



**JOURNAL OF
DEFENSE
RESOURCES
MANAGEMENT**

Vol. 3, Issue 2 (5) / 2012

BRASOV - ROMANIA



Teodor FRUNZETI

Professor Ph.D.

Lieutenant General

Commandant (Rector)

National Defense University "Carol I"

THE CONCEPT OF "SMART DEFENSE" IN THE CONTEXT OF AN EFFICIENT DEFENSE PLANNING

The international security environment is currently undergoing a series of fundamental changes becoming increasingly complex. Consequently, international actors need to find innovative ways to manage security and defense. The global financial and economic crisis has had a strong impact on military budgets, making it necessary for states and regional and international organizations concerned with such issues to streamline their defense planning and the more so because, in addition to the already consecrated risks and security threats, there are also new challenges. The concepts of "pooling and sharing" and "smart defense" have become, in this context, increasingly popular generating new initiatives in defense planning. However, despite some successes in this regard and their presentation as ideal solutions for managing defense in the current context, these concepts involve a number of difficulties to overcome that sometimes may translate into strategic political military and even economic disadvantages.

Key words: "pooling and sharing", "smart defense", security challenges, reductions in military budgets, NATO, EU, prioritization, cooperation, specialization.

1. INTRODUCTION

The international security environment is currently subject to a series of fundamental changes altering the way the defense and security problem is addressed. The most significant one occurs in the polarity of the international system that switches from a unipolar configuration to a multipolar one,

that is from the existence of several countries comparable in terms of the power resources they hold and that are centered around a single power center with significantly more capabilities than other actors [1] to the existence of multiple power centers in the international arena with comparable resources. To be more specific, this change refers to the decrease of the U.S.A. influence and power and the emergence of new power centers usually known by the acronym of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South America), to which we might also add Turkey. Another significant change is the emergence of a new area characterized by a high conflict potential and located in southern and south-eastern Mediterranean which was the result of the popular uprisings that took place in early 2011 in North Africa and the Middle East, categorized by Western researchers as a "democratic wave in the Arab world"[2].

However, the international security environment is still under the influence of what are now viewed as classic risks and threats - international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, inter-ethnic conflicts, and organized crime.

All of the above occur simultaneously with another phenomenon of utmost importance and influence for nowadays world, namely the economic and financial crisis that has triggered not only economic, but also political and social effects. Moreover, the undeniable link between the economic dimension of any international actor's security and other dimensions makes the military area no exception from the consequences of the aforementioned crisis. Therefore, like any other industry, the military, whether represented by national armed forces or by the ones of international organizations need financial support in order to exist and function.

Thus, the need to act and react in an international security environment is increasingly complicated and more variable given the fewer resources. Regarding the Euro-Atlantic area, the decision of the U.S.A. to emphasize the need to rebalance defense spending among NATO members given its previous contribution of about 75% to NATO total budget, the security and defense financial dimension has acquired new features. In addition, after 2008, the economic and financial crisis [3] has driven European states to decrease their contribution to the budget of the alliance. That resulted in NATO's efforts to find new solutions to maintain the Alliance's ability to fulfill its missions in accordance with the Washington Treaty and the Strategic Concept. In parallel, the EU took a similar approach.

Consequently, the two organizations started implementing a new concept in defense planning, known as "pooling and sharing" at EU level and "smart defense" at NATO level. Regardless of its name, the latter is actually a method of buying and using expensive military equipment in a joint manner. Basically, the concept describes various forms of defense cooperation, involving the merger of financial resources to purchase expensive military equipment and its use in common.

2. THE EUROPEAN UNION & THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY

The concepts of “pooling and sharing”/“smart defense” which imply, on the one hand, the development or acquisition of military equipment in the Union that could not be achieved by states on an individual base and, on the other hand, their shared use emerged at EU level and not at NATO, as one would have expected. The idea of purchasing and sharing expensive military equipment is inherent to the principles included in the founding documents of the European Defence Agency (EDA). Thus, both in the Common Council Decision 2004/551/CFSP on the establishment of the European Defence Agency (2004) [4], and in the Council Decision 2011/411/PESC defining the status and operational rules of the European Defence Agency and repealing Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP (2011) [5], the tasks and responsibilities include promoting harmonization of operational needs and adoption of effective, compatible procurement, in particular by:

- a) promoting and coordinating harmonization of military requirements;
- b) promoting cost-effective and efficient procurement by identifying and disseminating best practices;
- c) providing appraisals on financial priorities for capabilities development and acquisition (Article 5, 3 (b)).

Basically, the EDA has emerged since the beginning of the EU as a specialized body whose main task was to coordinate and encourage cooperation between member states in matters related to the acquisition and development of military equipment. As part of the EDA, member states may initiate programs to develop capabilities, with EDA providing expertise, legal and administrative assistance to support their initiatives. Within this context, it is worth reminding the EU’s approach to the security and defense dimension over time marked by the reluctance of its member states to invest and support this dimension. However, the latter was much better developed and, especially, financed by the U.S.A. as part of its NATO membership. Therefore, when the military budgets of the member states began to decline, the idea long developed by the EU has acquired the name of “pooling and sharing”, it was publicized and accepted as a solution for continuing efforts to ensure security in the global financial and economic crisis. Afterwards, it was adopted, developed and implemented by NATO. Moreover, the fact that “pooling and sharing” is a concept of European origin is confirmed by the considerable number of predisposing factors and experiences of this kind in the EU, allowing a group of countries to achieve a high degree of integration, assuming that the others would catch up as their necessary capabilities develop [6].

The increasing interest in implementing the concept of “pooling and sharing”, which proved an efficient way to strengthen the European military power in a period of austerity, is the result of economic factors. The Ghent initiative played an important role in the development of this concept. The latter consisted in the effort of the 27 EU Member States’ defense ministers to find solutions to strengthen European military capabilities in the context of budget cuts and rising cost investments in the military. The stated goal of the initiative was to “*preserve and increase national operational capabilities - resulting in improved effects, sustainability, interoperability and cost-effectiveness*” [7]. For this, areas of cooperation were identified in order to ensure a more efficient expenditure of existing resources across Europe and to maintain a range of military capabilities aimed at achieving national political ambitions and the EU’s ability to act credibly in crisis situations. Subsequently, each member state had to make an inventory of its national military capabilities. The lists of stocks were then centralized by the EU bodies in a document illustrating the state of affairs in this field in Europe, followed by capability plans and by the identification of possible areas of cooperation. Afterwards, the member states had to identify the actions that could be taken at national level and the partners for cooperation. The role of EDA is to work together with other EU bodies as facilitators in the process of cooperation. Given the adaptation of this approach to the characteristics of the international context (the implications of the economic and financial crisis, in particular), the presentation of feasible solutions and the focus on finding solutions have led to an increasing acknowledgement of the “pooling and sharing” concept. Basically, once the inventories of existing military capabilities is over, every member state needs to avoid investments in those capabilities that already exist in other member states and instead focus on those capabilities that are necessary in order to achieve national strategic objectives and maintain the EU as a relevant security actor. Therefore, the “pooling and sharing” initiative actually resides in the avoidance of capabilities duplication, both at EU and NATO-EU level. Compared to similar cooperative efforts undertaken within the EU over time and strictly limited to cooperation on specific projects, the aforementioned initiative takes a strategic, comprehensive outlook on all existing capabilities within the EU member states, the way they can be used in a joint manner, as well as on the gaps in the security and defense areas identified in the treaties signed by member states and yet difficult to bridge despite the commitments made. Thus, within the Ghent initiative, we have identified the following areas where multilateral cooperation could bring added value to the Common Security and Defence Policy [8]:

- **Harmonization of the military requirements.** This needs to occur at the level of the objectives related to the capabilities issue that were established at national and EU level.

- **Research and Development.** It is an area considered essential for improving existing capabilities and for developing new ones.
- **Procurement.** Aggregating national requirements savings can be made to the economy of mass production. In order to achieve cost efficiency, the harmonization of military requirements and contract awards based on competition are important prerequisites. When the document known as the Ghent initiative was issued, the EU had already issued two directives, thus creating the legal framework for meeting the above conditions. One of the Directives was aimed at simplifying the terms and conditions for defense-related products' transfers within the community [9] and hence, at harmonizing the European weapons market and reducing the administrative procedures that hinder the movement of military equipment between EU member states. The other one regulated the coordination of procedures for the award of certain work contracts, supply of goods and provision of services by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defense and security [10].
- **Training and exercises** play an important role in the context of European forces tendency to decrease in number. Therefore, applying the "pooling and sharing" concept to the facilities available for training could not only contribute to lower costs, but also to increased interoperability.
- **Command structures and procedures.**
- **Cost management.** Providing expensive goods (e.g. strategic recognition, etc.) is a priority in the efforts to increase cooperation. Consequently, initiatives such as Helicopter Training Program, Maritime Surveillance Network, European Satellite Communications Procurement Cell, campaign hospitals, air refueling, Future Military Satellite Communications, Reconnaissance - Surveillance - Intelligence, Pilots' Training, European Centre for Transportation, Smart Ammunition, Logistics and Naval Training were under discussion [11].

All of the above considered, the idea of "pooling and sharing" involves cooperative and harmonization efforts in the security and defense industry field. It is, in fact, an economical solution to manage the impact of the economic and financial crisis on military budgets. Although not necessarily a new concept, its scale and importance nowadays are new. Also, the fact that "pooling and sharing" is an economical solution for managing current challenges and that the idea itself is not fundamentally new can be found in the emphasis placed on research and development in the 2020 Strategy where smart (i.e. "smart growth") was defined as "developing an economy based on knowledge and innovation"[12]. Research and development can boost resource efficiency and create new jobs. Basically, research and development are key factors in economic growth and their inclusion in initiatives to streamline defense spending becomes natural. By including R&D in its areas of concern, the

“pooling and sharing” initiative is in line with the efforts to manage the effects of the financial economic crisis in all areas, the defense sector being one of them. Furthermore, from this perspective, “pooling and sharing” can be an effective initiative because EDA has included research and development capabilities in its activities since the signing of its founding act [13]. Moreover, the initiatives established under Strategy 2020 - Innovation Union – have created an environment for developing and promoting new ideas. Moreover, the EU Council meeting of 22-23 March 2012 stressed the importance of creating synergies between the policies of EDA and of the European Commission, particularly in the field of investments in Research and Technology. This is believed to be a solution to strengthening the Defence Technological Industrial Base in Europe [14]. The €15.8 billion program in research technologies, as well as the research programs in marine systems and unmanned aerial systems started by 12 EU Member States together is proof of the opportunities created by all of the above. In other words, the EU has created a very favorable framework that allows the development of research and development in all areas, the “pooling and sharing” concept defining the military applicability of a European general economic development. In fact, the declaration of the EU Commissioner responsible for research, innovation and science on the importance of research and innovation is significant in this respect: “Europe is facing a debt crisis and the greatest economic challenges for decades. The Member States take measures to cut budget, but we must ensure that these measures do not cut even the driving force of economic recovery: research and innovation. Investing in research and innovation now is the recipe for ensuring jobs and growth in the future.”[15]. This statement highlights both the impact of the international economic context and the need to identify a new approach. Also, another relevant aspect is the likeness between the permanent cooperation prerequisite and the “pooling and sharing” initiative. The existence of a provision mentioning this form of cooperation in the Lisbon Treaty is undoubtedly an advantage for strengthening and increasing the cooperation in the security and defense related industry. Nonetheless, this requires identifying and undertaking small projects, small initiatives on specific issues by certain members in a cooperative manner, while the other states are to join them when they have the will and power to do so.

“Pooling and sharing” is, from the outset, a European-wide concept and implies that all member states are involved and all have certain advantages in terms of cost efficiency and equipment necessary to achieve national interests and fulfill their responsibilities in the EU. Moreover, “pooling and sharing” involves extensive European synergies in the security and defense industry. However, it is necessary to remove all potential obstacles to the implementation of this concept, obstacles that can be found in the very way in which security and defense work at EU level [16]. Therefore, the

implementation of this concept may be confronted not only with distinct visions and priorities, but also with the reluctance of national authorities to be part of such an effort. For example, at the end of 2010, three EU member states - France, Germany and Poland - launched an initiative aimed at the creation of a military operational headquarters in Brussels, a proposal opposed by the United Kingdom on reasons of task overlapping, duplication with NATO. On the other hand, we must not minimize the impact of the current economic climate on the perception and endeavors to tackle security and defense. In this respect, a viable and profitable solution would ultimately allow member states to maintain or improve their ability to guarantee the security of their citizens and to meet commitments at regional and international levels.

3. NATO AND “SMART DEFENSE”

“Smart Defense” is equivalent to the “pooling and sharing” concept implemented at EU level. “Smart defense” was adopted in the context of a major imbalance in the contributions made to the NATO budget, an imbalance considerably enhanced by the effects of the economic and financial crisis. The decline of the U.S.A. power, the main contributor to the NATO budget, alongside with the change in its strategic priorities concerning the Asia-Pacific region [17] also had an impact on NATO’s organization and functioning. The recently launched concept of “smart defense” is part of the transformations undergone by the Alliance under the impact of major international events. According to NATO’s official website, the concept was adopted by the Alliance in the context of a crisis and of the need to “rebalance” the uneven efforts taken by the U.S.A. and European countries with their defense spending so that, in the end, the defense “burden” is fairly shared. In general, it is aimed at covering those defense capabilities involving considerable expenses, namely anti-ballistic protection, surveillance and reconnaissance, intelligence, maintenance and training, education and employment training, effective engagement and force protection. Basically, “smart defense” is a solution to maintain NATO’s ability to fulfill its missions in accordance with the Washington Treaty and the Strategic Concept. Thus, the Alliance maintains its ability to respond to the increasing complexity of the international security environment characterized by the presence of the same security risks and threats that have to be countered with declining military budgets. As previously mentioned, the U.S.A. is an exception to this situation.

The implementation of the Alliance Concept involves developing those capabilities NATO mostly needs within the current international context. The Alliance operates similarly to the EU’s EDA that acts as a facilitator and interim framework in which its members can decide what can get together, at lower costs, more efficiently and with fewer risks. In the case of NATO, the Allied

Command Transformation (ACT) plays the coordination role. Another important structure in implementing the concept of "smart defense" is the Conference of National Armaments Directors, the main NATO committee responsible for promoting cooperation in supplying weapons and capabilities to improve the effectiveness of NATO forces. Moreover, on July 6, 2012, an agency similar to EDA - NATO Procurement Organization (NPO) was created within NATO [18] in order to provide a framework which would integrate the multinational procurement programs. At the moment, NPO is still being organized in terms of the structure and processes that will underpin its operation. Also, the official NATO website states that NPO will build on the experience of the existing multinational procurement agencies [19] that will continue to operate as such until NPO is operational or until the member who is involved in the NPO will decide the integration. However, the existence of specialized multinational procurement agencies clearly reveals that the idea of "smart defense" is not a new one. However, the concept acquires a new scope and new meanings in the global financial and economic crisis. In addition, as with EDA, the implementation of "smart defense" requires certain necessary steps. The first is to prioritize the necessary national capabilities in accordance with Alliance's requests so that the main objectives identified in the defense planning coincide with those defined by NATO. The second step is specialization, namely the need for states to cut out from their budgets the expenditures with those capabilities allotted to other NATO member states and to which, in accordance with the principles of "smart defense", they should also have access. Specialization involves saving some resources and investing them in others that are insufficiently developed or inexistent across the Alliance. The third step is cooperation, a core dimension emerging from the idea that states can, together, have access to capabilities that would not be otherwise available.

The initiatives developed under the concept of "smart defense" at NATO level focused on extremely costly capabilities. Out of these, the following can be mentioned:

- The *land, sea and air surveillance systems* play a particularly important role in the protection of NATO forces in theaters. The equipment needed for the NATO Air-Ground Surveillance (AGS) system have already been purchased through a multinational agreement among Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Romania, Slovakia and the U.S.A.
- The *airborne warning and control system (AWACS)*.
- The *fight against improvised explosive devices (IED)* is another key point in the protection of NATO forces in theaters of operations, given that over half of those wounded in battle field were injured by such devices. In this respect, in November 2011, thirteen countries decided to jointly acquire control technologies for IED.

- The *missile shield* could be considered another example of the “smart defense” implementation. Its construction was initiated by the U.S.A., Turkey, Spain, Poland and Romania agreed to host its elements on its own territory. To thi purpose, the Netherlands announced plans to equip four vessels with radar and Germany ponders over offering its Patriot systems.
- *Cyber attacks defense* is another area where “smart defense” is implemented through projects involving innovative technologies and operational support.
- *Command and Control systems, etc.*

In the same vein, Norway launched an initiative concerning integrity development. The latter is based on the assumption that, in order to implement “smart defense” (*i.e.* defense intelligence), intelligent institutions are required. The project aims at promoting best practices and developing practical tools to reduce the risk of corruption and it is viewed as an appropriate support for Afghanistan and the countries in South Eastern Europe [20].

Unlike the EU, NATO’s approach to “smart defense” places less emphasis on research and development. The explanation for this may be found in the distinct nature of the two organizations. The EU was primarily formed, de ned and developed as a regional economic organization with an integrative purpose. Therefore, given the implications generated by the integration of different security dimensions (*i.e.* economic, social, political and military, the impact of the global nancial and economic crisis is greater. As a result, research and development represent one of the main EU levers for identifying comprehensive sustainable solutions to manage the effects of the crisis in as many areas as possible. NATO, on the other hand, is fundamentally a political-military alliance with responsibilities mainly related to security and defense. Therefore, the efforts were directed towards the identi cation and development of solutions for purchasing the military equipment necessary for the Alliance to ful ll its already assumed commitments.

Research is, indeed, part of any initiative since any development (*e.g.* military equipment, armaments, command and control systems, defense systems, etc.) is based on it. However, in our opinion, it plays a lesser role in de ning the concept of “smart defense”. For NATO, “smart defense” is equivalent “to spending money on defense in a smarter way” [21]. Moreover, in terms of research and development within NATO, the involvement of the Alliance in many operations involving considerable expenditures resulted in limited funds for research and development and procurement of new equipment [22]. Another likely cause for the diminished role of research and development in the context of “smart defense” may be the need on behalf of European countries to invest more in this eld. In this respect, it is worth

reminding that, according to official documents [23], the U.S.A. invests seven times more than the EU in research and technology. As a result, a more substantial investment on behalf of the EU in this area would create new opportunities for the transatlantic cooperation and, hence, mutual benefits. The low level of investment in research and development at European level can become vulnerability and, consequently, efforts must be made towards addressing this issue. However, similarly to the EU that has to face certain obstacles to the implementation of the concept of "pooling and sharing", NATO also faces its own challenges in this respect. "Smart defense" gained popularity and momentum during the economic and financial crisis, but its implementation requires efforts to overcome difficulties, mostly political, since the member states must rely to a greater extent on each other in terms of jointly using capabilities in order to meet their commitments in the security field. Besides the need to overcome the lack of trust among states, and the practical, procedural, institutional difficulties to implement this concept, the most consistent difficulty is, by far, the **specialization** requirement, which is a veritable "Gordian knot" for the concept's implementation [24].

As defined by NATO, specialization requires nations to focus solely on developing specific capabilities and abandoning the development of others, which are to be provided, if necessary, by other allies, under the same concept. It is about making efforts with permanent implications. Thus, the member states may be in one of the following situations: sole suppliers of certain equipment or completely dependent on the help of other countries. Of course, in this context, the security guarantee provided by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty must not be overlooked.

The implications of specialization are numerous and profound. First, specialization involves major changes within national military structures as a result of the states' focus on certain military capabilities. Inherently, there is also the risk that states may act in accordance with the sovereignty principle and, as a result, show reluctance to adopt such measures. Moreover, the cited source identifies six broad categories of challenges in this regard. The first one is that specialization has an impact on the strategic flexibility of each state partly because the necessary enterprise capabilities of contingency measures would remain uncovered, representing a vulnerability of the respective state actor. The second challenge refers to states' negative political freedom to act or not in a given situation as it is the case. For example, a state along with other allies may decide to act in a particular crisis requesting capabilities developed by other players, or a player, who is the only holder of capabilities, believes that engaging in a particular crisis or conflict is not consistent with its national interests. In both cases, one can speak of coercion: on one hand manifest in the unwillingness to act, and on the other hand in the decision to act. Third, establishing the criteria underlying to the

composition of specialized forces is another difficulty. These forces require a high degree of cohesion based on the assumptions that all capabilities are available regardless of the nations that contribute to them and that allies tend to develop the necessary capabilities because of their own vulnerabilities. The fourth difficulty concerns the implications for the defense industry since specialization requires states to abandon the development of certain capabilities in favor of others. Fifth, there is the increased complexity of military education and instruction. The sixth challenge is that the specialization process must start from the premise that NATO is the only organization with responsibilities in the Euro-Atlantic security area. In this respect it is worth reminding that NATO member states are also part of other organizations and subject to the need to deal with specific risks. For instance, Turkey has to tackle the PKK problem. Basically, states must maintain the capability to act under other security commitments and not duplicate other existing NATO military capabilities.

4. NATO AND EU INTEROPERABILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS

“Pooling and sharing” and “Smart Defense” are two concepts roughly referring to the same approach – capabilities’ merger and joint use in order to ensure more effective investments in security and defense. Cooperation among member states is the central idea around which the two concepts are built. However, in terms of the European area, cooperation should be approached at supra-national level since 21 states are members of both NATO and the EU. Consequently, attention must be paid to the side effects that may occur as a result of implementing both “pooling and sharing” and “smart defense”. It is obvious that what was initially aimed at preventing resources waste may actually lead to a duplication of functions at the level of the two organizations. The efforts to prevent this state of affairs are already visible.

What is common for both approaches is that the idea of pooling resources to develop and / or acquire defense capabilities to be later shared by the contributors is not new. “Smart defense” and its European counterpart – “pooling and sharing” - are initiatives aimed at reducing the gap between the U.S.A. and the European countries in terms of technological and operational capabilities, since it is common knowledge that the U.S.A.’s contribution is higher as a result of its greater funds’ channeling into the defense budget. Besides its role of main contributor to the NATO budget, the U.S.A. is still the greatest military power in the world despite its decline in defense investments. The differences between the U.S.A. and the European countries in terms of their investments in defense are huge. Thus, for 2011, statistics [25] show that

the U.S.A. invested no less than 711 billion dollars, while in Europe the largest investments were made by the UK totaling 62.7 billion dollars, which is about 11% of the total U.S.A. effort. Moreover, one can notice the same imbalance in terms of the investments made in research and development in the security and defense fields between the two sides of the Atlantic. Moreover, defense in Europe actually means the involvement of European states and not of a single entity, the EU respectively. This situation can be better explained as the expression of the inter-governmental character of the security and defense policy that provides for member states to act under the sovereignty principle. Therefore, in terms of defense, the European countries' investments are not only much lower than those of their transatlantic partner, but also little focused and coordinated - at least before the coining and initiation of the "pooling and sharing" and "smart defense" initiatives. Thus, the idea to pool resources and share capabilities solves the already mentioned gaps between Europe and the U.S.A. that only became larger as a result of the global financial and economic crisis, as well as because of a switch in the interests of the U.S.A. for the Asia-Pacific region.

The cooperation and coordination efforts between the two organizations are therefore vital for the two concepts to be successful in the long term. Moreover, before the advent of the economic and financial crisis, NATO and the EU had already developed interoperability frameworks aimed at avoiding overlapping functions and taking a complementary approach to security [26]. The first cooperation framework between NATO and the EU was established by the "Berlin Plus" agreements that granted the EU access to NATO's operational planning instruments regularly used crisis management operations to conduct its own operations. Currently, the NATO-EU agreements on security concern the cooperation in crisis management, the fight against terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, exchange of classified information, and EU's to NATO planning capabilities. In addition, the NATO-EU cooperation often materialized in complementary actions in theaters of operations, such as those in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, Afghanistan or in the naval operations conducted along the coast of Somalia. Therefore, for the two organizations, the need to cooperate in order to avoid tasks and functions duplication is a reality acknowledged and accepted for a long time. Consequently, the implications of implementing the concepts of "smart defense" and "pooling and sharing" are no exception to this rule.

So far, the accomplishment of the interoperability goal in defense planning under the new conditions created by the economic and financial crisis was facilitated by regular meetings of the heads of the two bodies responsible for coordinating the efforts related to the implementation of the two concepts: EDA and ACT. Such a meeting was held in December 2011, when the heads of the two structures discussed how EDA and ACT can work together so that

their efforts are complementary and avoid wasting resources [27]. In fact, a look at the lists of the already developed programs of the two organizations underlines the differences between them in terms of the types of investments made. Thus, EDA focuses mainly on logistics and communications, and ACT on capabilities for military operations in theaters, troops' protection and related risks and threats such as those arising in cyberspace or weapons of mass destruction. As a result, the efficient use of these in practice is an efficient one. At the meeting from December 2011 the topic of a practical approach to the NATO-EU interoperability was on the agenda. An example in terms of the results yielded by this was the progress made in Afghanistan as a result of the projects developed under EDA (i.e. healthcare, DEI fighting tools, training helicopter pilots) and used in NATO-led missions.

Therefore, there are reasons to believe in the ability of both organizations to cooperate given the current economic conditions when member states are facing cuts in defense budgets and need a new way of thinking of security and defense issues. In this respect, maintaining a continuous contact between relevant institutions in NATO and the EU, dialogue, transparency and the exchange of ideas are essential parts to achieving goals through the idea of intelligent defense. Moreover, this kind of NATO-EU relationship is all the more necessary as both face the same obstacles in their efforts to put "pooling and sharing" and "smart defense" into practice.

5. CONCLUSIONS

"Pooling and sharing" and "smart defense" were presented as ideal solutions to maintain the defense capability of the states given the Euro-Atlantic economic and financial crisis. The ideas, though not new, have had a far greater impact and success than in the past due to the international context which enabled their presentation in a positive light and in an unduly way. Of course, the idea of putting together and sharing resources for defense so as to allow the use of defense capabilities at lower costs is useful and justifiable. Its success is best explained as the result of the budget cuts in all fields, the military one included, faced by the NATO and the EU member states. However, there is also a downside to this expressed at the level of the difficulties and obstacles encountered along the way and with impact on defense planning. The specialization component of "smart defense" is one of the most significant challenges in this respect, in reducing and increasing the complexity of the defense planning area in the case of each nation. Abandoning the development of capabilities to focus investments on others, based on the idea that they will be provided by the other member states requires a redefinition of the defense industry, the organization of the armed structures, education and instruction of military or civilian personnel, as well as of the

tasks undertaken at national level. All this could lead, at least on short term, to economic imbalances in the military. Moreover, another problem to be overcome is that of mutual confidence between states. No country will be willing to neglect the development of the capabilities necessary for national security and integrity as long as the sense of security in terms of other countries' level of commitment lacks. In addition, in this respect, the way the relations between European states are managed gains an increased importance for the successful implementation of intelligent defense. As shown by most analyses of European security, this can be explained as these countries' attachment to the idea of nation, identity, sovereignty and defense, which is one of the most sensitive areas [28]. Therefore, in our opinion, the key to the success of both initiatives is the relationship built among the European states. Strengthening cooperation, mutual trust, overcoming, when appropriate, the Westphalian vision on security and defense are *sine qua non* conditions both for the smart defense and for the efforts to pool and share the military capabilities.

ENDNOTES

[1] Robert Jervis, *Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective*, in *World Politics*, Vol. 61, No. 1, January 2009, p. 191.

[2] Alvaro de VASCONCELOS, *Listening to Unfamiliar Voices – The Arab Democratic Wave*, The European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 12 March 2012.

[3] Băhnăreanu, Cristian, *Future defense and security. Military budgets in crisis?*, *The Strategic Impact*, no. 4 [37] / 2010.

[4] Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP of 12 July 2004 on the establishment of the European Defence Agency, in *Official Journal of the European Union*, pp. 17-28, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004E0551:EN:NOT>.

[5] Decision 2011/411/PESC of defining the statute, seat and operational rules of the European Defence Agency and repealing Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP, *Official Journal of the European Union*, pp. 16-26, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:183:0016:0026:RO:PDF>.

[6] Dutu, Peter; Bogzeanu, Cristina (2011) *EU institutional reform in terms of Security Policy and Defence Policy*, "Carol I" National Defense University Press, Bucharest.

[7] Pooling and Sharing, German-Swedish Initiative. Food for Thought. European Imperative. Intensifying military cooperation in Europe. "Ghent Initiative", November 2010, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede260511deseinitiative_/sede260511deseinitiative_en.pdf.

[8] *Ibidem*.

[9] Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defense-related products within the community, <http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:146:0001:0001:RO:PDF>.

[10] Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the award of certain works contracts, supply of goods and provision of services by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defense and security, and amending Directives 2004 / 17/CE and 2004/18/EC, <http://www.anrmap.ro/sites/default/files/legislatie/legislatie-976.pdf>.

[11] European Defence Agency, *EDA's Pooling and Sharing*, 24 November 2011, www.eda.europa.eu.

[12] European Commission, Communication from the Commission, *Europe 2020. A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth*, Brussels, 3.03.2010 COM (2010) 2020 nal, p. 10, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:2020:FIN:EN:PDF>.

[13] Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP of 12 July 2004 on the establishment of the European Defence Agency, in Official Journal of the European Union, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004E0551:EN:NOT>.

[14] Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on pooling and sharing of military capabilities, 3157th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 22nd and 23rd March 2012, p. 2, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/esdp/129162.pdf.

[15] EU Commissioner Máire Geoghegan-Quinn, responsible for research, innovation, and science, in *An Innovation Union. Paving the Way for Jobs and Growth in the EU*, in *Foreign Policy*, EU Focus, nr. 195, September/October 2012, p. 17.

[16] Bogzeanu, Cristina The concept of “national interest” in the European context, in *Strategic Impact*, no. 4[41]/2011, pp. 54-58.

[17] Hillary CLINTON, America's Pacific Century, in *Foreign Policy Romania*, no. 25, November/December 2011, pp. 26-33.

[18] The NATO Procurement Organization (NPO), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_89040.htm.

[19] These agencies are the following: NATO Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency (NETMA), NATO Helicopter Management Agency (NAHEMA), NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance Management Agency (NAGSMA), NATO Medium Extended Air Defense System Management Agency (NAMEADSMA) și NATO Airborne Early Warning Programme Management Agency (NAPMA).

[20] Norway supports Smart Defence through Building Integrity, 3 February 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_84137.htm.

[21] *NATO leaders to consider Smart Defence in Chicago*, Strategic Comments, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 19th May 2012, <http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-18-2012/may/nato-leaders-to-consider-smart-defence-in-chicago/>.

[22] “*Smart Defence Smart TADIC*”, *Conference to address Trans-Atlantic Defence Technological and Industrial Cooperation (TADIC)*, *Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD)*, *Conference Report*, p. 15, 14 October 2011, Brussels.

[23] *Ibidem*, p. 21.

[24] Jakob HENIUS, Jacopo Leone McDonald (2012) *Smart Defence: A Critical Appraisal*, NATO Defence College, Editura Deltamedia Group, Rome, March 2012, pp. 26-47.

[25] According to data provided by Stockholm International Peace Institute (SIPRI), *Background Paper on SIPRI military expenditure data*, 2011, p. 5, <http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex>.

[26] Teodor FRUNZETI, Complementarity visions of NATO and EU security in Political Science, International Relations and Security Studies. International Scientific Session, Volume I (eds. Christmas and Nicoleta Iulia Munteanu), "Lucian Blaga" University, University of Sibiu, Sibiu, 2010, pp. 9-21.

[27] NATO/EU collaboration on development of military capabilities, 12 December 2011, <http://www.act.nato.int/news-stories/natoeu-collaboration-on-development-of-military-capabilities>.

[28] Alexandra Sarcinschi, Cristina Bogzeanu, *Europe: borders, citizenship, security*, „Carol I”, National Defense University Press, Bucharest, 2009, pp. 32-39.

[29] FRUNZETI, Teodor; ZODIAN, Vladimir, World 2011. *Political and Military Encyclopedia. Military and Strategic Studies*, Editorial Army Technical Center Press, Bucharest.

CONTENTS

THE CONCEPT OF “SMART DEFENSE”
IN THE CONTEXT OF
AN EFFICIENT DEFENSE PLANNING..... 3

TEODOR FRUNZETI

APPLYING SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
TO INTERAGENCY COORDINATION
IN SUPPORT OF COMBATANT COMMANDS..... 23

Warren H. BONG, Paul BEERY, Eugene P. PAULO

THE REALITY OF OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
IN MILITARY OPERATIONS..... 41

MILAN PODHOREC

TRENDS IN SLOVAK REPUBLIC’S
MILITARY SPENDING..... 51

MILOTA KUSTROVÁ

DEFENSE PROGRAMS
RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK..... 57

Constantin PREDA

ORIENTATION:
KEY TO THE OODA LOOP – THE CULTURE FACTOR..... 67

Dr. Donald A. MACCUISH

KENYA’S CONSTITUTION
AND CHILD TRAFFICKING AS A SECURITY THREAT..... 75

E.O.S. ODHIAMBO, J. KASSILLY, L.T. MAITO,

K. ONKWARE, W. A .OBOKA

ROMANIA’S PARTICIPATION
TO THE AEGIS BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM
AS REFLECTED BY ROMANIAN NEWSPAPERS’
EVALUATIVE DISCOURSE..... 89

Raluca Mihaela LEVONIAN

NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE CONFERENCE,
SIBIU, 2012:
A MAJOR EVENT IN THE LIFE OF THE ALLIANCE..... 101

Marin ILIE

Gheorghe ION

THE ECONOMIC SITUATION
IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE:
A POSSIBLE THREAT TO THE SECURITY SYSTEMS..... 105

Oana-Andreea PIRNUTA

Dragos Nicolae SECAREA

CURRENT TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVES
ON SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE..... 113

Florin-Eduard GROSARU

INTERNATIONAL STABILITY AND SECURITY
IN CONDITIONS OF POWER ASYMMETRY:
PRESENT STATE OF PLAY AND FUTURE TRENDS.....121

Ionel STOICA

DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS IN MILITARY ACTIONS:
NECESSITY, POSSIBILITIES AND CONSTRAINTS..... . 131

Elena SUSNEA

CLOUD COMPUTING SECURITY ISSUES..... 141

Florin OGIGAU-NEAMTIU

INTUITION AS A BASIS FOR LEADERSHIP:
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND STATISTICAL
MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENTS..... 149

Daniela BELU

BOOK REVIEW..... 155

THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK
OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Thomas C. BRUNEAU (ed.)
Florina Cristiana MATEI (ed.)

BOOK REVIEW..... 159

PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES
IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT

OKOTH, P. G.(ed.)

BOOK REVIEW..... 163

SINERGIA INSTRUMENTELOR
DE MANAGEMENT

Georgel RUSU

APPLYING SYSTEMS ENGINEERING TO INTERAGENCY COORDINATION IN SUPPORT OF COMBATANT COMMANDS

Warren H. BONG, Paul BEERY, Eugene P. PAULO

Department of Systems Engineering
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93940

This research addresses interagency coordination from an architectural perspective utilizing a systems engineering process. Interagency coordination is not fully understood and has proven difficult for various U.S. government agencies to replicate. Two examples of successful interagency coordination are used in this analysis: the Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South) and Special Operations Forces (SOF) high-value target teams. These organizations are decomposed into their top-level functions and organized by their major physical components. These results are applied in the creation of a notional top-level functional and physical architecture for the U.S. European Command's new Joint Interagency Counter-Trafficking Center (JICTC).

Key words: *interagency coordination, systems architecture, counter-trafficking*

1. INTRODUCTION

Established by the National Security Act of 1947 and Title 10 of the United States Code, Combatant Commands (COCOM) provide command and control of U.S. Armed Forces in different regions around the world (Executive Order of the President, 2008, p. 1). They are responsible for “*utilizing and integrating air, land, sea, and amphibious forces under their commands to achieve U.S. national security objectives while protecting national interests*” [1]. As the primary executors of military policy abroad, COCOMs therefore play an

important role in foreign policy. This requires them to interact with other Executive Branch agencies whose responsibilities intersect with those of the military [2]. This coordination between the different agencies has proven to be challenging.

In an attempt to address these needed improvements in interagency coordination, in 2010, U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) created the Joint Interagency Counter-Trafficking Center (JICTC). JICTC's mission is to support the synchronization of interagency efforts to counter illicit trafficking in four main mission areas: narcotics, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and human

traf cking. The desired end state is to disrupt these traf cking networks and make the USEUCOM area of responsibility (AOR) inhospitable to them [3].

This research develops a generalized functional and physical architecture for the JICTC using a Systems Engineering approach. These architectures are developed in order to provide a template for the replication of successful interagency coordination for the JICTC based upon the successful interagency efforts of Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South) and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) high-value target teams. In order to more clearly understand the JIATF and SOF organizations, this research

also develops notional functional and physical architectures for JIATF and SOF high-value target teams, as well as applying Systems Engineering methods to better understand their operational perspective and system boundaries through the development of external systems diagrams.

Tracing its beginnings back to the 1980s, JIATF-South has become the standard to which all other interagency organizations are compared [4]. This integrated team is composed of members from the U.S. armed services, federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and partner nations. During the surge of American forces in Iraq in 2007, SOF utilized interagency teams to better identify, track, and

MAJOR CONFLICTS WORLDWIDE: SOLDIERS IN ACTION: 530,000 ONE PARTNER FOR SECURITY SO

SECURITY OF DEPLOYED FORCES. Wherever in the world, situations arise in which interventions inevitably have to be made and force has to be applied, all while trying to avoid collateral damage. Thousands of soldiers depend on the quality of their training and the reliability of their equipment. We are proud that partners around the globe have selected us for our outstanding capabilities to protect armed forces in these conflict zones. www.cassidian.com

DEFENDING WORLD SECURITY

defeat the insurgency. These high-value target teams were composed of military members and civilian personnel from a wide variety of government agencies as well as contracting companies.

The Systems Engineering Process used in this article follows the method outlined by Dennis Buede in *The Engineering Design of Systems: Models and Methods (2nd ed.)*(2009). The general outline of the Buede process is to develop an operational concept, define system architectures, and integrate the architectures together [5].

An operational concept is “a vision for what the system is, a statement of mission requirements, and a description of how the system

will be used” [6]. By describing how the system will be used, the operational concept begins to outline the system’s context and interactions with other external systems.

The functional architecture is a hierarchical model of the functions performed by a system. This is accomplished by a decomposition of the top-level functions of the system. This decomposition is used to identify components and the flow of inputs and outputs that can satisfy the system requirements.

The various components identified in the functional architecture are further defined in the physical architecture. Here, all of the resources for every function are identified. However, the descriptions

28

LUTIONS


CASSIDIAN

AN EADS COMPANY

are given in generic terms without any specifications or performance characteristics.

The results of the three previous processes all come together in the allocated architecture. The allocated architecture is the integration of the requirements decomposition with the functional and physical architectures. This research does not include the development of an allocated architecture.

2. BACKGROUND

The need for improved understanding of interagency coordination is apparent in today's world. No single government organization has the resources, ability, or the authority to adequately address every mission area. The mechanisms for utilizing the respective agencies with appropriate mission and area expertise is the backbone of interagency coordination and it needs to be better understood.

2.1. Interagency Handbook

The objective of a recent publication was to provide a resource for wide dissemination that would improve communication and information sharing shortcomings in interagency training [7]. This handbook is designed to provide an introduction to interagency coordination as well as best practices to implement it successfully on the operational level. These best practices were identified through the combination of an online survey, interviews, site visits, and literature

reviews. These best practices include getting the right people on the team, providing adequate resources, and breaking down barriers to information sharing.

2.2. Joint Interagency Task Force-South

An objective of a recently published case study was to examine how JIATF-South functions. The case study identified performance variables while evaluating the success of JIATF-South [8]. The analysis of these variables helped to identify several key characteristics that were essential to successful interagency coordination at JIATF-South. The following highlights four of these variables from the case study:

1. Purpose

JIATF-South is focused on illicit trafficking in the Western Hemisphere. Most of the interagency and partner nation illicit trafficking information is focused on one aspect of combating illegal trafficking – narcotics, specifically cocaine.

2. Empowerment

JIATF-South is given the authority and resources that it needs to accomplish its mission. By deriving authority from both the Congressional and Executive Branch, JIATF-South not only has the money but also the physical assets (planes, ships, etc.) to produce positive results. Additionally, the different organizational liaisons within JIATF-South are empowered to make decisions that commit the resources of their parent organization.

3. Support

JIATF-South receives support from a number of military and federal institutions, including Combatant Commands, U.S. Coast Guard, Drug Enforcement Agency, Customs and Border Protection, and others. Most notably, JIATF-South does not take credit for any drug seizures. Instead, it gives the credit to partner organizations, knowing that in turn, they will continue to support JIATF-South.

4. Structure

JIATF-South is organized into different departments based on similar tasks performed (intelligence, operations, logistics, etc.). The adverse impact of frequent turnover of agency and military personnel is moderated/mitigated by a force of long-term civilians.

2.3. High-Value Target Teams

National Defense University recently published a case study on the use of interagency teams by Special Operations Forces (SOF) in Iraq [9]. The objective was to provide unique insight to interagency coordination in a combat setting, focusing on these three variables:

1. Network-based targeting

Terrorists, insurgent cells, and their close supporters were analyzed and tracked in order to attack them with precision to minimize collateral damage.

2. Fusion of intelligence and operations

By collocating intelligence and operations groups together, any break

between information analysis and action was eliminated. This resulted in better decision making and quicker prosecution of high-value targets.

3. Counterinsurgency integration

The intelligence-fusion cells and high-value target teams located themselves in closer proximity to the enemy network. This reduced the cycle time in which new information was analyzed to identify new targets.

3. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

Before any system can be decomposed into its top-level functions, the mission requirements and purpose of the system must first be understood. This is done by creating an operational concept of the system. This operational concept is the framework of how the system interacts with other external systems in the form of inputs and outputs.

3.1. JIATF-South

JIATF-South serves as the hub for intelligence fusion and coordination of interagency organizations and partner nations. As a result, the other organizations participating in the interagency process are defined as partners, not subordinate agencies under the command of JIATF-South.

Interactions between the proposed system and external systems are represented by need lines as shown in the External Systems Diagram in **Figure 1**.

Each line describes an input to or output from the system. The process




Figure 1: JIATF-South System Interaction

by which input are transformed into outputs facilitates the desired outcomes of the system. *U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)*: JIATF-South is a national task force assigned to Commander, USSOUTHCOM. Its funding, as well as training support and facilities, comes from DoD through USSOUTHCOM.

U.S. Armed Services: The armed services provide the major hardware needed to support JIATF-South and its partner organizations. Since the military is restricted from directly participating in law enforcement activities, they assist in a supporting role under the tactical control of JIATF-South.

Federal Law Enforcement Agencies: Federal law enforcement agencies have the authority and mandates to find, arrest, and prosecute drug smugglers. JIATF-

South is the lead in facilitating open collaboration and coordination between all the individual agencies and for all detection and monitoring operations.

Intelligence Agencies: Intelligence gathered for JIATF-South comes from U.S. and partner nation law enforcement, other federal intelligence agencies, or the intelligence branches of the respective U.S. and partner nation military branches.

Partner Nations: Partner nations provide ships and aircraft to be employed under the direct tactical control of JIATF-South. They provide law enforcement intelligence to U.S. law enforcement agencies, which directly supports JIATF-South's detection and monitoring efforts. They also provide access to sovereign territory.

3.2. SOF High-Value Targets

The SOF high-value target teams demonstrated success in Iraq using organizations and tactics capable of conducting classic counterinsurgency warfare. These teams used interagency innovations such as network-based targeting and the fusion of intelligence with operational capability.

Interactions between the proposed system, which includes the SOF high-value target teams, and external systems are represented by need lines as shown in the External Systems Diagram seen in Figure 2. Each line describes an input to or output from the system. The process by which inputs are transformed into outputs facilitates the desired outcomes of the system.




Figure 2: SOF High Value Target Team System Interaction

U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM): The funding and personnel management for the SOF high-value target teams is provided by USSOCOM. They ensure that the teams have all the resources needed to accomplish their missions. Additionally, by reporting to a separate chain of command, the SOF teams bypass traditional communication channels, ensuring

that operations are not hindered by bureaucratic delays.

Conventional Military Forces: The military services, specifically the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps, provide additional manpower and security to the SOF high-value teams. These forces are close by should the need for reinforcements arise. Additionally, once the area is cleared by SOF teams, the conventional

forces remain behind to provide security to the local population and continue the nation building process.

Intelligence Agencies: Intelligence gathered for the SOF high-value target teams primarily comes from either federal intelligence agencies or the intelligence branches of the respective military branches and federal law enforcement agencies.

4. FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE

In its most basic definition, a function is a process that takes an input and transforms it into an output. It is from the functional architecture that one can view the flow of inputs and outputs throughout the system. Functional decomposition, also known as top-down structuring, starts with the top-level system functions and partitions them into several sub functions [10].

The application of functional decompositions to JIATF-South and the SOF high-value target teams allows for the identification of key functions that are important in regards to successfully executing interagency coordination. Based on the mission and requirements of the JICTC, the relevant functions from JIATF-South and SOF high-value target teams are modified and used to create the functional architecture of the JICTC.

4.1. JIATF-South

The proposed top-level function of JIATF-South is to “*Conduct Counter Illicit Trafficking Interagency/Partner*

Nation Coordination In Support of Law Enforcement”. This encompasses its entire mission, beginning with receiving actionable law enforcement information, compiling a case using interagency resources, deciding to commit interagency resources, and engaging in detection and monitoring operations. This top-level function is decomposed into six lower functions. Each of these proposed sub functions follow a progressive flow of inputs and outputs.

4.1.1. Understand Mission/Purpose

By sharply defining and understanding their mission, JIATF-South and its partners can concentrate all of their efforts and resources to accomplishing it. The lack of ambiguity in what the organization has been tasked to do gives it direction. The sub-functions are described below.

Define and Scope the Mission: The definition and scope of the mission needs to be clear. The focus of JIATF-South activities should not take neither a too narrow nor too broad of a look. There is always a limited amount of resources provided by partners that must be used effectively.

Conceptualize the Desired End State: JIATF-South's desired end state should be defined and known to all partners in order that all activities will be conducted in support of achieving it.

4.1.2. Conduct Intel Cycle

Intelligence drives operations at JIATF-South. Raw intelligence is gathered from a wide variety of sources, especially law enforcement human intelligence where it is processed and analyzed at JIATF-South in order to determine if there is enough information to attempt an intercept. This function is further described below.

Process Intelligence: The translation, evaluation, and collation of raw intelligence materials is necessary prior to any detailed analysis.

Analyze Intelligence: Analysis establishes the significance and implications of processed intelligence, integrates it with previous information, and interprets the significance of any newly developed knowledge.

Disseminate Intelligence: The finished intelligence product is distributed to decision maker and relevant response forces for them to determine the next course of action or to take action.

Exploit Intelligence: New intelligence leads relevant to the mission that are discovered during the course of analysis are noted for future intelligence gathering operations.

4.1.3. Share Resources

JIATF-South never receives all of the resources that it requests from its partners each year. As a result, it has to find a way to make its limited

resources work efficiently and effectively. The sub-functions are below:

Create Plans for Resource Allocation: Resources need to be utilized both efficiently and effectively based on efficient planning.

Prioritize the Different Needs for Resources: The allocation of more limited resources will be done on a priority basis. Certain missions will need to be designated as a higher priority than others.

Coordinate Resource Allocation: The movement of resources will need to be coordinated with the respective parent agency/partner nation.

4.1.4. Promote Collaboration

Partners are attracted to JIATF-South as they know that they can accomplish more by working with JIATF-South than they can by working independently. The sub-functions are:

Promote Networking of Information: JIATF-South establishes lines of communication so that information can be shared efficiently and effectively with all partners.

Nurture Long Term Relationships: The majority of the collaborative relationships between JIATF-South and its partners are built upon trust. Attributes such as transparency, respect, and politeness are all conducive of trust.

Fuse Intelligence with Operations: By having actionable intelligence drive operations, the JIATF-South Intelligence and

Operations Directorates will need to be able to communicate with each other rapidly.

4.1.5. Make Effective Decisions

Decision making at JIATF-South is done by consensus among partner agencies and nations. The resultant clash of diverse backgrounds and viewpoints is encouraged. The thorough debate and reconciliation of dissenting views is time consuming but ultimately improves the entire decision making process. The sub-functions are listed below.

Receive/Generate Operational Plans: The JIATF-South command team will receive day-to-day and sometimes minute-to-minute operational plans that were prepared jointly by the Intelligence and Operations Directorates. New plans will be generated as necessary.

Empower Organizational Officers: Liaison officers from partner agencies should/must be empowered by their parent organization to make decisions that commit their agencies to action.

Encourage Diverse Viewpoints: The diverse viewpoints at JIATF-South should promote and resolve “*productive conflict*” that improves the overall decision making process.

Achieve Consensus for Decision: Decisions should be made by consensus with all dissenting views being heard, openly considered, and resolved.

4.1.6. Improve Organization

Constant self-assessment of JIATF-South is important as it must be able to adapt and improve its operations quickly in order to continue to be effective in its mission. The sub-functions and their descriptions are listed below.

Review and Accept Feedback: JIATF-South must continually seek, and review, feedback on how it conducts its intelligence and operations missions, and develop subsequent improvements.

Implement Improvements to Organization: Improvements that have been developed need to be implemented in a timely manner.

4.2. SOF High-Value Target Teams

The proposed top-level function of SOF High-Value Target Teams is to “*Conduct Counter Insurgency Interagency Coordination and Operations*”. This function encompasses the entire mechanism utilized by the high-value target teams to identify, track, and defeat terrorists and insurgent networks. This top-level function can be decomposed into four sub functions. Each of these proposed sub functions follows a progressive flow of inputs and outputs.

4.2.1. Understand Common Purpose

The sharply defined purpose held by high-value target teams gave them a unified direction and

prevented individual organizations from straying and concentrating on its own goals and missions. The sub-functions are summarized below.

Communicate Desired End State: The knowledge of the desired end state needs to be known by everyone involved in the high-value target teams.

Commit to Achieve Desired End State: All members of the high-value target teams need to recognize their place in achieving the desired end state and ensure that all of their actions are in line with supporting it.

4.2.2. Conduct Network-Based Targeting

Intelligence was the key to the specific targeting of terrorist and insurgent cells. SOF high-value target teams relied on intelligence to provide situational awareness of the local environment, social networks, key decision makers, and their motivations. From this, they could determine where and when it was best to conduct operations against a target for maximum effectiveness. This process is detailed below.

Find and Fix Target for Intelligence Collection: High-value target teams need a starting point for intelligence collection. The start point can be deliberate or opportunity based, and can focus on a known personality, a facility, an organization, or some other type of signature.

Conduct Operations Against Target: High-value target teams shall

conduct successful operations against enemy targets.

Exploit Captured Intelligence from Operations: The process of examining, analyzing, interrogating, and processing captured enemy personnel, equipment, and material for intelligence purposes

Analyze Newly Gathered Intelligence: Information gained from exploitation is turned into intelligence which can be used to drive new operations.

Disseminate New Intelligence: Any intelligence information collected from operations is disseminated widely throughout the intelligence enterprise to help eliminate intelligence stovepipes.

4.2.3. Fuse Intelligence with Operational Capability

By bridging the gap between intelligence and operational capability, high-value target teams were able to place targets under constant surveillance. This persistent coverage of a target resulted in improved discrimination and lessened the chance of the target escaping.

Share Resources: Each partner brings unique skills and resources to the organization that need to be used efficiently and effectively.

Promote Collaboration: High-value target teams need to advocate the need for partners to coordinate and collaborate with each other. No one agency has all of the resources or information to accomplish the mission.

Make Informed Decisions: High-value target teams need to make informed decisions based on collaboration of intelligence analysts and SOF operators.

4.2.4. Improve Organization

As high-value target teams gained valuable experience, it was important that they took the lessons learned and applied them right away. This understanding contributed to their continuous improvement. The derived sub-functions are below.

Accept Organizational Feedback: High-value target teams must continually seek feedback on how it conducts intelligence and operations missions.

Review Feedback: High-value target teams will analyze and review feedback (lessons learned) in order to develop improvements that address any identified shortcomings or inefficiencies.

Implement Feedback: Improvements that have been developed need to be implemented in a timely manner.

4.3. JICTC

An objective of this research is to establish both JIATF-South and the SOF high-value target teams as examples of organizations that successfully implemented interagency coordination, and subsequently develop functional and physical architectures based on those organizations. These architectures are

then used to develop architectures for USEUCOM's JICTC. However, there are several unique characteristics of JICTC that differentiate its organizational structure and mission tasking from both JIATF-South and the SOF high-value target teams.

As outlined in its design concept, the JICTC's mission is to "*support U.S. interagency efforts to counter illicit trafficking and terrorism and assist focus nations in building self-sufficient counter trafficking skills, competencies, and capacity*" [11]. The primary goal of the JICTC is to promote and support the following three objectives:

1. *Increase disruption of trafficking networks internally and regionally.* Currently, the U.S. supports programs to enhance border security, provide support to foreign law enforcement, and protect the integrity of partner nations. These programs are administered by a multitude of federal agencies which provides the possibility for duplication and redundancy of efforts. The JICTC intends to assist in the coordination and synchronization of these international capacity building efforts.

2. *Identify, and discuss with partners, new interagency and international capacity building efforts.* Acting as a central node, the JICTC will ensure that there is appropriate interagency and international coordination for different projects and counter-trafficking efforts.

3. *Increase information sharing, both internally and regionally, to*

counter trafficking and to insure cross-border management. The JICTC will seek to establish a regional standard for information sharing with USEUCOM components and international partners.

Based on this design concept, the proposed top-level function of the JICTC is “*Conduct Interagency Coordination In Support of Efforts to Counter Illicit Trafficking*”. This function highlights the JICTC’s mission of complementing existing international programs and assisting the international community to build self-sufficient national capabilities to counter illicit trafficking. The previous functional decompositions of JIATF-South and SOF High-Value Target teams are used to develop specific sub functions that are still applicable to the JICTC’s mission. The second level functions are listed below.

4.3.1. Understand Mission/ Objectives

This function is very similar to the ones found in the JIATF-South and SOF high-value target team decomposition. All the partners involved in the JICTC need to completely comprehend its purpose and mission in order to participate efficiently and effectively in the organization. This is further described below.

Define the Mission: The mission of JICTC needs to be clearly defined. Any ambiguity in what it is designed to do will not help it and

its partners achieve their respective organizational goals.

Conceptualize Desired End State: JICTC's desired end state should be defined and known to all partners in order that all activities will be conducted in support of achieving it.

4.3.2. Promote Collaboration

Like JIATF-South and SOF high-value target teams, the JICTC needs to encourage and promote collaboration between its partners. Without collaboration, it cannot accomplish its organizational objective. The sub-functions can be found below.

Build Long Term Relationships with Partners: The JICTC concept must be socialized among the interagency and international participants who may contribute to the success of the organization.

Assess Current Nation Building Efforts: JICTC will develop a baseline to determine the need for existing and/or planned counter trafficking support efforts.

Synchronize Current and Future Nation Building Efforts: JICTC will assist in coordinating and synchronizing interagency and international capacity building efforts to maximize the effects of the overall resource pool.

4.3.3. Maintain Common Operational Picture

In order to be cognizant of all nation building activities occurring in the USEUCOM AOR, the JICTC

will need to maintain a common operational picture (COP). The process of maintaining the COP is similar to the intelligence gathering functions found in JIATF-South and SOF high-value target teams in the sense that information needs to be gathered, processed, and distributed. The required sub-functions are described below.

Promote Networking of Information: JICTC will establish lines of communication so that information can be shared efficiently and effectively with all partners.

Receive and Process Partner Information: Raw information will be collected, collated, and translated from partners. New information will be processed for significance, integrated with previous information, and interpreted to determine the significance of any newly developed knowledge. Once completed, a final information product is created.

Disseminate Partner Information: The finished information product is distributed to decision makers and relevant parties for them to determine the next course of action.

4.3.4. Improve Organization

Like JIATF-South and SOF high-value target teams, the JICTC must have some sort of capability and organizational flexibility to allow for process improvement. The sub-functions listed below are similar to those of JIATF-South and SOF high-value target teams.

Accept Organizational Feedback: JICTC must continually seek feedback

on how it conducts intelligence and operations missions.

Review Feedback: JICTC will analyze and review feedback (lessons learned) in order to develop improvements that address any identified shortcomings or inefficiencies

Implement Feedback: Improvements that have been developed need to be implemented in a timely manner.

5. PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE

The physical architecture is “a hierarchical description of the resources that comprise the system” [12]. It provides resources for every function identified in the functional architecture. Resources include the people, equipment, tools, tactics, techniques, policies, and procedures needed for the system to function.

By analyzing how JIATF-South and SOF high-value target teams are actually physically organized and resourced, significant components necessary for successful interagency coordination can be identified. The relevant components can then be organized to form a physical architecture of the JICTC based on its mission and requirements.

5.1. JIATF-South

JIATF-South is organized into seven different directorates under the direction of a command group [13]. Each directorate, described below, fulfills a specific role in the

organization and some provide unique assets to help JIATF-South accomplish its mission.

The J1/J8 directorate is responsible for oversight of manpower, personnel, resources, and administration functions for all personnel stationed at JIATF-South.

The J2 directorate supports JIATF-South with reliable and timely intelligence information. It provides appropriate prioritization, indications, and warnings for decision makers based on intelligence information.

The J3 directorate oversees the day-to-day operations by providing direction, control, and tasking of maritime and air assets that are under the tactical control of JIATF-South or partner agencies.

The J4 directorate facilitates movement of mission critical components to JIATF-South assets. It uses all available logistics resources to maintain high levels operational readiness and effectiveness.

The J5 directorate develops policy, strategy, and long term plans with interagency and international partners for the purpose of building additional resources and capabilities.

The J6 directorate provides and maintains the critical communications paths with partner agencies and nations. These paths enable both planning and operations to be conducted from JIATF-South.

Within the directorates, there are physical sub-elements which contribute greatly to the success of the organization. Two of these are listed below.

Tactical Analysis Teams: Under the direction of the J2, Tactical Analysis Teams (TATs) are JIATF-South liaison officers embedded with Embassy Country Teams in South America. These teams are permanently located inside American Embassies or Consulates and work side-by-side supporting the in-country law enforcement agency attachés. In total, approximately 10 percent of the JIATF-South staff is actually overseas serving in one of twenty TATs [14]. They are able to gain unique insights about the cultural and political aspects of the host nation.

Communications Infrastructures: The J6 at JIATF-South manages the vast array of communications networks including the Cooperating Nations Information Exchange System (CNIES). CNIES is composed of three major components:

1. Partner Nation Network – An information portal that allows partner nations to immediately publish and share information via machine based simultaneous translations and a common repository [15].

2. Command and Control Personal Computer – An unclassified COP where surface and air tracks of interest are filtered and transmitted to partner nations, thus providing them with better situational awareness [16].

3. SPARK Chat – A chat program with built in real time Spanish-English translation protocols which allows JIATF-South and partner nations to communicate in a chat environment [17].

5.2. SOF High-Value Target Teams

SOF high-value target teams were organized into two main entities: the SOF operators and the Intelligence Fusion Cell [19]. The typical U.S. Army Special Forces team consists of twelve men: a leader, a second in command, and two men for each of the five specialty areas (weapons, engineering, medical, communications, and operations/intelligence). Other SOF units include U.S. Air Force Combat Controllers and U.S. Army Rangers.

The Intelligence Fusion Cells were responsible for the fusion of all-source intelligence with operations. Unlike conventional military forces, who keep intelligence and operations planning separate, SOF high-value target teams integrated analysts with operators to ensure that there was a seamless transition between tracking and acting on a target. Additionally, Tactical Human Intelligence Teams accompanied SOF operators on missions to assist in gathering raw intelligence and interrogating suspects. Any new information could then be quickly processed into actionable information to be acted upon immediately.

5.3. JICTC

JICTC should be organized by the J-Code structure similar to that of JIATF-South. By having the directorates named according to standard U.S. military convention,

JICTC is able to quickly integrate itself with USEUCOM and other partner organizations. However, in order to be a true interagency organization, the command structure of the JICTC should not be all military personnel. Representatives from partner agencies should be integrated in various positions up and down the chain of command. **Figure 3** illustrates a notional organizational structure of the JICTC as proposed by the author.

The JICTC should make full use of the JIATF-South TAT concept. The concept behind TATs can also be found in the SOF high-value target teams. The Tactical Human Intelligence Teams worked side-by-side with the operators on missions to gather and process intelligence in the field. These two examples illustrate how important it is to have analysts “out on the front lines” working with partner agencies.




Figure 3: JICTC Physical Architecture

By embedding its own personnel in embassy teams, the JICTC will have open and unlimited access to partner information. This concept is a much less obtrusive solution to

gathering information than to have each partner report their activities to the JICTC. These embedded teams place the burden of information gathering and reporting on the JICTC instead of on the partners.

With so many different countries and languages used in the AOR, the JICTC will need to establish common communications networks and protocols. Networking systems such as CNIES are useful tools that can increase collaboration and productivity.

6. CONCLUSIONS

The notional architectures of JICTC and JIATF-South are understandably similar, as both organizations were created to coordinate various government agencies in countering illicit trafficking. However, JIATF-South is centered around using interagency and partner nation coordination to strengthen its “detection and monitoring” mission in support of law enforcement, while JICTC utilizes interagency coordination to identify capability gaps and synchronize nation building efforts.

An important takeaway from the analysis of JIATF-South and SOF high-value target teams was their common use of embedded intelligence analysts. The TATs from JIATF-South and Tactical Human Intelligence Teams on the SOF high-value target teams provided an organic intelligence processing capability “out on the front lines”.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, this research only addresses the top level functions and physical components

of interagency coordination. Further work can be conducted regarding the use of actual trade studies and analyses needed to create a allocated architecture. Additionally, as the JICTC has already gained operational capability, opportunities exist to examine how it is currently organized as compared to the notional architecture outlined in this thesis. Opportunities also exist to examine other interagency organizations using a similar Systems Engineering methodology.

REFERENCES

[1] Watson, C.A. (2011). *Combatant commands: Origins, structure, and engagement*. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, p. 15.

[2] Feickert, A. (2011). *The unified command plan and combatant commands: Background and issues for congress*. (Congressional Research Service R42077). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, p.7.

[3] United States European Command. (2010). *Joint interagency counter trafficking center (JICTC) design concept*. Stuttgart, Germany: United States European Command, p.1.

[4] Munsing, E., & Lamb, C. (2011a). *Strategic perspectives #5: Joint interagency task force-south: The best known, least understood interagency success*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense UP, pP. 1-3.

[5] Buede, D.M. (2009). *The engineering design of systems: Models and methods*. (2nd ed.). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, p. 51.

[6] Buede, D.M., p.56.

[7] Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. (2009). *Interagency*

teaming to counter irregular threats handbook. Laurel, MD: Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, pp.1-5.

[8] Munsing, E., & Lamb, C. (2011a), pp. 34-69.

[9] Munsing, E., & Lamb, C. (2011b). Strategic perspectives #4: Secret weapon: High-value target teams as an organizational innovation. Washington, D.C.: National Defense UP, pp. 33-34.

[10] Buede, D.M., page 218.

[11] United States European (2010), p. 1.

[12] Buede, D.M., p. 239.

[13] McKee, A. (2012, March 28). Interview by W.H. Bong [Personal Interview]., Key West, FL.

[14] McKee, A. (2012, March 28).

[15] McKee, A. (2012, March 28).

[16] Cheng, J. (2012, March 29). Interview by W.H. Bong [Personal Interview]., Key West, FL.

[17] Cheng, J. (2012, March 29).

[18] Munsing, E., & Lamb, C. (2011a), p. 19.

THE REALITY OF OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN MILITARY OPERATIONS

Milan PODHOREC

University of Defence, Brno, Czech Republic

The strategic and operational environment affecting national security is complex, multifaceted and variable. Even in the long term, it will be characterized by high dynamics of changes, the growing diversity of players and increasingly complex interdependence of security trends and factors. Threats, risks and their sources are often difficult to localize and nowadays have mostly non-state and transnational character. Many of the specific threats and their impacts are difficult to predict. It all adds up to a further blurring of distinctions between internal and external national security. The operating environment consists of a set of factors arising from the nature of an area where the operation is carried out or will be. Operating environment is also formed by the character of a potential enemy, possibilities of effecting technological and informational areas and further by terrain, climatic conditions and level of own forces and coalition forces.

Key words: *operational, security environment, operations, organization*

MOTTO:

The basic human weakness lies in that the human being does not predict the storm when the weather is nice.

Niccolo Machiavelli

1. INTRODUCTION

The strategic and operational environment affecting the security of the Czech Republic is complex, multi-faceted and volatile. Even in the long term it will be characterized by a high dynamics of change given the growing diversity of players and the increasingly complex interdependence of security trends and factors. Needless to remind that, all of the above, emerge from a global security environment continuously undergoing dynamic changes. Nevertheless, it is possible to determine some of the latter's

relatively constant determinants and primarily trace down trends which most likely will determine its character even in the following period. Threats, their sources and propagators are both of a state and, increasingly, non-state and supranational character and that makes their impacts hard to predict. Internal and external security threats mingle and a blurring occurs between them. The stated characteristics have a fundamental impact on the available means needed to ensure defense and security. As a result, a complex approach which combines military and civil instruments, including diplomatic and economic resources,

to threats' prevention and moderation of their negative influences is on the growth [2].

2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

We can apprehend the security environment as an external area implementing national interests of states, where a collision of participants will occur. This area will be marked by a higher rate of ignorance, uncertainty and reduced availability of control. Rational security and offensive politics of the individual states must focus on analyzing, predicting the development of a possible security area and adjusting the instruments

to its influence in order for them to be as effective as possible in terms of their reaction to this environment. The instrument of individual states for maintaining and increasing their security are the armed forces, which are created for this purpose. The possibility of a threat to the territory of the Czech Republic is very low. The fundamental guarantee to this favorable situation is the membership of the Czech Republic in NATO and EU, and good relationships with neighboring countries. However, this situation contrasts with the increase in asymmetric security threats. These are linked with trends within the global environment, which strengthen the latter's potential and increase the possibility for threats from relatively

MAJOR CONFLICTS WORLDWIDE: SOLDIERS IN ACTION: 530,000 ONE PARTNER FOR SECURITY SO

SECURITY OF DEPLOYED FORCES. Wherever in the world, situations arise in which interventions inevitably have to be made and force has to be applied, all while trying to avoid collateral damage. Thousands of soldiers depend on the quality of their training and the reliability of their equipment. We are proud that partners around the globe have selected us for our outstanding capabilities to protect armed forces in these conflict zones. www.cassidian.com

DEFENDING WORLD SECURITY

remote areas characterized by local or regional conflicts and feeble truces to spread. A distinctive feature of the current environment is that even instability and conflicts outside the European borders can have a direct impact on our security [1].

The beginning of the 21st century can be characterized by an environment continuously demanding reaction to arising critical situations. The characteristics of the military forces deployed to solve critical situations nowadays, but also in the future, are as follows:

- **deployment of smaller units;**
- **a large diversity of missions and tasks similar to those of the enemy (including the unconventional type);**

- **the use of the latest technology to approach the opponent;**

- **most tasks will be undertaken by coalitions.**

All of the above demand to establish modularly structured units with the ability to form groupings of assignments including headquarters and its digitized means of automated command and control. The automated command and control systems are nowadays in the centre of action and attention of modern armies with the task to provide **knowledge of the situation**. The meaning of this effort is to provide perfect **knowledge of the situation on a battlefield** to ensure effective accomplishment of the task.



In this respect, the Network Enabled Capability (NEC) is not a goal. NEC is a means to achieve capabilities that allow the creation of a connection of sensors, command and control and weapon systems, where the information is exploited in a synchronized timely manner.

3. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

In the future, the operational environment will be characterized by two dimensions: the situation in the social environment, primarily *the opponent, local population and social-political and cultural structure, history and traditions, state of environment, infrastructure, technological factors, state of information area, and the natural environment, particularly terrain, climatic conditions and other factors* [3].

3.1. Opponent

The future possible opponent will be very diverse in terms of its form of organization, goals, level of technology, values upheld and so on. As a result, the opponent can be described as falling into one of the categories below:

- armed forces with a firm and well-known organizational structure acting in accordance with accepted doctrinal principles and rules and respecting international law regulations.

- partially militarized organizations and groups of a militia character, and civil defense associations usually relying only on light weapons and characterized by a low level of respect towards generally accepted law regulations.

- partisan (guerrilla) units acting against domestic government and their potential allies, that have little to no regard for general law enforcement and regulation.

- terrorist organizations acting both at national and supranational or global level aiming at generating a large number of victims and thus, benefiting from a psychological impact exceeding state borders and influencing public view not only in one country, but in the whole region or even in the whole world.

3.2. Local population, social, political and cultural structure

Given the increasing number of tasks and missions of the armed forces outside the European territory, awareness of local population, of its ethnic composition, economic and religious stratification and its relation to cultural, as well as life values and traditions becomes important. Moreover, understanding local customs, the roles of local religious as well as social authorities in society, and identifying ways to gain their support or at least achieving their restrained attitude in relation to deployed forces and to their determined operational tasks is vital.

3.3. History and traditions

Understanding the historical development in a country or a region of an anticipated armed forces deployment can be very significant for the success of an operation and for eschewing potential mistakes and errors that are very hard to repair post factum. Therefore, it is very important to understand a country's historical context and position in a region, its relationships with neighbors, its religion, the roles of national minorities and majorities, historical personalities, the role of religion in the private and social organization.

3.4. State of environment

The impact of the evolving global changes on climate and the continuing devastation of environment can lead in some areas of the world to catastrophic shortages of drinking water resources, food, or to inaccessibility of energetic sources. All of the above contribute to social disintegration and migration pressure in areas that are more developed from an economic point of view and with less ecological problems. Issues of environment, water, resources and energy, food, health, information connections, righteous bank, economic and homestead system in relation to social and political environment will even more distinctly influence the situation in the operational environment.

3.5. Infrastructure

Infrastructure in the area of deployment can cause complications both in terms of troops' deployability and mobility, and in terms of logistic provision due to its non-functionality or its inexistence. It will have significant impacts on attitudes of local population and vicariously on the matter of protection of armed forces to the extent that they can become a substitute problem and rationale of malcontent attacks and interest groups.

3.6. Technological factors

There will be an increase in the availability of developed military and commercial technologies exploitable in military areas. That will present new opportunities even for potential opponents. Knowledge from the area of information technologies, nanotechnologies and biotechnologies will be applied for military purposes. Science and technologies will allow further development of command and control systems (with a large increase in data flows at the lowest levels of command), allowing for the gathering, evaluation and transfer of information in real time. The development of sensors, satellite technologies and unattended automated systems will continue. There will be an increase in accuracy, range and targeted effectiveness of weapons and weapon systems.

3.7. The state of information resources

The increasing dependence of society on information technology is crucial to sustain the functionality of the state in all its domains, including the armed forces, which will be highly dependent on computerization and functioning within a network environment. Information in the operational environment will play the role of independent agents and gradually become the main element of any conflict. Information improves the ability to command in combat, and increases or reduces the possibility of combat. It will grant combat and non-combat operations a new dimension and can also affect current activities like thinking, planning, decision making and feedback.

An increasingly globally dependent world will require information timing, availability, dissemination and application. In regions with technically advanced home media competing to influence the opinions of local and international public the understanding of crisis or conflict, as well as the likelihood to gain the initiative will be effectively influenced. In this context, military forces must be capable to conduct operations under the supervision of the media and the public, all of which requiring greater transparency and openness.

3.8. Terrain and climatic conditions

Geographical distance, as well as the varied terrain and climatic conditions raise increasing demands on troop deployment, both in terms of people and material. The future outlook on operations needs to take into account any type of terrain, from plains and depressions to mountains, deserts, jungles, forests and relatively isolated islands in all climate zones [4].

The operating environment consists of a set of factors, conditions, circumstances and influences determining the characteristics of future military operations. These are part of the security environment and have an effect on the activities of any area of operation. Both environments are interrelated and, therefore, the evaluation of environmental safety must be part of the overall evaluation of the operational environment [4].

4. THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT AND ITS EFFECTS ON PLANNING

Planning as a process is launched by creating a full range of skills which deployable forces need. The whole military planning should be linked to other non-military and potentially multinational and non-governmental initiatives designed to stabilize and create a self-sustaining security environment. Military response must therefore be

incorporated into a broader overall framework or comprehensive approach. If we take into the account these and other safety factors, there is no fundamental difference in the planning and execution of any operation across the full spectrum of military capabilities within an armed forces alliance. Various defense establishments across the world have changed their planning approach from “*threat based planning*” to “*capability based planning*”.

Threat based planning is a process based on creating specific scenarios for which the Alliance must be prepared. In addition, particular states contribute forces and resources to plan “*the optimal forces for a defined range of threats*”.

Capability based planning aims at creating “*powerful, adaptable forces able to face a wide range of threats*”. As a process it starts by creating a full range of skills which deployable forces need and later moves on to verifying the accuracy of scenario planning.

Operational capabilities are understood as a means to achieve appropriate operating and organizational structure of units and adequate starting position to fulfill the combat mission and parallel tasks. Operational capabilities become the basis for determining the operational (combat) tasks and not only, because these tasks may occasionally affect the efficient use of available forces and resources and their abilities.

Future activities underlying the conduct of operations will have a complex character that, besides its three-fold dimensionality, will increasingly benefit from the information dimension as well. This increases the importance of the initiative of the lower commanders at the tactical level of command and control. The mass character of the armed forces and resources is being replaced by smaller units (forces) with increased mobility, increasing range and greater operational accuracy. Timely and accurate deployment of appropriate forces, their mobility and sustainability in the operation until the fulfillment of a mission, including their own protection is crucial. Moreover, within the context of an expanding role of stabilization and reconstruction efforts, there is also a dynamic change in the nature of the tasks fulfilled within the operational environment.

Operational space and ground battle field will be characterized by:

- varying density of forces and resources – the battle field will be non-linear, forces and resources will be more dispersed;
- air superiority will have a decisive influence on the conduct of a warfare;
- fighting in built-up areas, which has already become a real life scenario;
- increased level of force and resources protection – coupled with technical and technological progress;

- rapid sequence of events on the battle field – coupled with technological progress and usage of high-precision weapons will make demands on people while shortening the time for the decision-making process undergone by commanders at all levels;

- diversity of participating forces and resources - will place great demands on forces interoperability requiring them to use their own resources at a high price and to have their protection and security ensured;

- dispersion forces and resources – will place increased demands on troops' mobility, reliability, continuous communication, interoperability and time and space interaction in combat and on the battle field;

- precision attack – with high-precision weapons;

- information superiority – ability to collect, process and disseminate information in a continuous information flow horizontally and vertically for users with predestined access;

- integration and interoperability of forces and resources – consistency of information and communication system of allies, alignment and harmony while fulfilling common tasks.

The shaping of the operating environment is aimed at working to the Alliance's advantage and to the enemy's disadvantage. Successful

shaping of operations may also deter the enemy and thus prevent the development of the crisis. It includes locating such areas where the power of the Alliance can be used and information superiority achieved while the opponent's power is minimized. Deterrence of the opponent may be perceived as a threat, while the use of coordinated information operations (Info Ops) can seriously impair his understanding of the environment and limit his freedom of action. Current effect within the political context, legality, and authorization for the use of force should be conducted in order to build and maintain a support for troops' actions both at home and for any parties with a stake in the conduct of operations.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The transformation of the security environment also impacts the character of the armed forces since they have to adapt to a number of the changing tasks. Compared to the second half of the twentieth century, nowadays security cannot be only identified with the absence of military conflict. It actually becomes a much broader phenomenon involving civilian and non-military parties, and more often than not subject to perception. In the process of building modern armed forces, a greater emphasis is placed on interoperability, flexibility, professional performance and technological superiority.

When planning the leading of operations a number of different factors in uencing the achievement of partial objectives and desired goal is taken into account. It is a coordinated action against the enemy using all available resources in assumed conditions. The complexity and uncertainty of future tasks will still require a wider involvement of resources, and not only military ones, to achieve operational objectives. Therefore, a new comprehensive approach to tasks based on setting effects to be achieved (Effects-Based Approach to Operations – EBAO) by taking into account the context and consequences of a comprehensive management of operations is on way. EBAO is a thoughtful and

comprehensive use of various tools of the alliance (military, political, economic and civilian) in combination with practical cooperation with all stakeholders, who are non NATO members, to create an effect (effects, results, impacts) that is necessary to achieve planned objectives and ultimately the desired nal state of NATO [1].

In its present form, this comprehensive approach to leading operations represents the full spectrum of activities of the armed forces, characterized by an objective, a number of forces and resources, through the activities of troops, space and time. All these magnitudes are variable.




Figure 1: Future operating environment [6]

REFERENCES

- [1] Doktrína Armády České republiky. Praha: 2010, 108 s.
- [2]*** Security strategy of the Czech Republik. Praha: 2011, 20 s. ISBN 978-80-7441-005-5. [czech].
- [3] Krásný, A. Budoucí vojenské prostředí, Obrana a strategie, 2007, roč. 7, č. 1. ISSN 1214-6463.
- [4] KRÁSNÝ, A., SOCHA, O. Operační prostředí. Vojenské rozhledy, 2007, roč. 16, č. 2. ISSN 1210-3292.
- [5] Strategie vnitřní bezpečnosti Evropské unie: Brusel: 2010, 32 s. ISBN 978-92-824-2674-6. [czech]
- [6]*** Joint Operating Environment. Trends&Challenges for the Future Point Force Through 2030: United States Joint Forces Command 2007.

TRENDS IN SLOVAK REPUBLIC'S MILITARY SPENDING

Milota KUSTROVÁ

The Armed Forces Academy of General Milan Rastislav Štefánik,
Liptovský Mikuláš, the Slovak Republic

The article focuses on the amount of military spending in the Slovak Republic. In the first part, the terms of defense expenditure and military spending are defined. The second part focuses on the evolution of military spending in the Slovak Republic so far and the future prospects, as well as on the structure of military spending. The final part covers the amount of defense expenditure in relation to the objectives and tasks of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic.

Key words: *defense, system of defense, defense expenditure, military spending, structure of military spending, strategic evaluation of defense.*

1. INTRODUCTION

Security and defense are among the primary functions of a state. As a result, nations apportion assets like personnel, material and financial to provide security. This process has a direct impact on the economy of a nation, imposes great requirements and, to a certain extent, goes beyond the framework of a market mechanism. The imbalance between the defense requirements and the possibilities of a country's economic sector to meet them may lead to disproportion in the development of relevant areas.

From an economic point of view, defense refers solely to public goods and services, which are predominantly catered for by the public sector. Expenses stem from the

need to provide state defense (the so called defense expenditures), and are covered by the national budget, thus being part of the public expenses. These enable producing defense assets, the use of which represents a complex and demanding process in terms of their efficient allocation and use.

The amount of defense expenditures depends on the defense policy preferred by a certain country in a given time frame. For example, a state's defense policy could be more focused on providing defense and, thus, on allocating greater assets to defense rather than on the development of other areas. In other cases, a country's policy may be directed towards economic growth with a direct impact on the allocation of assets to the defense sector.

Therefore, finding a balance between the two options is a challenging task for the governments of individual nations. The solution is to actually make a compromise and provide for a high level of a country's defense, while also focusing on economic growth.

2. DEFINING BASIC TERMS

The term of "defense expenditures" or "defense spending" is often misinterpreted. A frequent mistake in this respect is that of identifying defense expenditures with military expenditures. The basic rule when defining the term is to actually take into account a government's given set of defense goals based on which a proper definition for defense expenditures can be identified.

As far as the definition of defense expenditure of the Slovak Republic is concerned, the definition of defense must first be analyzed. Thus, the National defense (following the act on the defense of the Slovak Republic) is defined as a set of measures the Slovak Republic takes to promote peace, provide security, sovereignty, territorial and border integrity and follow the commitments resulting from international agreements on joint defense against attack and further international agreements of military character. Defense is provided by an overall defense system of the Slovak Republic, comprising executive and support elements. The crucial executive element of the Slovak Republic defense system is

represented by the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic. Other executive and support elements of the defense system of the Slovak Republic comprise strategic intelligence and defense diplomacy, state material reserves, defense infrastructure, armed security troops, civil protection, rescue squads, economic mobilization, civil emergency planning, training of citizens for defense, and the scientific base of the national defense. Defense expenditures are aimed at the overall system of national defense and they are expenditures on military and non-military elements of the defense system. Consequently, defense expenditures acquire a broader meaning than military expenditures, which include the sums allocated from the national budget to the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic only.

By also taking into account international views on the two terms, the one of military spending appears to be the most suitable one for the purposes of this article. This is supported by the fact that military spending holds an important ground in the area of defense expenditures and represents about two thirds to three quarters of the total defense expenditures of developed countries [1].

3. MILITARY SPENDING

The government of the Slovak Republic has claimed in its program declaration to allocate at least 2% of the country's GDP to the

Armed Forces. The commitment stems not only from the NATO recommendations, but above all from the need of the Ministry of Defense (MoD) to prepare and run the reform process of the Slovak Republic's Armed Forces in line with the approved long-term plan of the structure and development of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic model 2010. Therefore, the 2% GDP allocation for military spending has become the primary planning financial limit for the implementation of the long-term plan [2].

The volume of the planned and allocated financial assets for the MoD is most commonly referred to as the percentage of the estimated GDP (for example, 1.24 % for 2010). This figure not always corresponds to reality for several reasons. Above all, it is necessary to realize that during a fiscal year the budget measures of the Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic result in adjustments to the overall limit of the MoD budget chapter spending, and that is typically reflected in a decreased budget allocation. Also, the real GDP may not reach the estimated amount in a given year.

Table 1. Spending of the MoD of the Slovak Republic budget chapter from 1996 to 2011 [3]

Year	MoD SR spending (mil. SKK)	real GDP (mil.SKK)	% GDP
1996	13 588.1	606 100	2.24
1997	14 339.5	708 617	2.02
1998	14 628.3	775002	1.87
1999	13 835.8	835 721	2.02
2000	15 048.1	934 079	1.61
2001	18 463.8	1 009 839	1.83
2002	19 892.6	1 108 117	1.80
2003	21 674.5	1 222 483	1.78
2004	23 172.8	1 359 533	1.70
2005	25 549.9	1 484 609	1.72
2006	27 923.1	1 658 302	1.68
2007	28 528.0	1 854 167	1.54
2008	31 196.1	2 025 101	1.54
2009 (mil. €)	1 045.71	63 050,7	1.66
2010 (mil. €)	822.94	65 970	1.25
2011(mil. €)	759.774	70 160	1.08

Table 1 illustrates the spending of the MoD of the Slovak Republic budget chapter and the percentage within GDP from 1996 to 2011. As it can be seen in table 1, as well as in **Figure 1**, financing the MoD has been undersized in the long term. This stems from the view discrepancies and the lack of common approach to the questions of the integration of the Slovak Republic into NATO, backing or, on the other hand, opposing the MoD and its development by the government, different views concerning the form of our involvement in international crisis management operations, the outbreak and the aftermath of the world financial crisis, increasing the debt of the public finance and the resulting cuts, which have continued up to now. The gradual decrease in the military spending percentage reached a level that forced the MoD to start reorganization. The former governments had dealt with the matter of insufficient funding by means of rationalization and increasing efficiency in the area of asset management, enhancing transparency and effectiveness.

The matter of defense planning and asset management has become the key issue for the MoD. The total amount of funds allocated for the MoD for 2011 reaches 55 per cent of the real financial limit estimated in the Directive for the defense policy of the Slovak Republic. It is an alarming figure which requires no further comments. Less

and less money is allocated to defense from the national treasury, and the current figure is just 1.08 % of GDP. For 2013 the government projects to decrease the resources from the national budget to less than 1% of GDP. Presently, current expenditures make up a substantial part of military spending from the economic point of view (approximately 95%). (**Figure 2**).




Figure 1. The trend of military spending from 1996 to 2010 (in % GDP)




Figure 2. The structure of military spending according to economic classification (year 2009)

Source: MoD of the Slovak Republic

Almost the whole amount of financial assets comprise expenses on wages, salaries, goods and services, insurance, accommodation

benefits and other. Only a small part is spent on capital expenses, namely procurement of modern weapon systems, armament and equipment. A constant reduction in financial assets results in insufficient investment expenses. The real financial limits barely cover to maintain the current state of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic. As a result of budget cuts, procurements incurred by some projects are being halted. That leads to failure in meeting some set objectives either totally or partially and, inherently, to the poor performance of the defense system [4].

4. CONCLUSIONS

According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, in terms of the amount of "military burden" per capita (240 dollars), Slovakia is, alongside with the Czech Republic, in the group of nations whose military spending is two times higher than the world average. In this respect, the military spending of more than half of the world's nations is lower than the world average (for example Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and other) [5].

Slovakia has been facing difficulties to meet its commitments to NATO and since 2007 its armed forces have been falling behind with modernization due to undersized budgets.

A financially unsustainable MoD, alongside with an ongoing decrease in asset allocation prevent Slovakia's armed forces from meeting the

tasks of national defense and widen the country's long term imbalance of tasks and capabilities to such a critical extent that the process of the Strategic evaluation of the defense of the Slovak Republic commenced. The Strategic evaluation of the defense of the Slovak Republic is the initiative of the current MoD, and can be characterized as a comprehensive analysis of the current condition and the projection of further development of the defense potential of the Slovak Republic including armed forces into the future. It must be seen as a unique opportunity to reach national consensus in the matters of defense policy and national defense, priorities, objectives, tasks and requirements of armed forces and the corresponding asset framework and its longer-term stability. Thus, the problem does not stem solely from the level of allocated funds, the long-term increase in the level of internal MoD debt or efficient management of existing assets, but also from absence of the MoD's long-term development approach based on tangible, and, above all, permanent resources.

REFERENCES

- [1] Lašček L., 2008. Nové požiadavky na riadenie obranných zdrojov v rezorte obrany v podmienkach aliancie. In: Zborník z medzinárodného vedecko-odborného seminára „Nové požiadavky na ekonomické riadenie obranných zdrojov v súčasnosti“. AOS gen. M. R. Štefánika : Liptovský Mikuláš, 2008. pages 72-76, ISBN 978-80-8040-346-1

[2] Jirásková, S. – Školník, M., 2011. Outsourcing v Ozbroyených silách SR (scienti c monograph). AOS: Liptovský Mikuláš, 2011. 152 s., ISBN 978-80-8040-424-6.

[3] MoD SR. 2004. Smernica pre obrannú politiku. 2004. [online] Internet website: <<http://www.mod.gov.sk/data/les/837.pdf>>

[4] Ivančík, R. 2010. Vojenské výdavky na zabezpečenie obrany a bezpečnosti vo svete v čase globalizácie a hospodárskej krízy. In: Vojenské re exie, 2010, volume. 5, issue. 1, pages 15-25, ISSN 1336-9202.

[5] SIPRI Year Book, 2010. World Armaments and Disarmaments. Oxford' Oxford University Press. 580 pages. ISBN 978-0-19-958112-2.

DEFENSE PROGRAMS RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

Constantin PREDA

Risk Manager

NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance Management Agency (NAGSMA),
NATO HQ, Brussels, Belgium

For the past years defense programs have faced delays in delivering defense capabilities and budget overruns. Stakeholders are looking for ways to improve program management and the decision making process given the very fluid and uncertain economic and political environment. Consequently, they have increasingly resorted to risk management as the main management tool for achieving defense programs objectives and for delivering the defense capabilities strongly needed for the soldiers on the ground on time and within limited defense budgets. Following a risk management based decision-making approach the stakeholders are expected not only to protect program objectives against a wide range of risks but, at the same time, to take advantage of the opportunities to increase the likelihood of program success. The prerequisite for making risk management the main tool for achieving defense programs objectives is the design and implementation of a strong risk management framework as a foundation providing an efficient and effective application of the best risk management practices. The aim of this paper is to examine the risk management framework for defense programs based on the ISO 31000:2009 standard, best risk management practices and the defense programs' needs and particularities. For the purposes of this article, the term of defense programs refers to joint defense programs.

Key words: objectives, risk management, framework, commitment, risk culture, governance, benchmark.

1. DEFENSE PROGRAM GOVERNANCE

Defense program management is the centralized coordinated management to achieve programs' strategic objectives and benefits and to assure that suppliers deliver on time, within budget and in accordance with customer requirements. It also provides any other support, enablers

(e.g. infrastructure, communication) needed for the defense capabilities to become operational.

For achieving defense programs objectives program governance is crucial. The latter can be defined as the process of developing, communicating, implementing, monitoring and assuring organizational structure and practices associated with a program.

The design of program Governance is highly specific to the program and organization. However, it has to fit for purpose. The role of program Governance is to “ensure decision making and delivery management activities are focused on achieving program goals in a consistent manner; addressing appropriate risks and fulfilling stakeholder requirements”[1].

The appropriate implementation of program Governance is critical for defense programs success, providing the appropriate organizational structure, policies, processes and

procedures to manage, control and support the program. Program Governance should cover the entire defense programs life cycle phases.

Program Governance includes

(Fig.1):

- Organizational structure
- Policies
- Processes, procedures
- Roles and responsibilities:
 - Sponsor
 - Board (Steering Committee)
 - Program Manager (PM)
 - Program Management Office (PMO)
 - Project Managers



Figure 1. Program Governance

Each of these entities plays an important role within the defense program risk management process. Program sponsors are ultimately responsible for the delivery of program benefits. They provide direction and oversight to the program and are the final decision makers. Their decisions should take into account program risks and opportunities.

Defense programs are typically large initiatives impacting strategic

defense areas. To provide an opportunity for collaborative decision making and coordinated issue resolution, a program Board may be established. Such a board is mandatory for complex, high visibility and high risk exposure programs. The program Board approves release of funding and allocation of financial reserves, including contingency and management reserves. The Board also manages the escalated risks

that may impact program objectives and approves the prioritization of risk response strategies. The PMO defines program risk management policy, risk management plan, processes and procedures, provides coordination of risk assessment and response actions across the program and supports monitoring and tracking of program risks. A PM ensures that project deliverables are aligned with business strategy and interacts with senior management and sponsor in managing program strategic risks.

The program Governance is one of the most important factors for an effective and efficient defense programs risk management process. Strong and committed program Governance can provide the foundation for using the risk management as the main tool for managing the defense programs. Program Governance framework integrates the risk management within the organization processes and responsibilities and assists in managing defense programs risks. ISO 31000:2009 standard states very clearly that *“the success of risk management will depend on the effectiveness of the management framework providing the foundations and arrangements that will embed it throughout the organization at all levels”*[2].

Building a risk management based decision making process at program Governance level will be decisive for achieving program goals and objectives and for defining the importance of the defense programs risk management framework.

2. DEFENSE PROGRAMS RISK MANAGEMENT

Defense programs, known for their size, complexity and technological pursuits, are seen among the most challenging of programs. Large defense systems are very complex systems, consisting of hardware and software, multiple suppliers, rapid technology changes and obsolescence issues.

For the last decades, organizations have failed to manage successfully defense programs encountering significant delays in delivering the defense capabilities on time and overrunning the approved budgets. Consequently, some programs lost the political and financial support and became irrelevant for their end users. In addition, defense programs became more and more complex, not only due to the high political and strategic importance and economic implications, but also because of the cuts in defense budgets and schedule constraints. Moreover, it is worth reminding a common truth according to which a broad range of uncertainties and corresponding risks influences the acquisition of new equipment and defense capabilities.

When analysing the effectiveness of risk management within defense programs, a number of pitfalls can be identified:

- the lack of the management commitment in applying the best risk management practices;
- the reactive behaviour of management instead of promoting

and implementing a proactive attitude in managing programs risks;

- the decision making process is not based on the results of risk analysis and evaluation;
- the lack of a risk culture and organization risk appetite;
- the lack of a risk management lessons learned system leading to repetitive mistakes.

Managing risk has been inherent to any type of activity within defense programs. But now, more than ever, and given the recent results of global and local financial crises, the need for a coordinated and systematic approach to managing defense programs risks has emerged. Consequently, the importance of risk management has increased and more and more organizations have made significant investments in using the best risk management practices, expertise and software tools. Organizations have begun to perceive risk management as the main management tool used for protecting stakeholders' investments and for delivering defense capabilities on time, within budget and in accordance with customer and end user demands.

The publication of the ISO 31000 standard in 2009 has provided the organizations a reference guidance and common ground for applying risk management in a more coherent and efficient way. Even if the standard is not mandatory and cannot be used for certification purposes, more and more organizations rely on it, recognizing its value and benefits. The public and private sectors

should share a common approach to risk management. However, the need for public accountability and transparency results in some differences between the two sectors. Thus, there are issues which make the public sector risk context quite specific. For example, all employees are required to act in accordance with government regulations, public service values, ethical principles and codes of conduct. Risk management in the public sector must meet strict legal requirements. There is a significant pressure on defense management agencies to be more risk averse in the current uncertain environment. As a result, strong risk management coupled with stronger defense programs governance can improve the decision making process and avoid future delays and budget overruns in providing defense capabilities.

3. RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

3.1. Definition

The framework is a structure to guide the management of program risks. ISO Guide 73:2009 defines the risk management framework as *“a set of components that provide the foundations and organizational arrangements for designing, implementing, monitoring reviewing and continually improving risk management throughout the organization”* [2]. The risk management framework proposed by this paper takes into account the concept and definition proposed by

ISO 31000:2009, as well as the best practices in the risk management area of the defense programs (Fig.2).

3.2. Role

The risk management framework *“is not intended to prescribe a management system, but rather to assist organization to integrate risk management into its overall management system”* [2]. The framework provides the foundation for *“managing risks effectively through the application of the risk management process at varying levels and within specific context of the organization”*[2]. It also assists the organization in the integration of risk management into the overall organization management system. With a risk management framework in place as a foundation for mutual understanding, all parties involved in defense programs management will be able to speak a common language and communicate more effectively. Throughout the framework the risk management will be adopted by all program staff as inherent part of the everyday way to manage the program. The introduction of a risk management framework is to help organizations to set up a higher standard of program management: the framework *“ensures that information about risks derived from the risk management process is adequately reported and used as a basis for decision making and accountability at all relevant organizational levels”*[2].

3.3. Components

The program risk management framework includes a set of interrelated components. The core components, defined as the risk management foundation, are found in all risk management frameworks, regardless of the type of organization and complexity of the program. Over time frameworks for risk management have evolved and improved as more and more applications of risk assessment and risk based approaches have been implemented within program management. This evolution involves the addition of new components to the framework core components. For example, the addition of the component concerning the risk communication with stakeholders was an essential framework improvement in the 1990s as part of the Canadian Guideline for Decision-Makers (CAN/CSA-Q850-97). In accordance with ISO Guide 73:2009 [3], the risk management framework includes the foundation and organizational arrangements. The foundation includes:

- Mandate
- Commitment
- Policy
- Objectives

The organizational arrangements include:

- Plans
- Relationships
- Accountabilities
- Resources
- Processes and activities

3.3.1. FOUNDATION

A program Sponsor should make a clear statement through a mandate that program risk management is considered an important tool for achieving program objectives and that all program decision-making processes will be risk management based. By giving a clear mandate the sponsor conveys, in a strong and clear message, his interest for risk management and his continuous preoccupation for supporting the program risk management area and for overseeing program management.

Before a program is started, high-level strategic objectives should be defined and made very clear for the management agency. These will have a number of levels of detail including program risk management. According to ISO 31000 a risk is an “*effect of uncertainty on Objectives*”[2]. Defining clear program Objectives will guide the management agency and program staff in identifying and mitigating the risks. But even having a clear mandate program risk management cannot be effective without a clear and strong management commitment at all organization levels. Management commitment provides the motivating force and resources for any organization. Without gaining the TOTAL support from the top program management the risk management process will fail and program staff will not support its implementation. It is very difficult to implement an effective risk management if management,

particularly at senior level, do not have a mature understanding of risk and how it can be managed.

Risk management policy represents “*a statement of the overall intentions and directions of an organization related to risk management*” [3]. The policy statement is a formal acknowledgment of management commitment to effectively manage program risks, including risk management objectives, roles and responsibilities and to support risk management plan, process and procedures. The risk management policy must be implemented at all levels of the organization.

3.3.2. Organizational Arrangements

Organizational arrangements define the framework components which are specific for each organization and program. All these components are to be tailored to program needs in accordance with the risk management policy provisions. The framework design will consider all defense program particularities, characteristics, goals and objectives, organization risk attitude, stakeholders and resources.

3.4. Design

The framework design takes into account defense programs’ needs, objectives, as well as their political, strategic, internal and external context. However, the framework for all organizations, whatever their

size or purpose, should still contain certain essential elements (core components), for risk management to be effective. The framework should reflect current best practices for risk management and should allow for a clear and easy understanding and implementation on behalf of all stakeholders. The framework should be embedded in all organization practices and process in a way that is relevant, effective and efficient. Through program governance the risk management framework and process should be treated as an integral part of organizational processes. The PMO is responsible for designing the policy, plans, processes, activities and for providing templates, tools and techniques.

A key framework design component defines the resources needed for implementing the risk management policy and process. Consequently the program contingency and management reserves should be sized in accordance with program risk level, organization risk tolerance and program Objectives.

The framework should allow for quicker and better communication between the decision-maker and all stakeholders, avoiding excessive cost and complexity in the process. Establishing internal and external communication channels and reporting mechanism are of the great importance for the risk framework success.

Clause 5 of ISO 31000 contains full advice on how the framework should be designed and implemented.

3.5. Implementation

This paper supports the implementation of the risk management framework based on the ISO 31000 standard provisions. A structured and comprehensive risk management framework should be implemented using a top-down incremental approach where risk management should become a key process to enable the organization to determine and achieve its objectives.

The program governance provides guidance and oversees the framework implementation strategy. The program management should ensure that the decision making process is aligned with the risk management process outcomes. Implementing the risk management framework involves trained people, consultation with program stakeholders, discipline and appropriate tools.

3.6. Monitoring & Review

The risk management framework should adapt to program changes generated by organizations' external and internal context. From this point of view, the PMO should periodically review the effectiveness of the risk management framework and whether the risk management framework, policy and plan are still appropriate. Monitoring and review involves confirmation that the various risk management elements and activities actually work effectively and in line with expectations.




Figure 2. Risk Management Framework

3.7. Continuous Improvement

Based on the results of the monitoring and review processes, the PMO should make proposals to program management on how the risk management framework can be improved. Any change to the risk management framework should lead to improvements. Moreover, it should be timely communicated so that all program stakeholders' buy-in is thus obtained.

4. BENCHMARK FRAMEWORK

Organizations can and should use ISO 31000 principles and attributes of good practices as a means to benchmark their risk management framework. ISO 31000 should be used as a "health check" of the maturity of risk management framework and process. ISO 31000/Annex A shows an informative list of the attributes representing a high level performance in managing risks

and some tangible indicators for each attribute:

- Continuous improvement - Continual improvement of the risk management framework based on the risk management performance assessment as part of organization performance measurement.
- Full accountability for risks - Fully defined and fully accepted accountability for risks, controls and risk treatment tasks. For this, designated people must have appropriate skills, training, authority and adequate resources.
- Application of risk management in all decision making - Explicit consideration of risks and application of risk management within the decision making process at all levels of an organization.
- Continuous Communications - Ongoing communication with external and internal stakeholders, establishing a two-way channel and including appropriate reports.
- Full integration in the organization's governance structure -

Risk management is central to the organization management processes especially if risks are evaluated in terms of uncertainty and inherent effects on program objectives. In such a case, the governance structure and process are based on the management of risk.

Taking into account defense programs' particularities and the criticality of the decisions that are to be made about them, two other attributes are of equal importance for an enhanced risk management framework: risk culture and stakeholders' management.

4.1. Risk Culture

Defense programs involve people from different countries with different levels of knowledge of risk management. This makes the implementation of a risk management process quite difficult and requires a significant culture change. Some changes can happen quickly but it does require prolonged effort and management focus to make risk management become self-sustaining. One solution is to form and use a community of practice of risk champions who represent parts of the organization. Thus, risk management practices within a program can be approached as a whole instead of delegating responsibility solely to the risk management department. A risk management culture needs to be supported by top level management by developing a clear risk policy and process and by involving all staff in risk training and education.

The challenge of changing the organization's culture to ensure risk management should be management first priority and must be applied to every activity at every level with an impact on organizational goals and objectives.

Some of the means to ensure that risk management becomes an integral part of the general culture of the organization are: raising risk awareness, organization-wide dialogues/discussions, formal training, recognition of risk qualification levels and assigning management responsibilities for risk communication. An effective risk management framework must be based on a comprehensive, systematic and coordinated approach and on a culture recognising risk management as everyone's responsibility and as a feature of the way of doing things.

4.2. Stakeholder Management

International defense programs involve a significant number of stakeholders with different power, culture, position and interests within the program. Program risk management covers all risks that might affect program objectives, including the risks originating from external stakeholders. Consequently, management should identify all program stakeholders' concerns and involve them within the program risk management process for risk identification and mitigation. Stakeholders' involvement within risk management process is vital for program success.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Most of the defense programs management agencies face problems in delivering the defense capabilities on time and within limited budgets. The defense programs risk management encounters challenges which could negatively impact the defense programs decision making process. The management should be aware of these challenges and take the appropriate actions. Some of the management agencies have implemented a risk management framework based on the best risk management practices and more and more agencies seek to improve their risk management by implementing ISO 31000:2009 standard.

However, unless management, especially senior management, values the new paradigm for risk as an effect of the inherent uncertainties of program objectives, and the value of risk management, then no real progress can be made in designing and implementing an enhanced risk management framework. ISO 31000 is already a well-recognized and accepted standard which should be followed for significant improvements in the defense programs risk management.

REFERENCES

- [1] Program Management Governance Course, <http://cstudies.ubc.ca/a/Course/Program-Management-Governance/IQ200/>, last retrieved 13.06.2012.
- [2] *** (2009) International Standard: ISO 31000:2009, Risk Management Principles and Guidelines, http://calmap.gisc.berkeley.edu/dwh_doc_link/Technical_Background/RAM_documents/ISO+31000-2009.pdf, pp. 8-9, last retrieved 13.06.2012.
- [3] *** (2009) ISO Guide 73:2009, Risk Management Vocabulary, http://www.pqm-online.com/assets/files/standards/iso_iec_guide_73-2009.pdf, last retrieved 13.06.2012.
- [4] Australian Defense Risk management Framework: A Comparative Study, Svetoslav Gaidow and Seng Boey, Land Operations Division Systems Sciences Laboratory, Australia, 2005.
- [5] Benchmark Framework for Risk Management, Contributed by J.H. Shortreed, L.Craig and S.McColl, 2000.
- [6] Canadian Standards Association, 1997-Risk management: Guideline for Decision-Makers (CAN/CSA-Q850-97).
- [7] How to bring your ERM framework into line with ISO 31000 - Grant Purdy, Chairman of Standards Australia and New Zealand Joint Technical Committee on Risk Management, Broadleaf Capital International Pty Ltd, 2008.
- [8] PMI-The Standard for Program Management, Second Edition, 2008
- [9] PMI-Practice Standard for Project Risk Management, 2009.

ORIENTATION: KEY TO THE OODA LOOP – THE CULTURE FACTOR

Dr. Donald A. MACCUISH

Associate Professor
Strategy, Leadership, and Military Ethics
Air Command and Staff College
Maxwell AFB, AL 36112

The late Colonel John Boyd developed what he called the OODA-Loop as both a learning and decision making model to help us better understand how we make decisions and learn. His OODA-Loop model consists of non-sequential elements: Observe – Orient – Decide – Action. He contended if one could cycle through these phases quicker and more accurately than one's adversary you could then get inside your adversary's OODA-Loop and "win". The key to the OODA-Loop he noted is Orientation. He only drew one diagram of his OODA-Loop. Only in the Orientation phase did he elaborate component elements. These elements are: Cultural Traditions, Genetic Heritage, Analysis/Synthesis, New Information, and Previous Experience. All of these elements he contended are interconnected. Thus, the interaction of all these factors effects how we orient ourselves to the situation at hand. In this article I will share my view of the "Culture Factor" in Orientation.

Key words: *OODA-Loop, cultural traditions, genetic heritage, analysis/synthesis, new information, previous experience*

1. INTRODUCTION

By way of introduction I want to first discuss what the OODA-Loop is and then what it is not. You will make numerous assumptions based on your mental image of it. I suggest that if you visualize the OODA-Loop as Boyd diagramed it your accompanying assumptions will be quite different from all other depictions. To those readers who have studied Col. Boyd and have seen his depiction of the OODA-Loop I apologize for I do not want to come across as condescending.

For those who are not as familiar, the distinction between the two diagrams is significant.

As you can readily see from the diagram in **Figure 1** the OODA-Loop is both complex and dynamic. Boyd drew his diagram once and Figure 1 is how he illustrated it. As human beings we constantly go through this OODA-Loop process every minute we are awake. Perhaps our minds continue while we are asleep. That notion on my part is only speculative. When you drive a car you are constantly, and unconsciously, looping and looping and looping. Your orientation is on

your driving but you are constantly observing, gathering, and filtering information from your surroundings. Usually your driving habits improve as you gain more experience behind the wheel.

Military training and education, for example, helps you learn new skills and improve those you already have. Simulators help pilots perfect

their knowledge of the aircraft, honing driving skills, developing better situational awareness, etc. In a previous issue of this Journal Dr. Laurian Gherman stated that the OODA-Loop is a learning model[1], and it is. But it is also much more than that. In the same issue, Dr. Cezar Vasilescu wrote that the OODA-Loop is a decision-making model.[2] He too is correct.




Figure 1. Boyd's OODA-Loop[3].

Unfortunately too many researchers, educators, military professionals, and others do not use Boyd's illustration, rather they have opted for a representation that overly simplifies the OODA-Loop, see Figure 2.




Figure 2: Simplified version of Boyd's OODA- Loop

One reason this depiction is so misleading is it grossly oversimplifies the OODA-Loop.

Second the Figure 2 representation suggests that the OODA-Loop is based on stage theory, which definitely is not the case. A stage model approach means that the individual first Observes an event, then Orients to it, Decides on a course of action, and thence Acts on that decision.

Then the process is repeated. If one understands the OODA-Loop from this perspective the only conclusion one can reach is that the person who makes faster decisions wins. Nothing could be further from the truth. If you

are improperly oriented you make wrong decisions faster and thereby dig your hole deeper more quickly.

Let me provide two examples to clarify the point I am trying to make. During the Vietnam Conflict senior US military leaders were incorrectly oriented to the situation. They expected and wanted to fight a conventional war. As a result the Army and Air Force each had two matrices to measure success. These were body count and battles won (Army) and target sets bombed and bomb tonnage dropped (Air Force). It was not until Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, General Creighton Abrams, and William Colby replaced the old breed and formed a Department of State, Military, and CIA triumvirate. This new triumvirate changed our orientation and we started fighting a population centric counterinsurgency type of war [4]. But, by then the American home front had been lost leading us to withdraw with our tails between our legs.

A more recent example is Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). In this case the Bush Administration and General Tommy Franks were focused on fighting Desert Storm II. During the months and weeks leading up to the launching of OIF, Saddam Hussein showed off his military prowess with parades and other types of military demonstrations that were air on television. Among the forces always present were the white clad Saddam Fedayeen. No one took notice.

When the American units finally met the Fedayeen on the battlefield it took a little time to adjust, but the young soldiers on the ground as well as

their immediate commanders quickly reoriented themselves. Battalion and Brigade commanders told their superior officers that we were fighting an insurgency, but were not believed. Lieutenant Generals Scott Wallace and John Conway were the first two senior officers to recognize that there was an insurgency going on inside of conventional military operations. Unfortunately for Wallace he shared this information during a joint interview with the New York Times and Washington Post [5]. It was only because of Lieutenant General McKiernan's intervention with General Franks that he was not relieved of his command for stating in his interview "*The enemy we're fighting is a bit different than the one we war-gamed against, because of these paramilitary forces.*"[6]

To emphasize again if you are not oriented to a situation correctly, whether it is in the military, business, politics, etc., it makes no difference how quickly you learn because you will not observe the situation or process new information correctly. If you are not oriented properly it makes no difference how quickly you make decisions. Although other factors, as depicted in figure 1, are involved as well your cultural traditions are a significant factor in interpreting your observations and thus the decisions you make.

2. CULTURE IN ORIENTATION

In his depiction of Orientation in his OODA-Loop diagram Boyd included cultural traditions interacting with the other factors genetic heritage, previous experiences, new

information, and analysis/synthesis in a dynamic fashion. Yet the only explanation he gives about this is in his briefing titled Organic Design for Command and Control slide 11 where he states *“Interactions, as shown, represent a many-sided implicit cross-referencing process of projection, empathy, correlation, and rejection.”*[7] Two slides later he notes: *“Orientation, seen as a result, represents images, views, or impressions of the world shaped by genetic heritage, cultural tradition, previous experiences, and unfolding circumstances.”*[8] In his seminal text on the OODA-Loop Colonel Frans Osinga, Ph.D. contends that *“Boyd has developed the argument that orientation is the center of gravity for command and control.”*[9] Later in his presentation Boyd states *“Orientation is the schwerpunkt. It shapes the way we interact with the environment – hence orientation shapes the way we observe, the way we decide, the way we act.”*[10]

What is it then that Boyd trying to tell us? He is saying the orientation is a factor of the dynamic interaction of one’s genetic heritage, cultural traditions, new information, previous experiences, and our analysis and synthesis of all these factors. The process is such that this interaction is constantly and rapidly cycling over and over again. Additionally, we do it unconsciously. And, if we understand this process there are many ways we can influence it – education and training for example.

With regard to culture we need to know what it is and why it is important. The Canadian Foreign Service Institute (CFSI) is helpful in this matter. CFSI contends:

“Culture rules virtually every aspect of your life and like most people, you are completely unaware of this. If asked, you would likely define culture as music, literature, visual arts, architecture or language, and you wouldn’t be wrong. But you wouldn’t be entirely right either. In fact the things produced by a culture which we perceive with our five senses are simply manifestations of the deeper meaning of culture – what we do, think and feel. Culture is taught and learned and shared – there is no culture of one. And yet, culture is not monolithic – individuals exist within a culture. Finally, culture is symbolic. Meaning is ascribed to behaviour, words and objects and this meaning is objectively arbitrary, subjectively logical and rational. For example, a “home”, is a physical structure, a familial construct and a moral reference point – which is distinct from one culture to another.

Culture is vital because it enables its members to function with one another without the need to negotiate meaning at every moment. Culture is learned and forgotten, so despite its importance we are generally unconscious of its influence on the manner in which we perceive the world and interact within it. Culture is significant because as we work with others it both enables us and impedes us in our ability to understand and work effectively together.”[11]

If we simply look at our cultural traditions we need to ask ourselves how these traditions help us learn and make decisions? Schein reminds us that there are three levels of culture – Artifacts (visible structures/processes and observable behaviors), Espoused Beliefs and Values (ideals and goals,

ideologies, rationalizations, etc.) and Basic Underlying Assumptions (unconscious, taken-for-granted beliefs and values) [12]. The CIA World Factbook 2012 may be helpful and a good starting point. The book reports that according to the 2002 census there were more than 7 ethnic groups in Romania specifically Romanian, Hungarian, Roma, Ukrainian, German, Russian, Turkish, and other [13]. Each of these ethnic groups has its own cultural traditions. If we include the element of religion, Eastern Orthodox, Protestant, Roman Catholic, Muslim, none, etc. [14] as an additional factor we see how one's cultural tradition becomes more robust. Each ethnic group has the three levels that define how members observe their environment. The three levels of culture of each religious group add yet another cultural heritage dynamic.

Schein further notes that every organization has its own culture. Thus a person of ethnic group A with a religious background of X becomes a member of an organization, such as the military, they adapt to that organization's cultural dynamics. Builder tells us that military services and institutions have their own distinct and enduring personalities (cultural traditions). Thus we cannot simply assume that all members of a nation's military view their environments in a similar fashion [15]. These factors and others as well, affect how people from different nationalities, organizations, military services, etc. can observe the same situation and have quite different interpretations that result in their making different decisions.

If you are trying to sell your program to a staff member from a

different service, or a politician, or the public you might become quite frustrated because they may be perceiving things quite differently because of their cultural tradition. Although these differences may be intuitive they may be more dramatic than that.

Several years ago I was conducting some research on culture. My Google search identified the Canadian Foreign Service Institute (CFSI) web site among others. As I worked my way around the site I hit upon a short presentation about a man visiting a foreign country. He could not understand why he could not communicate well, interact with the local people, or integrate himself into the community. After reflecting on the situation he realized that every one of the locals wore green glasses. He therefore concluded that if he purchased green glasses then his orientation would be like that of the locals. When he put the green glasses on not much changed because he failed to consider that the people from his country always wore yellow glasses. He simply put the green glasses over his yellow ones.

My point here is that even if we know and understand our own cultural traditions that may not be enough to succeed in a joint staff assignment, working with political leaders, or even succeeding on the battlefield. As I noted previously the American experiences in Vietnam and Operation Iraqi Freedom may be illustrative. In Vietnam, our senior military leaders wanted to and expected to fight a conventional war. Why was this so? It was because they all fought in World War II and Korea – two conventional wars.

Army doctrine supported force on force conflict and this was reinforced because we were focused on the ‘real’ war and expected confrontation with the Soviets in Europe. Air Force leaders were wedded to the culture of the Strategic Air Command which was built upon the foundation of the WWII Bombing Campaign and Japan’s surrender after dropping two atomic bombs on Japan. Furthermore Air Force leaders believed that had they been allowed to employ airpower properly we would have easily won. [16] So that is how we fought – a strategic air campaign. If they had studied the cultural traditions of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese things may or may not have been different. Our opponents saw us as colonial occupiers. Their cultural tradition in fighting occupiers was by fighting unconventionally as insurgents.

In Operation Iraqi Freedom General Tommy Franks and his boss Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld believed they were going to fight another Desert Storm type of war. In spite of evidence to the contrary they never deviated from this belief. Their orientation influenced all their decisions. Unfortunately their orientation, partially influenced by cultural traditions, was flawed and today we are paying the price for that error.

3. MITIGATING THE CULTURE FACTOR

What can we do rather than simply putting on different colored glasses?

Boyd’s message to us about orientation on slide 18 of the same

briefing maybe helpful: *“Expose individuals, with different skills and abilities, against a variety of situations -- whereby each individual can observe and orient himself simultaneously to the others and to the variety of changing situations.”*[17]

I believe that Boyd may be suggesting things such as Joint Professional Military Education schools to include attending service schools of one’s allies, joint assignments, participating in cultural exchanges, and so forth. Studying foreign languages, reading books about culture, watching foreign television programs and listening to foreign radio programs may also be helpful. But I do not think that goes far enough if we want to mitigate our own cultural prejudices.

The CFSI publishes a number of materials that provide insight into this difficulty. One publication states that people need to become interculturally effective. Such a person has three main attributes: an ability to communicate with people of another culture in a way that earns their respect and trust. Has the capacity to adapt his/her professional, technical, and managerial skills to fit local constraints; and has the capacity to adjust personally so that they can make themselves at ease in the host culture [18]. Although this publication does not discuss its course on to develop the attributes mentioned it does contain a list of competencies and behavioral indicators [19]. Knowing what these are it is not too difficult to develop educational and training programs to teach the necessary competencies from the lowest ranking service member to senior leaders.

In a different publication the CFSI discusses the issue of self-monitoring behavior [20]. Citing research on cultural values CFSI noted *“that national cultures vary in main dimensions – power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism and masculinity – and that these differences ‘have profound consequences for the validity of the transfer of theories and working methods from one country to another.’* [21]

Recently Lesenciuc and Codreanu wrote an article for the Romanian Journal of Defense Resources Management emphasizing the point. They use the term cultural competence meaning the ability to *“adequately perform in a given environment”*. [22] In addition, Lesenciuc and Codreanu note the importance of communication competence which *“refers not only to the capacity to adapt to the surrounding environment, but also to the physical and psychological features of an individual that enable the latter’s communicative performance in a given environment.”*[23]

Training and education are but two important ways we can mitigate our own cultural prejudices. But it takes time and effort on each individual’s part as well. A formal process needs to begin when one enters, in our case, military service. The individual needs to understand why being culturally effective is important. We need to learn the self-monitoring behaviors and practice them until they become an unconscious way of life. Some will have us believe that the youngest and less educated soldier cannot master these skills. This is not true.

When General H.R. McMaster learned that the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (3rd ACR) he commanded was tasked to deploy to Iraq he organized and implemented a comprehensive training regimen that included cultural effectiveness. Upon deployment to the Iraqi city of Tal Afar which was an insurgent hot bed his soldiers immediately began utilizing the skills and knowledges they had learned in their pre-deployment training. They successfully eradicated the insurgents from the city helping the locals establish law and order.

We may not always have the lead time General McMaster and his 3rd ACR had. This is especially true when it comes to peacekeeping, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and similar missions. But if we start now and make being culturally effective a priority then we will be able to mitigate our own cultural prejudices. Our self-monitoring will become one of our cultural traditions.

Cultural effectiveness is not limited to conflict or conflict-like situations. Cultural competence and effectiveness will help us work better and more closely with colleagues from different services and specialties. For example, consider representative from each of the military services along with several legislators having a discussion perhaps about the need for new items of equipment. Have you noticed that it is difficult for them to comprehend what each other means? Perhaps they lack both cultural knowledge and the cultural communications competence skills to be understood.

In addition, cultural and communication competence or effectiveness will help us in working

with allied and coalition partners. It will also help us in working with our political leaders. Cultural effectiveness is important in other fields as well such as business, education, and interaction with our neighbors.

In summary, cultural traditions affect how we orient ourselves to a particular situation so we can observe it more accurately. We can mitigate some elements of our genetic heritage through medicine and good health. We can do the same with our cultural traditions.

REFERENCES

- [1] Gherman, Laurian (2011). “The Second Revolution in Military Affairs” in *Journal of Defense Resources Management*, No. 1(2). Brasov, Romania: Military Technical Publishing Center. pp. 57-66.
- [2] Vasilescu, Cezar (2011). “Effective Strategic Decision Making”, in *Journal of Defense Resources Management*, No. 1(2). Brasov, Romania: Military Technical Publishing Center. pp. 101-106.
- [3] From Boyd’s briefing “The Essence of Winning and Losing” (1995). Source is Dr. Chet Richard’s briefing “Time as a Competitive Weapon,” 2000.
- [4] See Sorely, Lewis (1999). *A Better War the Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam*. Orlando: Harcourt, Inc.
- [5] Gordon, Michael R. and B.E. Trainor (2006). *Cobra II the Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*. New York: Pantheon Books. pp. 307-314.
- [6] *ibid.* p. 311.
- [7] Boyd, John R. (1987). *Organic Design for Command and Control*, slide number 11.
- [8] *ibid.*, slide 13.
- [9] Osinga, Frans (2005). *Science Strategy and War the Strategic Theory of John Boyd*. Delft, The Netherlands: Eburon Academic Publishers, p. 237.
- [10] Boyd, slide 16.
- [11] Centre for Intercultural Learning, <http://www.international.gc.ca/cfsi-icse/cil-cai/whatisculture-questlaculture-eng.asp>.
- [12] Schein, Edgar H. (2010). *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 4th ed. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.
- [13] Central Intelligence Agency (2011). *The CIA World Factbook 2012*. New York: Skyhorse Publishing. p. 538.
- [14] *ibid.*
- [15] Builder, Carl H. (1989). *The Masks of War American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. p. 3.
- [16] Clodfelter, Mark (1989). *The Limits of Air Power the American Bombing of North Vietnam*. New York: The Free Press. p. 25.
- [17] Boyd, slide 18.
- [18] Vulpe, Thomas, D. Kealey, D. Protheroe, and D. MacDonald (2000). *A Profile of the Interculturally Effective Person*. Ottawa, Canada: Centre for Intercultural Learning. p. 6.
- [19] For more information about CFSI’s Centre for Intercultural Learning the reader is referred to <http://www.international.gc.ca/cfsi-icse/cil-cai/index-eng.asp>.
- [20] Kealy, Daniel J. (2001). *Cross-cultural Effectiveness*. Ottawa: Centre for Intercultural Learning. p. 28.
- [21] *ibid.*
- [22] Lesenciuc, Adrian and A. Codreanu (2012). “Interpersonal Communication Competence: Cultural Underpinnings”, in the *Journal of Defense Resources Management*, vol. 3 No. 1(4). Brasov, Romania: Military Technical Publishing Center. p. 128.
- [23] *ibid.*

KENYA'S CONSTITUTION AND CHILD TRAFFICKING AS A SECURITY THREAT

E.O.S. ODHIAMBO *, J. KASSILLY **, L.T. MAITO **,
K. ONKWARE ***, W. A. OBOKA ***

* 9th Kenya Rif es (9KR), Moi Barracks,
Ministry of State for Defence (MoSD)

** Dept. of Peace and Con ict Studies (PCS),

Masinde Muliro University of Science Technology

*** Dept of Emergency Management and Humanitarian Assistance (EMHA),
Masinde Muliro University of Science Technology

Human trafficking also referred to as modern-day slavery is seen as a security threat. Traditional security approaches to human trafficking call for analysis of trafficking as a threat to the Kenyan state and to Kenya's control of its borders. Traditional security analyses of trafficking emphasize border security, migration controls, and international law enforcement cooperation. This article discusses three forms of child trafficking: sexual exploitation, forced labor and child soldiers and argues that the newly promulgated Kenyan constitution in chapter three on citizenship has a provision that can be interpreted as encouraging child trafficking.

Key words: *child trafficking, Kenyan constitution, international law*

1. INTRODUCTION

Human traf cking also referred to as modern-day slavery is a gross violation of human rights, has been condemned globally and should be a relic of the past and is also a security threat [1]. Yet this modern form of slave trade persists and continues to grow. Traditional security approaches to human traf cking call for analysis of traf cking as a threat to the state and to state control of borders. Child traf cking is a demand driven crime for cheap labor during periods of economic growth or decline [2]. Though the international community

has focused on human traf cking, the progress has not been successful probably due to the conception of the problem which ought to form the basis of the law developed to combat human traf cking [3].

Traf cking in persons does not only infringe on the victim's human rights and freedom of movement, but is also a threat to human security. The individual victims of traf cking endure atrocious living and working conditions that physically injure, psychologically traumatize and, in some cases, cost victims their lives. Often bonded by debt, victims can be subjected to physical torture and sexual abuse [4].

The vice of trafficking in persons has a negative impact on the human security of communities from which victims are recruited because it creates an environment of violence, crime and fear. Trafficking in persons separates families, erodes social bonds and support networks, and undermines the economic prospects of communities. Furthermore, facilitated by large-scale international organized criminal networks that are linked to illicit trade in arms and narcotics, trafficking in persons can also compromise state security and impede human development by weakening the rule of law and threatening public safety [5].

The phrase “human trafficking” has been used to address a wide variety of crimes and human rights abuses associated with the recruitment, movement and sale of people into a range of “exploitative” and/or “slave-like circumstances.” The basic problem with the present “human trafficking paradigm” is that many of the elements and definitions used to define this social phenomenon are often limited in their scope and do not adequately reflect the totality of the problem [6]. Trafficking might be defined in a number of ways as a legal problem; a human rights problem; a security problem; a child labor problem; a migration problem or a combination of one or more of these. Likewise, depending on how a given person defines the problem, his/her definitions will dictate what solutions are proposed for example legal problems require legal solutions. Likewise, few attempts have been made to develop usable conceptual frameworks that allow for the many variables to be encompassed under a single umbrella [7].

2. METHODOLOGY

The sensitivity of this study required that primary and secondary researches be employed. Primary data involved interviewing agencies involved against child trafficking like Maendeleo Ya Wanawake (MYWO), The Federation of Women Lawyers, Society for the Advancement of Women Studies and the Single Mother Association of Kenya, the Widows and Orphans Welfare Society of Kenya, The United Women Muslim Association, Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, Children Department in Kuria, Gender Violence and Girl Child Network in Migori County and Womankind Kenya.

Thus, 130 people were interviewed and they expressed their views concerning the nature of human trafficking and in particular child trafficking in Kenya. Secondary data entailed a critical analysis of the existing literature on the subject under discussion. Consequently, the authors of this paper conducted an extensive library research on newspapers, reports, journals, books, Internet, magazines, Conference proceedings, Government/corporate reports on the subject.

3. SOME DEFINITIONS

3.1. A Child Defined

The *United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child* Article 1, states that a child is a person below the age of 18, unless the age of majority is attained earlier under the national law applicable to the child [8]. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,

Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) Article 3 (d) states that a child shall mean any person under eighteen years of age [9]. Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (2000) Article 2 (ILO No. 182.) Says the term child shall apply to all persons under the age of 18 [10]. Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990) Article 1, States that a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier [11]. World Vision International [12] asserts that a child is defined as anyone below the age of 18. Although the Convention on the Rights of the Child allows for an adjustment to this standard through national legislation, World Vision takes 18 as the legal limit in reflection of standards recognized in international law (including in ILO Convention No. 182, the Convention on Trafficking and the jurisprudence of the Committee on the Rights of the Child).

3.2. Trafficking

According to UNICEF [13] trafficking is a term used to describe the illegal trade across borders of goods especially contraband, such as drugs for profit. The concept has been expanded to cover the illegal transport of human beings, in particular women and children for the purpose of selling them or exploiting their labour. Anti-Slavery International [14] says human trafficking involves the movement of people through violence, deception or coercion for

the purpose of forced labour, servitude or slavery-like practices. It is slavery because traffickers use violence, threats, and other forms of coercion to force their victims to work against their will. This includes controlling their freedom of movement, where and when they will work and what pay, if any, they will receive. Child Wise [15] defines trafficking as the transporting of a person from one place to another through means of deception, kidnapping, actual, threatened or implied violence, and/or the abuse of individuals actual or perceived by a person in a position of authority. The term trafficking implies a profit arising from the transportation of the child, which can occur across borders and from rural to urban areas. The Global Alliance Against the Trafficking of Women [16] defines trafficking as the recruitment and transportation of (a) person(s) within and across national borders, by means of violence or threat of violence, abuse of actual or perceived authority arising from a relationship, or deception, in order to subject them to the actual and unlawful power “of (an) other person(s). Scholars have pointed out the continuing difficulty of measuring trafficking, given the range of actions and outcomes covered by the term. As O’Connell et al [17] explain, trafficking in persons is used as an umbrella term to cover a range of actions and outcomes. Viewed as a process, trafficking can be said to entail several phases like recruitment, transportation and control in the place of destination. Different groups, agents or individuals may be involved in different phases of the process, and can organize recruitment, transportation and

control in different ways. There is thus immense diversity between and within trafficking systems.

3.2.1. Child Trafficking

Global March Against Child Labour [18] says child trafficking refers “to any act or transaction whereby a child is transferred by any person or group of persons to another for remuneration or any other consideration”. This category is qualitatively different from the others in that it refers to the process that puts children in a situation of commercial exploitation. Many of them end up working as slaves, prostitutes and soldiers.

The most common international law definition is the one contained in Article 3 of the *UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children*, Supplementing the *United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime* [19].

(a) “Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs;

(b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth in subparagraph

(a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) have been used;

(c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered “trafficking in persons” even if this does not involve any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article; and

(d) “Child” shall mean any person under eighteen years of age.

Human trafficking has emerged as an issue of global concern in recent years: facilitated by porous borders and advanced communication technologies, it has become increasingly transnational in scope and highly lucrative. Children are trafficked for sexual exploitation, labor, transplant of organs and illegal adoption. Regardless of the initial purpose, all child victims of trafficking are highly vulnerable to sexual abuse and exploitation because they are removed from support structures such as their families and communities.

When it comes to trafficking in children, it does not matter if there was use of force, coercion or deception because children are not able to give informed consent to their exploitation. Trafficking can occur across borders or within a country. In the case of international trafficking, traffickers can more easily manipulate and exploit their victims as they may be punished for having entered a country illegally, or are at a disadvantage because of their

ignorance of the local laws, culture and language. The trafficking in children within a country is less common than cross-border trafficking, although it does occur from rural to urban areas. Children who have been trafficked across borders may continue to be trafficked within the destination country to avoid detection [20].

In the case of cross-border trafficking, the countries involved can be classified as countries of origin, countries of destination and transit countries. Some countries fall under all three categories. Kenya, for example, can be considered a country of origin, destination and transit country. The Government of Kenya does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of human trafficking [21]. The trafficking of children manifests itself in three main forms: Sex Trafficking, Forced Labor and Child Soldiers.

3.2.2. Sex Trafficking

The most heinous of the various forms of child trafficking is sex trafficking. Similar to the other forms of child trafficking, the victims of sex trafficking are forced, coerced or deceived into the trafficking network. Specifically, child sex trafficking is the recruitment, transfer, harboring, or receipt of persons 18 and younger for the purpose of sexual exploitation, prostitution or commercial sex act. There are two major subcategories of child sex trafficking, which are the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children (CSEC) and Child Sex Tourism [22].

Commercial sexual exploitation of children consists of criminal practices that demean and threaten the

physical and psychosocial integrity of children. The Declaration and Agenda for Action against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children is a groundbreaking instrument that defines the commercial sexual exploitation of children as: "A fundamental violation of children's rights. It comprises sexual abuse by the adult and remuneration in cash or kind to the child or a third person or persons. The child is treated as a sexual object and as a commercial object [23]."

3.2.3. Forced Labor

In many countries, it is legal for children to engage in light work. In fact, most national laws and international organizations recognize the legality of moderate forms of child labor. Today, there is a growing concern for the safety and well-being of children who are involved in the worst forms of child labor [24]. The worst forms of forced child labor include instances when a child is subjected to debt bondage, servitude or slavery through extreme force, coercion or fraud. Any child, regardless of location or station in life, who is subjected to these unfortunate conditions is a victim of human trafficking [25].

3.2.4. Child soldiers

Child soldiering is a harsh form of trafficking that entails the unlawful recruitment of children through force, coercion or fraud for labor or sexual exploitation in conflict areas. The majority of child soldiers are between the ages of 15 and 18; however, some are as young as seven or eight, which is illegal under international law. Once abducted, children are used as

porters, cooks, servants, combatants or spies. Young women are often forced to marry or engage in sexual relations with the male soldiers [26]. In the worst cases, child soldiers were forced to commit murder of their own family or community. Perhaps one of the most unfortunate aspects of this type of child trafficking is that the perpetrators of this crime are not just individuals of society, but government forces, paramilitary organizations or rebel groups. In 2007, the United Nations estimated that 57 armed groups and forces were using children, increased from 40 in the prior year [27].

4. CHILD TRAFFICKING IN KENYA

Human trafficking in Kenya is nothing new. The largest number of missing persons inside Kenya is represented by girls. Most are younger than sixteen-years-of-age. Another disturbing portion of trafficked children are new-born babies. Even though mothers have asked for information about their missing children, numerous cases in missing babies continue to go unaddressed and unsolved by Kenyan authorities [28].

It is estimated that more than 20,000 children are trafficked annually. The practice of child trafficking and prostitution is rampant due to private villas, especially at the Coast, with the country being regarded as a 'hot' sex tourism destination. [29]

Pumwani Maternity Hospital in Nairobi was investigated for involvement in the 2004 theft of over twenty new-born babies who mysteriously disappeared from the

hospital. During the investigation eighteen babies were discovered with adults that did not have matching DNA. With eighty to one hundred births daily, the spectre of human trafficking at the hospital is alarming. Missing babies are being taken from compromised mothers. Most trafficking targets are babies whose mothers are living in extreme poverty. Others are from mothers who have died while giving birth [30].

Mary Deya of Gilbert Deya Ministries was arrested in November 2004 in Nairobi and charged with stealing children [31]. Ten children, none of whom had any genetic connection to the Deya family, were found at Mr Deya's House [32]. Twenty babies have been placed in foster care in Kenya after DNA tests showed they had no connection to their alleged mothers [33]. Rose Atieno Kiserem, a former pastor with Deya's ministry was jailed along with Mrs Deya. Upon her release from jail, Kiserem confessed that the 'miracle babies' were "a hoax created by the Deyas and their accomplices to deceive me and other God fearing people" [34].

Under Kenyan law, a missing person is considered dead if they have been missing for more than seven years. This law puts some missing children out of the jurisdiction of legal protection after they have been missing the allotted time and declared dead as cases, if any case has been led, are closed. In spite of laws prohibiting trafficking, trafficking of infants and newborns in Kenya has been rising substantially inside the country [35].

Kenya is a source, transit, and destination country for men,

women, and children trafficked for forced labor and sexual exploitation; children are trafficked within the country for domestic servitude, street vending, agricultural labor, and sexual exploitation; men, women, and girls are trafficked to the Middle East, other African nations, Western Europe, and North America for domestic servitude, enslavement in massage parlors and brothels, and manual labor. According to All CIA World Fact books [36] Kenya is placed on the Tier 2 Watch List due to a lack of evidence of increasing efforts to combat severe forms of trafficking.

Tier 2 Watch List countries do not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but are making significant efforts to do so, and meet one of the following criteria:

1. they display a high or significantly increasing number victims,
2. they have failed to provide evidence of increasing efforts to combat trafficking in persons, or,
3. they have committed to take action over the next year.

4.1. Kenya as a Source Of Child Trafficking

This phase includes arrangers, Investors and Recruiters who facilitate the child trafficking operations in the child's country of origin. Arrangers and Investors are essentially the ringleaders of a trafficking operation. They are the people that finance and oversee the entire criminal organization and its activities. The nature of this function is elusive, and lower level employees and the people being trafficked rarely know the identity of these persons.

4.2. Kenya as a Transit Point

In the international child trafficking, the recruited children are passed off to Transporters as they leave the country. Transporters are elicited with the responsibility of accompanying the trafficked person to their destination country, where there is generally another transporter waiting to deliver the trafficked person to their final destination city if necessary. These individuals must be sophisticated and have some law enforcement knowledge in order to be able to quickly change their operations or route in reaction to border surveillance.

When the trafficked child arrives in the destination country through the assistance of Transporters, Corrupt Public Officials and Informers, they are taken by Guides and Crew Members. The function of these individuals is to accompany the children from the point of entry in the destination country to each of their transit points until they reach their final destination. Once the children arrive at their final destination, they come into contact with debt collectors. The duty of these individuals is to collect fees from the victims, often by means of violence or extortion. This is the point when debt bondage often appears. Many times the victims, especially children, do not have the required funds so they are forced to "work off their debts" through forced labor or sex.

After successful delivery of the trafficked children, people are engaged to cover the trail of traffickers and money involved in order to secure the elusiveness of the operations. There are two different job functions in this stage, which are Money

Movers and Supporting Personnel and Specialists. Money movers must cover up the trail of cash, which may be reinvested into other criminal activities or dispersed through a series of intangible transactions. Supporting Personnel and Specialists serve to tie up the loose ends of the trafficking operations.

5. KENYA'S CONSTITUTION AND THE LOOPHOLE ON CHILD TRAFFICKING

Kenya does not prohibit all forms of trafficking, though it criminalizes the trafficking of children and adults for sexual exploitation through its Sexual Offenses Act, enacted in July 2006, which prescribes penalties that are sufficiently stringent and commensurate with those for rape, however the Employment Act of 2007 outlaws forced labor and contains additional statutes relevant to labor trafficking [37]. Kenya Counter Trafficking in Persons Act, 2010, In Article 3(5) of this Act provision for hefty penalties is accorded if a person is found guilty of human trafficking. The person is liable for imprisonment for a term not less than 30 years or to a fine of not less than Ksh.30 million or both and upon subsequent conviction, to imprisonment for life. [38] Regardless of these gains made through Sexual Offenses Act, enacted in July 2006, The Employment Act of 2007 and Kenya Counter Trafficking in Persons Act, 2010, we argue that *Chapter Three* of the *Constitution* section 14 and sub section (4) on Citizenship negates these gains made on child trafficking:

Citizenship by birth

14. (4) *A child found in Kenya who is, or appears to be, less than eight years of age, and whose nationality and parents are not known, is presumed to be a citizen by birth* [39].

According to Okere, the chairperson of Gender Violence and Girl Child Network in Migori County, cases of child trafficking across the Kenya-Tanzania border are rife. *"It is difficult to identify traffickers as some pose as owners of orphanages and homes for the destitute. Some pass through the border claiming the children belong to their relatives."* She also adds: *"She received two children who were directed to her home after escaping from their captors. The children hailed from Tanzania and they managed to hand them over to their country's authorities with the help of police."* She says most of the female victims end up working in discreet brothels in Kuria, Migori and Transmara districts as well as Isebania border [40].

Womankind Kenya is a non-governmental organization operating out of Garissa, in the North Eastern Province. It estimates that the number of trafficked girls from Garissa and Somalia into Nairobi at 50 weekly [41]. In Kenya's Coast Province, 10,000 people are trafficked into the country annually. In the Rift Valley Province, 200 illegal migrants enter Kenya from Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Uganda every week to work as cattle herders, domestic laborers and commercial sex workers. From Nairobi, girls may

be sent to the coastal, tourism-heavy city of Mombasa for the purposes of sex tourism [42].

The above examples show how this problem has been difficult to eradicate. *Chapter Three* of the *Constitution section 14* and *sub section (4) on Citizenship* will encourage child traffickers across the borders especially Somalia to bring in the children through our porous borders and later the corrupt government of Kenya uses *Chapter Three* of the *Constitution section 14* and *sub section (4) on Citizenship* to legitimize the trafficking.

Another loophole in section 14 sub section (4) is the phrase "appears" in that appearance can be deceitful because other factors like environmental, economic, social, psychological and political factors do contribute either positively or negatively to the appearance of an individual for example a child who is malnourished can appear to be either younger or older than the actual age. This is elaborated by Theories of Development by different scholars as discussed below;

6. CHILD DEVELOPMENT

The study of child development is often divided into three main areas. These include physical, cognitive, and social-emotional development. Development refers to change or growth that occurs in children. It starts with infancy and continues to adulthood [43]. Different names are used to describe young children at different ages. From birth through the first year, children are called infants.

Toddlers are children from age one up to the third birthday. The term preschooler is often used to describe children ages three to six years of age. Physical development refers to physical body changes which occur in a relatively stable, predictable sequence and it is orderly not random. It includes changes in bone thickness, vision, hearing, muscle, size and weight. Cognitive development, sometimes called intellectual development, refers to processes people use to gain knowledge and has Language, thought, reasoning, imagination, Identifying colors and knowing the difference between one and many are examples of cognitive tasks [44].

The third area of development is called social-emotional development. These two areas are grouped together because they are so interrelated. Learning to relate to others is social development. Emotional development, on the other hand, involves feelings and expression of feelings. Trust, fear, confidence, pride, friendship, and humor are all part of social-emotional development. Other emotional traits include timidity, interest, a person's self concept and self-esteem and pleasure [45].

6.1. Erikson's Stages of Development during Early Childhood

According to researchers in the field, there are four stages of development in early childhood, as presented in **Table 1**.

Table 1. Erikson's Stages of Development during Early Childhood

Stage	Approximate Age	Psycho-social Crisis
I	Birth – 18 months	Trust versus mistrust
II	18 months–3 years	Autonomy versus shame and doubt
III	3–5 years	Initiative versus guilt
IV	6–12 years	Industry versus inferiority

Starting from Erikson's description of the [46] the fourth Stage with has ages between 6-12 and characterized by Industry Versus Inferiority we focus our interest on Kenya's Constitution Chapter 14. (4) A child found in Kenya who is, or appears to be, less than eight years of age is captured in this stage. Erikson [47] argues that the major crisis of this stage occurs between six and twelve years of age. At this time, children enjoy planning and carrying out projects. This helps them learn society's rules and expectations. During this stage, children gain approval by developing intellectual skills such as reading, writing, and math. The way family, neighbors, teachers, and friends respond to children affects their future development. Realistic goals and expectations enrich children's sense of self. Children

can become frustrated by criticism or discouragement, or if parents demand too much control. Feelings of incompetence and insecurity will emerge. This is corroborated by [48] Cognitive Development Theory corresponding to Erikson's fourth stage, during the ages of seven to eleven when concrete operations begin. Children develop the capacity to think systematically, but only when they can refer to actual objects and use hands-on activities. Then they begin to internalize some tasks. This means they no longer need to depend on what is seen. They become capable of reversing operations. For example, they understand that $3 + 1$ is the same as $1 + 3$. When real situations are presented, they are beginning to understand others' points of view. This is further confirmed by Vygotsky's [49] description of the age levels Crisis at age 7. The three scholars corroborate our argument that in Kenyan Education system, most children start their schooling at the age of six. This in essence means that the child is able to speak, knows the parents and the country of citizenship. Therefore, alluding to the fact that "A child found in Kenya who is, or appears to be, less than eight years of age, and whose nationality and parents are not known, is presumed to be a citizen by birth" will encourage child trafficking into the country and hence encourage insecurity in the Country.

6.2. Effects of Trafficking on Children

Trafficking deprives child victims the privilege to exercise their wide range of rights, including the right to

belong/identity, the right freedom, education, to rest and leisure as well as the right not to be subjected to torture, or cruel and inhuman degrading treatment. When children are first recruited to be trafficked, they may leave home peacefully or by deception or violence, as well as abduction and application of drugs to secure children's obedience. The harm inflicted on trafficked children depends on the form or forms of exploitation to which they are subjected.

7. CONCLUSIONS

Actions to combat trafficking in children must address the conditions that make children vulnerable and target punitive measures against the traffickers rather than the victims. Looking into the future of child trafficking and its prevention, there are many things that need to be done. The governments of the world need to pass policies and laws that combat the demand for child trafficking instead of the supply. Currently, most governments that have anti-trafficking legislation have laws or policies aimed at limiting the flow of illegal migration, which often only serves to exacerbate the situation further, as it forces traffickers to become more elusive. Other issues with current legislation include legal loopholes due to inadequate definitions of trafficking, and that they are not focused on catching the trafficker or the customers of the trade. Under current legislation, the clients of child trafficking remain nameless and faceless, while the child is made out to be the villain, instead of the victim. [50] Legislations that

are more appropriate would aim at stemming the demand for children by focusing on the clients who drive to demand and the traffickers who respond to the demand.

Child trafficking is an organized criminal industry that is not going to go away overnight. The current slavery problem is far more extensive. We must use our voices and determination to call on governments to increase restrictions and regulations, and to change our society's perception in order to fight for the abolition of child trafficking. Child trafficking may never be completely eradicated from our culture, but each life saved from the horrors of child trafficking means a better future for all of us because children are our future.

8. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. The Kenyan government should strengthen laws defining and criminalizing trafficking, and establish and equip institutions to implement the laws. The government has a responsibility to vigorously investigate and prosecute traffickers and those who aid or protect them. The Kenyan government should eliminate demand by punishing the persons who pay, protect, and/or perpetuate these crimes. Development of more holistic and sensitive planning policies that incorporate child protection policies are needed in response to an increase in commercial development, international visitors, and child sex tourism. Better coordination, research methodology, data gathering, and the sharing of information across governments, regional organizations, non-governmental organizations are

needed to monitor the movement of registered international sex offenders. Equal emphasis should be placed upon the capture and prosecution of locals, foreigners, and government officials alike, which contributes to the atmosphere of impunity.

B. The Kenyan government should establish community-based structures at the border towns to counter the vice in the regions through public awareness campaigns and monitoring of the children's movement along and across the borders. Create integrated and holistic policies that approach trafficking as a human security threat to give the issue more international gravitas and national prioritization.

C. The government should train more officers and use all the legal tools at disposal to facilitate effective extradition for prosecution of traffickers. Anti-trafficking interventions must address prevention, protection and assistance, including return and resettlement.

D. Strategies to prevent trafficking must address the macroeconomic policies in both developed and developing countries that generate the push and pull factors in labor migration and thus, where that movement is illegal, directly promote trafficking.

Governments including those in industrialized countries that commit to combating trafficking must consider the possibility that, in a globalized world, their own policies contribute directly to the phenomenon they seek to eliminate. The current contradictions in trade policy are a case in point. Economically marginalized people, particularly women, in developing countries are unable to realize their

human right to a decent livelihood in their own country partly due to global inequities in trade. On the one hand, the economic liberalization promoted by industrialized countries exposes them to competition from imports in local markets. On the other, their own products continue to face trade barriers in the markets of those same industrialized economies. The result is strong pressures in those poor countries to migrate to the industrialized economies in search of the means for livelihood, often becoming victims of trafficking in the process.

REFERENCES

[1] Bravo, Karen E. Exploring the Analogy Between Modern Trafficking in Humans and the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, 25 B.U. INT'L L.J. 207, 270–271 (2007).

[2] Caraway, Nancie. Human Rights and Existing Contradictions in Asia-Pacific Human Trafficking Politics and Discourse, 14 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 295, 295 (2006).

[3] Haynes, Dina F. (Not) Found Chained to a Bed in a Brothel: Conceptual, Legal, and Procedural Failures to Fulfill the Promise of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 337, 342 (2007).

[4] Lederer, E. M. (2009, September 9). Economic Crisis May Boost Human Trafficking. Retrieved March 30, 2010, from Miami Herald: <http://www.miamiherald.com/2009/09/11/1227842/economic-crisis-may-boost-human.html>

[5] Human Security at the United Nations Newsletter-Issue 6 (Winter 2009/ 2010) <http://ochaonline.un.org/humansecurity>

[6] Beare, Margaret E., 1999, 'Illegal Migration: Personal Tragedies, Social

Problems, or National Security Threats?', in: Williams (ed.), *Illegal Migration and Commercial Sex: The New*

Slave Trade, London/Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, pp.11-41.

[7] The Declaration and Agenda for Action were adopted by 122 governments at the First World Congress against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children in Stockholm, Sweden, in 1996. As of 2006, 161 countries worldwide have adopted it.

[8] The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child Article 1. Entry into force 2 September 1990

[9] Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, Article 3 (d) 2000

[10] Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour. Article 2. (ILO No. 182.) Entry into force 19 November 2000.

[11] The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child Article 1. Entry into force 2 September 1990

[12] World Vision International, 'Public Policies'. January 2003.

[13] UNICEF. <http://www.unicef.org>. Accessed: January 2004.

[14] Anti-Slavery International, 'What is trafficking?

<http://www.antislavery.org>. Accessed: December 2011.

[15] Child Wise (2003) Trafficking <http://www.ecpat.org>. Accessed: December 2011.

[16] The Global Alliance Against the Trafficking of Women 2004. <http://www.inet.co.th/org/gaatw> Accessed: December 2011.

[17] O'Connell Julia., Davidson and Bridget Donelan, "Review of the Evidence and Debates on the "Demand Side of Trafficking," (Save the Children: Stockholm, 2003).

[18] Global March Against Child Labour, *Out of the Shadows: A*

Worldwide Report on the Worst Forms of Child Labour. India. 2000.

[19] Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, Article 3 (d) 2000

[20] Ranjan, P. (2001) Credit constraints and the phenomenon of child labor. *Journal of Development Economics*, 64(1), 81.102.

[21] "Kenya". Trafficking in Persons Report 2008. U.S. Department of State (June 4, 2008).

[22] Kumar K.C., B., Subedi, G., Gurung, Y. B., & Adhikari, K. P. (2001) Nepal, Trafficking in Girls With Special Reference to Prostitution: A Rapid Assessment. ILO-IPEC, Geneva.

[23] Trafficking in Persons Report 2009. (2009). Retrieved January 6, 2010, from United States State Department: <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2009/index.htm>

[24] Dessy, S. E. & Vencatachellum, D. (2003) Explaining cross-country differences in policy response to child labour. *Canadian Journal of Economics*, 36(1), 1.20.

[25] Trafficking in Persons Report 2009 (2009). Retrieved January 6, 2010, from United States State Department: <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2009/index.htm>

[26] ILO-IPEC (2002b). *Unbearable to the Human Heart: Child Trafficking and Action to Eliminate It*. International Labor Organization: Geneva.

[27] Trafficking in Persons Report 2009 (2009). Retrieved January 6, 2010, from United States State Department: <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2009/index.htm>

[28] Njeru, Gitonga (2011) Women News Network on human trafficking in Kenya

[29] Okoth Dann (16/12/2011) Human trafficking rife despite end of slavery <http://www>.

standardmedia.co.ke/InsidePage.php?id=2000048461&cid=4&

[30] Njeru, Gitonga (2011) Women News Network on human trafficking in Kenya.

[31] Mwinzi, Bernard (November 26, 2009) Daily Nation. <http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/813340/-/vnh6es/-/index.html>. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gilbert_Deya Retrieved 11 April 2010.

[32] Jon, Douglas (1 April 2010) "Miracle babies' pastor in UK despite extradition". BBC. Retrieved 9 April 2010.

[33] Miracle baby' a victim - judge. news.bbc.co.uk. 12 November 2004. Retrieved 11 April 2010 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gilbert_Deya

[34] Mwinzi, Bernard (November 26, 2009) Daily Nation. <http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/813340/-/vnh6es/-/index.html>. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gilbert_Deya Retrieved 11 April 2010.

[35] Njeru, Gitonga (2008) Corruption Kenya drives rise in girl-child trafficking.

[36] All CIA World Factbooks (18 December 2003 to 18 December 2008) Trafficking in Persons Report <http://www.nationmaster.com/country/kenya/crime>.

[37] "Kenya". Trafficking in Persons Report 2008. U.S. Department of State (June 4, 2008).

[38] Human Trafficking in Kenya – Probity of an Emerging New Trend, Published on July 6, 2011) <http://smilekenya.com/138/human-trafficking-in-kenya>.

[39] The Kenya Constitution 2010

[40] Miruka Kenan and Oluoch Nick (01/11/2011) Child traffickers using church <http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/InsidePage.php?id=2000046003&cid=658>.

[41] The Christian Post (Wed, Nov. 02 2011) Girls Trafficked into Kenya from East African Countries <http://www.soschildrensvillages.ca/news/news/child-protection-news/child-trafficking-news/pages/girls-trafficked-kenya-east-african-076.aspx>

[42] The Christian Post (Wed, Nov. 02 2011) Girls Trafficked into Kenya from East African Countries <http://www.soschildrensvillages.ca/news/news/child-protection-news/child-trafficking-news/pages/girls-trafficked-kenya-east-african-076.aspx>.

[43] Erikson, Erik H. (1993) [1950] *Childhood and Society*. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company. p. 242.

[44] Piaget, J. (2000). "Commentary on Vygotsky". *New Ideas in Psychology*, 18, 241–259.

[45] Erikson, Erik H. (1959) *Identity and the Life Cycle*. New York: International Universities Press.

[46] Erikson, Erik H. (1968) *Identity, Youth and Crisis*. New York: Norton.

[47] Erikson, Erik H. (1993) [1950] *Childhood and Society*. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company. p. 242.

[48] Piaget, J. (1983) "Piaget's theory". In P. Mussen (ed). *Handbook of Child Psychology*. 4th edition. Vol. 1. New York: Wiley.

[49] Vygotsky, L. S. (1978) *Mind in society: The development of higher psychological processes*. Chapter 6 Interaction between learning and development (79-91). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

[50] International, E. (2009) *Stop Sex Trafficking of Children and Young People*. Retrieved January 30, 2010, from ECPAT: http://www.ecpat.org.uk/downloads/Full_Report_Global_Child_Trafficking_for_Sexual_Purposes.pdf

ROMANIA'S PARTICIPATION TO THE AEGIS BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM AS REFLECTED BY ROMANIAN NEWSPAPERS' EVALUATIVE DISCOURSE

Raluca Mihaela LEVONIAN

Lecturer, PhD, University of Calabria /
Teaching Assistant, University of Bucharest

This study aims to investigate Romanian media discourse on the current standing of the relations between Romania and the United States of America in the military field. The main topic investigated is connected to Romania's decision to host the land-based component of the Ballistic Missile Defense System on its ground, an event which attracted significant media coverage during the year 2011. The corpus analyzed consisted of 37 news and opinion items and reports published on the site of three Romanian newspapers. The main research questions were to assess whether the evaluations of this event were positive or negative, who were the actors issuing these statements and what objects were discussed in association to this event. The results showed that positive evaluations were more common than negative evaluations and that the official stances on this topic formed a very coherent perspective, endorsing the project.

Key words: *stance, evaluation, newspaper discourse, Romania, U.S.A.*

1. INTRODUCTION

In September 2011, the conclusion of the agreement regarding the hosting of a land-based component of the U.S. Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) System in Romania marked a significant moment in the field of the military and diplomatic relations between the two states. This cooperation has proved to be a constant in the Romanian foreign politics after the fall of the communist regime and it has been enhanced since Romania became a N.A.T.O. and European Union member.

An important component in the imaginary of the European societies, the image of America is characterized by the combination of opposite values: it can be represented both as the land of freedom and as the realm of decadence, superficiality and consumerism [1]. This ambivalence is particularly visible in the case of those European states which have had a totalitarian regime in the 20th century. The negative image of the U.S.A. was promoted by the discourse of the communist authorities, which stigmatized it as a corrupt and imperialist state. At the same time, common people dreamed

about an intervention decided by U.S. officials that would miraculously put an end to the domination of the Soviet Union, a desire which permeated the national mythologies and imaginaries for a long time during the Cold War. Communist propaganda has constantly depicted the Western countries as a main enemy of the worldwide peace and of the communist citizens' prosperity, but the borders between "us" and "the others" have been completely changed at present when international – not only national – security is facing the threat of terrorism.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The investigation of the media discourse in a given community offers an insight into its systems of values and beliefs. It is widely accepted that news fulfill more than the functions of disseminating information or providing entertainment for the public and that their significance can only be understood in connection to the social and cultural context in which they are encoded and decoded. News discourse functions jointly with other institutions and discourses which exist in the society at a given moment [2]. Berkowitz identifies three possible meanings of the cultural dimension of the news. First, news articles reflect the culture of their production and the values of the society in which they are produced; second, news is

shaped by the global context. A third meaning results from the property of each culture to develop relations of power; media convey these cultural specific representations of power which reinforce the current social structure [3].

Media discourse combines intended objectivity and unavoidable subjectivity, as the intention to depict the real facts collides with the action of the social and cultural values at stake [4]. This category of discourse corresponds to two of the three types of stancetaking (physical action, personal attitude, social morality) identified by [5]. We believe that identifying expressions of stance in media texts might give an insight into the beliefs and images of a community at a given moment. Following the terminology proposed by [6], this study is particularly focused on the actors whose opinions are expressed in the texts and on the objects or topics discussed, while other aspects, as the discursive strategies involved might represent a topic for further research.

3. DATA & METHODOLOGY

The corpus consists of a total of 37 articles (26 news articles, 9 opinion articles, 2 reports) which have been published online during the year 2011 on the sites of three Romanian journals. One of them, *Gândul*, appears only online while the other two, *Adevărul* and *România liberă*, also have a print version. The databases available on each site have

been searched using the keywords Romania, SUA, scut antirachetă, sistemul Aegis. The articles which have been selected had to refer to the development of the military relations between Romania and the USA during 2011, especially to the negotiations and the treaty regarding the Ballistic Missile Defense System. This media event had the following main phases. At the beginning of May 2011, Romanian authorities announced that the land-based component of the BMD System will be installed in the Romanian village Deveselu. In September 2011, the Romanian president made an official visit to Washington for the conclusion of the negotiations. On this occasion, the agreement was signed by the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the Romanian Minister for Foreign Affairs Teodor Baconschi in Washington. The subject was also debated at the NATO Parliamentary meeting which took place in Bucharest in October. Because of their “news value”, all these phases were reflected by the Romanian media, which also highlighted the social dimension of this event as it concerned the future development of the Romanian community in Deveselu.

The main research questions were: (1) how are these events evaluated in the media and who are the actors issuing these statements; (2) which are the main topics discussed in the texts about this event. A further topic of investigation which emerged in

this phase concerned the specific lexical items, stylistic devices and the discursive strategies used in the framing of the “strategic partnership” between Romania and the USA. The main method used was content analysis.

4. A MUTUALLY PROFITABLE PARTNERSHIP

All texts have been read and lexical items (nouns, adjectives, verbs and adverbs) functioning as evaluative markers have been identified. Only evaluative judgments referring to the conclusion of the treaty, to the Aegis BMD System and to the general depiction of the bilateral relations have been taken into account. The results show that, on average, these topics have received more positive than negative evaluations in the newspaper texts but also that speakers with different social status tended to evaluate the event differently or to focus on different aspects of the event.

Table 1 presents the status of evaluations in the articles analyzed as they ranged from positive to negative, mixed and neutral. The labeling of the evaluations made by some articles as “neutral” is to be understood as no evaluation being made explicit neither by the journalist, nor by the persons quoted.

Table 1. Positive and negative evaluations in the articles analyzed

	Positive evaluations only	Negative evaluations only	Mixed evaluations	Neutral tone
Total number of articles	13	4	11	9

Most quotations in the news articles come from public authorities, representing what can be labeled the “official” stance, as the quoted persons do not voice their individual opinions but the perspective of the institutions represented. Such actors in the public sphere are the Romanian government officials, namely the President, Traian Băsescu, and the Secretary of State, Bogdan Aurescu or the representatives of the local administration, for example the mayor of Deveselu. U.S. officials (e.g. the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, and the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control, Ellen Tauscher) are also frequently quoted. In the case of the Romanian authorities, their public act of stancetaking is combined with the necessity to inform the people and the media about the development of the negotiations, the conclusion of the treaty and its consequences. These actors voice a coherent perspective, highlighting the advantages of the project, and even representatives of opposition parties have endorsed the

decision regarding the installment of the system component in Romania (source 8).

The official stance-taking include evaluations at a macro and a micro level. Evaluation at the macro level is focused on the project as a whole and on its benefits for Romania as a nation. The idea of partnership between Romania and the USA is highlighted in the discourse of the officials representing both states. The Romanian secretary of state for foreign affairs alleged that “*această participare a României va contribui la consolidarea relațiilor bilaterale*” [“*this participation of Romania will concur to the strengthening of the bilateral relations*”] (source 12) while the Minister of Foreign Affairs said, during his visit to Washington, “*stăm alături de voi, cum am stat întotdeauna*” [“*we are standing by your side, as we have always done*”] (source 32). According to Hillary Clinton, Romania has thus gained a major role in the NATO missile defense architecture, an assertion which was afterwards quoted in the headlines and in the news texts.

Another idea which attracted positive evaluations was connected to the economic benefits of this decision for Romania. The idea was formulated by Romanian officials and it has been widely reiterated by the media both in headlines like *Cum ar putea aduce scutul antirachetă bani pentru România* [How could the antimissile shield bring money for Romania]; *Ce câștigă România din scutul american antirachetă*

[What does Romania gain from the American antimissile shield] and in articles: “*târg reciproc avantajos cu americanii*” [“*a mutually profitable deal with the Americans*”] (source 29); “*Însă de la scutul antirachetă american mulți români se așteaptă și la beneficii concrete*” [“*But from the American antimissile shield many Romanians are also expecting tangible benefits*”] (source 17).

At the micro level, the evaluations address the situation of the village Deveselu. The media depicted it as a rather “poor” community, whose inhabitants were affected by unemployment. The hosting of the Aegis component has been perceived as a means to create working places for Romanians and to attract funding for future investments: „*«Dar știți de când îi aștept?!»* răspunde însuși țăitul primarul Gheorghe Beciu. *«[...] aeroportul s-a dizolvat. Și uite că, după atâția ani, vin americanii tocmai la Deveselu. Ei știu despre ce e vorba, iar lucrurile s-au negociat profesionist, între ofițeri, nu între politicieni.»*” [“*But do you know how long I’ve been waiting for them?!*” The mayor Gheorghe Beciu answers eagerly. *[...] the airport has been closed. And look, after so many years, the Americans are coming precisely to Deveselu. They know what it’s all about and the matter has been negotiated in a competent manner, between officers, not between politicians.’*] (source 33).

There were a few cases when actors who played a role in the public sphere issued negative statements at

the macro level, hence contradicting the main “elite” perspective. Two news items mentioned that foreign officials expressed their skepticism regarding the efficiency of the project at the NATO Parliamentary Meeting in Bucharest, in September 2011. The status of the speaker, in this case, was considered to justify the character of the news: “*Chiar vicepreședintele Adunării Parlamentare a NATO, francezul Jean M. Boucheron, a explicat că sistemul este ineficient și că scutul ar atrage mai mult agresiuni.*” [“*Even the vicepresident of the NATO Parliamentary Meeting, the French Jean M. Boucheron, explained that the system is inefficient and that the shield would attract more aggressions.*”] (source 1). Seven articles reported the negative stance taken by Russian officials and media on this topic.

5. NEW MASTERS AND OLD COMMUNITIES

An interesting situation occurs when voices which do not play a role in the public sphere are heard. While the discourse of the public authorities is reported mostly in news items, private actors are quoted in opinion texts and in reports. According to [7] “*it is important to the newspapers to include references to people – because of the factor of ‘personalization’ mentioned above – but their status as sources is accidental rather than privileged*”. Though the “private actors” are fewer than the “public” ones, the insertion

of their opinions and judgments in the newspaper articles is meant to give the impression of authentic depiction of the Romanian reality. It is also important that, according to recent research, editorials or opinion pages are more trusted by the public “for understanding and interpreting the meaning of international affairs” [8]. The persons quoted in the reports were mostly inhabitants of the village Deveselu. They were interviewed because of their belonging to this specific community. The reporter asked them to evaluate the efficiency of the project and/ or to express their judgments and feelings about what was described as the “arrival of the Americans” in their village, an allusion to the historical period between 1945 and 1965. After the Romanian communist party had taken the power, the citizens hoped that they would be saved by an American action at the political and the military level.

The “personal” stances expressed in the corpus included mostly negative evaluations of the topic. Besides providing a counter-perspective on the event, their statements manage to shift the discussed topic from the complexity of the bilateral relations to the stereotypical „us”/ „them” binary scheme. Instead of the idea of partnership, the lexical choices and the stylistic devices employed suggest that the relationship between the two states is depicted as profoundly asymmetrical: “Deveselu: se schimbă doar stăpânul” [“Deveselu: only the

master is changing”]; “Cu ce să ne ajute pe noi americanii?” [“How can the Americans help us?”] (source 29). The voices of the common people mingle, contrast and collide with the public discourse and their status may be more important for the message conveyed as it may appear; such voices are able to express a specific attitude without threatening the newspaper’s position. The simple echoing in the newspaper texts functions sometimes as a tacit agreement. In other cases, the journalists openly assert their knowledge of the attitudes and opinions of the public: “Mulțumiți?! Zic, conștient că deveselenii [...] sunt perfect sătisiți de interesul pogorât peste capetele lor [...]” [“Satisfied?! I say, aware that the people of Deveselu are absolutely tired of the interest suddenly concerning them”] (source 33).

6. TERRORISM & SECURITY ISSUES IN THE NEWS AND OPINION TEXTS

In all the analyzed texts, the broad objects were considered to be the BMD System and Romania’s hosting of one of its components. Four specific issues have been associated to the objects considered, namely terrorism, technical features of the system, details of the treaty, and economic consequences, as presented in **Table 2**.

Table 2. Specific issues discussed in the analyzed corpus.

Topic discussed	News items	Opinion articles	Reports
Terrorism	4	3	2
Technical features of the system	8	-	1
Details of the treaty	17	-	-
Economic consequences	5	1	1

The most extensive coverage was obtained by the two topics strictly connected to the event: the conclusion of the agreement and the technical features of the AEGIS system. Although the system has been designed to counteract terrorist threats, this main function has received limited coverage in the Romanian media. One possible explanation for the little information on the topic of terrorism is that it may have been regarded as a remote danger without any direct consequences for Romanian people till present. The idea was also reinforced by the official speeches, which asserted that raising Romania's warning level for terrorism was unnecessary. The allegation that the cooperation with the U.S.A. included both risks and benefits was mentioned in a few articles but not further developed. At most, it led to the construction of headlines in the style of the tabloids, being used as a device to attract the

readers' attention: *Bogdan Aurescu: România poate fi țintă! Vezi ce conține acordul privind scutul de la Deveselu!* [Bogdan Aurescu: Romania may be a target! See what the agreement regarding the Deveselu shield consists of!].

Some authors of opinion articles mentioning the terrorism topic express a clear dissent with the possibility that Iran may construct and launch ballistic missiles. The headline of an opinion text is based on a rhetorical device, formulating a question and immediately denying it: *De ce ne temem de Iran? O întrebare pe care nu o punem* [Why are we afraid of Iran? A question that we do not ask]. The author of this text clearly states his agreement with the general positive evaluations of the Aegis System while also insisting on the importance of avoiding a stereotypical representation of Iran and of its citizens as a dangerous "other" which must be fought against. At the geopolitical level, another journalist draws attention to a closer (and therefore possibly more dangerous) "other" represented by Russia and thus reminds the readers of the narratives of the Cold War. In his opinion, the fight against terrorism in the Arab world is less significant than the incapacity of the U.S.A. to control the Black Sea area (to introduce democracy in the Republic of Moldavia, as the author puts it). The deictic used by the writer, the Romanian pronoun "noi" ("us") forces an agreement with the readers and thus asserting

his belonging to a greater and more signi cant community: "Pentru noi, cei din 'Noua Europă', care nu am crede povestea cu scutul american anti-Iran nici dacă ar adevărată, miza este crucială" ["For us, those from the New Europe, who wouldn't believe the story of the American shield against Iran not even if it were true, the stake is crucial"] (source 20).

The of cial discourse mentions the raise of Romania's security level as a positive consequence of the participation in the Aegis system. On the other side, the journalists manifest doubts about this advantage in terms of security, because it is considered of less importance in comparison to other topics and to the internal state of affairs. This proves to be a constant feature of the newspaper discourse on the Aegis topic, as the internal politics and problems of Romania are brought into discussion and opposed to its evolution in the sphere of foreign affairs (e.g. source 11). The author of another opinion text denies the depiction of the event (the conclusion of the bilateral agreement in Washington) as "historical" and treats it from an ironical perspective: *Deveselu, Rovine, Călugăreni*. This headline resorts to the readers' background knowledge in order to be correctly interpreted. *Rovine* and *Călugăreni* represent the name of two places in the actual Romania, where two famous battles took place during the Middle Ages, both concluded with the victory of the army of Wallachia against the Turks.

Placing the village *Deveselu* in this series indicates a logic incongruence regarding the importance and a shift from traditional or "canonical" history to what can be termed as "contemporary" history.

7. CONCLUSIONS

The conclusion of the agreement between Romania and the U.S.A. was likely to attract news coverage, not only because of the general interest of the media in dealing with "important" nations [9], but also because it had been anticipated by the strong cooperation in the ght against terrorism in the last decade. Romania's decision to host the land-based component of the system has generally received positive evaluations from public actors and from a part of the journalists. Negative evaluations issued by public actors were directed against the ef ciency of the project while negative evaluations coming from private persons showed doubtfulness regarding the possibility that Romania might bene t from the military cooperation with the U.S.A. The journalists' perspectives on the topic were mixed, generally endorsing the military cooperation but also expressing dissatisfaction at the lack of more visible bene ts for Romania. The content analysis showed that positive and negative evaluations on this topic can be ultimately reduced to the representation of power, solidarity and status in the relations between the two countries.

REFERENCES

- [1] Kroes, Rob, 1996. If you've seen one, you've seen the mall: Europeans and American mass culture. University of Illinois Press, Urbana and Chicago.
- [2] Hartley, John, 1999. Discursul știrilor. [Understanding News], translation by Mona Mîtarcă. Polirom, Iași, P. 18.
- [3] Berkowitz, Daniel A., 2011. Introduction. In Daniel A. Berkowitz (ed.). Cultural Meanings of News. A Text-Reader. Sage Publications Inc., Thousand Oaks, California, p. xv.
- [4] Hartley, John, 1999. Discursul știrilor. [Understanding News], translation by Mona Mîtarcă. Polirom, Iași.
- [5] Englebretson, Robert (ed.), 2007. Stancetaking in Discourse: Subjectivity, Evaluation, Interaction. John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam / Philadelphia, p.6.
- [6] Carvalho, Anabela, 2008. Media(ted) Discourse and Society. In: Journalism Studies, 9:2, 161-177.
- [7] Fowler, Roger, 1991. Language in the News. Discourse and Ideology in the Press. Routledge, London, New York, p. 22.
- [8] Le, E., 2003. Information Sources as a Persuasive Strategy in Editorials: Le Monde and the New York Times. In: Ismail, Amani, Mervat Yousef, Dan Berkowitz, 2009. American in crisis: opinion discourses, the Iraq War and the politics of identity. In: Media, War & Conflict, vol. 2 (2): 149-170 (p.153).
- [9] Hartley, John, 1999. ibidem, p. 87.
- [10] Klein, Adam G., Carolyn M. Byerly, Tony M. McEachern, 2009. Counterframing Public Dissent: An Analysis of Antiwar Coverage in the U.S. Media. In: Critical Studies in Media Communication, vol.26, no.4, 331-350.

OTHER SOURCES

- [1] Scutul antirachetă american din România, criticat la București, Adevărul, 08.10.2011. (http://www.adevarul.ro/international/AP_NATO-Bucuresti-intepaturi_0_568743299.html).
- [2] Alexandru, Corina, Baconschi vrea ca acordul pentru scut să e semnat de Băsescu și Obama, România liberă, 05.05.2011. (<http://www.romanalibera.ro/actualitate/eveniment/baconschi-vrea-ca-acordul-pentru-scut-sa-fie-semnat-de-basescu-si-obama-224389.html>).
- [3] Alexandru, Corina, Rusia, interesată de contribuția României la scutul antirachetă, România liberă, 08.10.2011. (<http://www.romanalibera.ro/actualitate/eveniment/rusia-interesata-de-contributia-romaniei-la-scutul-antiracheta-240319.html>).
- [4] Badea, Miruna, Acordul privind scutul antirachetă, negociat de România și SUA, a fost parafat la Washington, Gândul, 07.06.2011. (<http://www.gandul.info/news/acordul-privind-scutul-antiracheta-negociat-de-romania-si-sua-a-fost-parafat-la-washington-8320256>).
- [5] Badea, Miruna, Ce vor face americanii la Deveselu. Iată principalele prevederi ale acordului privind scutul antirachetă, Gândul, 23.09.2011. (<http://www.gandul.info/politica/ce-vor-face-americanii-la-deveselu-iata-principalele-prevederi-ale-acordului-privind-scutul-antiracheta-8790031>).
- [6] Câmpeanu, Cristian, Avem scut antirachetă! Urmează reacția Rusiei, România liberă, 22.05.2011. (<http://www.romanalibera.ro/actualitate/eveniment/avem-scut-antiracheta-urmeaza-reactia-rusiei-264780.html>).
- [7] Chiruta, Răzvan, Deveselu – comuna care apără Europa, România liberă, 04.05.2011. (<http://www.romanalibera.ro/actualitate/ro-actualitate/ro-actualitate-264780.html>).

romanalibera.ro/exclusiv-rl/documentar/deveselu-comuna-care-apara-europa-224209.html)

[8] Ciolac, Florin, Dadacus, Liviu, Ce spun Geoană și Antonescu despre scutul antirachetă, *Gândul*, 03.05.2011. (<http://www.gandul.info/news/ce-spun-geoana-si-antonescu-despre-scutul-antiracheta-8223030>)

[9] Cristea, Radu Călin, Deveselu, Rovine, Călugăreni, *Adevărul*, 14.09.2011. (http://www.adevarul.ro/opinii/comentarii/radu_calin_cristea_-_comentarii/Deveselu-Rovine-Calugareni_7_554414554.html)

[10] Cristea, Radu Călin, (Nenea) Iancu de Deveselu, *Adevărul*, 01.06.2011. (http://www.adevarul.ro/opinii/comentarii/radu_calin_cristea_comentarii/Nenea_Iancu_de_Deveselu_7_491420854.html)

[11] Cristoiu, Ion, Ce-ar zis Ionel Brătianu despre vizita în SUA, *Adevărul*, 18.09.2011 (http://www.adevarul.ro/ion_cristoiu/Ce-ar_fi_zis_Ionel_Bratianu_despre_vizita_in_SUA_7_556814316.html)

[12] Crișan, Magda, Băsescu se duce la Obama să semneze acordul privind scutul antirachetă de la Deveselu, *Adevărul*, 10.09.2011. (http://www.adevarul.ro/actualitate/Basescu_se_duce_la_Obama_sa_semneze_acordul_privind_scutul_antiracheta_de_la_Deveselu_0_551945022.html#)

[13] Crișan, Magda, Cine activează scutul antirachetă de la Deveselu, *Adevărul*, 14.09.2011. (http://www.adevarul.ro/international/activeaza-scutul-antiracheta-Deveselu_0_553745204.html#)

[14] Crișan, Magda, Nicio mișcare la baza americană, fără știința României, *Adevărul*, 13.09.2011. (http://www.adevarul.ro/international/sua/Nicio_miscare_la_baza_american_a_fara_stiinta_Romaniei_0_553744949.html)

[15] Crișan, Magda, Scutul SUA încinge spiritele la București, *Adevărul*, 09.10.2011. (http://www.adevarul.ro/international/Scutul_SUA_incinge_spiritele_la_Bucuresti_0_569343434.html)

[16] Crișan, Magda, Soldații americani care vin la Deveselu vor judecați după legile SUA, *Adevărul*, 23.09.2011.

(http://www.adevarul.ro/actualitate/eveniment/Soldatii_american_i_care_vin_la_Deveselu_vor_fi_judecati_dupa_legile_SUA_0_559744194.html)

[17] Crișan, Magda, Adina Vlad, Dan Straut, Ce urmează după vizita lui Băsescu în America, *Adevărul*, 15.09.2011.

(http://www.adevarul.ro/actualitate/Ce_urmeaza_dupa_vizita_lui_Basescu_in_America_0_554345227.html)

[18] Dadacus, Liviu, Baconschi roagă presa să nu rătă de Deveselu, locul în care va amplasat scutul antirachetă, *Gândul*, 05.05.2011. (<http://www.gandul.info/news/baconschi-roaga-presa-sa-nu-rada-de-deveselu-locul-in-care-va--amplasat-scutul-antiracheta-petre-roman-am-inteles-ca-acolo-nu-aunici-canalizare-8231925>)

[19] Dumitru, Andra, Rusia se simte amenințată de scutul României, România liberă, 03.05.2011. (<http://www.romanalibera.ro/actualitate/eveniment/rusia-se-simte-amenintata-de-scutul-romaniei-224230.html>)

[20] Dungaciu, Dan, Războiul pierdut al SUA nu e cu terorismul, *Adevărul*, 11.09.2011. (http://www.adevarul.ro/international/Razboiul_pierdut_al_SUA_nu_e_cu_terorismul_0_551345357.html)

[21] Duță, Mihai, Pe scut, *Adevărul*, 10.05.2011. (http://www.adevarul.ro/opinii/comentarii/opinii_la_zi/Pe_scut_0_478152559.html#)

[22] Holban, Laura, Sondaj: 9 la sută dintre români nu știu că suntem în NATO, 41 la sută n-au auzit de implicarea României în scutul antirachetă, *Gândul*, 02.05.2011. (<http://www.gandul.info/news/sondaj-9-la-suta-dintre-romani-nu-stiu-ca-suntem-in-nato-41-la-suta-n-au-auzit-de-implicarea-romaniei-in-scutul-antiracheta-8215300>)

[23] Munteanu, Lelia, A opta minune de la Caracal, *Gândul*, 07.05.2011. (<http://www.gandul.info/puterea-gandului/a-opta-minune-de-la-caracal-8228941>)

[24] Nahoi, Ovidiu, Băsescu în SUA: „Bravo!” și „Huo!”, *Adevărul*, 18.09.2011. (http://www.adevarul.ro/ovidiu_nahoi_-_editorial/Basescu_in_SUA_-_Bravo_-_si_-_Huo_7_556814317.html)

[25] Nicolae, Dragoș, De ce ne temem de Iran? O întrebare pe care nu o punem, *România liberă*, 30.11.2011. (<http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/mapamond/de-ce-ne-temem-de-iran-o-intrebare-pe-care-nu-o-punem-224424.html>)

[26] Pecheanu, Gabriel, Badea, Miruna, România și SUA au semnat Acordul privind scutul antirachetă. Clinton: România va un actor central în viitoarea arhitectură antirachetă a NATO, *Gândul*, 13.09.2011. (<http://www.gandul.info/news/romania-si-sua-au-semnat-acordul-privind-scutul-antiracheta-clinton-romania-va-fi-un-actor-central-in-viitoarea-arhitectura-antiracheta-a-nato-8743633>)

[27] Popescu, Andrei Luca, Cristina Dobreanu, La ce-i folosește României scutul antirachetă lângă Caracal, *România liberă*, 04.05.2011. (<http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/eveniment/la-ce-i-foloseste-romaniei-scut-antiracheta-langa-caracal-224216.html>)

[28] Rotariu, Victor, Cum ar putea aduce scutul antirachetă bani pentru

România, *Gândul*, 03.05.2011. (<http://www.gandul.info/puterea-gandului/cum-ar-putea-aduce-scutul-antiracheta-bani-pentru-romania-8223451>)

[29] Sibii, Răzvan, Magda Crișan, România sub scut: de ce aici și ce câștigăm, *Adevărul*, 16.05.2011 (http://www.adevarul.ro/actualitate/dosar/Romania_sub_scut_de_ce_aici_si_ce_castigam_0_481152193.html)

[30] Stoica, Mihaela, Cât a plătit România pentru războaiele Americii. Ce va primi Traian Băsescu în schimb la Washington?, *Adevărul*, 13.09.2011. (http://www.adevarul.ro/actualitate/eveniment/Cat_a_platit_Basescu_pentru_razboaiele_Americii_Ce_va_primi_in_schimb_la_Washington_0_553744891.html)

[31] Stoica, Mihaela, Magda Crișan, Bogdan Aurescu: România poate țintă! Vezi ce conține acordul privind scutul de la Deveselu!, *Adevărul*, 23.09.2011. (http://www.adevarul.ro/actualitate/eveniment/MAE_face_public_Acord_privind_amplasarea_scutului_SUA_la_Deveselu_0_559744080.html)

[32] Stoica, Mihaela, Alina Vasile, Hillary Clinton și Baconschi au semnat acordul privind scutul antirachetă. Clinton: România va un actor central în viitoarea arhitectură antirachetă a NATO, *Adevărul*, 14.09.2011. (http://www.adevarul.ro/actualitate/eveniment/WEB_Hillary_Clinton_si_Teodor_Baconschi_semneaza_astazi_acordul_privind_scutul_antiracheta_0_553744635.html)

[33] Sultănoiu, Marian, Cum s-a infiltrat CIA pe străzile comunei românești unde americanii instalează scutul antirachetă, *Gândul*, 07.05.2011. (<http://www.gandul.info/reportaj/cum-s-a-infiltrat-cia-pe-strazile-comunei-romanesti-unde-americanii-instaleaza-scutul-antiracheta-8236926>)

[34] Vasile, Alina, SUA vor informa Guvernul României despre situația sistemului american de apărare a Europei, *Adevărul*, 13.09.2011. (http://www.adevarul.ro/international/web-SUA_vor_informa_Guvernul_Romaniei_despre_situatia_sistemului_american_de_aparare_a_Europei_0_553745211.html)

[35] Veress, Robert, Ce câștigă România din scutul american antirachetă, *Gândul*, 03.05.2011. (<http://www.gandul.info/news/ce-castiga-romania-din-scutul-american-antiracheta-8222941>)

[36] Veress, Robert, Băsescu anunță locul unde vor amplasate în România

rachetele americanilor. Ce spune primarul din Deveselu, chemat luni seara la Cotroceni să-și dea acordul, *Gândul*, 03.05.2011. (<http://www.gandul.info/news/basescu-anunta-locul-unde-vor-fi-amplasate-in-romania-rachetele-americanilor-ce-spune-primarul-din-deveselu-chemat-luni-seara-la-cotroceni-sa-si-dea-acordul-8219766>)

[37] Vinteanu, Radu, Traian Băsescu, primarului din Deveselu: „Te-a luat presa în târbacă”, *Gândul*, 04.05.2011. (<http://www.gandul.info/news/traian-basescu-primarului-din-deveselu-te-a-luat-presa-in-tarbaca-8227927>)

NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE CONFERENCE, SIBIU, 2012: A MAJOR EVENT IN THE LIFE OF THE ALLIANCE

Marin ILIE *
Gheorghe ION **

* LT GEN (ret) professor, PhD,
National Defense University “Carol I”, Bucharest, Romania

** COL (ret), PhD, Lawyer, PhD, The Bar of Bucharest, Romania

The unfolding of the NATO Military Committee Conference in Sibiu, September 14-16, 2012 marked an important event in the life of the Alliance. The Committee is the highest decision-making forum within NATO and its decisions critically impact the latter's future. Romania hosted the conference based on a multiannual rotation schedule. Its designation as an organizer is actually an acknowledgment of its credibility as NATO member, as well as of its capacity to undertake such an endeavor. The aim of this article is to highlight the role of the Military Committee, as well as the commitments made by Romania as an Alliance member. Thus, this material actually bridges the gap in the coverage of this event at national and international level.

Key words: *Military Committee, NATO, security, military missions.*

As a NATO member state, Romania hosted events of importance to the Alliance's future development. For example: in 2004, the Informal Meeting of the Defense Ministers took place in Braşov, and in 2008, the NATO Summit was organized in Bucharest. In 2011, 14-16 September, the NATO Military Committee, the most important decision-making forum within the Alliance, held a conference in Sibiu. The agenda of the meeting included [1] topics of great interest and concern for the Alliance related to the global security situation, an analysis of the latest developments in North Africa and Middle East, the military endeavors

taken towards the implementation of the decisions made by the heads of state and government during the Chicago Summit unfolded in 2011, the Afghanistan mission, the military operations in West Balkans, the ongoing military operations, namely ISAF in Afghanistan and KFOR in the West Balkans, the status of NATO transformation and the structure review of the International General Staff.

The Conference was headed by the President of the NATO Military Committee, the Danish General Knud Bartels and attended by the Director of the International Military Staff (IMS), Lieutenant General Jurgen

Borneman (later replaced once his mandate was over by Christopher Harper, UK [2]), the commandants of NATO's two strategic commands, namely the Supreme Allied Command for Europe (SACEUR) represented by Admiral James Stavridis, and the Supreme Allied Command Transformation from Norfolk represented by both its acting commandant, General Stephane Abrial, and its future head (as of 24 September 2012), the French General Jean-Paul Palomeros, General John Allen, the Commandant of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), as well as by the heads of the General Staffs from the 28 NATO member states and by states' military representatives from Brussels.

The important role played by the NATO Military Committee in terms of the decisions made at the Alliances' level is derived from the following responsibilities:

- Assistance and counseling for the political-military structures of the Alliance (i.e. the North Atlantic Council and the Nuclear Planning Group);
- Information dissemination and counseling for the General Secretary and for the North-Atlantic Council (the most important political authority in NATO).

This extremely brief presentation of the MC's main responsibilities proves that the latter is actually the link between the political and military parts of the Alliance. In this context, we would like to emphasize that the President of the MC is also the main counselor of the Secretary General

and North-Atlantic Council, as well as the spokesperson of the military component of NATO.

As we have highlighted at the beginning of this article, by organizing this Conference, as well as previous NATO events Romania proved once again its important role as a member state. In this respect, we would like to underline the part played by of our country in the implementation of the decisions made by the Military Committee, all of which actually grants it credibility and a well defined place within NATO. Generally speaking, Romania participates to the whole spectrum of missions and operations of the Alliance by contributing personnel and military technology in accordance with its commitments made at international level. Since 1996, Romania has been part of NATO missions like the ones from Bosnia-Herzegovina (IFOR and KFOR), or later, in 2000 the KFOR mission from Kosovo. As a result, our country played and is still playing through its maneuver unit from SACEUR's Strategic Reserve, an important role in peace keeping in the West Balkans. To all of the above, there are also missions like the one of the air police in the Baltic countries, the participation into the Iraqi Freedom operation from Iraq, the NATO Training Missions for the Iraqi security forces. Moreover, worth reminding is Romania's participation with a frigate to the Active Endeavor Operation from the Mediterranean Sea (i.e. the UNIFIED PROTECTOR mission). One of the most important, efficient and long-lasting mission our country has been

part of is the NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan started in 2002 and which, nowadays totals 1763 military. It is absolutely necessary to mention that Romanian troops are actually displaced in a highly volatile area (*i.e* Zabul) and that makes the militaries' mission even more challenging. In accordance with NATO's decision to completely transfer the security and governance responsibilities to the local Afghan authorities by the end of 2014, as of 2013 Romania will gradually diminish its contribution to this theater of operations so that, by the already established deadline the Romanian troops' mission is over. In this respect, the statement made by Knud Bartels, the President of the NATO Military Committee is relevant: *"For the next 27 months, we will continue to train and support the Afghan forces so that by the end of 2014 they will be able to ensure the security of their country. There is still a hard fight to undertake, and that will be a challenge and an originator of unavoidable regresses. However, as a result of the support provided, Afghanistan has made remarkable progress in its development as a country. The new NATO mission will not be an ISAF by a different name, but will only be focused on enabling the Afghan people to ensure security and thus take over this mission from NATO."* [3]

Upon analyzing the statement above, we can conclude that NATO continues to maintain a responsible attitude towards the closing of its ISAF mission and the future development of Afghanistan. By taking great endeavors at the cost of human lives

and not only, NATO has made a great contribution to the development of Afghanistan in accordance with the principles of democracy, freedom and human rights.

All of the above considered, we believe it is our duty to highlight the efficiency of the Romanian participation to the mission in Afghanistan as long as that resulted in the loss of human lives, as well as in financial and material efforts at a time when the whole world is confronted with the economic crisis. However, Romania has succeeded in overcoming the inherent difficulties and thus, has proved a trustworthy partner for the Alliance and for Afghanistan.

Concerning the Conference from Sibiu, there are several issues from the press release that are worth mentioning.

The talks among the 28 defense heads from NATO member states during the Military Committee Conference unfolded in Sibiu focused on the Strategic Plan for Afghanistan of the Alliance (NSPA) endorsed by the heads of states and government representatives at the Chicago Summit. The plan establishes the premises for NATO's presence in Afghanistan after its ISAF mission closure.

As agreed at Chicago, the initial planning for a new mission focused on training, counseling and support of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is under way. The heads of the General Staffs from NATO member countries talked about the plan based on which NATO is to be further involved in Afghanistan

after 2014. Based on the information provided by this plan, the North-Atlantic Council is to make more detailed plans in this respect.

Admiral Jim Stavridis, the Commandant of the Supreme Allied Command for Europe in charge of NATO operations and General John Allen, commander of ISAF provided the framework for the conference's discussions by expressing their viewpoints. Thus, the heads of the General Staffs from NATO member states were informed that the Afghan armed forces are getting stronger and more confident by day and, hence, are on the right track to assume control. In a matter of weeks, the AFNS would reach 352.00 members and take over leadership as a result of their capability to ensure the security of three quarters of the Afghan population. At the moment of the conference that was a process unfolding in all provinces. Moreover, it was underlined that 80% of the insurgents' attacks would occur in areas where approximately 20% of the population lives as a result of the ISAF and ANSF operations [3].

All of the above clearly suggests that NATO will continue to play an active part in Afghanistan even after 2014, even though not covering the same range of missions as with ISAF. Thus, its main goals will be to ensure the prerequisites to living a normal life in this country, and to connect it to the set of fundamental values characteristic of contemporary age.

All the decisions made at Sibiu underline the important role played by the Military Committee within the overall framework of the

Alliance. Moreover, they inherently involve Romania as an important and responsible member of the Alliance that is capable to uphold its international commitments as a reliable member and partner of NATO.

SOURCES

[1] Observatorul Militar nr. 36, 12-18 Septembrie 2012

[2] <http://www.ziarelive.ro/stiri/generalul-christopher-harper-vitorul-sef-al-dgims.html>

[3] <http://www.agerpres.ro/media/index.php/comunicate/item/147406-Comunicat-de-pres-Conferinta-Comitetului-Militar-NatoSibiu.html>

[4] <http://www.ziaruldeiasi.ro/national-extern/sefii-armatelor-din-nato-s-au-intalnit-la-sibiu-ni8t77>

[5] <http://www.ziare.com/stiri/armata/reuniune-la-inalt-nivel-a-nato-la-sibiu-1189447>

THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE: A POSSIBLE THREAT TO THE SECURITY SYSTEMS

Oana-Andreea PIRNUTA*, Dragos Nicolae SECAREA**

*Senior Lecturer Ph.D., TRANSILVANIA University of Brasov, Romania

**LUCIAN BLAGA University of Sibiu, Romania

The entire world has had to face the draconian effects of the economic recession recently. One of the regions marked by severe economic damages has been South Eastern Europe. The present article aims at analyzing the current economic situation in this particular region by trying to identify the strong and weak points, as well as possible ways to solve these specific issues. This paper lays emphasis upon states, such as: Turkey, Greece and Romania, but also on certain facts about the other states belonging to the previously mentioned region.

Key words: *South Eastern Europe, economy, Turkey, Greece, Romania, recession.*

1. INTRODUCTION

The present security context is threatened not only by possible military conflicts, but also by other elements, such as: social, political and mainly economic problems, which could initiate a chain reaction. And this could eventually lead to the risks of a collapsed security system.

Global security has suffered a dramatic change. The old risks and threats have been replaced by more terrifying challenges generated by the instability due to international terrorism, proliferation of mass destruction weapons as well as organized crime networks [1].

Economically speaking, South Eastern Europe is considered to be one of the most vulnerable regions in

the world. And this fact is determined by a series of factors.

Firstly, this particular area lacks natural resources especially when referring to the states from the Balkan area. Indeed, the Balkan area has big problems when it comes to natural resources.

In South Eastern Europe, one could also identify the big deficiencies in the field of agriculture, mainly because of the geographic conditions. Again, it is important to highlight here the states from the Balkan area, excepting maybe countries, such as: Romania, Bulgaria.

It is also worth mentioning that the economy in this area is still based on industrial components, which are old and cannot adapt to the new European and worldwide context.

Due to the fact that many of these states do not belong to any European or transatlantic organizations, there are huge problems in obtaining funds to modernize their industry.

Also, many of the governments from this area are not only inefficient, but also corrupt, when it comes to attracting foreign investors. This fact is highlighted by countries, such as: Romania and Bulgaria. Although they are part of the European Union, they are not able to attract either investors or European funds. This situation originates in the early 1990s when these states were ruled by communist economic ideologies. The economic poverty in this area is also determined by the underground economy.

According to Mihai Zodian (2011:132), this is a traditional field revitalized by the context of military conflicts, the disorganization of the states and the post-communist economies [2].

Obviously, the problems in this area were also caused by military conflicts, especially in the area of the Balkans, which are also affected by crime. Unfortunately, there still are violent clashes in many of the states from this area. These clashes are determined by several types of conflicts, such as: religious and ethnic ones.

The most vulnerable states, from this point of view, are Kosovo, Albania, Serbia or Bosnia Herzegovina. Also, it is important to remember the global recession, which started in 2007 and went onwards up to present and also

affected this area. Any economic problem encountered by the European Union will automatically affect South Eastern Europe.

This region includes Greece, which is in the situation to converge from a rich country into a developing state. A Greek default, accompanied by the exit of Greece from the Eurozone, would have catastrophic effects on the EU and automatically on the South Eastern region.

And specialists have made a forecast having in view a small economic growth for 2012: *“In South Eastern Europe the economic growth is forecast to be at 1%, much lower than the previous data, which shows a 1.6% growth”* [3].

When talking about the factors which could generate economic growth, it is important to remember, again, the foreign investments. These regions should not be influenced by foreign consumption, real estate investments or other factors causing economic bubbles [3].

It is important to see these economic problems as a threat to the states' security environment. The economic difficulties will affect the states' people (low standard of living, austerity measures etc.) and this could lead to social tensions that could destabilize the countries' security environment.

2. TURKEY AND FOREIGN INVESTMENTS

The only country from this area, which does not have major economic

problems seems to be Turkey. This state, with a population of 80 million people, had in 2011 a GDP of \$1.232 trillion. Last year, Turkey had a GDP growth of almost 9%. Turkey's economy was developed through foreign investments in industry, for instance, the car manufacturing industry, but also in other fields. Also, many investors from the Far East decided to move their businesses to Turkey. This decision was also determined by the political issues from the Far East. It is worth mentioning that this particular country has several important economic partnerships with powerful countries, such as: Russia and others.

According to Mihai Zodian (2011:150), Turkey is one of Russia's most important economic partners. In 2004, the economic deals between the two countries valued 11 billion dollars. In 2008, the value of these deals reached 40 billion. Russia exports to Turkey products and services which are valued at 27.7 billion dollars [2].

Also, Turkey is part of the G20, being ranked 16 in a worldwide rating. Thus, the EU leaders want Turkey to be part of the Union and the Turkish Government already started the mechanisms of the integration process.

A reason for Turkey's success lays in *"an aggressive privatization program [which] has reduced state involvement in basic industry, banking, transport, and communication, and an emerging framework of middle-class entrepreneurs is adding dynamism*

to the economy and expanding production beyond the traditional textiles and clothing sectors. The automotive, construction, and electronics industries are rising in importance and have surpassed textiles within Turkey's export mix" [4].

The only problems which could affect this country's economic prosperity are the internal conflicts, the tense relationships between the Ankara Government and the Kurdish minority from Turkey, but also the poor relations with Turkey's neighbors, more recently Syria.

At this moment, specialists forecast that Turkey will maintain this economic growth path. Some specialists fear that, at one point, Turkey will imitate Greece. It might be possible for the Government to allow its population to request bank loans whose values will be too high for its financial possibilities.

3. GREECE – THE SYMBOL OF WORLDWIDE RECESSION

A completely different situation is encountered when dealing with Greece. The population of this country is about 11 million people and its GDP is €215.088 billion according to 2011 statistical data.

Because of its economic problems, Greece became the symbol of the worldwide recession. About one year ago, Greece's public debt was approximately 30,000 dollars per person. For example, in 2011, this country's GDP growth was of -6.5%.

How did the Greeks get in this situation? It could be said that the roots of these issues are situated in the first years of Greece's entry in the EU. The Government has not taken the necessary measures to control the chaotic way in which the population took bank loans or to control the underground economy, the high value of unjustified salaries awarded to people working for the state. As an example, in the early 2000s, a Greek received salaries as high as those from Germany.

Also, in the first decade of 2000, *“Greece had abundant access to cheap capital, fuelled by flush capital markets and increased investor confidence after adopting the Euro in 2001. Capital inflows were not used to increase the competitiveness of the economy, however, and European Union (EU) rules designed to limit the accumulation of public debt failed to do so. The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 strained public finances, and subsequent revelations about falsified statistical data drove up Greece's borrowing costs. By early 2010, Greece had risked defaulting on its public debt”* [5].

And once Greece was hit by the recession, its population was put in the critical situation in which a person had to pay more than he could earn. The Greek political leaders requested help from the International Monetary Fund and the EU.

Of course, these organizations imposed draconian austerity measures in exchange for financial aid. The problem is that the external loans

created a vicious circle meaning that Greece was always in the situation of requesting aid.

If the country does not receive this loan, then Greece is at the risk of entering default, which, as previously mentioned, would lead to the state's exit from the Eurozone and initiate catastrophic effects on the EU.

This country has a big rate of unemployment and poverty is more and more dramatic. Only in Athens, about 250,000 people, who once had a decent life, are forced basically to go to canteens in order to receive some food [6].

And if Greece remained in the Eurozone, the living standard would drop with at least 70% in this country!

This would affect the EU in many ways. For example, Greece's default would hit, first of all, the French and German banks, the main providers of financial aid for this country. Therefore, the default would create panic in the banking system, which could lead to a similar situation to what happened in 2008 with the Lehman Brothers bank groups.

4. ROMANIA AND ITS MAJOR ECONOMIC POTENTIAL

Romania was one of the poorest European countries in the 1990s, mainly because of the inefficiency of the economic measures adopted by the communist regime.

But afterwards, the country experienced an important economic growth, generated mainly by foreign

investors from the United States in the 1990s and through the 2000s, through exports to countries, such as: Italy and Germany.

This particular growth was also possible by the political leaders' policies adopted in the 2000s as well as due to the EU integration.

Romania had been expected to join the Eurozone by 2013. Unfortunately, this country was hit by recession and the Government requested financial aid from the European leaders and IMF. Romania received in 2009 about 13.9 billion Euros from the IMF:

"The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) today approved a 24-month SDR 11.4 billion (about €12.9 billion or US\$17.1 billion) Stand-By Arrangement for Romania to support an economic program designed by the Romanian authorities and intended to cushion the effects of the sharp drop in capital inflows while addressing the country's external and fiscal imbalances and strengthening the financial sector" [7].

In exchange for this aid, the political leaders were forced to apply draconian austerity measures, which led to social tensions and to a chain reaction after which the Government was replaced. Furthermore, there are small chances for Romania to enter the Eurozone before 2015.

In 2011, the GDP of Romania was of \$264.269 billion and a nominal per capita GDP estimated at \$8,863. Nowadays, almost 50% of Romania's labor force is involved in services, while 23% in industry.

It is worth mentioning that Romania has a major economic potential, especially by enumerating not only more than 10 million hectares of agricultural land, some energy sources, such as: coal oil and gas, but also tourism.

Unfortunately, it seems that Romania is not able to use these resources, probably not even at half of its potential. Also, it is worth remembering that this country has an important potential in industry, highlighting here for example, the production of automobiles.

Romania needs more foreign investors in order to take advantage of this potential. Until the late 2000s, Italy was considered to be Romania's main trading partner.

5. THE IMPACT OF OTHER STATES ON THE SECURITY SYSTEMS IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE

There are also some other countries in this part of Europe which could in uence, from an economic perspective, in a way or another, the security systems specific to this region.

Albania has a population of 3.2 million people and a nominal GDP of \$13.4 billion. This country had major economic problems in the early 1990s, a fact determined mainly by the transition from communism to democracy.

Also, the economic problems were determined by the conflict from Kosovo, but also by the mass

migration, for example, half a million of Albanians moved to Italy in the 1990s. Since then things got better and better, especially due to foreign investors especially from the United States and Italy, financial aid from IFM.

It is worth mentioning that Albania, along with San Marino and Liechtenstein, were the only European countries which registered economic growth in 2009.

Bulgaria has a population of 7.8 million people and a nominal GDP of \$54.3 billion. This country had difficulties because of the 1990s transition from communism to democracy. In that period, the standard of living decreased with 40% and the leva (n.r. Bulgaria's national currency) collapsed. This country experienced economic growth in the early 2000s, but this process was slowed by the economic recession.

The new Government, led by Boiko Borisov, took efficient measures, which annihilated the effects of the recession. It is worth mentioning that an important part of the Bulgarian economy is the Black Sea tourism.

Bulgaria was supposed to enter the Eurozone in 2013, but the political leaders from Sofia decided, because of the economic context, to delay this process until 2015.

Cyprus won its independence in 1960, but it is important to mention that this country still has a tense status, between the two major populations who inhabit this island, the Greeks and the Turks.

In the 1970s, the Turkish Army intervened in Cyprus and helped the Turkish community to proclaim the northern part of the island as being the Republic of Northern Cyprus. Only Turkey recognizes the existence of this state. The island is situated in the Mediterranean Sea and it is, therefore, a strategic point.

In Cyprus, there are still stationed UN troops and several British military bases. Therefore, this situation has its own effects on the economy.

Nowadays, this country has a nominal GDP of \$24.949 billion. The worldwide economic recession also affected Cyprus, which requested financial aid from the EU and IFM. This situation was determined by the fact that many of Cyprus' economy depends on Greece. Therefore, when Greece has problems, Cyprus has problems, too.

Serbia is the former nucleus of Yugoslavia. It has nowadays 9.5 million people. This country experienced major military operations during the 1990s, conflicts which were penalized by the international community. The penalties brought Serbia to poverty.

In the first decade of 2000, Serbia's economy was revitalized. Throughout this period, the foreign investors injected about seven billion dollars in Serbia's economy.

A big problem occurred in 2006, when Montenegro separated from Serbia, which, in turn, was affected because it lost its only exit to the Adriatic Sea. Serbia lost important funds from tourism.

Nowadays, this country has a nominal GDP of \$80.282 billion. Its economy is based on industry and agriculture. Most of Serbia's exports are sent to Germany, Italy, Bosnia, and Montenegro.

Speaking of Montenegro, this country became independent, as previously mentioned, in 2006. But this country's economy flourished since then. For example, Montenegro has an estimated GDP of \$4.536 billion, which is impressive if we take into consideration its population of 800,000 people.

Russia invested important sums of money in Montenegro. This country's economy is based mainly on services, especially tourism.

Another flourishing country is Croatia, which has, at a population of 4.4 million people, an estimated GDP per capita of \$14,457. This flourishing economy is determined mainly by foreign investors, from Germany especially. Still, Croatia experienced some difficulties because of the recession. In 2011, this country had a GDP growth of -1.3%.

A powerful country in this region is also Slovenia, with an estimated GDP per capita of \$22,916, at a population of 2 million people.

Opposed to these countries are states, such as, for instance, Macedonia, which has a nominal estimated GDP per capita of only \$5,229, at a population of approximately 2 million people. A big problem in this country is corruption and bureaucracy, and there are still left some scars from

the military conflicts that took place in the 1990s.

Montenegro is one of the poorest countries from this region. But, the poorest country in Europe is Moldova. This country has an estimated per capita GDP of only \$1,968.

Speaking of the economy of Moldova, it is important to highlight that about 40% of its economy is based on agriculture while only 16% on industry.

It is also important to remember that Moldova has big problems because of the political leaders from Transdnistria (region of Moldova) which claim their independence.

6. CONCLUSIONS

The present paper analyzes the main economic strong points and weak points in South Eastern Europe. Although the entire area was affected by the global recession, it could be noticed that there are big differences between the countries from this region.

It is worth mentioning here the differences between Turkey, a major economic power and Greece, which is very close to a catastrophic default. Like Turkey, there are other strong countries, from an economic perspective, such as: Croatia or Montenegro. But there are also very poor countries, such as: Macedonia or Moldova, which are important threats to the global security system.

It is very important to remember that the financial aid received from the IFM or other organizations is

not likely to represent the exit from the recession. The economy has to produce and for this to happen it is necessary to attract foreign investors. This financial fund, from the investors, represents the difference between countries, such as: Moldova and Montenegro.

Future work should also be focused on the mechanisms of recovery after the recent economic crisis or the impact of possible future crises or turbulences.

For a better understanding of the impact of different states on the security systems in South Eastern Europe, a transvaluation is required, a reconsideration of the way in which the actors of international relations perceive the political instruments of the integration of present-day and future relations.

REFERENCES

- [1] Pirnuta, Oana-Andreea, Boscoianu, Mircea (2011) "International Security Repatterned by Globalization", International Conference on Security, Management and Society 2011 held as part of CATE 2011 organized by the University of Defence, 11th -12th May 2011, Brno, Czech Republic, Conference Proceedings published by University of Defence in Brno, pp. 453-458, ISBN 978-80-7231-790-5
- [2] Zodian, Mihai (2011) "Europa de Sud-Est", in Lumea 2011, Editura Centrului Tehnic Editorial al Armatei, Bucuresti, p. 132
- [3] <http://www.buildpress.ro/articole/europa-de-sud-est-are-nevoie-de-reforme-profunde-pentru-a-creste.html>
- [4] http://www.indexmundi.com/turkey/economy_prole.html
- [5] <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41167.pdf>
- [6] http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=1f6_1335770036
- [7] <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pr09148.htm>

CURRENT TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVES ON SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

Florin-Eduard GROSARU

Lecturer

Regional Department of Defense Resources Management Studies,
Brasov, Romania

South-Eastern Europe is one of the buffer zones of the current international conflict arena given its role into taking up the jolts stemming both from an old and yet democratic and modern Europe, and from a seething, authoritarian and, in many cases, dogmatic Asia. Within the current international environment characterized by swift and unpredictable changes NATO plays an essential part in strengthening the Euroatlantic security. As a result of the Alliance's determination to model and ensure a solid security environment and a durable peace, the new NATO doctrine develops a strategic concept according to which security strengthening needs to be based on a political-military partnership, as well as on cooperation and dialogue among all states.

Key words: *security, NATO, political options, partnership, South-Eastern Europe*

1. INTRODUCTION

The dissolution of the communist block did not only signal the disappearance of the red East and blue West dichotomy, but also the political reorientation of the former East European communist states towards democracy. As a result, the likelihood for these to join the same security structure their former adversaries had been part of increased. Ultimately, the need to maintain control over the security in the Euroatlantic area made NATO a natural and feasible choice for security insurance. Consequently, the Alliance expanded through the accession of the aforementioned states into its structures and, hence,

a highly dangerous and chaotic phenomenon was avoided, namely anarchic security.

2. POLITICAL CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE FROM A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization plays a key role in the stabilization and defense of South-Eastern Europe (SEE) and at the moment, an important part of this area, the south and almost all the west of the region, respectively, are already under the control of the Alliance. NATO promotes a policy centered around

the concept of trusting neighbors. In this respect, worth reminding are its partnerships with Russia (1997), with Ukraine (1997) which resulted in the NATO – Russia Council (2002), the NATO – Russia Council Action Plan on Terrorism (2004), the NATO – Ukraine Commission (1997), the NATO – Ukraine Action Plan (2005), the NATO – Georgia Commission (2008), as well as a number of individual partnerships signed with all the countries in SEE. As a result of the more secure and stable environment ensured through initiatives like the Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe, NATO's involvement in the region also plays a positive role from an economic point of view.

The numerous civil wars, terrorism spread at international level, and other contemporary asymmetric threats proved that the security of European border regions – the eastern and south-eastern ones, mostly – is a component of the overall Euroatlantic security. Therefore, NATO needs to intensely cooperate with the Western Balkans, Caucasus and Middle Asia in order to solve the problem of the frozen conflicts in the SEE. The means through which such an initiative can be undertaken are: exerting the Alliance's influence over the external supporters of the secessionist movements; incentivizing and accelerating democratic reforms in SEE, enhancing the defense capacity of the states in the region against external regional threats; establishing a number of

general rules and norms aimed at encouraging and maintaining the interregional cooperation through market economy as a basis and incentivizer of conflict resolution and political relations, as well as ensuring a follow-up to their implementation; establishing a dialogue platform in the security field and developing targeted programs. Frozen conflicts in the area are a barrier to increasing the collaboration between NATO and the states in the region, not to mention Russia's diplomatic, economic and military role. Currently, the Alliance's influence in the region manifests through its member states: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Romania, Slovenia and Turkey, through the states willing to join NATO: Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, through Armenia – that, even though it is a PfP member, also signed a strategic partnership with Russia – and Russia that established a special relationship with the Alliance in the NATO – Russia Council.

During the 2008 NATO Summit that unfolded in Bucharest, 26 NATO member states representatives and 23 PfP representatives met to debate issues of major interest at the moment like Afghanistan, NATO's enlargement and the deployment of the antimissile shield in Europe. There were also disagreements between the Alliance and Russia over Georgia's and Ukraine's requests to join NATO. In this respect, Russia voiced its concern about the Alliance's expansion into the former Soviet area and threatened the two countries

with severe consequences should they be keen on their intentions. In their turn, officials from Kiev and Tbilisi denounced Russia's position and underlined their commitment to pursuing their plans.

The 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia severed the relations between Russia and NATO and they were to be resumed only in December 2008 when the ministers of foreign affairs from NATO member states met in Brussels and agreed that the two states took important and yet insufficient steps towards their accession to the the Alliance. As a result, the allies decided to increase these countries' opportunities to join NATO through the two commissions that were already in place: the NATO – Ukraine Commission and the NATO – Georgia Commission. On the other hand, they underlined the importance of NATO's relations with Russia. However, they reiterated their disapproval of the conflict between Russia and Georgia and invited Russia to commit to the values and principles of international security by complying with the agreement signed with Georgia and by refraining itself from conflict prone declarations and threats to allies' and their partners' security.

No further progress towards Ukraine's and Georgia's accession was made during the Lisbon and Chicago summits. Ianucovici changed Ukraine's position into a non-alignment one, whereas Georgia's chances to join NATO any time soon decreased dramatically after the conflict with Russia.

The Chicago Summit offered no surprises and it could be characterised as a working group that reunited 64 state and international organizations' representatives: 28 NATO member states, 3 international organizations and 33 states from all continents. The main issues discussed concerned the future of NATO mission in Afghanistan, the development of NATO capabilities under current economic constraints, as well as the strengthening of the relations with NATO's partners. The process of transferring security insurance responsibility from NATO forces to Afghan forces, and the withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan by 2014 dominated the discussions. The conclusions were that by 2014 NATO's mission in Afghanistan will only be concerned with the support and training of the Afghan armed forces. Moreover, the necessity to maintain the presence of the Alliance in Afghanistan beyond 2014 as a result of the Taliban threat, especially in the east and south, was reiterated.

The new concept of Smart Defence was also introduced. Its aim is to focus on a number of multinational projects targeting more efficient expenditures in the military field given the diminishing defense budgets. Such a project is the anti-missile one and its goal is to provide protection against any ballistic threats from states like Iran. Basically, this project is aimed at integrating the anti-missile defense systems developed by NATO member states

and to have the command and control costs covered by the Alliance. In this respect, it is worth reminding that as of 2015, Romania will be full part of the project with the Deveselu base. Russia has expressed its discontent with the project from the very beginning with the covert purpose of maintaining a superior negotiating position that would allow it to have a gain in other fields. Therefore, one major concern for the Alliance is to pursue the project while continuing the dialogue with Moscow.

Despite its aims, the Chicago summit has not resulted in solutions to all the Alliance's problems. For example, Afghanistan's stability is far from being established, Russia headed by its new president will be a cumbersome partner, the European allies that only cover 21% of NATO's expenses will have to find solutions to balance expenditures within the Alliance given the current economic constraints. With a view to the last issue just mentioned, projects like Smart Defence or the EU Pooling and Sharing initiative are a feasible alternative to the joint European effort to maintain Washington's interest for Europe's security.

All of the above pinpoint NATO's role as a power pillar in Europe and, inherently, in SEE, despite the costs and responsibilities incurred. For the Alliance the concept of security in SEE is defined not only as a part of the euroatlantic security approach, but also described through the lenses of the ethnic and cultural diversity that makes it difficult for a regional

identity to emerge. The principle underlying this concept is based on a regional and multilateral approach to the solutions proposed by the democratic countries in the region.

3. NATO STRATEGY IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE

In the conclusions of the 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon, the heads of states reaffirmed their commitment to maintain and strengthen the security of NATO member states: *"We, the political leaders of NATO, are determined to continue renewal of our Alliance so that it is fit for purpose in addressing the 21st Century security challenges. We are firmly committed to preserve its effectiveness as the globe's most successful political-military Alliance. Our Alliance thrives as a source of hope because it is based on common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and because our common essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members. These values and objectives are universal and perpetual, and we are determined to defend them through unity, solidarity, strength and resolve"* [1].

After the end of the Cold War the policy of the Alliance targeted political and strategic goals meant to grant the organization extended power and influence. Thus, immediately after the fall of communism, NATO promoted the open doors policy by accepting as members or as

discussion partners states from Central and Eastern Europe. In this respect, the PfP initiative allowed the organization to reach not only countries from Europe, but also states from the Caucasus.

The extension of the stability and security environment to South Eastern Europe allowed NATO to further reach regions like the Wider Black Sea Region, Caucasus and Central Asia [2]. Such an effort is the result of a core, common sense principle according to which security is one for all and, therefore, requires a common, joint approach given the commonality of the threats at regional level. An important part of this are goals like: a more intense political dialogue, support for undertaking military reforms and for achieving the interoperability desideratum, more secure frontiers, crises management, counter terrorism and armament control, information exchange.

The *Partnership for Peace*, the main NATO cooperation program for the states in SEE has undergone a number of changes in terms of its targets so that, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, it reached the states from Central Asia. Moreover, PfP is an important tool supporting candidate states to join NATO – only in the past ten years, ten states becoming NATO members. Moreover, the initiative greatly contributed to stabilizing the conflict areas in SEE by establishing an environment based on understanding, trust and cooperation among allies and their partners, as well as by promoting

military reforms in these states. For the future, PfP will continue to play a major role in the joint approach to cooperation among allied and partner states in the euro atlantic region in the security and stability fields. Its main contribution lies in the continuous dialogue between NATO and each and every participant that is established through common activities and consultations meant to encourage military and democratic reforms. An Individual Partnership Program was founded within the PfP and it was aimed at training, for two years, NATO partners for undertaking activities like civil emergency planning, peace enforcement missions, crisis management.

Another instrument of PfP, the *Planning and Review Process*, with no time constraints in terms of employment, enables NATO to help its partners find solutions to problems other than the military ones. For example, the Alliance provides support and counselling for developing civil society in these countries, for financial planning, or for developing interoperability with NATO systems. The main regional actors from Caucasus, Central Asia, North Africa and Middle East prone to causing instability and, hence, in euroatlantic security have led to NATO's efforts to consolidate its partnerships with states from the aforementioned regions, without neglecting its relations and interests in Caucasus, Western Balkans, the Republic of Moldova, and Cyprus.

NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme is another instrument of the Alliance targeting researchers from NATO member states, as well as from the PfP and Mediterranean Dialogue states. NATO SPS allows the Alliance to ensure global and, inherently, regional security in SEE by facilitating collaboration and capabilities development. Its goal is to sponsor cooperation in the fields of security, science, environment and technology, and to support the elaboration of recommendations and practical solutions and, thus, meet the requirements of the parties concerned.

As outlined by the new NATO Strategic Concept signed during the 2010 Lisbon summit, as well as by the strategic objectives established during the informal meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs from NATO member states unfolded in Berlin in 2011, NATO's SPS new priorities are [3]:

- to facilitate the mutually beneficial cooperation in fields of common interests for the states involved and to accelerate the efforts towards overcoming the new security challenges;
- to fight against terrorism; to ensure energetic, information and environment security; to protect against mass destruction weapons;
- to increase support for NATO led missions and operations; to increase alertness to the evolution of international security, including early warning to prevent crises by

using advanced technologies for security assurance; by securing frontiers; by detecting and removing unexploded mines in the post conflict areas, and last but not least

- to connect the strategic objectives of the Alliance with the human and social aspects of security.

On the other hand, the political, economic, cultural, ethnic and religious diversity characteristic of the new NATO partnerships requires a review of the PfP/EAPC (Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council) instruments. Thus, a renewed partnership policy asks for a more flexible dialogue and cooperation framework and for granting personalized support to SEE partners, as well as to Western Balkans, the Extended Black Sea Region, Caucasus and Central Asia. Even though the states in the aforementioned areas are committed to implement democracy and durable development, the results are still imbalanced. Therefore, as a result of its new global priorities, NATO needs more than ever to cooperate with its SEE allies in order to fulfil its regional responsibilities.

However, currently, NATO has to tackle two major problems. First, it has to overcome the differences in trust and commitment among its allies. Second, it has to find solutions to the influence of geopolitical and economic factors in unifying its operations. In other words, as the Strategic Advisors Group (SAG) within NATO Council underline:

“[...] It is not acceptable that some countries deploy forces in the risky areas of Afghanistan because they believe that their vital interests are at stake, while others reluctantly deploy and only to less risky areas or with limited numbers in the hope to minimally satisfy allied expectations” [4].

With a view to all this, the states in SEE that have agreed to host parts of the American anti-missile shield on their territories are entitled to reiterate that the Alliance's traditional mission, namely collective defense, is still a necessity. Moreover, the new Russian doctrine characterized by a defensive approach signals Moscow's unwillingness to continue reducing its nuclear arsenal. Therefore, the Alliance needs to resort to multilateral diplomatic instruments in order to appease Russia's worries about a nuclear threat. In this respect, a pragmatic and coherent dialogue within the NATO-Russia Council and aimed at approaching the concept of nuclear deterrence in all its details is the best solution.

Committed to its policies adopted after 1990 in the field of long-term regional cooperation, security and stability in SEE, NATO launched the South East Europe Initiative (SEEI) during the 1999 Washington summit. The four pillars of the initiative are:

1. the Consultative Forum on Security Issues on South East Europe whose members are NATO, Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Slovenia, Bosnia and

Herzegovina represented through ambassadors in Brussels;

2. the Ad Hoc Working Group (AHWG) on Regional Cooperation in South East Europe working under the auspices of the EAPC in Political Committee Session;

3. Partnership for Peace working tools;

4. programs targeted at security and cooperation issues of the countries in the region.

As a result of the AHWG efforts, solutions to promote regional cooperation were found and included into activity plans similar to those of the PfP. The targets of the plans are: transparency in defense planning; crisis and defense management; regional cooperation and integration.

As for the tangible results of SEEI, they are as follows: the cooperation program in the security field signed with Croatia (2000) and based on PfP instruments; the special cooperation program in the field of security with Bosnia-Herzegovina; counselling and expertise in military retirees' outplacement as a result of the reforms undergone Bulgaria's and Romania's armed forces.

4. CONCLUSIONS

The cooperation process facilitates NATO member states' access to the Euroatlantic structures, especially in terms of gains in the field of political and economic stability, as a result of employing the Alliance's and EU's available mechanisms, programs and initiatives like EAPC,

PfP (from NATO) and the Stability and Association Agreements of EU.

In conclusion, the Alliance's efforts must and are supported by the endeavors of the countries from South East Europe that are committed to integrate into their political, economic and security structures the Western set of values through their accession into the European and Euroatlantic structures upholding this. South East Europe is under the influence of world security developments. Moreover, any future analysis of the geopolitical, geostrategic and security environment in the region should not neglect the role of NATO member states from SEE, the relations between Europe and the Caspian Sea area, the frozen conflicts in the proximity of NATO's area of responsibility, as well as the part played by EU and OSCE in the region.

REFERENCES

[1] *** Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Lisbon 2010, <http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf>, p.11, last retrieved June 2012.

[2] FULGA, Gheorghe „Implicații ale extinderii NATO asupra climatului

de securitate regional”, in „Defensa” no. 320, December 2004.

[3] http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-64125771-E00AD795/natolive/topics_85373.htm?, last retrieved June 2012.

[4] De Wijk Rob, „IssueBrief: The Challenge: NATO in the Realm of New Geopolitical Realities”, Atlantic Council of the United States, p.3, http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/403/TheChallenge_SAGIssueBrief.PDF, last retrieved June 2012.

[5] BREZEZINSKI, Zbigniew (1999) Marea tablă de șah – supremația americană și imperatiile sale geostrategice, Univers Enciclopedic, Bucharest.

[6] DUMISTRĂCEL, Cătălin-Silviu (2010) Marea Neagră de la politica vecinătății europene la securitatea euroatlantică, CTEA Publishing House, Bucharest.

[7] FRUNZETI, Teodor, ZODIAN, Vladimir (coord.) (2011) Lumea 2011. Enciclopedie politică și militară. Studii strategice și de securitate, CTEA Publishing House, Bucharest.

[8] *** Declarația Summitului NATO de la București, 3 aprilie 2008.

[9] <http://www.acus.org>.

[10] <http://www.mapn.ro>.

[11] <http://www.nato.int>.

[12] <http://nato.mae.ro>.

[13] <http://www.summitnato.ro>.

INTERNATIONAL STABILITY AND SECURITY IN CONDITIONS OF POWER ASYMMETRY: PRESENT STATE OF PLAY AND FUTURE TRENDS

Ionel STOICA

Ministry of National Defense, Bucharest, Romania

Power asymmetry within the international security system can be noticed both at conceptual and practical level. Although it is not a new phenomenon, this asymmetry, which has extended for the past decades, has led to some particular developments that question international security and stability in different ways. States have striven to tackle the consequences of the deepening power asymmetry among them but the success of their endeavors is questionable. This paper analyzes the ways in which power asymmetry propagates within the international security system and its likely consequences for international stability and security in the near future.

Key words: *international security, stability, power asymmetry, globalization.*

1. INTRODUCTION

Power asymmetry was perceived as a characteristic of the international system long before the end of World War II. However, after the fall of the Iron Curtain, this concept has been more systematically developed and approached by researchers in international relations theories. The explanation for the increased interest in the dimensions and variables of the aforementioned concept lies in the geopolitical and geo-economic consequences triggered by the end of the Cold War that raised a series of challenges for capitalist economies.

Power asymmetry in the international system can be noticed both at conceptual and practical level. As Martin Wight noticed, the current international system is a Western

one (the international institutions are the creation of Western states), but the overwhelming majority of its members are non-Western states [1]. In the same line of thought, Bull made the observation that “the international law system is not only made up by the West, but also for the West” [2]. As a result, a paradox like this generates asymmetries not only in theory, but also in practice.

Although a certain degree of asymmetry has existed for a long time between states and regions of the world, nowadays, given globalization effects, the configurations and the impact of those asymmetries upon the international relations has gained new features. These developments have tempted us to study the effects of power asymmetry on international security and stability.

2. POWER ASYMMETRY EFFECTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The best method to identify, understand and analyze the effects of power asymmetry on international stability and security is to analyze them by focusing on specific fields where they are most visible. Thus, this article will look at the economic, political, social and environmental fields in order to highlight both the origin of power asymmetry and its impact.

2.1. Power asymmetry in the economic field

Power asymmetry in the economic field has its roots in the differentiated access to food and mineral resources, but also in the aptitudes (or options) of states for a particular type of productive (economic) activity. In this respect, as Wallerstein underlined, economic development discrepancies between the East and the West of Europe have emerged since the XVIIIth century with industrialization and colonialism playing a major role. Nowadays, globalization only deepened the existing gap to the extent that this is perceived as an insurmountable reality [3].

The discrepancies in the economic performance of the states, poverty, and globalization, economic and financial crises like the one from 1997 or the one started in 2008 have contributed to a greater disparity between the rich and the poor states, leading to diminishing standards of life and poverty among large segments of population from the global South [3]. An important consequence of these developments is the economic and

social polarization between the global North characterized by dwindling populations, high living standards, low rates of unemployment and the global South with a large number of people, high birth rates and high mortality rates, large segments of young population and high unemployment rates.

The uneven economic growth panders to political conflict since it undermines the international status-quo [4]. The current political regulation of the international trade creates advantages for the powerful states to the detriment of the other states. Moreover, pressures on behalf of the powerful states aiming at gaining asymmetric benefits not only from such international trade regulations, but also from pollution rights, from energy trade, as well as from other economic and commercial activities paralleled by their ability to harmonize the interests could increase the economic inequality between the rich and the poor states, with negative consequences on international stability. For example, the current protest movements in some of the developing states (e.g. the Arab Spring) target explicitly national leaders, but, in subsidiary, they also have an anti-Western component, the West being perceived as the main beneficiary of the natural resources of the poor states.

The international aids that, in many cases actually represent credits, provided by developed states to the developing ones are far from compensating the loss of the latter caused by their impossibility to match the subsidies granted by the developed states to their own farmers and manufacturers, as well as by the

tariffs applied to the goods made in the developing states. Consequently, the subsidies and tariffs applied by the developed states cost the developing states fifth times, in terms of the lost markets, the value of the aids the latter receive [5].

2.2. Power asymmetry in the political field

Power asymmetry creates the premises for changes in the basis of states' foreign policy. In the current international economy and trade the comparative advantage is no longer the exclusive result of a natural gift or of economic efficiency and, hence, it is frequently created through "political options and governmental and corporatist decisions" [4]. As a result of reassessing priorities (i.e. shifting the accent from the military aspects to economic and technological ones) the nature of the competition between states has changed. Consequently, the means used for this competition have adapted as it was the case, for example, with the increasing role of diplomacy to the detriment of military force. The changing nature of inter-state competition is reflected in the states' behavior, both at domestic and international level [6]. In this respect, the statement of the US Representative for trade in Clinton Administration, Michael Kantor, is illustrative: "*Trade and economy do not represent a distinct sphere from the rest of the American foreign politics anymore*" [7]. Moreover, in conditions of multiple interdependencies, states will be constrained to become partner-competitors [8], such as to cooperate in conflicting situations.

According to Giddens, the processes associated with globalization had in effect "a translation of power from states towards the global depoliticized space" filled up with an impressive number of national and international non-governmental organizations [9]. Worth mentioning from this point of view is that, currently, there are more than 400 international governmental organisations and tens of thousands of non-governmental organisations (depending on the accepted definition) [10]. These organizations compete with states to establish the international agenda and sometimes they contribute to the laws passed at international level. For instance, Amnesty International benefits from its consultative status within the UN that allows it to take part in important summits of this organization, to propose documents and to make statements [11].

The power of international organizations is derived from their competition with the states at the level of international politics which grants them a higher degree of acceptability in front of the public opinion in every country. In some fields, such as sports, art the power of these organizations clearly exceeds that of the states. These organizations can have an important say in the negotiations of international agreements and contracts [6] and can also play important roles in increasing or diminishing the states' prestige.

Two quite recent developments/trends contribute to the increasing power of international organizations. First, there is the loss of citizens' trust in the desire and capability of political authorities to solve community problems because of corruption,

as well as because of the common perception that politicians often forge alliances with those working in the financial field with a direct result in the privatization, to some extent, of the public institution. Second, current problems are mostly transnational ones and international organizations are much better positioned from this perspective, since cooperation between states - which is compulsory in such cases - is much more difficult to realize.

However, the power of these organizations should not be overestimated. They can draw conclusions, can make recommendations but, in the end, the states themselves are those that decide their own policies. As they are not invested with decision power over states, international organizations are, at least nowadays, tribunes or discussion forums in the international political arena. Moreover, given their need of states' support in the promotion of their own agendas, these organizations are sometimes used by states. Theoretically, all states can use international organizations, based on their status within these. However, in practice, it is the powerful states that have clear advantages from such a relationship. In fact, by creating these organizations, the powerful states cede a part of their power to the international organization they created, in exchange for the right to dominate the international stage on democratic bases. In these conditions, cooperation, but also conflicting relations have emerged among states and international organizations [12].

2.3. Power asymmetry in the security field

Asymmetry impacts both directly and indirectly regional and international security and stability. Changes in the nature of security threats trigger changes in the definitions of security. Moreover, an asymmetric military force determines changes in the concepts of security, risk, threat and vulnerability [13] with implications for security policies. In the context of the new asymmetric challenges, the security dilemma, as it was formulated by Herz, remains valid but, still insufficient to incorporate the updated consequences on national and international security [14].

Power asymmetry in the military field corroborated with some developments/ consequences of the Cold War end led to the intensification of some older forms of fight (such as international terrorism), but also to the appearance of a new type of conflicts/threats, such as local/regional insurgencies or transnational organized crime. In some cases, these conflicts are to produce significant changes in the strategic interests of states, as well as in the ways these interests will be pursued (including the politics of making alliances). The case of Pakistan, a state facing sectary divisions and a trans-border insurgency is illustrative in this respect. Currently, from its own perspective on national security and regional strategic equilibrium, the government from Islamabad tends to view as equally important its role in the Taliban's reconciliation and reintegration process in Afghanistan and its defense against prospective threats coming from India - its historical enemy.

The new type of conflicts based on asymmetric tactics specific to insurgency, organized crime, etc. leads to a loss in the monopoly of violence by the states, to a "more and more intense privatization of violence"[15] in parallel with the erosion of states' legitimacy as centralized entities with important implications for their citizens' loyalty. A result of these conflicts, with major implications for regional and international security, is that they produce a significant number of internally displaced civilians or refugees. According to UNHCR, the number of displaced civilians at global level reached 14.4 million persons (this number including only refugees that cross national boundaries). To that number the Iraqi (more than two millions) and Afghan (more than four millions) refugees should be added. The US Commission for Refugees presented higher figures: 38 million displaced civilians, from which around half are internally displaced persons. One international trend worth noting is to actually provide shelter to these refugees not only in the countries that are neighbor to their country of origin, but in other countries with no common border with the conflict areas from where they flee. The most obvious examples are the conflicts from Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan (even though almost all African conflicts follow this course). It is significant that the majority of the conflicts registered in the last 50 years have occurred in the global South, these conflicts being a consequence of the poverty, and vertical inequalities (i.e. intra-state inequalities and not inter-state ones).

An effect of this new type of conflicts is the increasing number

of "gray areas", namely those areas where local conflicts and the collapse of state's authority have substantially increased the risks to life and property [6].

To the new tactics new methods of financing the militants' actions are recorded: drugs trafficking, weapons trafficking, cars trafficking (that furthermore are transformed into vehicle-borne improvised explosive device), money laundering, kidnappings, etc.

Transnational organized crime - another type of asymmetric threat - has become, considering the dimensions it has reached, a major danger for the political, social and economic stability of many states and a risk to global security. The available financial resources allow organized crime groups to undermine democracy in many areas of the Globe, especially in weak states and societies and where pluralist regimes are not strengthened.

At present, in Western states, an escalating trend of traffics can be noticed. That could become more prominent as, at international level, there is an increasing social polarization, marginalization and stigmatization of the immigrants, as well as an increasing feeling of frustration, as a result of the (inequitable) redistribution of resources across the Globe. Once tangible by its effects, the phenomenon will lead to the strengthening extremists' capacity to act counter international stability and security.

Cyber-space attacks have emerged as an expanding asymmetric threat for the past years. Worth mentioning is that, in some cases, organizations

belonging to (allegedly hostile) states were behind such actions.

The negative effects of this new type of conflicts are increased by the insufficient readiness and, hence, inability of state military forces to intervene in such situations given their allegiance to a more traditional role in the security field. Moreover, the new conflicts mainly unfold in urban areas, and that determines changes in the very concept of military operations.

2.4. Power asymmetry in the social field

Poverty, economic and social marginalization, the increasing population in poor countries lead to a growing feeling of insecurity which, in turn, leads to social polarization and to diminishing the space for the integrative values [15]. The young population in these countries frustrated and without a clear perspective of a decent life will become easy to manipulate and exploit by obscure forces.

As a CIA report claimed in 2001 *“the poorest countries and, often, the most unstable politically ... will have the largest young population till 2020. Many of them will lack the economic, institutional or political resources to integrate these teenagers in their societies. The teenagers deprived by their rights, without hope, but quite unpleased, will be the most powerful insurgents against the world order that America strives to provide”* [13].

Presumably, according to researchers, poor countries may have a better chance provided that women gain a higher status in society and that a larger number of people have

access to education. However, such reforms take several decades to produce effects.

The problem is as acute as the dwindling population in developed countries. The demographic decline and ageing population in these countries, simultaneously with the demographic boom in poor states will significantly affect the global distribution of power, not only from an economic point of view, but also from a military one [4]. The demographic decline is frequently associated with a reduction in labor productivity rate, and ageing population involves an increase in the costs with medical care and pension systems. As the labor productivity is the indicator determining a nation's wealth and, in the last instance, the power of a society, it a shift in the global distribution of wealth and power in the international system from the current advanced industrialized countries towards the new emergent powers can be foreseen [4]. Such a perspective will quite probably lead to tensions in the international system. Meanwhile, China, Brazil, India, South Africa or Mexico claim a more important role in the leadership of the international financial institutions.

On the other hand, from the perspective of the powerful states, the demographic decline creates problems for the military in terms of a diminishing recruiting pool of volunteers. Consequently, competition among different socio-economic sectors to attract skilled people will intensify even more than nowadays.

The demographic decline will directly impact, at least in some cases, the capabilities of the powerful states to project their military power beyond

national territories. A particular case is that of the Russian Federation where the current demographic processes (i.e. demographic decline, ageing population, increasing rate of Muslims and Chinese, a decreasing number of Russian ethnics, huge discrepancies in the population's density across the regions of the country) can stimulate inter-ethnic tensions and can increase the risk of political instability, as well as the social and cultural cohesion of the country on the long term. The surveys undertaken suggest that the majority of the Russian ethnics see their Muslim and Chinese co-nationals as a threat to their national sovereignty and identity, which explains the increasing xenophobe feelings in the Russian Federation. The neo-Nazi groups are poorly represented in Russia but they are steadily increasing their attacks against non-Russian ethnics, especially in Caucasus. Racial incidents frequently occur in Moscow and in other large Russian cities.

Demographic changes can lead to ethnic conflicts (e.g. the case of Kosovo) with unforeseeable consequences for international stability.

Even if, quantitatively speaking, nowadays the population does not represent a decisive force in the competition among states, the demographic potential creates the premises for changing the strategic equilibrium both at domestic and international level. That can be best explained as a result of demographic trends that are perhaps the most difficult to influence through national policies and strategies as they do not depend only on a particular political or economic context.

2.5. Power asymmetry and the environment

The environment is the field in which the effects of asymmetry are perhaps the most visible, but where combating the negative effects proves to be the most difficult to realize (being less effective). Environmental issues have become a source of international conflict [10] and according to Robert D. Kaplan it represents "*the national security issue at the beginning of the XXI century*". [16]

Environment deterioration, competition for food and water resources, but also for energy resources and other minerals lead to conflicts between an increasing number of states (as well as between groups within the same states). Approximately 80% of greenhouse gas emissions come from highly industrialized countries (25% only from the USA), but the most damaging effects are felt in the developing countries [10]. Natural hazards also have catastrophic effects on poor countries. The former US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, compared the effect produced by a tsunami on the poor states with that of a nuclear weapon. Environmental issues have already generated tensions among ecologists and supporters of free trade on the one hand, and among poor and rich states, on the other hand.

The current international system is managed by two distinct blocs: the capitalist community of security and trade (made up from OECD, NATO, UE, NAFTA member countries and Japan) and the rest of the world. For the latter the "bloc" concept should be understood in correlation with the idea of exclusion from the former category of states since, in

reality, these states are much too heterogeneous to make up a “bloc” *per se*. There is an asymmetry of resources, capabilities, standards, etc. between these two blocs and that is reflected in an asymmetry of power, in the favor of the Western bloc. However, the other bloc has important power resources, unused yet. If these two blocs will not cooperate more effectively in order to establish the bases of a coordinated and coherent management of the international system things can escape from control.

3. STATES' RESPONSE TO POWER ASYMMETRY IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The negative consequences of power asymmetry have determined the disadvantaged states to (re)act more or less successfully. Usually, their response is more visible in the economic and military fields.

In the political and economic fields regional organizations, politically motivated (in the case of the European Union), economically focused (ASEAN, in the case of countries in South-East Asia; MERCOSUR, in the case of South American countries) or with a mix of interests (in the case of NAFTA) were established with the aim of increasing commercial effectiveness and of strengthening their negotiation capacity at international level. In other cases, states make up cartels as it is the case of the best known one of the oil exporting countries – OPEC, or the latest attempts of the Russian Federation to make up an international cartel for natural gases.

One cannot claim that these strategies are the most efficient. It is likely that, by such actions, states transfer the current risks for the future. Regionalization has become an important strategy to maximize the economic and political power of the states, but it can have profound negative consequences on international politics, economics and security due to the subsequent effects it generates [4].

In the military field power asymmetry determined some of states which cannot be termed as great powers (but which possess high-skilled human resources) to invest in the military scientific research in a desire to compensate, at least partially, the power deficit. They have tried to overcome this deficit by producing nuclear weapons. As Stillman and Plaff, cited by Kenneth Waltz put it: “*The final result of the nuclear weapons is to make from the powerless states equals to those powerful*”.

In other situations, states have made up regional blocs that include a military dimension. An example of this kind is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization which the Russian Federation (a prominent member of this organization) would like to act as a military counterpart of NATO.

Nowadays, asymmetrical reactions are easier to embrace and, at the same time, more difficult to counteract [18]. The asymmetric response is facilitated by the relative low cost of the means of generating violence, large access to information, as well as the speed and innovation intrinsic to new technologies. On the other hand, the early detection of asymmetric threats is currently more difficult to accomplish because

of constraints of different types (people's rights, individual freedom, immigration, as well as an inadequate organization of the responsible structures) and because of the interdependence between states [13].

4. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper the author has tried to present an objective opinion regarding the consequences of power asymmetry on international stability and security. Such an effort is not easy to fulfill, considering the variety of opinions expressed by researchers in the field. Moreover, any analysis, being a result of an individual process, involves a certain degree of subjectivism. The importance of the subject has made us to ignore these limits.

This effort has led to the following conclusions.

First, power asymmetry has important effects (consequences) on international relations. It can stabilize the international system, if the aggregated result of the interaction between different forces within the international system leads to cooperation, but it can also propagate profound destabilizing effects if the states try to exploit on their own the possibilities of maximizing power to the detriment of other actors within the international system. The current course of affairs suggests that there are premises to estimate that in the near future the disequilibrium among states will deepen and tensions able to generate unforeseeable developments could appear within the international system.

Second, even if the asymmetry will lead to the concentration of power

in the hands of a small number of states (the most powerful) within the international system, the powerless states will also be important. There are premises for a "world with multiple centers of decision ... that suppose more consultation and more consent than any time before" [12].

Third, in the near future, credibility and legitimacy will become key resources of power and that creates the premises for changes in states' behavior and, most likely, for an increasing role of international organizations. A more important role of these organizations should be in favor of the developing states, but this will not occur unless these states prove able to harmonize their common interests in order to become a coherent force in world politics. From a historical perspective, we can appreciate that there are both pros and cons to such a perspective. Some of the developing states (China, India, and Brazil) have already gained important benefits (particularly in the economic field). However, the fact that international organizations like the UN lose from their relevance/effectiveness (although UN's legitimacy is still preserved and benefits from the largest international consent), and that regional and international organizations operating in various fields have become more and more prominent and powerful is not very encouraging for international stability. In this asymmetric world, the states will continue to adapt their working methods either to survive, or to maximize their power.

Fourth, one should not overestimate the radical character of current asymmetries. As we said at the beginning of this paper,

the existence of asymmetry is not something new for human history; the trend that associates asymmetry with the unclear perspective has its roots in the fact that forces that generate and intensify asymmetry at present are new and, therefore, insufficiently known. But, if we admit Waltz' hypothesis according to which "the perennial forces of international politics are more important than new technologies"[8], we may consider that things will not exceed too much the current mainstream. Moreover, since we cannot completely eliminate risks, nor ignore them we should learn how to live with them. Finally, the asymmetry of power represents a factor, but not the only one, in explaining international conflict and instability.

REFERENCES

- [1] Wight Martin (1998) *Politica de putere*, Arc.Wight, 1998, p.30.
- [2] Bull 1984 quoted in Guzzini Stefano (2000) *Realismul în relațiile internaționale și în economia politică internațională*, Institutul European, Iași, p.399.
- [3] Wallerstein Immanuel (1992) *Sistemul mondial modern*, Vol. 1-4, Meridiane.
- [4] Gilpin Robert (1999), *Economia politică a relațiilor internaționale*, DU Style, UNIVERSALIA, p. 7, p. 80).
- [5] (Tim Winer, 2002).
- [6] Strange Susan (1997), *State și piețe*, Institutul European, Iași, p. 122, p. 125, p. 230.
- [7] Strange Susan (2002), *Retragerea statului*. Difuziunea puterii în economia mondială, Trei.
- [8] Waltz Kenneth (2001) *Teoria politicii internaționale*, Polirom, p. 238.
- [9] Giddens Anthony (2001) *A treia cale. Renașterea social-democrației*, Polirom, p. 147.
- [10] Goldstein S. Joshua, Pevenhouse C. Jon (2007), *Relații internaționale*, Polirom, p. 339.
- [11] Buzan Barry, Little Richard (2004) *Sistemele internaționale în istoria lumii*, Polirom, p. 288).
- [12] Rosenau James (1994) *Turbulență în politica mondială*, Editura Academiei Române, p.111.
- [13] Brzezinski Zbigniew (2005) *Marea dilemă. A domina sau a conduce*, Scripta, pp.23-28.
- [14] Georg Sorensen (2002), *State transformation and new security dilemmas*, in Aydinli Ersel and JamesRosenau (2002) *Globalisation, security and the nation state*, States University of New York Press.
- [15] Kaldor Marry (1998) *Războaie vechi și noi*, Antet.
- [16] Gilpin Robert (2004), *Economia mondială în secolul XXI. Provocarea capitalismului global*, Polirom.
- [17] Kaplan D. Robert (2002), *Politici de război. De ce necesită conducerea politică un etos păgân*, Polirom.
- [18] Morgenthau Hans (2007) *Politica între națiuni*, Polirom.
- [19] Nye Joseph, Keohane O. Robert (2009) *Putere și interdependență*, Polirom.
- [20] Nye Joseph (2001) *Descifrarea conflictelor internaționale*, Antet.
- [21] Zakaria Fareed (2009) *Lumea post-americană*, Polirom.

DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS IN MILITARY ACTIONS: NECESSITY, POSSIBILITIES AND CONSTRAINTS

Elena SUSNEA

“Carol I” National Defense University, Bucharest, Romania

Nowadays, modern organizations cannot resort to the decision-making process without relying on information and communication technology if they want to be successful. Thus, besides information as an important input of this process, the tools and techniques used by decision-makers are equally important in the support and validation of their decisions. All this is also valid for the military organizations and their specific tasks and activities. A fortiori military commanders face some of the most difficult and high-stake decision issues meaningful not only at the level of the military, but also for the humankind. Under these circumstances and as a result of an increase in the diversity and complexity of conflict situations, in the information and technology means employed by opponents in warfare and in the amount of information needed to be processed in real time, decision support systems become a necessity. Starting from the aforementioned inevitable requirement, the aim of this article is to emphasize the possibilities and constraints in developing an intelligent decision support system that assists commanders in making scientific decisions on time, under the right circumstances, for the right costs.

Key words: *DSS, military actions, management information systems*

1. INTRODUCTION

The subject of military theory is military action. The latter is defined as “*the result of human civilization, of armed confrontation between the formal and informal groups of society, their emergence and (counter)actions as a result of their mutual interdependence*” [1]

The planning and implementation of military action are part of the military decision-maker’s competence. Consequently, the latter needs to decide on elements like

procedure adoption to ensure military actions’ leadership, establishment of force structures, structuring of operational orders, re support, cooperation, command and control, military action support and forces protection.

Besides all of the above, technological innovation increasingly and decisively influences military actions. The new generations of intelligent weapons will be widely used in operations and military conflicts. Advanced information and

communication technology used in developing these weapons provide new military opportunities. This technology facilitates data gathering, processing and analysis, as well as information extraction and rapid dissemination to almost any conflict area. Moreover, the development of the military processes is under the direct influence of technological development. Therefore, it is not redundant to identify a clear direction towards using the new information and communication technology in the military field [2].

The development of Information Systems Management (ISM) contributed dramatically to providing the right means to gather and process the data needed by military leaders to extract meaningful information so as to increase the quality of all aspects related to the management of forces and material resources (information included). However, these systems have not enabled the generation of decision alternatives and appropriate solutions to address the new opportunities and issues related to military action. Therefore, they did not have the capability to solve some management problems. This shortcoming was solved through the development of Decision Support System (DSS).

The aim of this paper is to overview DSS and its relationship with the military field by identifying the major issues and opportunities provided by these systems in military actions.

2. DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS: BASIC CONCEPTS

Decisions are the outcome of managers' and leaders' work. In a globalized and increasingly complex and dynamic society, decision-makers should have the necessary abilities to decide better and quicker.

Beginning in the late 1970s, many practitioners and researchers focused on the development of computer-based systems that help managers make decisions based on scientific approaches. This initiative *"generated much optimism about the prospects for improving decision making"* [3].

In this respect, some authors consider that *"by the 1990s, the decision makers were well versed in mathematical and statistical techniques needed for usefulness analysis, operations research, decision matrices and probabilistic decision trees"* [4].

The term of decision support system (DSS) has many connotations but it can be mainly characterized as a *"model-based set of procedures for processing data and judgments to assist decision-makers"* [5] situated at different levels in the chain of command to solve semi-structured and unstructured decision tasks. Further, DSS stimulates the decision-makers to improve the decisional process and make the right decision in order to obtain high and quick performance. It also helps decision makers to extend their capabilities,

but it does not replace their decisions [6].

DSS are also seen as “*technologies that help convey the right knowledge to the right decision makers at the right time in the right representation, and for the right costs*” [7].

The APICS Dictionary defines DSS as “a computer system designed to assist managers in selecting and evaluating courses of action by providing a logical, usually quantitative analysis of the relevant factors” [8]. Therefore, this system can support military commanders in their primary job of making good, timely decisions. Routine, or structured, reports often do not help because they may contain data that may come in a too great amount, in the wrong form, or not timely enough. A DSS is designed to provide relevant information in a timely manner and a format that is easy to understand.

Thus, structurally, a DSS has four basic components: the data management subsystem, the management subsystem model, user interface, and users. There are some advanced DSS also containing the knowledge management subsystem [9]. The first three components are viewed as software parts, while the last try to include the decision maker. The multi-layered architecture provides powerful instruments for recognizing and solving problems during the decision making process [10]. As a result, military commander performs specific decision task based on a permanent dialogue with the system.

The support of the military commander and his staff in the decision-making process has to be the main objective of the respective systems in order to increase the overall efficiency of the Command and control – Reconnaissance – Effects integrated system. From this perspective, DSS contributes to the Command and Control Superiority [11].

3. MILITARY ACTIONS

3.1. Preliminary aspects

In its classical form, military action is defined as the total number of land, air and maritime operations led by a group of forces, elements and/or means belonging to various force categories within an environment characteristic for each of them, into a given geographical area, for given period of time, in a unitary manner, under the single command of an operational commandment in order to achieve some goals.

Regarding the nature of the participant forces, the types of operations executed are: joint, multinational, interdepartmental, and independent.

Under the current circumstances that are best characterized under the umbrella phrase of the twenty-first-century globalized world, the military action acquires new characteristics. Consequently, nowadays it resembles police actions and must be concerned with minimizing casualties for all sides, even at the risk of generating casualties among one's own forces.

Moreover, to be legitimate, such action must comply with international law provisions.

The military action tends to be the most visible and hazardous expression of national policy [12] and it must be the ultimate resort of political leaders. However, nowadays, even if the relation between the political decision and its military enforcement has not changed, things are not the same in the decision elaboration system. In this respect, it is worth reminding the increasing roles of international alliances and coalitions, of various security bodies, and of the media and public opinion. As a result, "political will" acquires new meanings and, regardless of the organization (i.e. great powers, NATO, the European Union, security organizations and coalitions) it is mostly oriented towards crises and conflict management, war prevention and the eradication of terrorism as a contemporary phenomenon. Consequently, the dynamics of military action is characterized by responsibility and global coverage.

3.2. DSS: some major issues

In our opinion, the introduction of a new DSS in the military action may lead to some important problems.

The first major problem consists of money and time constraints. In this respect, the acquisition and training costs required by an optimal use of the new DSS may prove impossible.

Second, the expansion of conflict areas involves a greater need to

share data. In this context, there are concerns regarding the security of DSS knowledge and large databases. Moreover, the changes introduced by the new DSS may not be acceptable in terms of military doctrine or rules of engagement [13].

Third, the expertise developed by the decision-maker with previous systems may prove irrelevant in the context of the new procedures introduced by the new DSS. In this particular situation, the introduction of the new DSS may place all decision-makers at novice level.

While a computer system is the backbone of the DSS, it requires cross-functional teams to build the database and a model that is unique to the decision areas supported. From this point of view, the human factor plays an important role because the efficiency principle is related to how well the original data are organized in the system. It is also important the nature of data to be used as input for the system. Therefore, the objective and subjective quality of data is another issue that needs attention in the use of a DSS for taking decisions. This is because the poor data quality can lead to less effective decisional acts and poor decision outcomes.

The objective nature of data quality is based on evaluating the conformity of data to the initial specifications and integrity rules, or their correspondence to external phenomena. In this respect, measures related to data delivery, actual data use, and data users' perceptions must be taken. Furthermore, even with the

data that meet the basic requirements there may be some problems. Thus, data objectively evaluated as qualitative may be regarded as unsatisfactory by the managers who have to use them because of quality loss as a result of deficiencies in delivery mechanisms, processes or interfaces.

The subjectivity in data quality consists in the need for continuous feedback from the decision-makers on the problems encountered in data reception and processing.

A major issue in implementing DSS refers to the reduction of human errors. These computerized systems are intended to improve the performance of human operators by filtering and integrating raw process data, interpreting the status of particular situations, prioritizing goals and providing advice. Human operators focus their attention on the most relevant data and highest priority problems, and dynamically manage change situations more easily using the computerized system. There are many support systems used by DSS operators to aid the surveillance, diagnosis, and prevention of human errors. On one hand, there are indirect support systems using integrated graphic displays, configurable displays, ecological interface designs and information systems (e.g. the alarm systems). On the other hand, the direct support systems include intelligent advisors, computer-based procedures, fault diagnosis systems, and computerized DSS.

In our opinion, the development of Decision Support System (DSS) is challenging, as it must include system designers and specialists to ensure the cognitive fit between the DSS and the decision-maker so that decision-making effectiveness is maximized. The validation step from the DSS development process is very important because it determines how the implemented system satisfies the purpose and expectations of the user. Reducing human errors requires personnel trained in IT, but also military specialists.

A DSS that has already been used before is considered advantageous and necessary in order to shorten reaction time in the decision making process so that the results are included in relevant course of actions.

3.3. Possibilities

Military actions are complex situations occurring in complex environments. Therefore, the decisions taken in this field must be treated in a complex manner. The challenge is the integration of logical processes with military decision-makers' intuition in the obtaining of the most efficient decision alternatives. Concerning these alternatives, we agree with some authors who consider that "*by a complex situation, we mean one that may be difficult to define and may significantly change in response to some solutions; may not have a single "right" answer; is triggered by many forces; has no (or few) predecessors...*" [14].

In the complex environments characteristic of military actions where human errors may have tragic consequences, DSS are essential to the execution of complex tasks. The technological evolution constantly increases the scope of the operational theatre and the tempo of the response. Moreover, a huge load of uncertain data is generated by the environment. Clearly, this large amount of data may exceed the human capability in processing them. Information technology support is designed to cope with those human limitations in such complex environments. Thereby, intelligence decision making systems use data fusion that consists of processes automation so that diverse sets of raw data from different sources are combined into a single set of meaningful information that is greater than the sum of its contributing parts [15]. Due to this technology, the interval between data gathering to model creating is greatly reduced.

Decision Support Systems are often used as online alternatives to the development and analysis of courses of action (ACOA) and as tools that can be used for Online Doctrine and Tactics Techniques, and Procedures (DTTP) for support to operations. In this regard DSS offers the following possibilities:

- makes the evaluation of command and control processes and the friendly or foe capabilities' performance assessment possible;
- supports the military commander and his staff in their

headquarters by increasing their ability to identify new opportunities;

- supports all phases of the command and control process;
- uses computer-based, automatic and closed models that can be adapted to the current situation [16].

As for the generic operations performed by DSS the following types can be used for military actions: the drawer systems, information models for analysis, representational models and suggestion models.

A pertinent example of a the drawer system is the one used by the US Department of Army called ARIMS (The Army Record Information Management System) that is applied to all unclassified Army records, including For Official Use Only (FOUO), regardless of medium, as well as to all Army records classified as SECRET (US Army Department: 2007).

The information models for analysis took many forms in the military field. One development has been an increased emphasis on building "realistic" models and simulations, including the so-called virtual world. These are more than mere analytic constructs designed to capture just enough about a system to do system analysis. They are attempts to study, understand, and interact with the real world through models that have increasingly high fidelity in many respects. A challenge at the frontier of the decision-making science is developing well-conceived families of models and human games

that are much more rigorous and mutually informed and that have been regarded as families of models in the past. A second development has been to discover new methods to help in the creative and imaginative aspects of strategic planning. Three such methods are Uncertainty-Sensitive Planning (USP), Assumption-Based Planning (ABP) and “Day After ...” games [17].

DSS is also used in situation assessment which is the ongoing process of inferring relevant information about the forces of concern in a military situation. Relevant information can include force types, repower, location, and the past, present and future course of action. Situation assessment involves the incorporation of uncertain evidence from diverse sources. These include photographs, radar scans, and other forms of image intelligence, or IMINT; electronics intelligence, or ELINT, derived from characteristics of emissions generated by enemy equipment; communications intelligence, or COMINT, derived from the characteristics of messages sent by the enemy; and reports from human informants (HUMINT). These sources must be combined to form a model of the situation [18].

Among the DSS used in military action, the simulation systems used as add-ons to the C4I systems play an exquisite role especially in: all processes of command, control, communication, intelligence, reconnaissance, attrition, movement, etc. relevant to the problem to be

solved which must be adequately modelled; the command agents and computer generated forces (CGF) that have to be used for automatic order generation and intelligent behaviour of simulated entities; the initial state of the simulation which must be generated automatically out of the data available from the C4I systems and adequate and validated data which must be available for the simulation system [16].

The DSS suggestion model has the role to produce suggestions about how to decide in certain situations. It is a model that can only support the repetitive decision situations and it needs an appropriate set of models in order to work.

Military actions depend on real-time information sharing to make time critical decisions. Inherent in this process are network-centric operations (NCO) that integrate the isolated air, land, sea, and space-based systems that gather, process, and disseminate vital information. NCOs enhance information sharing and collaboration to improve the quality of information and shared situational awareness.

3.4. Barriers to DSS implementation

Some of the main characteristics of today's security environment are *“exquisite technique and technological development in the military field and the easiness to access the products prone to be used as weapons by not necessarily*

well-intended categories of states and organizations" [19]. DSS is as effective as the context in which it functions and the individuals who use it. Here we speak about the existence of the qualitative and quantitative resources needed to implement a DSS, as a matter of suitable and standardized communication and information systems, trained personnel and decision-makers capable to analyze and interconnect computerized results with human intuition.

Issues regarding computer literacy and hardware/software requirements are identified as initial barriers.

The ability to integrate and correlate a vast amount of disparate information from multiple sensor and heterogeneous data resources of varying degrees of uncertainty in real-time is an impediment for mission-critical decision support systems (DSS).

One recognized characteristic for the successful implementation of DSS tools is their adaptability to the existent management approaches. In this respect, efforts for changing current/common management practices are necessary.

There are a series of factors contributing to the success or failure of DSS implementation. In terms of personal factors, there are many barriers in implementing DSS related to prior expectations, education, value and belief, impact on user's job [20]. The technical factors refer to user interface and system performance and reliability. There are also factors

emerging from the interconnection of both personal and technical aspects in the form of social content gain and loss before and after DSS implementation. There are also other factors [23] related to the external environment, or some organizational aspects such as changes in the interpersonal relations and in the management processes that the DSS is designed to aid.

4. CONCLUSIONS

Over the past decade many researches and practitioners have broadened their activity focusing increasingly on the development of decision support systems that emulate human decision-maker capabilities. For the military field, the development of such systems is very useful in the current dynamic security environment.

DSS is a computerized system that is intended to interact with, and complement human decisions. Therefore, the ideal DSS for military actions must have the following characteristics: it provides the information needed by the commander; it can be easily controlled by humans dealing with large amount of data; it complements the power of the human mind by offering solutions to a wide variety of military problems.

The effectiveness of DSS depends on the resources needed to create it and on its appropriate design and use. The main issue when it comes to employing DSS in military action

is to confer superiority. This is all the more a stringent problem if the increase in battle field information rate brought about by modern weapons, sensors, and tactics is taken into account. That requires selective but extensive application of automation to assist commanders and their staffs in reaching timely and appropriate decisions.

In our opinion, the problem of real-time decision-making represents a fundamental challenge to the artificial intelligence used in the military action, and has been kept under scrutiny by researchers.

REFERENCES

- [1] Medzmariashvili Elguja (2011) Novel Approach to Indirect Actions in Military Theory, München: GRIN Verlag GmbH, p. 2..
- [2] Şuşnea Elena, "Using Artificial Neural Networks in eLearning Systems", Scientific Bulletin, Series C, 72, 4, 2010.p. 92.
- [3]Power J. Daniel (2002) Decision Support Systems: Concepts and Resources for Managers, Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., p. 1.
- [4] Sashkin Marshall (2001) Tough Choices: The Managerial Decision-Making Assessment Inventory, Seabrook: Ducochon Press, p. 17.
- [5] Little D. C. John, "Models and Managers: The Concept of a Decision Calculus", Management Science, 16(8), 1970, <http://mansci.journal.informs.org>
- [6] Filip G. Florin, Sisteme suport pentru decizii, Bucureşti: Editura Tehnică, 2004, p.59.
- [7] Burstein Frada, Holsapple W. Clyde (editors), (2008) Handbook on Decision Support Systems 1, Berlin: Springer-Verlag., p. 21.
- [8] Schuster W. Edmund, Allen J. Stuart, and Brook L. David (2007) Global RFID: The Value of the EPCGlobal Network for Supply Chain Management, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, p. 292.
- [9] Turban Efraim, Aronson E. Jay, Liang Ting-Peng (2005) Decision Support Systems and Intelligent Systems, 7th edn., New Jersey: Pearson/Prentice Hall, p. 292.
- [10] idem, p. 663.
- [11]Tolk Andreas, "Decision Support Systems – Technical Prerequisites and Military Requirements", in 2000 Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium Proceeding, June 2000, <http://arxiv.org>.
- [12] Department of Defence of the United States of America, "Capstone Concept for Joint Operation, Version 3.0", <http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare> , (accessed September 1, 2012).
- [13] Burstein Frada, Holsapple W. Clyde (editors), (2008) Handbook on Decision Support Systems 1, Berlin: Springer-Verlag. p. 4.
- [14] Chen Miao, Zhu Qiuming, and Chen Zhengxin, "An Integrated Interactive Environment for Knowledge Discovery from Heterogeneous Data Resources", Journal of Information & Software Technology, 43, 1, July 2001.
- [15] Petrov V. Plamen, Zhu Qiuming, Hicks D. Jeffrey, and Stoyen D. Alexander, "A Hierarchical Collective Agents Network for Real-time Sensor Fusion and Decision Support", in AAAI Workshop Technical Report WS-02-15, Menlo Park: AAAI Press, 2002.
- [16]Tolk Andreas, "Decision Support Systems – Technical Prerequisites and Military Requirements", in 2000 Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium Proceeding, June 2000, <http://arxiv.org>.

[17] Davis K. Paul, Kulick Jonathan, and Egner Michael, *Implications of Modern Decision Science for Military Decision-Support Systems*, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2005.

[18] Laskey Blackmond Kathryn, D'Ambrosio Bruce, Levitt Tod S., and Mahoney Suzanne, "Limited Rationality in Action: Decision Support for Military Situation Assessment", in *Minds and Machines*, 10, 1, February 2000.

[19] Atanasiu Mirela, "Recon gurări și redimensionări militare și civil-militare ale luptei armate în războiul viitorului", in *Securitate și Apărare în Uniunea Europeană*, București: Universitatea Națională de Apărare „Carol I”, 2008, p. 569.

[20] Vanrolleghem A. Peter, *Decision Support for Water Framework*

Directive Implementation, London: IWA Publishing, 2011, p. 134).

[21] Cezar Vasilescu- *Effective Strategic Making*, *Journal of Defense Resources Management*, vol.2, issue 1, 2011, p.104.

[22] US Army Department, "The Army Records Information Management System (ARIMS), Washington DC, 2 October 2007", www.apd.army.mil (accessed September 1, 2012).

[23] Turban Efraim, Leidner Dorothy, McLean Ephraim, and Wetherbe James, *Information Technology for Management: Transforming Organizations in the Digital Economy*, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2007.

CLOUD COMPUTING SECURITY ISSUES

Florin OGIGAU-NEAMTIU

IT Specialist

The Regional Department of Defense Resources Management Studies,
Brasov, Romania

The term “cloud computing” has been in the spotlights of IT specialists the last years because of its potential to transform this industry. The promised benefits have determined companies to invest great sums of money in researching and developing this domain and great steps have been made towards implementing this technology. Managers have traditionally viewed IT as difficult and expensive and the promise of cloud computing leads many to think that IT will now be easy and cheap. The reality is that cloud computing has simplified some technical aspects of building computer systems, but the myriad challenges facing IT environment still remain. Organizations which consider adopting cloud based services must also understand the many major problems of information policy, including issues of privacy, security, reliability, access, and regulation. The goal of this article is to identify the main security issues and to draw the attention of both decision makers and users to the potential risks of moving data into “the cloud”.

Key words: *cloud computing, security risks, IT security, cloud models, services, cloud standards, risk assessment*

1. WHAT IS CLOUD COMPUTING

According to specialists [1] cloud computing is one of the most significant transformation in information technology with many advantages to both companies and end users. This technology promises to release the client from the burden of administering more and more complex and expensive systems by offering him the possibility of using systems with state of art computing capabilities, high availability and scalability.

Given the theorists', network architects', developers', managers', consumers', etc. constant scrutiny over this subject, there is a plethora of definitions that attempt to address the concept of *cloud computing*. Therefore, this article will use a generic definition which, even if not a comprehensive one, it will include the most important dimensions and variables. Thus, cloud computing is *a model of organizing computers for enabling convenient, ubiquitous, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable IT resources*. Cloud computing has the potential

to enhance collaboration, agility, scaling and availability and provides opportunities for cost reduction through optimized and efficient use of computing resources. The cloud model is a way of organizing computers so that resources can be quickly orchestrated, provisioned, implemented and decommissioned, scaled up or down to provide an on-demand service allocation.

The term **cloud** is used as a metaphor for the Internet, based on the cloud drawing used in the past to represent the telephone network, and later to represent the Internet in computer network diagrams as an abstraction of the complex infrastructure it represents. The unknown cloud is used here to represent the data center hardware and software which will be transparent to the client offering him the capability of focusing his efforts on the main activity.

This computing model appeared as a consequence of the development of parallel computing, distributed computing, grid computing, utility computing, all of them oriented on outsourcing computational needs.

2. THE CLOUD DELIVERY MODEL

The technology of cloud computing is based on a modern approach to software engineering called service oriented architecture (SOA). The technique focuses on the delivery of an integrated and orchestrated suite of functions to an

end-user through the use of different functions or services. These services are well defined functionalities that are built as software components and that can be used in different combinations to achieve different goals.

Cloud computing providers offer services built around three fundamental models: Infrastructure as a service (IaaS), platform as a service (PaaS), and software as a service (SaaS), as displayed in the **Figure 1**.




Figure 1: Cloud computing fundamental models

Source: www.wikipedia.com[2]

Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) is the capability provided to the cloud user that provisions the processing, storage, networks, and other fundamental computing resources. All of the above enable the user to deploy and run arbitrary applications and even operating system software. The cloud user does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure, but has control over operating systems, storage, deployed applications, etc. In this model, it is the cloud user who is responsible for patching and maintaining the operating systems and application

software. Infrastructure-as-a-Service is a platform through which businesses can avail equipment in the form of hardware, servers, storage space etc. at pay-per-use service. Examples include Amazon EC2, Terremark Enterprise Cloud, Rackspace, Microsoft Azure, etc.

Platform as a Service (PaaS) is the capability provided to the cloud user to deploy onto the cloud infrastructure consumer-created applications using programming languages and tools supported by the provider (e.g. Java, Python, .Net). In such a case the cloud user can develop and run its own software solutions on a cloud platform without the cost and complexity of buying and managing the underlying hardware and software layers. He cannot manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure, network, servers, operating systems, or storage. Examples of such platforms are Google AppEngine, IBM SmartCloud Application Services, Amazon Web Services, etc.

Software as a Service (SaaS) represents the capability provided to the cloud user to use the provider's applications running on a cloud infrastructure and accessible from various client devices through a thin-client interface such as a web browser (e.g. web-based e-mail). The consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure, network, servers, operating systems, storage, or even individual application capabilities, but only some limited user-specific application configuration settings. Examples include online word processing and spreadsheet tools,

customer relationship management (CRM) services and web content delivery services (Salesforce CRM, Google Docs, Yahoo Email, Gmail, etc).

Viewed in terms of data security the three ways of service provision differ radically because of the extent to which the user has access to the software used and its settings.

3. CLOUD DEPLOYMENT MODELS

Deploying cloud computing can differ depending on requirements, and the following four deployment models have been identified, each with specific characteristics that support the needs of the services and users of the clouds in particular ways :

a. Private Cloud — the cloud infrastructure has been deployed, and is maintained and operated only for a specific organization. The cloud may be hosted within the organization or externally and is managed internally or by a third-party. This model does not benefit from the less hands-on management, nor from the economic advantages that make cloud computing such an intriguing concept.

b. Public Cloud — the cloud infrastructure is made available to the public on a commercial basis by a cloud service provider. This enables a consumer to develop and deploy a service in the cloud with very little financial implications compared to the capital expenditure requirements normally associated with other deployment options.

c. Community Cloud — the cloud infrastructure is shared among a number

of organizations with similar interests and requirements. It can be managed internally or by a third party and hosted within the organization or externally. The costs are shared among fewer users than a public cloud. Hence a community cloud benefits from medium costs as a result of a sharing policy. By means of comparison, with the private cloud the costs increase alongside the level of expertise needed.

d. Hybrid cloud is a combination of two or more clouds (private, community or public) that remain unique entities but are bound together, offering the benefits of multiple deployment models. By utilizing “hybrid cloud” architecture, companies and individuals are able to obtain degrees of fault tolerance combined with locally immediate usability without being entirely dependent on third party services. Hybrid Cloud architecture requires both on-premises resources and off-site (remote) server based cloud infrastructure. Hybrid clouds lack the flexibility, security and certainty of in-house applications. However, they provide the flexibility of in-house applications with the fault tolerance and scalability of cloud based services.

4. THE RISKS OF ADOPTING CLOUD COMPUTING TECHNOLOGY

The process of creating and managing a secure cloud space is a more challenging task than creating a secure classical IT environment. Given the immaturity of this technology the new resources and the reallocation of traditional ones are not fully tested and

come with new risks that are still under research.

The main risks of adopting cloud computing identified by this paper are:

a. Misunderstanding responsibilities.

If in a traditional scenario the security of data is entirely the burden of the company owning data. In the cloud computing scenario the responsibilities are divided between the two actors: the cloud provider and the client. There is a tremendous potential for misguided risk management decisions if cloud providers do not disclose the extent to which the security controls are implemented and the consumer knows which controls are further needed to be adopted.

Different kinds of cloud services adopted mean different responsibilities for the service provider and the customer. If an IaaS service model is adopted, then the provider is responsible for physical security, environment security and the virtualization software security, whereas the consumer is responsible for securing everything else above this layer including operating system, applications and data. However, in an SaaS cloud service model the provider is responsible not only for the physical and environmental security but also for all the software services he uses in order to provide that particular software service to the client. In this case, the responsibilities of the consumer in the field of security are much lowered.

b. Data security and confidentiality issues

One of the biggest security concerns people have when moving to the cloud is related to the problem of keeping data

secure and confidential. In this respect, some particular problems arise: who can create data, where the data is stored, who can access and modify data, what happens when data is deleted, how the back-up is done, how the data transfer occurs, etc. All of this is known as data security lifecycle and it is displayed in **Figure 2**.



Figure 2: The data security lifecycle
Source: www.securosis.com [4]

This lifecycle exists also in the classic architecture but in a cloud environment its stages are much more complex, posing higher security risks and requiring a more careful management. Worth reminding in this respect is that it is much more difficult for the cloud customer to effectively check the data handling practices of the cloud provider and thus be sure that the data is handled in a proper way.

To counter such a risk, strategies like data encryption, particular public key infrastructure, data dispersion, standardization of APIs, etc are proposed to customers as security measures to create a trusted and secure environment.

c. Lack of Standards

The immaturity of this technology makes it difficult to develop a

comprehensive and commonly accepted set of standards. As a result, many standard development organizations were established in order to research and develop the specifications. Organizations like *Cloud Security Alliance*, *European Network and Information Security Agency*, *Cloud Standards Customer Council*, etc. have developed best practices regulations and recommendations. Other establishments, like *Distributed Management Task Force*, *The European Telecommunications Standards Institute*, *Open Grid Forum*, *Open Cloud Consortium*, *National Institute of Standards and Technology*, *Storage Networking Industry Association* etc., centered their activity on the development of working standards for different aspects of the cloud technology. The excitement around cloud has created a hurry of standards and open source activity leading to market confusion. That is why certain working groups like *Cloud Standards Coordination*, *TM Forum*, etc. act to improve collaboration, coordination, information and resource sharing between the organizations acting in this research field.

d. Interoperability issues

The cloud computing technology offers a degree of resource scalability which has never been reached before. Companies can benefit from additional computational needs, storage space, bandwidth allocation, etc. whenever they need and without great investments to support peak

load demands. If the demand falls back the additional capacity can be shut down just as quickly as it was scaled up without any hardware equipment sitting idle.

This great advantage has also a major drawback. It comes alongside with the risk of managing data within a shared environment (computation, storage, and network) with other cloud clients. Additionally, at one time one company may have multiple cloud providers for different services which have to be interoperable. In time, for different reasons, companies may decide to move their services to another cloud and in such a case the lack of interoperability can block or raise heavy obstacles to such a process.

Cloud providers may find the customer lock-in system attractive, but for the customers interoperability issues mean that they are vulnerable to price increases, quality of services not meeting their needs, closure of one or more cloud services, provider going out of business, disputes between with the cloud provider.

e. Reliability breakdowns

Another important aspect of the cloud computing is the reliability or availability of services. The breakdown of an essential service operating in a cloud has an impact on many clients. For example, in April 2012 there was a Gmail disruption that made Gmail services unavailable for almost 1 hour. The company first said that it affected less than 2 % of their customers, then they updated to 10 %, which sums around 35 million

clients of a total of 350 million users. These incidents are not rare and evidence the customer lack of control over their data.

The irony is that, in terms of reliability, cloud providers have set high standards which are rarely achieved in an internal environment. However, because these outages affect large numbers of consumers it cast doubts in the minds of IT decision makers over the viability of replacing desktop functionality with the functionality offered by the cloud.

Also, in this industry, the leading companies have set some high level quality services. Those levels are not easy to be reached by the other cloud service providers which do not have such a well developed infrastructure. Unfortunately for the clients these quality services may come at higher costs and sometimes the decision makers, lured by the cheaper services, will be reluctant to collaborate with such a provider.

f. Malicious insider

A malicious insider is a person motivated to create a bad impact on the organization's mission by taking action that compromises information confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability. When sensitive data is processed outside the enterprise the organizational managers are less immediately aware of the nature and level of risk and they do not possess quick and direct capability to control and counter these risks.

Experienced security specialists are highly aware of the inverse

relationship between loyalty and risk. Even if trusted company employees can make mistakes or commit fraud and the outsiders are not automatically less ethical than them, it is prudent to invest company's long-term employees with higher trust.

The malicious activities of an insider could potentially have an impact on: the confidentiality, integrity and availability of all kind of data and services with impact on the internal activities, organization's reputation and customer trust. This is especially important in the case of cloud computing due to the fact that cloud architectures require certain roles, like cloud administrators, cloud auditors, cloud security personnel, which are extremely high-risk.

5. CONCLUSIONS

"Cloud" computing is based on technologies like virtualization, distributed computing, grid computing, utility computing, but also on networking, web and software services. The benefits of adopting this technology draw decision makers' attention and nowadays many companies are engaged in adopting or researching cloud adoption. Specialists who analyze this sector forecast that the global market for cloud computing will experience a significant increase in the next years and will replace traditional IT environment.

In the process of adopting cloud based services companies and IT organizations should evaluate the business benefits and risks. The

cloud's economies of scale and flexibility are both a friend and a foe from a security point of view. The management of security risk involves users, the technology itself, the cloud service providers, and the legal aspects of the data and services being used. The massive concentrations of resources and data present a more attractive target to attackers, but cloud-based defenses can be more robust, scalable and cost-effective than traditional ones. To help reduce the threat, cloud computing stakeholders should invest in implementing security measures to ensure that the data is being kept secure and private throughout its lifecycle.

REFERENCES

- [1] Bob Savage's speech delivered to Science Foundation Ireland's (SFI) forum, 'Science and Industry: Working Together for Economic Recovery', <http://www.siliconrepublic.com/cloud/item/24428-cloud-most-significant-tran>, last retrieved 02.08.2012
- [2] http://wikipedia.org/wiki/Cloud_computing last retrieved 04.08.2012
- [3] <http://www.vmware.com/solutions/cloud-computing/index.html>, last retrieved 02.08.2012
- [4] <https://securosis.com/blog/data-security-lifecycle-2.0> last retrieved 15.08.2012
- [5] <http://www.redhat.com/solutions/cloud-computing/>, last retrieved 15.08.2012
- [6] <http://softwarestrategiesblog.com/2012/01/17/roundup-of-cloud->

computing-forecasts-and-market-estimates-2012/, last retrieved 29.07.2012

[7] <http://www.google.com/appsstatus>, last retrieved 16.08.2012

[8] <http://cloud-standards.org>, last retrieved 10.08.2012

[9] http://cloud-standards.org/wiki/index.php?title=Cloud_standards_overview, last retrieved 13.08.2012

[10] <http://royal.pingdom.com/2007/09/26/google-availability-differs-greatly-between-countries/>, last retrieved 27.08.2012

[11] <http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/datacenter/11-cloud-iaas-providers-compared/5285>, last retrieved 05.08.2012

INTUITION AS A BASIS FOR LEADERSHIP: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND STATISTICAL MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENTS

Daniela BELU

Department of Military Sciences and Management,
Air Force Academy “Henri Coanda”, Brasov, Romania

The aim of this paper is to overview a set of research results concerning the influence a person may have on others by simply using leadership skills. The premise underlying the endeavor is that, in the end, intuition is a basis for leadership. Based on the findings, the definition for leadership suggested by this article runs as follows: the harmony between what one thinks and does. Moreover, the article proposes that this harmony be taught through distinct subject matters at undergraduate level for those who are to obtain a diploma in “organizational management”.

Key words: *management, intuition,, leadership, charisma, leader, self-confidence.*

1. CAPACITY TO FOLLOW ONE'S INTUITION

The measure of leadership is the leader's capacity to go beyond simply defending certain ideas/ values/ beliefs/aspirations and to actually be a promoter of these through his/her own behavior.

The harmony and congruence between an individual's thoughts/emotions/actions is a landmark of psychological maturity expressed through creative ideas and inner tranquility. It is only under such circumstance that the individual's actions can be effective, consuming an extremely small amount of energy, but yielding maximum results.

The issue of congruence raises two problems that need to be solved:

1. leading positions, regardless of the hierarchical level, should be led by psychologically congruent people.

2. any organization should be focused on increasing the mental congruence among its employees, as a characteristic of personal development.

Cognitively speaking, all employees comprehend and are capable of explaining certain things, but not all people are able to apply them in other actions other than those adequate to their biological age.

At the level of the organization, the selection for managerial positions must necessarily be made relying on a battery of psychological tests, with the purpose of employing people with leadership skills, so that any manager,

regardless of the hierarchical level, may be a natural leader. Such a position would translate in reality into the following behavioral markers:

- The person in question will constrain no one to behave in accordance with a pre-established scenario suiting his/her personal needs, but will rather impose the observation of the internal regulations of the organization, the application of the labor norms, of the country's laws and of the principles of Christian moral, by the scientific methods acquired from management training course;

- The person is self-confident;
- The person is genuine;
- The person will act in accordance with his/her own values and, by way of consequence, will do what he/she preaches and should not have any problems with transparency issues.

The increase of the mental congruence of any organization's employee is important for the process of self-development and mental maturity and should be based on the following aspects:

- To work, relying on what we ourselves can do;
- To eliminate the 'to be perfect' imperative;
- To learn optimism;
- To discover skills/passion/ things that may support optimism and the individual's state of happiness;
- To reorient the imperative of perfection towards skills/passions/ things that support optimism and the individual's state of happiness.

These methods aimed at increasing mental congruence will materialize in:

- physical and psychological relaxation;
- free expression of personal emotions and opinions;
- honest recognition that the individual 'does not know', 'does not have what it takes', 'lacks the theoretical/practical knowledge' required to solve a problem;
- the choice of simplicity in the relations with the others, renouncing at the 'confrontation' with the fellow-creatures and choosing instead to 'uphold one's own values/beliefs', while expressing themselves clearly/bravely/honestly, using metaphors to allow comprehension and to help those around them feel intelligent/relaxed/respected as interlocutors.

2. CASE STUDY: 2008-2009 SURVEY

All of the above ideas supported the conduct of a survey among Air Force and Armed Forces cadets that, upon graduation, were to hold a degree in 'organizational management'. The aim of the survey was to evaluate the charisma of future officers that should act as military leaders at their prospective workplaces. Figure 1 presents the form used to collect the necessary data. The items were taken from various psychological tests and were aimed at those dimensions that measure the magnetism of the personalities of the subjects from two groups of cadets who chose to

complete the form on a volunteer basis.

Group 1- made up of 13 non-ying, military aviation students (air traf c controllers) and artillerymen of the Air forces.

Group 2 – made up of 24 infantry military students of the Army.

The hypothesis we aimed to verify was:

Do most of the subjects from the two groups express psychological congruence through their capacity to become aware and trust their intuition? This hypothesis may have the signi cances below:

- The null hypothesis: ‘air, imagination, the anticipation capacity, affectivity’.

- Rejection of the null hypothesis: ‘reason, pragmatism, focusing on routine, the failure to use one’s imagination and the lack of intuition’.

The instruments used for data collection were selected from a set of psychological tests and contained the adapted variants below. The resulting test evaluated the dimension of congruence, namely the capacity to respect one’s intuition. The bibliography used to design it is the ‘Corpus of psychological tests to get to know yourself better’, by Gilles D’Ambra, Litera International Publishing House, 2008, page 52.

The evaluation scale is of 4 points distributed as below:

- 1-Obsessive
- 2-Rational
- 3-Extremely intuitive
- 4-Intuitive

The battery of psychological tests was aimed at verifying the basic hypothesis presented in this article, namely that intuition is a basis for leadership. As a result, the items were presented in the succession below:

1. Check the box each time your answer to the statements below is YES:

- You have a cat or you would like to have one.

- You remember your night dreams at least once a week.

- You prefer round or oval shapes.

- Weather changes affect your mood (positively or negatively).

- You are rarely mistaken about people, (your rst impressions always prove correct).

- It has happened to you (at least once) that a thing you dreamed of (in your sleep) came true.

- You do not feel like yourself on the full moon nights.

- You have gotten lost, (in a wood/ in a shop).

- You have recollections from when you were very young, (younger than 4).

- You are good at gardening.

- You are convinced we are not alone in the Universe.

- It’s happened to you to speak to your plants („How are you doing today, my beautiful?”) or to objects („You, don’t move!”).

- You have experienced (at least once) the „déjà vu” sensation.

- Light wounds (scratches, for instance) heal with dif culty.

- You have won the lottery (or another type of gambling) by betting on your birth date.

- You have witnessed some inexplicable events (at least once), such as: objects falling on their own, odd coincidences, etc.

- You have found things lost by others (keys, glasses, books).

- At school you were more talented at literature, philology and foreign languages than at mathematics, physics or biology.

- You have had the feeling that you were witnessing something 'supernatural' (ectoplasm, Allah, truly intelligent type).

- You immediately start conversing to strangers, even when they are of another race.

- You are very sensitive to smells, either pleasant or unpleasant.

- During your childhood you experienced sleepwalking (at least once).

- When you receive a present, you often know what it is before opening it.

- When you were child, you often looked under your bed before going to sleep.

- As a child you were terribly afraid of the black color.

- You are not afraid to pass under ladders and scaffolds.

- You do not kill animals (spiders, flies, ants...) and do not have them killed.

- You believe in telepathy, (you have at least once witnessed that it works).

- You often have memory blanks.

- In the middle of a crowd (in the subway, in big stores etc.) you have experienced a state of sudden sickness.

3. INTERPRETATION OF THE ANSWERS

The number of checked boxes determines the category under which the subject falls.

Score < 8 points

The type completely lacks intuition

Characteristics: reactions / routine / he/she do not like changes / he/she is anchored in his/her own certainties / lacks intuition.

- On a scale measuring the individual's congruence through his/her capability to be intuitive, this subject scores 1 point.

8 points ≤ Score < 15 points

The practical type

Characteristics: pragmatic / very rational / poor intuition / has imagination / does not listen to his/her intuition.

- On a scale measuring the individual's congruence through his/her capability to be intuitive, this subject scores 2 points.

16 points ≤ Score ≤ 22 points

The sensitive type

Characteristics: sensitivity relies merely on air / highly imaginative / the affective side is dominant in his/her psychic / strong intuition / capability to foresee.

- On a scale measuring the individual's congruence through his/her capacity to be intuitive, the subject scores 4 points.

Score > 22 points

The average type

- Characteristics: too receptive to other people's emotions and

feelings / very involved in the others' problems.

- On a scale measuring the individual's congruence through his/her capacity to be happy, the subject scores 3 points.

4. THE STATISTIC INSTRUMENTS USED TO MEASURE THE PROBABILITY OF ERROR OF THE RESULTS

$$\text{Average} = \frac{\sum (\text{value} * \text{number of subjects})}{\text{Sample group}} \tag{1}$$

$$\text{Standard deviation} = \frac{\sum (\text{value} - \text{average})}{\text{number of value} - 1} \tag{2}$$

$$\text{Variance} = \frac{\sum \text{values}^2 - (\sum \text{values})^2 / \text{number of values} - 1}{\text{number of values} - 1} \tag{3}$$

The “t” test is applied in its form in which two averages calculated in two separate, independent groups are compared by applying the formula:

Note:

Standard deviation = *Sd*

Standard common deviation = *SCd*

Sample group = *Sgr*

Deviation Sample group = *DSgr*

$$t = \frac{\text{average of sample1} - \text{average of sample2}}{\text{SCd} * \sqrt{\frac{1}{\text{Sample group1}} + \frac{1}{\text{Sample group2}}}}$$

$$\text{SCd} = \sqrt{\frac{\text{DSgr1} * (\text{Sgr1} - 1) + \text{DSgr2} * (\text{Sg2} - 1)}{(\text{Sgr1} + \text{Sg2}) - 2}}$$

$$t_{\text{calculated}} \leq t_{\text{critical}}$$

-the null hypothesis is accepted

$$t_{\text{calculated}} > t_{\text{critical}}$$

-the null hypothesis is rejected

The ‘t’ test is applied in its forms comparing the average calculated in a single sample.

$$\text{SD} = \sqrt{\frac{\sum \text{values}^2 - (\sum \text{values})^2 / \text{Sgr}}{\text{Sgr} - 1}}$$

$$t_{\text{calculated}} \leq t_{\text{critical}}$$

-the null hypothesis is accepted

$$t_{\text{calculated}} > t_{\text{critical}}$$

-the null hypothesis is rejected

5. CONCLUSIONS

The results of the survey were as follows:

Congruence expressed through the capacity to respect one's intuition in sample 1:

- t calculated = - (-4,3825484) = 4,3825484

- t critical = 4,32

- t calculated > t critical - We therefore conclude that a risk of error of 0,1%, is in sample 1 - Rejection of the null hypothesis: ‘reason, pragmatism, focusing on routine, the failure to use one’s imagination and the lack of intuition’.

$$4,3825484 > 4,32$$

Capacity to respect one's intuition		
Sample 1 (group members=13)		
Score	Effective score	%
4	5	38.46%
2	8	61.53%

Sample 2 (group members =24)		
Score	Effective score	%
4	4	16.16%
2	19	79,16%
1	1	4,16%

Congruence expressed through the capacity to respect one's intuition in sample 2:

- t calculated = - (-10,381509) = 10,381509

- t critical = 5,63

- t calculated > t critical - We therefore conclude that a risk of error of 0,001%, is in sample 2 - Rejection of the null hypothesis: 'reason, pragmatism, focusing on routine, the failure to use one's imagination and the lack of intuition'.

10,381509 > 5,63

Sample 1

Average = 2,846

Standard deviation = 0,688779

Sample 2

Average = 3,208

Standard deviation = 0,5882545

t calculated = 1,4820294

t critical = 1,31

t calculated > t critical - With an error risk of 20% we conclude that 61,53% in Sample 1 and 83,32% in Sample2 - Rejection of the null hypothesis: 'reason, pragmatism, focusing on routine, the failure to use one's imagination and the lack of intuition'. 1,4820294 > 1,31

In conclusion, the following suggestions become obvious. Thus, the students who were part of the survey can be characterized as practical minded and little if not at all willing to use their intuition. This may have critical implications for their future professional life if they are to act and ll in leader position in the chain of command. Therefore, a greater attention should be paid to developing their soft skills.

Inherently, the curriculum should be designed in such a manner to make up for this shortage. In this respect, it is worth reminding the importance of matching, on an ongoing basis, these students' job descriptions as elaborated by their future commanders with the curricula and with the practical requirements of the workforce market.

REFERENCES

[1] Kets de Vries, M., Leadership, the Art and Mastery of Leading, Condex Publishing House, 2003.

[2] Goleman, D., Emotional Intelligence, Curtea Veche Publishing House, 2001.

[3] Michael Armstrong, Human Resources Management, Publishing Codecs, 2003, pg. 523-537.

[4] Marcus Buckingham, Curt Ciffman, Manager against the current - What great managers do differently than other, Editura Publishing Allfa, 2005.

[5] Karl Albrecht, Practical Intelligence, Publishing Curtea veche, 2007.

[6] Gilles D'Ambra, 'Corpus of psychological tests to get to know yourself better', Litera International Publishing House, 2008.

BOOK REVIEW


THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Edited by:

Thomas C. Bruneau
Florina Cristiana Matei

Routledge,
Taylor and Francis Group

ISBN 978-0-415-78273-9



REVIEWERS:

Cezar VASILESCU
Aura CODREANU
Florin-Eduard GROSARU

The editors of the **The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations** are two reputable specialists in the field. **Thomas C. Bruneau** is a Distinguished Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California and **Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei** is a Lecturer at the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) at the Naval Postgraduate School. Both have been involved in extensive research projects on the topic of civil-military relations and, what is more important, succeeded in engaging fruitful discussions and debates with other experts and key thinkers not only from the USA, but also from Europe, South America, Middle East, South Asia and Africa. All chapter authors have proven extensive experience on civil-military relations or defense policy in the country or region they are writing about, know the language, have access to scholars and policy-makers, and have honed their ideas with local experts and decision-makers. Consequently, the outcome of the editors' scientific endeavors and work commissioning for this volume is a wide-ranging internationally focused overview of the civil-military subject both at conceptual and practical level.

The **major thesis** of the book is that a “*new conceptualization*” of the civil-military relations is necessary. The arguments presented by Bruneau and Matei in this respect fall into two main categories. First, they highlight the impediments to a good theoretical understanding and practical approach to the field under discussion raised by an outdated and more often than not normative literature very little anchored in the New Institutionalism approach to conceptualization. Second, and in my opinion most importantly, the two editors demonstrate the inadequacy and insufficiency of Huntington’s model on CMR in the context of the latest developments in social sciences and of the contemporary challenges to the relationships concerning democracy and security forces.

The handbook takes both a theoretical and practical approach to the subject of CMR. Consequently, it succeeds in framing the conceptual tools characteristic of the field, and in providing relevant updated information through a number of case studies that prove or disprove the validity of instrument choice depending on the subject of analysis, namely non-democratic/nominally democratic countries, democratic countries and democratizing states.

First, it presents in a well-documented dialogic manner the need for a **new framework** to be used in the analysis of the twenty-first century civil-military relations (Part I, Chapters 1 to 6, Bruneau, Matei, Edmunds and Olmeda). The conceptual dimensions identified as necessary to underpin the proposed model go beyond those suggested by similar analyses of CMR and they are as follows: **democratic civilian control; operational effectiveness; and the efficiency of the security institutions (i.e., the armed forces, the intelligence community, and police) in their use of resources.**

The **novelty of the approach** suggested by Bruneau and Matei in **Part I** consists in the balanced three-dimensional view on the field, and in the alternatives provided to those dimensions that cannot actually frame the current state of affairs in certain countries. In this respect, they highlight the difficulties of actually employing the concept of efficiency in the analysis of the national security and defense sector of a given state due to its methodological and instrumental intricacies. In this respect, Bruneau and Matei suggest that the goal underlying the concept of efficiency, namely the maximization of the probability of using resources in accordance with a government’s policies and goals, could be better achieved by resorting to Supreme audit institutions (SAIs).

Using a **comparison and contrast method** that actually allows the reader to draw the conclusions, the editors commission Chapter 5, Part I to Timothy

Edmunds in order to implicitly highlight the major similarities and differences between their **three-part framework** and the **concept of security sector reform**, which is another approach to CMR.

Second, by drawing on **an extensive set of case studies** which are the result of research conducted in North America (the United States), South America (Argentina, Venezuela, and Chile), Europe (Portugal, Spain, France, Germany, Austria, Slovenia, Hungary, Romania, Russia, and Moldova), the Middle East (Lebanon and Iraq), Africa (Egypt and South Africa), and Asia (India, Mongolia, and North Korea), the editors alongside with a corpus of experts use the framework they proposed and described in Part I to discuss in **Part II** and **Part III** the status of CMR in a wide range of states. Their **stated goal** is to unveil under what circumstances common patterns and trends can be identified, or at least to understand the dynamics of the relationship created between the armed forces and other security instruments. For this, the case studies are grouped in two categories using democracy (i.e., absence of democracy, non-functional democracy, democratic transition, and democratic consolidation) as a guiding criterion. Consequently, **Part II** focuses on **civil-military relations in non-democratic or nominally democratic countries**, and **Part III** on **civil-military relations in democratic and democratizing states**.

The **most important contributions** made by the case studies analyzed and presented in this handbook to the field of civil-military relations can be summarized as follows

1. Part II of the handbook focuses on non-democratic and nominally democratic regimes and that allows readers to better understand the mechanisms underlying the behavior of states that are part of this category in terms of the role the armed forces play.

2. Part III warns against any attempts at making generalizations, or at identifying patterns of behavior in the case of democratic transitions given the multifarious reasons underlying them and, hence, the impossibility of imposing valid criteria for assessment and forecast.

3. Part III, while using the framework proposed in Part I, addresses a deficiency manifest at the level of analytical literature and of official government programs in terms of the place allocated to civil-military relations in consolidated democracies. Thus, the handbook reinstates the field of CMR in its due place by providing a thorough analysis of the issues and institutions in functioning democracies.

In conclusion, the framework proposed by the handbook and its validation through the series of case studies presents the necessary features to be later

transformed into an updated theory of CMR and, hence, model of analysis. It is our firm belief **The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations**, edited by **Thomas C. Bruneau** and **Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei** is a valuable addition to the existing literature in the field of civil-military relations. In this respect, it will make an **essential reading** for students and practitioners in the fields of civil-military relations, defense studies, war and conflict studies, international security, and international relations in general.

REVIEWERS (CV IN BRIEF)

Cezar VASILESCU

He is the Editor-in-Chief of the **Journal of Defense Resources Management**. He is also a Senior Lecturer at the Regional Department of Defense Resources Management Studies, Brasov, with a PhD degree in Engineering Sciences, specialization Computer Science Military Technical Academy (2006). He currently teaches defense and information resources management (IRM Policy and Principles), and project management software to postgraduate students.

Aura CODREANU

She is the Executive Editor of the **Journal of Defense Resources Management**. She holds a PhD degree in Military Sciences and Information. She currently teaches organization performance, project and program management and organizational behavior to postgraduate and undergraduate students.

Florin-Eduard GROSARU

He is the Director of the Regional Department of Defense Resources Management Studies, Brasov. He is a Lecturer and currently teaches theories in management to postgraduate students.

BOOK REVIEW

PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT

Edited by:

Pontian Godfrey OKOTH

MMUST Press

ISBN 9966-779-02-7



Edited by
Pontian Godfrey Okoth

REVIEWER:

Corporal (Rev'd) E.O.S ODHIAMBO

The editor of this book, **Professor Okoth Pontian Godfrey**, is the Vice Chancellor of Lugazi University in Uganda. He is a professor of History and International Relations and taught in Kenya both in Maseno and Masinde Muliro University. Chapters were contributed by professor Okoth's former doctoral students at Masinde Muliro University. There are fourteen chapters by the four Contributors including the editor's. **The chapters are arranged thematically: *peace and conflict, concepts of peace and conflict and strategies of conflict management.***

The continuum of peace and conflict studies (peace building, peacekeeping, peacemaking, diplomacy) and some associated terms like Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), security, arbitration are clearly elucidated and explained in a non technical language in this book. The work is well researched and written and should be recommended for all scholars working in the field of peace and conflict studies. In my review, I give an overview and critique of each chapter.

In **Chapter One**, Okoth defines the term 'peace and conflict' and describes its origin and development. He defines peace as concord, harmony

and tranquility but peace is also defined as a state of law or civil government, a state of justice or goodness, a balance or equilibrium of Powers.

In **Chapter Two**, Kamoet explains the concepts of peace and conflict as understood by different schools of thoughts including liberal and realist. Democratic Peace theory is mentioned briefly but not critiqued, “Democracies Don't Fight Democracies” which originated in the work of the eighteenth-century philosopher Immanuel Kant. R.J. Rummel in (Peace Magazine, May/June 1999) provided a thorough analysis of how Western democracies are not in the business of waging war with one another. This has not been the case for example the war between NATO and Yugoslavia and USA and Iraq.

Mwaniki in **Chapter Three** discusses the controversies regarding the definition of peace. She defines and gives a detailed account of several theories of peace like Game theory, Active Peace Theory, Integrative Theory, Feminist Theory and Economic Theory.

Matemba in **Chapter Four** contends that the central core of international diplomacy gravitates around security and securing the sanctity of life. Therefore, actions that threaten this life should be mitigated.

In **Chapter Five**, Kamoet agrees with John Paul Lederach, a conflict resolution scholar-practitioner at Eastern Mennonite University in Virginia, who has moved beyond the mere recognition of cultural factors impinging upon conflict resolution to the creation of a specific methodological framework; in it he argues that society interprets conflict from various perspectives; this view calls for clarity in the usage of the term conflict.

In **Chapter Six**, Kamoet examines ‘contextualisation’, which is the study of how people make sense of conflict situations and the appropriate (cultural), environmental and religious common-sense methods of resolving them.

In **Chapter Seven**, Kamoet examines indigenous actors who uses elicitive approach which is based on creating appropriate models from the cultural resources available in a given setting and external actors (external intervention) who uses prescriptive approach which is based on transferring conflict resolution techniques from one setting to another, primarily the transfer of Western methods to non-Western settings in conflict and conflict mapping at the national, regional and the international.

Chapter Eight is contributed by Mwaniki who discusses strategies of conflict management in detail.

In **Chapters Nine** and **Ten**, Matemba, describes the continuum of peace which includes; peacemaking, peace-keeping and peacebuilding. Peacemaking is the diplomatic effort to end violence between conflicting parties, move them towards nonviolent dialogue, and eventually reach a peace agreement. Peacekeeping is a third-party intervention (often, but not always done by military forces) to assist parties in transitioning from violent conflict to peace by separating the fighting parties and keeping them apart. These

peacekeeping operations not only provide security, but also facilitate other non-military initiatives. Peacebuilding is a long-term process that occurs after violent conflict has slowed down or come to a halt. Thus, it is the phase of the peace process that takes place after peacemaking and peacekeeping.

In **Chapter Eleven**, Mwaniki defines the concept of peace and analyses the theories of peace enforcement. United Nations operations in areas of crisis have mostly been established after violent conflict has occurred like the cases of Ethiopia and Eritrea war, Sierraleon, Liberia, Kuwait, Yugoslavia and Namibia. I argue that the United Nations should be proactive to plan for circumstances warranting preventive deployment, which could take place in a variety of instances and ways.

Okoth in **Chapter Twelve** discusses urban terrorism, where terrorists focus on targets that have financial, communication, and symbolic significance. A case in point for urban terrorism is the destruction of the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City (NYC) on 9/11 which led to a change in American foreign policy with implication for the African continent.

Okoth and Kamoet in **Chapter Thirteen** discuss the role of international actors in mediating the Post Kenyan election violence of late December 2007 to early 2008. Conflicts can occur at all levels of society; between individuals, in families, workgroups, in local and central decision making, and in society as a whole. Conflicts occur for many reasons: different goals, values or interests, misunderstanding of situations, unsatisfied needs. To live with unsolved conflicts takes energy and may cause people to feel burdened and divided.

In **Chapter Fourteen**, Matemba looks back on how after the Cold War peace has been managed. A new strategy like Globalization in the context of peace is discussed.

The field of peace and conflict studies has not received much attention in the past. The focus has now turned to it because peace as one of the pillars for development was at the periphery. This book is a resource for everyone who is interested in the fields of peace and conflict studies. It can be used by scholars in higher institutions of learning and a larger general audience because it is simple and understandable.

There are three international relations theory with a bearing on the ideas presented by this book. Realism assumes that nation-states are unitary, geographically-based actors in an anarchic international system with no authority above capable of regulating interactions between states as no true authoritative world government exists. Secondly, it assumes that sovereign states, rather than International Government Organizations, Non Government Organizations, are the primary actors in international affairs. Liberalism holds that state preferences, rather than state capabilities, are the primary determinant of state behavior. Unlike realism, where the state is seen as a unitary actor, liberalism allows for plurality in state actions while Constructivism or social

constructivism is concerned with how ideas define international structure, how this structure defines the interests and identities of states and how states and non-state actors reproduce this structure. The key tenet of constructivism is the belief that “International politics is shaped by persuasive ideas, collective values, culture, and social identities”. The healthy globalization is characterized by the rule of law which recognizes the sacredness of life and fundamental freedoms, the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of States within the established international system, and the principle of self-determination for peoples, both of great value and importance, must not be permitted to work against each other. Respect for democratic principles at all levels of social existence is crucial: in communities, within States and within the community of States.

In conclusion, I believe that a comprehensive definition of “peace” must include positive characteristics over and above the mere absence of belligerence. It must include those positive factors that foster cooperation among human groups with ostensibly different cultural patterns so that social justice can be done and human potential can freely develop within democratic political structures. A reading of the book reveals that the goal is obscure in that it is not clear whether the book is to offer theory of peace or to discuss theories of peace because there is no single definition of the term peace but only theories, this could only be appropriate if the aim was to discuss theories of peace. However conflict is fairly discussed and as Thomas Turay (2001:34) writes, “*understanding how people perceive conflict is fundamental to understanding the types of conflicts they deal with, their root causes and how they respond to them*”. This book is well researched and written in easy English to understand and therefore should be recommended for all in the field of peace and conflict studies as a resource book.

REVIEWER:

E.O.S ODHIAMBO

Dept. of Peace and Conflict Studies (PCS) Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology and Kenya Military Academy (KMA), Ministry of State for Defence (MOSD)

BOOK REVIEW


SINERGIA INSTRUMENTELOR DE MANAGEMENT

Author:

Georgel RUSU

Paralela 45 Publishing House

ISBN 978-973-47-1416-2



REVIEWER:

Florin-Eduard GROSARU

Currently there are a lot of authors that published diverse studies regarding the management field. Nevertheless, a more systematic and up-to-date study on the aforementioned topic is more than needed.

The volume “Sinergia instrumentelor de management” not only fills this important lacuna, but offers a new, interesting and exhilarating approach of the domain’s concepts. The author is Georgel Rusu which is colonel within the Directorate for Training and Doctrine, General Staff, Ministry of National Defense.

The volume features the scientific analysis with narrative qualities of an essay. The book’s formula is unprecedented. The discourse is very convincing, the chapters and subchapters are following a logical ascending trajectory, unveiling the information gradually.

An absolute novelty element proposed by the author is the definition of the social synergy’s acquiring process, which effects are revealed by a correct employment of management tools and instruments, a logical and functional usage of resources based on a healthy organizational culture.

The author points out that the achievement process of social synergies is not recommended to be done by imitating other nations' experience, but from a lessons learned perspective. The personal thoughts, will, inspiration and qualities of the manager are those which unify the organization's human energies (both technical and social), such as the generated output of the actions/processes is more than the sum of the inputs.

The concept of management viewed as an asymmetric process is the one which states that leadership should be fulfilled by a minority, representing the majority of the consenting people. The activity is based on the qualities of the managers and not on their number.

In the context of a reality dominated by the economic aspects, the volume reveals the essence of the management domain using an approach valid for all organizations, including the non-commercial ones. The author uses a critical view on the opinions of well known authors based on personal reasoning and scientific arguments, and generates relevant conclusions applicable to Romanian realities.

A special mention should be made to the suggested thesis of "management alignment" with national culture and civilization. Also, the connections within national and international leadership frameworks towards the globalization process are coherent and offer interesting themes for possible future debates.

The establishment of a hierarchy based on essences gives new understandings for systematic managerial processes and make them understandable for each management practitioner. Each qualified user (manager) receives only the recommended tools.

The volume is a valuable landmark among the domain's studies and has a great synthetic character based on the right scientific background. Its quality derives from the novelty of approach, the logic of argumentation and the applicability of the proposed approaches at any organizational level.

The author's ideas advocate for an optimization of efforts and resources using a logical connection between normative compulsion instruments and systemic/organizational ones. This approach warns us against the danger of "white collar anarchy" and also indicates the logical, scientific and legal methods to avoid the "Babel tower" effect. Every manager could use the book's arguments in order to personalize the managerial act and to make it both efficient and effective.

REVIEWER:

Florin-Eduard GROSARU

He is the Director of the Regional Department of Defense Resources Management Studies, Brasov. He is a Lecturer and currently teaches theories in management to postgraduate students.