 Geneva convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war;
 - 1980 Protocol III on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of incendiary weapons to the UN convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects;
 - 1980 Protocol II on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices to the UN convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which CCW PII may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects;
 - 1989 Convention on the rights of the child;
 - 1993 Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction;
 - 1995 Protocol IV on blinding laser weapons to the UN convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects;
 - 1996 Amended Protocol II on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices to the UN convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects;
 - 1997 Ottawa Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and on their destruction.
- Documentary analysis gives us the opportunity to develop a short list of generally prohibited weapons. Using the following weapons is absolutely forbidden:
- a) Poison and poisoned weapons;
 - b) Biological and bacteriological weapons;
 - c) Gas, and other chemical weapons, including riot control agents when such agents are used as a method of warfare;
 - d) Exploding anti-personnel bullets;
 - e) Weapons that mainly injure by fragments which escape detection by x-rays;
 - f) Laser weapons designed to cause permanent blindness.
- Additional restrictions on the use of specific weapons are established also [2]:
- 1) *Booby traps*
It is forbidden to use booby-traps in connection with objects entitled to special protection or with certain other objects likely to attract civilians. It is also prohibited to use booby traps in any city, town, village, or other area containing a concentration of civilians in which combat between ground forces is not taking place or does not appear imminent, unless they are placed on or in the close vicinity of a military objective or measures are taken to protect civilians from their effects [3].
 - 2) *Land mines*
All feasible precautions must be taken to protect civilians from the effects of land mines, especially anti-personnel land mines [4].
 - 3) *Incendiary weapons*
In the use of incendiary weapons, particular care must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects [5].
All of these limitations and specifics for the PSO make them

separate area of military knowledge. It demands not only finding new approaches of conducting operations but also it enforces implementation of new methods of individual and unit preparation, creation of new tactics, techniques and procedures, including new equipment and non-lethal weapons (NLW). Much like a rheostat switch in which power can be dialed up or down as desired, NLW provide tools to allow a commander to employ sufficient force to accomplish an objective without requiring the destruction of the enemy or the habitat. The intent of employing NLW is not to add another step in the progression of escalation with an adversary, but to add another tool to use anywhere along that continuum [6].

This new area of responsibilities and tasks requires also a new level of relationship between government and non-government players on the global stage of research, development, production and trade of knowledge and products of military and security industry.

3. SPECIFICS OF PSO

They are NATO's Non-article Five operations, on a territory devoid of fully functioning civil institutions which can contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations [7].

The Alliance Strategic Concept goals have been focused on the interaction between forces and the civil environment (both governmental and non-governmental), in which they operate, is crucial to the success of operations.

Coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil

actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies include:

- *Support to the mission forces* - any activity designed to create support for the military force from within the indigenous population.
- *Civil-military liaison* - coordination and joint planning with civilian agencies in support of the mission.
- *Support to the civil environment* - the provision of any of a variety of forms of assistance (expertise, information, security, infrastructure, capacity-building, etc.) to the local population in support of the military mission.

Comprehensive peace agreements and assistance in laying the foundations for sustainable peace require a wide variety of complex tasks, from helping to build sustainable institutions of governance to a stable security system. All of these specifics make PSO "multi-dimensional". It means a necessity to include administrators, economists, police officers, legal experts, electoral observers, human rights monitors, etc. Extraneous experts' participation in PSO is a new challenge not only for commanders, planning groups and executors, but it is also a challenge for MoD sections and entire security system, because of: differences between civil and military systems and organizational culture; differences between procedures; differences between communication capabilities and abilities; differences between equipment; differences between personnel preparations; OPSEC requirements; Force protection requirements.

The accomplishment of effectiveness and efficiency on

that “multi-dimensional” level of operation could be impossible without a new level of government multi-sectorial cooperation. Furthermore, it requires a new level of government-business attitudes.

We have to try to establish net-centric principles in our organizational structure and culture, based on flexibility, real-time information sharing and exchange, high-speed transformation capability, command authority transfer from the core to any periphery element (and restoration), without any functional problems.

At the same time we should accept new models of preparation, as well as join experts from civil and business sphere.

If we accept that the PSO timeline starts from the mission beginning and ends to the real transfer of authority to the local security forces, we may separate three main phases: Active phase; Passive phase; Transition phase.

During the *active phase*, peace keeper’s activities are offensive. In accordance with the necessity of establishing the control in the area of responsibility, PSO forces should take an active position and all measures to ease the tension. This phase may include [8]:

- *Establishing and managing a cease-fire* - Cease-fires normally depend on a clear geographical delineation and an agreed time scale for their implementation. However, in more volatile circumstances, and when forces are intermingled, the best that may be achieved could be a cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal to camp.
- *Interposition operations* - A PSO force can be deployed as an inter-positional force as a form of trip-wire, either when consent exists or when consent is fragile. Troops deployed in interposition

operations are generally deployed to pre-empt conflict-Difficult due to size of forces needed.

- *Disarmament, demobilization and anti-mine actions* - This may include securing of disarmament and cantonment sites; and/or the collection and destruction of weapons, ammunition and other materiel surrendered by the former combatants. Includes emergency mine action assistance, as well as developing medium- and long-term mine action plans.

During the *passive phase*, the peace-keepers’ activities are defensive. Applying the force has to be provoked by any of the opposite forces, law or agreement violators, etc.

- *Supervision of truces and oppression of fire* - Military forces may be deployed to supervise any commitments agreed to the parties as part of a truce, cease-fire or other peace plan. This may include operational level joint force deployments. Tasks will generally be agreed and specified in the detail of the agreement or treaty.
- *Restoration of law and order* - Operations designed to restore or to maintain the peace will generally be necessary in the circumstances of chaos associated with a conflict and when there are no coherent parties, or the parties are ill-disciplined and indistinguishable from the criminal elements of the local society.
- *Observation and monitoring (continues in transition phase)* - May be conducted by strategic and operational maritime and air assets, including satellites, but ultimately will rely heavily on the human factor, i.e. observers on the ground. Typically used when forces are limited.

- *Humanitarian relief* - Humanitarian relief is conducted to alleviate human suffering, especially in circumstances where responsible authorities in the area are unable or possibly unwilling, to provide adequate support to the population.

During *transitional phase* the main goal is the effective transfer of authority and responsibility to local security system and its independent functioning. The phase may include activities below. At the same time any functions started in previous phase may continue.

- *Protection of humanitarian operations and human rights* - The foremost task for the military force may be to restore the peace and create a stable and secure environment in which aid can run freely and human rights abuses are curtailed [9].
- *Transition assistance* - It refers to all forms of military assistance for a civil authority or community, which are rendered as a part of a wider diplomatic, humanitarian and economic strategy to support a return or a transition to peace and stability.

4. THE NEW OPERATION “RESOLUTE SUPPORT” IN THE MAIN PSO TIMELINE

According to the above mentioned timeline, monitoring and transition assistance are located around the end of the passive phase and during all transition phase.

One of the main activities is military assistance to homeland security forces. In accordance with the specifics of tasks and the character of the activities, three sub-periods could be deduced, too: Observation, mentoring and liaison period - OMLT (active); Advising period (passive);

High-level expert advisory (transfer of authority).

OMLT Tasks as a part of ISAF are:

a. Coach, teach, and mentor all functional areas of Corps staff, including battle staff procedures, Military Decision making process and Command and Control Tasks in line with unit Mission Essential Task List (METL);

b. Facilitate cooperation and liaison with partner units and RCs;

c. Assist units in planning and executing combat operation;

d. Mentor and liaise with commanders and command groups.

The conditions of an operational picture and the transition to the next phase, causes the relevant changes in Bulgarian National strategy for the participation in the ISAF, paragraph 2.4 states [10]:

“Rational national contribution to the satisfaction of new priority needs of military assistance in training, assistance and support to Afghanistan National Security Forces, in the period after 2014”.

5. NATIONAL DEFENSE COLLEGE CONTRIBUTION

National Defense College contribution, as a main institution, which is responsible for education and training the senior leaders of Bulgarian armed forces is focused on the following fields:

- *Research and analysis* - in that sphere of efforts more than ten themes, bringing real contribution to military theory and practice, have been successfully completed and the results from them are in use. Very deep analysis and research, using the lessons learned and the experience of already accomplished missions, are in progress in the Academy's Defense Advanced Research Institute, as well; NDC achieved a

notable success in different, relevant to security and counteraction-to-terrorism projects, such as:

- “Development of tools needed to coordinate inter-sectorial power and transport CIP activities at a situation of multilateral terrorist threat. Increase of the protection capacity of key CIP objects in Bulgaria” – accomplished in 2013, managed by *European Commission-Directorate-General Home Affairs*

- Permanent work on different projects and in think tanks managed by NATO Science and Technology Organization.

- *Development of textbooks, handbooks, training aids and relevant capstone documents;*

- *Master and doctoral degree programs management;*

- *Organizing professional courses in the PSO field;*

- *Providing lecturers for the preparation of national contingents;*

- *Taking part in PSO with mentor and advisers.*

The success of each Security Forces Assistance mission, during the period of post-conflict restoration, depends on their capabilities, particularly on the Homeland Security Forces, to overtake the challenges to guarantee the security and stability in their own territory. The transfer of authority and NATO Forces withdrawal is a serious test for the new homeland forces to meet the challenges in their own country. At the same time that will also be the most serious evaluation for the success of the different programs for local national forces post-conflict recovery assistance.

That would not be possible without an effective cooperation between the government, the business and the NGOs through joining their efforts and capabilities in one modern and effective Net Centric Architecture.

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