THE MILITARY COUP IN MALI, 22 MARCH 2012.
REFLECTIONS ON THE DEMISE OF DEMOCRACY AND
THE IMPORTANCE OF CIVIL – MILITARY RELATIONS

Thomas C. BRUNEAU,
Distinguished Professor Emeritus of National Security Affairs
Florina Cristiana (Cris) MATEI,
Lecturer
Center for Civil – Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California, USA

The coup in Bamako, on 22 March 2012 both gave lie to the apparent stability of Mali as a democratic country and resulted in the taking of power of an assortment of armed combatants in the North of the country, which resulted in armed intervention by France. This article is about the coup itself that created the power vacuum allowing the insurrection to grow and ultimately take power in the North. The authors have developed a framework for analyzing civil – military relations they believe is more useful than other available frameworks in understanding the role of the military in politics.

Key words: Coup in Mali, Civil - Military Relations, Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

1. INTRODUCTION

In this article we build on the conceptual framework of Samuel E. Finer in The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, and use the case study of the North West African country of Mali. We believe that any analysis of democratic civil – military relations must be attuned, as Finer’s book so convincingly demonstrates, to the potential for a military coup to overthrow a democratic regime [1]. While there may be some areas of social science in which conceptualization has minor implications, civil – military relations is not one of them since, at least in our formulation, how civilian decision-makers deal with the armed forces, and other security institutions, can, as in the case of Mali, result in very serious consequences. We realize that the case of Mali may be particularly dramatic given the long history of insurgents in the North of the country and the fact that the demands on the armed forces for fighting insurgents seriously increased after the collapse of the Muammar el-Qaddafi regime in Libya in August 2011 [2]. Even so, we believe that sooner or later most armed forces will be required to do something concrete by the civilian leaders and, if the requirements we posit for control and effectiveness are not fulfilled, the democratic regime may well be overthrown [3].

2. THE MILITARY COUP IN MALI

2.1. Background on the Coup

Mali gained independence from France in 1960, and became a one-party socialist style dictatorship under President Modibo Kéïta until
1968, when a military coup led by Moussa Traoré removed Kéïta from power. Traoré remained President until 1991, when Amadou Toumani Touré (dubbed ATT) – an army officer - staged a coup that overthrew Traoré [4]. Since then, according to all surveys or sources we have consulted, Mali was one of the few democracies in Africa, which everybody in the international arena praised [5]. In this regard, in 2011 (and even in 2012), the widely respected Freedom House listed Mali as one of five democracies in Africa [6]. Not only did Freedom House list Mali as “free” in terms of freedom of political rights and civil liberties but it also listed it as “free” in terms of freedom of the press, a status many older as well as Second and Third Wave democracies in Europe and Latin America still lack [7].

All of this came to a quick and violent end with the military coup on March 22, 2012, a few weeks before the democratic elections scheduled for April, when Touré would follow his predecessor’s example and step down at the end of his two constitutionally permitted terms [8]. On March 22, a group of junior officers and enlisted soldiers, led by Army Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, overthrew the elected government of Touré, looted the presidential palace, seized members of the government, suspended the Constitution, imposed a curfew, and closed the country’s borders [9].

The coup was followed by instability and violence in the capital of Bamako, and quickly in the loss of Malian government control in the Northern half of the country (including the well-known tourist destination of Timbuktu) to an array of four major insurgent groups, which had long been operating in the North of Mali but which consolidated their power after the fall of the dictatorship in Libya (the groups will be discussed later in this paper). Dioncounda Traoré, then 70 years old, was appointed interim head of government until July 31, 2012, when new elections were to be held. The interim government has been challenged by the existence of conflicting internal divisions, continuous military meddling in politics, corruption and mismanagement within state institutions, as well as harsh economic constraints due to a national recession and revenue crisis [10]. The transition was delayed due to Traoré’s health problems after he was beaten by loyalists of Captain Sanogo. On August 20, 2012, a new government was announced, within which many ministers were considered close to the coup leader (with some reports emphasizing they were actually selected by the military) while none of the ministers had ties to ATT [11]. On December 11, 2012, under arrest, Mali Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra announced his resignation and the resignation of his government. A new Prime Minister Django Sissoko was appointed [12]. In May 2013, the interim government announced that general elections would be held on July 28, 2013.

2.2. The Rebels

The main groups competing, or at times cooperating, for power in the disrupted context of “pre-” and “post” coup Mali are the following [13]:

1) The Azawad National Liberation Movement (MNLA), which was created in 2011 from the merger of existing Tuareg groups (including those who went to Libya during the Qaddafi rule and came back after the collapse of his dictatorship), is a secular revolutionary movement fighting for establishing a pan-ethnic independent state in Azawad. While
MNLA allied with Ansar Dine and MUJAO (to be discussed below) initially, it now opposes Islamic jihadist groups. On April 6, 2012, the MNLA declared independence from Mali with the creation of the Republic of “Azawad” in three Northern counties. Despite attempts to seek legitimacy for Azawad’s independence by invoking United Nations charter and separatist aspirations going back to 1958, two years before Mali’s independence from France, no foreign government has so far recognized Azawad [14].

2) Ansar Dine, also known as Ansar al Deen, Ansar Eddin or Ansar al Dine, (“Defenders of the religion” in Arabic), which was established in 2011 with the goal to impose the Shari’a across the whole country (yet without disputing Mali’s territorial integrity).

3) Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is the former Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), renamed in 2007, after the group officially joined Al-Qa’ida central in 2006. AQIM was established in the North of Mali without encountering any opposition from the Malian government, and includes combatants of Algerian, Mauritanian, Senegalese and Malian nationalities, loyal to Osama Bin Laden’s legacy [15]. AQIM uses ransom money from kidnapping of Western citizens as well as drug-trafficking to fund itself.

4) The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), which emerged in 2011 from combatants who defected from AQIM, due to “the marginalization of black African members” within AQIM [16]. In 2012-2013, two more groups emerged from the previously discussed four.

5) Signed-in-Blood Battalion (also known as the Signatories for Blood) is an AQIM breakaway faction supporting global jihad, created in 2012 [17].

6) Islamic Movement for Azawad (IMA): is a movement is an Ansar Dine breakaway faction created in January 2013, after France commenced military intervention in Mali [18]. IMA expressed its willingness to negotiate for a peaceful settlement of the crisis in Mali, as well as their readiness to fight “extremism” and “terrorism” [19].

The Tuareg groups had been operating in the North and rebelling against the Malian State since the early 1950s (more frequently since the 1990s). Such rebellions led to the adoption of several peace accords including the National Pact of 1992, and the Algiers Accord of 2006 [20]. Nevertheless, lack of implementation of said accords only increased the Tuareg grievances. As David J. Francis notes, “Between 1985 and 2009 the government signed several peace deals and ceasefire agreements after every violent Tuareg rebellion, without addressing on a long-term basis the fundamental problems of the marginalisation and exclusion of the Tuareg minority. The promises by successive governments of greater political autonomy and devolved rule for the Tuaregs in the north never materialised.” [21]

What distinguished the January 2012 context from previous rebellions, however, was the strong Islamist vibe in the traditionally nationalist Tuareg groups, which, coupled with the fall of the Qaddafi regime in Libya in 2011, helped the rebels consolidate their power in North Mali. As Mireille Affa’a-Mindzie argues, “Groups like Ansar Dine (Defenders of Faith) had ties to ideologically motivated external groups such as Algeria-based al-Qaida in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM). Added to that was the proliferation of heavy weapons after the downfall of Libyan leader Qaddafi, making for a volatile situation.” [22]

2.3. Foreign Intervention

Clearly, since the coup to early January 2013 the unstable political situation in Bamako coupled with the alliances between the Tuareg and Islamist groups paved the way for the rebels to advance and seize the main Northern Mali cities - Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal, then central Mali city of Konna – threatening to advance all the way to Bamako [23]. Originally a UN – sponsored military force was planned to fight the various insurgents in order to retake the North of Mali. ECOWAS, African Union, as well as other partners, agreed in the fall of 2012 to an intervention plan for retaking the North. The plan involved 3000 troops provided by Mali, 3000 by ECOWAS, intelligence and logistics support, as well as aerial cover and surveillance by France and UN, and training of Malian troops by the EU [24]. However, while the international military intervention to combat militants and retake the North was planned to take place in the Fall of 2013, the advancement to central Mali and possible capture of Bamako, which would have had a deleterious impact on not only Mali, but also on the whole region, prompted the Malian president to seek military assistance from France in January 2013. France, also concerned with the impact that a rebel-dominated Mali have on the region and beyond, but which has its particular interests in Mali (given the high number of French citizens living or traveling to and from Mali, as well as of various business and economic ties with Mali and the region) began air attacks on the insurgents on January 11 (under the name of Operation “Serval”) as they were moving South and were feared to capture the capital, Bamako, if outside military assistance was not quickly provided [25]. French troops were joined by an ECOWAS-led force in late January, while the European Union started in March to provide training to the Malian armed forces to help them boost their effectiveness [26]. The operation was approved unanimously by the UN Security Council, which underscores the shared international concern about the mounting extremism and armed conflict in Mali. Since the launch of the operation, ECOWAS-led African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) troops (e.g. French, Mali, Chad, etc.) have recaptured important territories in the North of Mali, including Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal, took prisoners, and killed several hundred, including important Al Qaeda leaders such as Abdelhamid Abou Zeid, one of the top ranking Sahara commanders of Al Qaeda in North Africa [27]. Despite these accomplishments, Islamists “melted back into desert and mountain hideaways and have begun a small campaign of harassment and terror, dispatching suicide bombers, attacking guard posts, infiltrating liberated cities or ordering attacks by militants hidden among civilians.”[28] In addition, the rebels conducted terrorist attacks. In sum, while one could argue that the intervention has been successful in pushing the rebels away from the main Mali cities, one still cannot assess its further impact on Mali’s future and / or return to democracy. The international community acknowledges that a solution to the situation in Mali requires a
multipronged approach by Mali, as well as its regional and global partners and allies: diplomatic, political, humanitarian, economic, and security (including the problem of counterinsurgency)[29].

All of these developments made France consider an incremental withdrawal of its troops and AFISMA’s replacement with a UN Force. In March 2013, the U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon stated: “Our worry is that [the jihadists] could reappear, and that could affect the countries of the region.”[30] On April 25, 2013, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2100 of 2013, which established the Peacekeeping Force for Mali (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA), to replace AFISMA, effective July 1, 2013. Extremely significant, MINUSMA will operate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and will be comprised of some 11,200 troops, 1,440 police, to replace AFISMA [31].

The initial vacuum in power created by the coup, which is highlighted above, was extremely important in allowing the situation described above to happen. As the very highly — regarded North Africa expert, Roland Marchal stated: “As expected, [by him in an earlier publication] the coup in Bamako on March 22nd 2012 was more a symptom of the crisis in Mali than the first step to its recovery. The crisis actually deepened and was reshaped by new dynamics, including the growing role of jihadi groups such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Unicity (Tawhid) and Justice in West Africa (MUJWA).” [32] Equally important, and currently receiving increasing attention in serious scholarly work, are the reverberations from the coup in three major areas. First, the need for a legitimate government to take control over the armed forces, which of course made the coup and are still to some degree involved in power, in order for them to become more professionally competent to be able to work with the French and other African armed forces, to include Chad, Nigeria, Niger among others, and to do so in a way that respects human rights. Free and fair elections, in particular elections that the North will perceive as credible, are the first step to ensure this. Second, to establish a government that is able to reengage with the United States, and thereby receive military and other aid beyond solely humanitarian assistance, which was cut off after the coup [33]. And, third, the need to establish a government that can in fact negotiate with the various groups in the North, and especially the Tuaregs with the goal to establish a workable and long term “solution” to the problems of decentralization or recognition of different ethnic groups [34]. In short, the coup has had very serious and continuing negative repercussions.

Currently, as Wolfram Lacher and Denis M. Tull argue, “it is still unclear what impact the French intervention will have on the balance of power in Bamako. France, AFISMA and EUTM Mali will seek to curb the coup leaders’ influence. However, even if they are successful, the army leadership will attempt to capitalise on the fact that external actors depend on cooperation with the Malian army for their intervention in the north.” [35]
3. ANALYSIS OF THE COUP UTILIZING SAMUEL FINER’S FRAMEWORK

In a country like Mali, where the democratic system was problematic even before the coup, we strongly identify with the following statement by Samuel E. Finer. “Instead of asking why the military engage in politics, we ought surely ask why they ever do otherwise. For at first sight the political advantages of the military vis-à-vis other and civilian groupings are overwhelming. The military possess vastly superior organization. And they possess arms.” [36] If we employ Finer’s framework for analysis we find that the military had, in Finer’s terms, both the mood and disposition to intervene. For Finer the mood can consist of self–awareness, overwhelming power, and grievance. The opportunity is most likely created when a civilian regime must increasingly rely on the military.

In our own work on civil–military relations, which we developed for more consolidated democracies, we have elaborated on Finer’s framework by conceptualizing civil-military relations in terms of both democratic civilian control and military effectiveness. Specifically in terms of Mali, we believe there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the catalyst for the coup on 22 March 2012, and the support it quickly received from broad sectors of the armed forces, can only be understood in terms of the perception of the armed forces, which was largely accurate, that the government was not providing them with the necessary means to be effective in military terms. This was the oft-repeated allegation of the coup leader, Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, who, together with other coup leaders publicly stated that they were frustrated with the lack of effective management of the defense sector by Mali’s government (especially when attempting to confront the rebellion in the North) [37]. Coup leaders lamented the unwillingness of the Ministry of Defense to provide weapons and other supplies (including food) to soldiers fighting the Tuaregs in the North, and the Minister’s refusal to respond to the subsequent rank-and-file complaints that they were not properly equipped to fight the rebels [38]. Indeed, as the CRS report notes, “rebel gains, combined with mismanagement and corruption within the senior command … demoralized many Malian troops and undermined support for President Touré…Military commanders’ failure to protect troops from the massacre, which some analysts saw as having AQIM involvement, entrenched grievances within the ranks and among military families.”[39] This analysis is also supported by what we saw “on the ground”, through participant observation and interviews, during two one week visits, in July 2010 and September 2011. By the time of the second seminar, after the fall of Muammar el-Qaddafi and decrease of foreign tourism to Mali by 90% due to the precarious security situation in the North, the Malian officers in the seminar made it clear they were very concerned about their ability to respond to security problems. In short, civilian control was jeopardized, or negated, by the inability or unwillingness of the Mali government to provide the armed forces with the means they required in order to be effective. While we consider these observations unexceptional, and drawing directly from Finer’s work, we find we must expand on why we use this broader
3.1. A Myopic Approach to Democracy and to Civil – Military Relations

Our observation above on the cause of the coup should be obvious, but it is not since civil – military relations has come to be conceptualized only in terms of democratic civilian control. That is, if there is any consideration at all to the security or military dimension, as most studies of democratization do not even include the security forces. And, when academics do include the military, it is exclusively in terms of democratic civilian control. As Peter Feaver states in his 1999 review article: “Although civil – military relations is a very broad subject, encompassing the entire range of relationships between the military and civilian society at every level, the field largely focuses on the control or direction of the military by the highest civilian authorities in nations states.” [40] This observation is further buttressed by the scholarly literature on new democracies, where the exclusive focus is asserting democratic civilian control [41].

While there are understandable historical reasons for the conceptualization of civil-military relations as exclusively asserting, and consolidating, democratic civilian control, it cannot accommodate what is happening in the “real world” of the relationships of the civilian policy – makers with the armed forces. We thus propose a broader, and we believe, more relevant framework for the conceptualization. This conceptualization emphasizes two main themes. First, the need for developing institutions for both control and effectiveness; and, second, a focus on the necessary but not sufficient requirements for both. Here we encounter, at least for civilian decision- makers, the challenges of adopting a more relevant framework. To create institutions, requires attention and effort, and the payoff in terms of votes generally appears problematic. Further, in our framework, to achieve effectiveness requires not only a plan, or strategy, but also institutions to cooperate with the armed forces and other security forces, and resources in the form of money and personnel. These are very demanding, and few political leaders are willing to make the types of commitment necessary. Our argument is: if scholars and decision – makers would begin to think in terms of this framework, they can better deal with the myriad of challenges and issues that arise between civilian decision makers and the security forces, to include armed forces, national police, and intelligence services [42].

Democratic civilian control of the armed forces must indeed remain a central part of the civil-military relations framework, especially with regard to new democracies, and most importantly those that emerge from military dictatorships. Nevertheless, it is not sufficient to describe civil-military relations in the twenty first century in terms of control alone, and Mali is a case in point, and even more so, judging from the country’s history, as civilian control was precarious. From the perspective of making effective security decisions and policies, which requires “functioning” security forces, civil-military relations must involve more than control. In a democracy, policy
makers craft and implement security decisions and policies that are in service of safeguarding democratic values, national interests, and the citizens themselves; successful policies, however, go hand in hand with effective security forces. We must remember that even when civilian control is unquestioned, as in the United States, this control by itself is no guarantee that the policymakers will make good decisions, or implement policy in such a way as to result in military success. On the other hand, the exclusive focus on the military versus the other security forces is detrimental to understanding the larger and more complex relationships concerning democracy and security forces, particularly when we consider the very wide spectrum of interchangeable roles and missions. The concept should, then, include the effectiveness of all security forces in doing their jobs, at the optimum cost possible – that is, efficiently.

4. CONCLUSION

Beginning with the military coup in Mali that has huge implications for regional and, as evidenced by the French military intervention on January 11, 2013 and the UN Security Council decision under Chapter VII on 25 April 2013, international security, we argue that a, if not the, cause is a poorly understood approach to civil-military relations that focuses exclusively on democratic civilian control. While understandable, we argue that this focus is insufficient and must be balanced and be combined with equal attention to what is required for armed forces to be effective.

NOTE ON SOURCES

The literature on civil – military relations in Africa is limited. In this article on Mali there are three main reasons why, we believe, we have adequate information to be able to describe and analyze reasonably accurately. First, the co-authors spent one week in July 2010 and another week in September 2011 in Bamako, Mali, conducting seminars on intelligence reform for intelligence professionals from several Francophone countries in North Africa. We used the seminars as a form of participant observations, and beyond the seminars conducted interviews with local Malian civilians and civilian and military officials at the U.S. embassy. Second, due to the coup of 22 March 2012, and the subsequent conflict in the North involving a wide ideological spectrum of combatants, with the resultant armed combat involving at least France from 11 January 2013, there is a great deal of attention given to Mali. There is periodic and extremely good reporting in the New York Times, originally by Adam Nossiter, who was based in Bamako and has been willing to communicate with the authors, as well as in The Washington Post, The Economist, and British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) News. A very wide variety of think tanks and non-governmental organizations throughout Europe and North America have reported extensively on the situation in Mali. In particular we found the “Mali: Eviter L’Escalade. Rapport Afrique No 189-18 juillet 2012” very useful. We can also cite “Mali: Civilians Bear the Brunt of the Conflict” and
Mali: Five Months of Crisis. Armed Rebellion and Military Coup by Amnesty International, London, 2012; “ECOWAS in Face of the Crises in Mali and Guinea-Bissau: A Double-Standard Dilemma?” from IPRIS in Lisbon, August 2012; Anouar Boukhars, “The Paranoid Neighbor: Algeria and the Conflict in Mali” Carnegie Endowment. The Carnegie Papers, October 2012; and, as can be seen in the endnotes, various articles from FRIDE, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, London Review of Books, European Union Institute for Security Studies, and the U.S. Institute of Peace. There are at least two governments interested in the situation as evidenced by the following two publications: Alexis Arieff and Kelly Johnson, “Crisis in Mali” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (R42664) of 2012 and 2013, and Andrei Belik, Nela Grebovic and Jeff Willows, A Policy Briefing for Wayne G. Wouters, “Friction Along the Sahelian Fault Line: Azawad and Ethnic Conflict in Northern Mali” Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 2012. Third, we capitalized on the information contained within the Defense Institution Reform Initiative papers, which are prepared and periodically updated by a team at the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) (including one of the authors of this article) for the Office of Secretary of Defense, and which are based on a review of secondary source documents, as well as on discussions between CCMR experts and AFRICOM. We used unpublished in depth research analyses on the Tuareg and Al Qaeda groups in the region written by CCMR colleague Lawrence E. Cline, former intelligence officer and expert in Islamically-based insurgencies, and José Olmeda, Dean of the Faculty of Political and Sociological Sciences at the Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia of Madrid.

NOTES AND REFERENCES


[7] For example, Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary in Europe, and Argentina, Peru, and Brazil in Latin America to name a few are partially free in terms of freedom of the press. See http://www.knightfoundation.org/media/uploads/article_images/map-of-press-freedom-w-icon.jpg; http://www.freedomhouse.org/reports. It should be noted, however, that scholars of democratic transition and consolidation such as Larry Diamond, Mark Plattner, and Zeric Kay Smith point out some flaws in Mali’s democracy. See Larry Jay Diamond and Mark M. Plattner, “Francophone Africa in Flux”, Journal of Democracy Volume 12, Number 3 July 2001, pp. 35-36 and Zeric Kay Smith “Mali’s Decade of Democracy”, Journal of Democracy Volume 12, Number 3 July 2001, pp. 73-79.


[27] Media reports however indicate it is unclear how the French came up with the numbers of deceased Islamists. Source: Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI) Mali Country Paper, prepared by CCMR on March, 01, 2013


[33] The United States provides the highest humanitarian assistance in Mali and the Sahel region (more than $445.9 mil in FY2012 and FY2013). Besides, according to a January 2013 released CRS Report on Mali an additional $70.4 mil in bilateral foreign assistance “has either continued under existing legal authorities, or has been approved to resume”. See Alexis Arieff, “Crisis in Mali”, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report, R42664, January 14, 2013, pp. 1-18. Because of the 2012 coup however, which ended a democratically elected government, the law does not
allow U.S. government to provide direct military aid to Mali. Nevertheless, as Johnnie Carson, the State Department’s top diplomat for Africa, stated in late February 2013, security assistance and other assistance could “immediately” resume to Mali “if there is a restoration of democracy.” Craig Whitlock, “U.S. troops arrive in Niger to set up drone base”, The Washington Post, February 22, 2013. Keeping the elections on schedule for July 2013 therefore remains cardinal.


[39] Alexis Arieff and Kelly Johnson, “Crisis in Mali”, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report, R42664, August 16, 2012, pp. 1-16. Reports indicate that Tuareg soldiers that were part of the national armed forces deserted and joined the MNLA and/or Ansar al Deen.


[41] The excellent work of Felipe Aguero on Southern Europe and South America maintains this same focus. He uses the term “civilian supremacy”. Of his many works see, for example, his “Democratic Consolidation and the Military in Southern Europe and South America” in Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Hans-Jurgen Puhle, eds, The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), pp. 124-165.


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