Providing the resources needed for the effective functioning of the alliance has always been a challenge for EU members, especially after the increased difficulties generated by the economic crisis which started in 2008. The need to overcome these challenges generated intense discussions and the emergence of new approaches to defense planning.

Pooling and sharing is one such approach; although not a novel one (as it was mentioned in the 2003 European security strategy) it provides a new approach to the issue of collaboration and sharing of resources. In this respect, both the European Union and NATO have dedicated agencies to identify joint projects (the European Defense Agency and the Allied Command Transformation, ACT, respectively) and governments of various members - from Norway to Slovenia have experimented forms of structural pooling and sharing. The Center for European Reform’s research suggests that for each country which engages in sharing (such as the Netherlands or Sweden) there are other countries which prefer an “individual” approach (such as Spain). Still, the new economic, political and military conditions generate the need for more EU members to engage or consider engaging in this type of cooperation - pooling and sharing, as a way to mitigate the impact of defense budget cuts on their capabilities.
Unlike the situation in the United States (as a unitary country), European allies have to deal with the particular situation that the European defense looks like a giant puzzle, composed of various countries with different levels of technological development, defense budgets and different approaches to defense planning. The pieces of this puzzle need to come somehow together during military deployments to form one whole: countries support each other’s contingents by sharing intelligence, providing security and transportation as well as access to spare parts, food and ammunition. Thus, a particular base during an Allied operation may be commanded by one nation, with the security of the location provided by troops from a second country, transport services provided by a third country, while the logistic support may be provided through NAMSA - NATO’s logistical agency. These arrangements end with the termination of the allied operation and each country continues to plan and operate its own armed forces, independently, with separate defense planning, training, logistics and defense budgets, as the members of the European Union are distinct countries with their own (if similar) security and defense interests and policies.

In the current environment, characterized by shrinking defense budgets and a struggle for most European countries to control their budget deficits, cooperation in these matters becomes a requisite, as many EU countries, with a few exceptions such as Germany, France or UK, literally cannot afford to participate in overseas missions by supporting this effort in isolation, without sharing the deployment burden with others countries. Presently, few countries can afford to support on their own the resources (human, material, financial, logistic, information, etc) necessary for the deployment of troops in Alliance operations outside the national territory and even the larger countries (in terms of size, economic development, military power) often need also to rely on the help of other allies in terms of logistic support, for instance, in order to make savings.

Consequently, pooling and sharing are vital for the development of EU’s desired capabilities, especially by the identification and connection of nations with similar needs but not enough money to build a capability on their own – specialization and cooperation.

This type of cooperation can be achieved through many means, either through the improvement and adaptation of common use of capabilities, by cooperation in the area of acquisitions of commonly used capabilities or by pooling training infrastructure (such as the use of joint training infrastructure by the air forces of two or more countries), in order to allow the nations to “pool together” resources in order to maintain important capacity for less money. Nations may also consider multinational maintenance and logistics in operations. Cooperation can also be achieved
through role sharing, meaning allowing various nations to “take turns” in performing certain missions in support of a specific nation. Close cooperation between allies may provide a twofold benefit: on one hand, saving precious resources by avoiding duplication and stove-piping and, on the other hand, providing a more effective response to common threats, by providing a greater interoperability between allies and the development of more effective military capabilities.

Specialization can also play a role in the new approach towards a better use of scarce resources; for instance, specialised training infrastructures may be developed by one nation for the use of all Allies, as the Czech Republic has done for defence against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons.

For Romania’s military, the concept of pooling and sharing may start a new process of thinking and developing its desired military capability packages. For example Romania will participate within a group of 13 nations (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the United States) to purchase five Global Hawk drones. These aircrafts will be available to all 28 allies who will contribute to the cost of operating them. France and Britain will mostly contribute by providing their own surveillance aircraft to the program. Another example is related to military communications, where European nations spend a collective €50 million annually on purchases of commercial bandwidth. France, Italy, Poland, Romania and the U.K. combined resources under an EDA pilot project dubbed the European Satcom Procurement Cell (ESPC) to purchase and share C- and Ku-band satellite capacity to meet military communications requirements.

Romania is also participating in the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), which is designed to deal with the threat posed by Iranian short - and intermediate-range ballistic missiles to U.S. assets, personnel and allies in Europe. EPAA is flexible, initially using mobile radars and interceptors mounted on Aegis-equipped Ticonderoga class cruisers and Arleigh Burke class destroyers. Our country will host land-based SM-3 ballistic missile defense (BMD).

Approaches like pooling and sharing may provide some answers to the new challenges of common defence, but are not a silver bullet. First of all, the required resources have to be dedicated for the fulfilment of the alliance objectives and secondly, these resources have to be used wisely, in an efficient and effective manner, by clearly identifying the priorities and the required capabilities. The priorities identified at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, such as cyber defence, and the fight against terrorism and piracy, need to be backed up by critical capabilities such as helicopter transport,
medical support, and countering road-side bombs. In this respect, the Romanian authorities are faced with the challenging task of having to review carefully the entire defence planning process, starting with relevant needs of national security and how to correlate national efforts with EU efforts, in the context of a very complex and dynamic economic and social environment.

On the other hand, pooling and sharing shares some similarities with the Smart Defense concept, that aims to achieve greater security for less money by improving NATO’s flexibility. Greater sharing of tasks and pooling of equipment among cash-strapped Europeans will enable an increased capacity to defend themselves without putting more burdens on the already strained budgets, especially as the United States switching its military focus to the Asia-Pacific region. Smart Defense enables the nations to work together more effectively and may facilitate the development of capability packages alone, together as Allies, or even involving non-NATO countries, in NATO or in the EU. Even in this case, Romania must find its optimal way to play a clear, efficient and realistic role in order to obtain maximum security benefits at an affordable cost.
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SECURITY OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC
IN TIMES OF CRISES AND AIR TERRORISM THREATS

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The article deals with security aspects of the Slovak Republic (SR) in times of air terrorism threats as dominant threats for the SR. It introduces basic legal, legislative and technical options and problems of fighting air terrorism. In conclusion it presents possible solutions, as well as the fact that SR can meet security objectives only in cooperation with coalition partners.

Key words: security, operation, terrorism, doctrine, renegade, strategy.

1. INTRODUCTION

The doctrine of the armed forces of the Slovak Republic as the top doctrinal document offers answers to some basic questions, e.g. how and when will the state use its armed force in the fight against terrorism [1]. These issues must be viewed from the perspective of strategic relations, especially in political and legal context, which represents determining allies, opponents, and enemies, neutral or uninvolved partners in the concrete situation. The most unpredictable elements of the strategic environment for us are non-governmental political elements including semi-military and terrorist organizations [2].

The employment of military power of the state in this environment is very difficult and certainly the most extreme tool of promoting the state interest, in case all other methods have failed. The defence strategy of the Slovak Republic defines and characterizes two types of basic threats for the national security. These are military threats and non-military threats, see Figure 1.

Fig. 1. Threats for Slovak Republic

Regarding the issues of terrorism it is necessary to focus especially on non-military threats that, according to the military strategy represent activities threatening the security, and employ mostly non-military means [3]. Those threats include: terrorist activities, illegal arms trade, internationally organized crime, migration or mass influx of
refugees beyond control, religious or ethnic extremism, riots, social riots, natural and environmental disasters, accidents and catastrophes, as well as many other activities[4].

Terrorist activities of individuals or organized groups and international networks are extremely dangerous for international security. Thus, the armed forces must be ready to support the organs of state power or even assume full responsibility for fighting terrorism.

Regarding the fight against terrorism, the armed forces of the Slovak Republic might be used in two basic types of operations, which are called defensive counterterrorist measures and offensive counterterrorist measures [5]. Contents of these activities are described in **Figure 2**.

Regarding the position of SR in the centre of Europe and its low involvement in crisis areas of the world the biggest threat for us is probably from the air – air terrorism. Some other state’ kidnapped plane or some other source on the Slovak sky could be used for terrorist actions in our country or in neighbouring countries. Thus, the protection of air space will be as important as the protection of Slovak and European borders.

When SR joined NATO and accepted the goals of the forces [FG-Force Goal] it became a part of the joint air space of NATO countries [NATINADS – NATO Integrated Air Defence System] with its inherent rights and duties.

**2. PROTECTION OF AIR SPACE OF SR**

The protection of air space of SR within NATINADS should be viewed from two main perspectives [6]:
- activities against military and unidentified air objects under the command of Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC);
- activities against any civilian air object used as a terrorist weapon, the co-called RENEGADE, which are exclusively in the competences of NGA – National Governmental Authority, which has right to use national forces selected for NATINADS.

![Basic types of counterterrorism fight](image)

**Fig. 2.** Types of operations of the fight against terrorism (1)

In line with SR’s Constitution, valid laws and legal norms, the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic
meet the objectives that are stated in its Defence strategy.

One of the objectives is also maintaining the necessary staff of air force in order to secure permanent protection of the sovereignty of our air space and, since SR joined NATO, also the protection of the integrated air space [5].

The protection of SR’s air space is provided by the Emergency System of Air Force of the Armed Forces of SR (ES AF AF SR), which meets the objectives in line with the act on “the organization of activities of the government and central government”, Act No. 319/2002 Coll. on Defence of SR, Act No. 321/2002 Coll. on The Armed Forces of SR and Act No. 143/1998 Coll. on “Civil Aviation”.

ES AF AF SR in line with the “Operations plan of force and means utilization” is the set of measures performed by forces and means of the air force, surveillance and fire equipment of air defence to secure the air space of SR, the integrated air space of NATO and providing assistance to aircrafts in emergency situations.

Priority tasks of ES AF AF SR include:
- checking if the air traffic follows the valid rules, regulations and international agreements;
- continuous surveillance of air space of SR, detection and evaluation of air objects;
- intervening against intruders of air space of SR;
- providing help for aircrafts in emergency situations in the air space of SR;
- mutual exchange of information on situation in air space and weather conditions with neighbouring countries;
- cooperation with air search and rescue service;
- participation in the protection of the integrated air space of NATO within NATINADS.

ES AF AF SR consists of organs of command and control, emergency aircrafts, surveillance and fire equipment of air defence.

Emergency aircrafts and surveillance means of air defence provide permanent protection of air space and fire equipment of air defence can be included in ES AF AF SR if needed on a special command.

Emergency aircrafts are deployed against intruders according to strict rules and criteria. After the detection of an intruder aircraft emergency aircrafts take off in order to find out the necessary data for identifying the intruder aircraft and to offer help using optic and radio signals, which are published for all users of air space in military and civilian rules for flying. If the intruder aircraft does not follow the emergency aircrafts’ instructions, it is stopped from threatening the security of the SR and its citizens.

The Air Force of SR, in line with the accepted commitments of goals of SR, meets the objectives of integration into NATINADS by building infrastructure, modernizing selected machinery, safe certification of people, machinery, facilities and selected areas. The selected staff is preferentially educated in technical and linguistic fields. The acquired skills and habits were used for certification in line with NATO
standards. The Command of Air Force of SR issues professional aids, methodologies of activities and regularly updates documents in line with NATO documents. The Centre for Command of Air Force of SR processes and distributes air situation to the competent CAOC and CRC [Control and Report Centre] of neighbouring states of NATO [8].

3. AIR TERRORISM THREAT

After 9/11 all countries over the world faced a completely new form of terrorism – air terrorism threat using civilian aircrafts as weapons.

The term RENEGADE is used to define civilian aircrafts that are suspected of being used as weapons to perform terrorist attacks.

Dealing with the concept of RENEGADE is connected with the problem of protecting air space. We can simply say that the activities against an air target such as RENEGADE are a specific part of protection of air space.

3.1. TAKING ACTION AGAINST RENEGADE OBJECTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS

Civil aviation rules result from Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago, 1944), which was ratified by Czechoslovak Republic in 1947 and published in codex No. 147/1947. This Convention in Article 3, letter a, says: “The contracting States recognize that every State must refrain from resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight and that, in case of interception, the lives of persons on board and the safety of aircraft must not be endangered”.

In addition to the Convention there are also Convention on Offence and Certain Other Acts Committed Aboard Aircraft (Tokio, 1963), Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Haag, 1970) and Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal, 1971).

International conventions and agreements on civil aviation strictly prohibit the usage of weapons against civil aircrafts.

3.2. RENEGADE CONCEPT IN NATO

The air space protection principles during peace for supporting the integrity of European air space of NATO, for protecting NATO countries and their forces from air attacks are based on set rules and standards of NATO. The International Military Staff (IMS) prepares a document to elaborate the issue of NATINADS more in detail. The mentioned document defines the term RENEGADE, defines the competences, responsibilities and methods of command and control for individual command levels of NATO and for military as well as civil organs of control of air traffic when preparing measures, coordination and intervention against objects such as RENEGADE [6].

If this is the case, the state in line with the international law must avoid the decision to use weapons against
a civil aircraft and it must accept all necessary measures to secure and lead the civil aircraft in accordance with the competent rules, standards and recommended methods included in the Chicago Convention and its amendments. The state must not be passive if it faces a RENEGADE object threat.

Obviously, according to international law principles, no sovereign state has limits that could prevent it from reacting in case of violation of its territorial integrity or political independence, or if its principles related to the state’s responsibilities are violated in some ways.

Sovereign states face the threat of using force against their territorial integrity or political independence by launching corresponding activities, which will secure their preparation for averting the threat by activating the elements of air space defence.

Any state is responsible for protecting its territorial integrity and political independence, which also includes protection of its national interests and people within its territory. Under certain circumstances the activity against RENEGADE object can be justified by the protection of these legitimate interests. If it is necessary the state is authorized to use force to protect itself from activities which would violate its independence.

In this case we must consider activities against the object that violates the state sovereignty and independence as well as security of the citizens who are entitled to protection and freedom, too.

It is not important if the intruder uses civil or military approaches. It is the intention that is important. In case of RENEGADE object, the goals and intentions of the intruder might be achieved by direct action, which can then cause corresponding reactions of the competent state.

In the Czech Republic, for instance, the issue of RENEGADE objects was partially handled during the NATO summit in Prague. Before the summit the CR accepted Act No. 482/2002 Coll. valid just during the summit, which defined the competences of the national authority in line with the legal order of CR regarding the usage of force against an object and ordering the usage of weapons if necessary. A similar Act was also accepted by other NATO and EU countries. These states accepted NATO regulations and standards regarding the RENEGADE concept, created a national authority with the competence to decide on using weapons against RENEGADE, and accepted the responsibility for the damage caused by activities against suchlike object.

3.3. WAYS OF PROTECTION FROM RENEGADE-LIKE OBJECTS IN THE LEGAL ORDER OF SR

Participation of SR in the Alliance’s system of collective protection of air space requires handling the questions connected to the protection of the integrated air space of NATO.

The RENEGADE concept is handled in response to the acceptance of the Concept of Integrated Air
Defence of NATO. In order to solve the RENEGADE concept an interdepartmental committee has been established under the authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of SR. It consists of staff members of MFA, Ministry of Transport, Posts and Telecommunications, Ministry of Defence, Civil Aviation Authority of SR and MS of SR. The missions of this committee are to define the term RENEGADE legally, to elaborate legal analyses of methods of solving situations, in which a civil object is classified as a military target, to adjust the mechanism of decision-making and deciding on RENEGADE - like objects legally and to define legal consequences in case of elimination of RENEGADE - like objects.

At present the Air Force of SR have the means, tools and mechanisms necessary for an action against a RENEGADE - like air object in case this object can be considered a military target.

Crucial missions of the Air Force in the fight against terrorism include the protection of objects of national importance. After 9/11 2001 our objects of special importance – the capital city Bratislava and nuclear powerplants Mochovice and Jaslovske Bohunice were protected from air attacks by units of air defence of low and medium range (Figure 3).

Before the deployment of these units there was a simulation of activities of the units against an intruder based on prof. Sopoci’s project from the end of the 80s called Optimization of air defence for the needs of the units of air defence of land forces [7]. Based on the digitalized model of terrain it was possible to display the defended units and objects. The chosen criteria allowed optimization of the choice of firing positions and battle formations of the units of air defence of land forces, the calculation and display of destroyed areas for various altitudes, speed and RCS, the possibility of centralized control of various types of anti-aircraft rocket systems. The mentioned project was innovated in the first half of the 90s because of organization changes, modernization of armament and especially because of new hardware and operation systems in computers. Based on the calculations of areas of destruction and areas of firing tasks (yellow colour and green colour or outer curves) the units were deployed in formations that were considered optimal (Figure 1). Aviation resources (emergency aircrafts – Mig-29) were used for protection of objects of special importance.

4. CONCLUSIONS

If we admit that air terrorism is a dominant global threat for SR, then the AF of SR have the mission to provide protection, countermeasures and measures to reduce the impacts on eliminating the results of terrorist actions.

The participation of SR in the system of collective protection of air space of the Alliance resulted in the need to solve problems connected to the protection of integrated air space of NATO. If these problems are solved, the technical side of the problem will be activities against RENEGADE-like objects.
The political and legal context of the problems remains open.

According to the mentioned facts we can say that the Air Force of SR has the means, tools and mechanisms to intervene against air objects such as RENEGADE.

However, according to the current valid laws, norms and regulations it is not possible to intervene against civil aircraft using weapons and threaten the security of people aboard the aircraft. Thus the question is: when can an aircraft not respecting the guidelines of organs of air traffic command and the other participating aircrafts be considered a reasonable threat to be declared a military target?

The territory of SR is too small to identify, decide on classification and take countermeasures in case of RENEGADE threat. That means that SR can effectively apply the RENEGADE concept just in the international context, i.e. in cooperation with neighbouring countries within the integrated air space of NATO [9].

**Fig. 3.** Protection of objects of special importance by air defence units

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The contribution focuses on the issue regarding security of information shared within the decision-making processes concerning control activities and information protection, which represents a key factor in the cyberspace. One of the main principles, which are considered as the basis for network operations and information sharing under the conditions of environment digitalization for users, lies in security and protection of mutually interconnected networks. Information superiority on the one hand and meeting requirements for secrecy and security on the other hand will result in high demands on personnel and implementation of cyber security and protection measures.

Key words: Communication and information systems, Cyber security and protection, Information.

1. INTRODUCTION

The environment which influences the security of states undergoes dynamic changes. Its foreseeability decreases due to the increasing interconnection of security trends and factors. The threats, their sources and bearers are of both state and more and more non-state and supranational character. Internal and external security threats mingle and the differences between them are being removed. The importance of a complex approach is increasing; it combines military and civilian tools including diplomatic and economic resources to prevent threats and to mitigate their adverse effects. The requirements for readiness to respond to sudden threats in time and effectively are also increasing. They are related to the trends in the global environment which reinforce their potential and increase the possibility of their propagation from the relatively remote areas of local or regional conflicts and strained relations. The balance of the security environment is affected by the increasing goals of new global and regional participants. The distinctive feature of the current environment is the fact that the instability and conflicts beyond the European border may also have direct impact on our security. The main guarantee is the membership of NATO and EU and good relations with neighbouring countries. Main threat sources are critical attitudes towards the base values of the society, the doubtful concept of a democratic legal state and the negation of basic human rights and freedoms. Both states and increasingly non-state participants and various groups and
their supporters may be bearers of these attitudes. [1]

Through prevention and coping with common threats the security became a key factor in supporting the quality of life in the European society and in protecting critical infrastructures. The internal security strategy has been adopted with a view to facilitate the road ahead for Europe, to combine present activities and to set out principles and instructions for future activities. Therefore, it is vital for the internal security strategy itself to be able to conform to both the requirements of citizens and the challenges of the dynamic and global twenty-first century.

2. SECURITY OF COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS IN THE GLOBALIZATION PROCESS

The present age can be called information age. Information superiority is also one of the main goals of NATO transformation processes. The Czech Republic as an Alliance member has to pay special attention to improving information support of operations in peace as well as in coping with crisis situations. New trends vest in massive emergence of communication and information technologies and modern tools related to them to provide security...
and services. The aim is to eliminate problems in operating communication and information systems and to achieve high resilience, reliability and effectiveness. Based on the analysis of security environment of the Czech Republic specific threats for its security can be identified. The Czech Republic, as a responsible member of international organizations, also considers such security threats which do not affect directly its security, but threaten its allies. Cyber attacks rank among these threats. In this respect, the official view of cyber attacks is as follows: The increasing dependence on information and communication technologies raises the vulnerability of the state and its citizens towards cyber attacks. These attacks may represent a new form of warfare or may have criminal or terrorist motivation and may be used for society destabilization. The leakage of strategic information, interferences in information systems of state institutions or strategic businesses and companies which support state basic functions may threaten strategic interests of the Czech Republic. [2]

3. CONCEPT OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC CYBER DEFENCE

The problems of the Czech Republic cyber defence were known as the Plan-Do-Check-Act or the PDCA. It may be applied to
all ISMS processes according to this norm. **Figure 1** illustrates how the ISMS accepts requirements for information security.

The ISO/IEC 27001 norm provides the entire model for implementing principles which modify risk assessment, the proposal and implementation of security, security management and repeated security evaluation. This international norm supports the adoption of procedural approach for establishment, implementation, operation, monitoring, maintenance and improvement of ISMS in an organization.

For an effective operation of an organization it is necessary to identify and control many interconnected operations. The operation which uses sources and which is controlled for the purpose of transformation of inputs to outputs may be considered to be a process. An output from one process often forms directly an input for the next process. The application of the process system in an organization together with the identification of these processes, their mutual operation and control may be designated as a "process approach". In using the process approach for information security management, as it is presented in this norm, the stress is laid on:

- Insight into the requirements for information security of an organization and the need to define the policy and goals of information security;
- ISMS implementation and adoption of measures in the context of organization activities risk management;
- ISMS efficiency monitoring and reviewing;
- Continuous improvement of the system on the basis of physical metering.

![Fig. 1. The PDCA model applied to ISMS processes](image-url)
4. REQUIREMENTS FOR INFORMATION SECURITY

Information, supporting processes, systems and networks are important assets of an organization. Defining, implementing, supporting and improving information security may be essential for maintaining capability of an organization. Organizations and their information systems are threatened when they are subject to security threats from different sources including computer frauds, espionage, sabotage, vandalism and fires. The sources of damages, such as computer bugs, hacker attacks and denial-of-service attacks, are more frequent and their hazardousness and sophistication are increasing. Information security is important from the viewpoint of critical infrastructure protection in both the private and the public sector. In both sectors information security is important for service availability and, at the same time, for avoiding or minimizing risks. Interconnecting public and private networks as well as sharing information sources increase the difficulty of access control. The tendency towards the distributed processing and information sharing may weaken the effectiveness of central control performed by specialists.

Many information systems were not designed to be safe. Security which may be achieved through technical resources is inadequate and should be completed with adequate management and procedures. Careful planning and analysis of any detail are necessary to determine the measures to be taken. Information security management, therefore, requires at least some participation of all employees of an organization. It may also include cooperation of an organization, third parties, users and other external entities. Last but not least, some advice from specialists of other organizations may be useful. It is necessary for an organization to define its safety requirements. The three main sources are as follows:

1) The first source is the assessment of risks which threaten an organization with regard to its global strategy and aims. Within the risk assessment the threats and the probability of their occurrence are identified. The threats may act against activities and vulnerability and may be misused. It is necessary to make an estimate of their potential impact.

2) The second source includes the requirements of laws, by-laws and norms, contractual stipulations as well as local conditions which an organization, its business partners, contractors and service providers have to follow.

3) The third source includes specific principles, goals and requirements for information processing which an organization created to support its activities.

5. PREPARATION, TRAINING AND EDUCATION OF PERSONNEL IN THE FIELD OF CYBER SECURITY

The ability and readiness of personnel to fulfil assignments in the environment of information technologies and in the integrated environment will require different levels of knowledge and skills from each user depending on his/her tasks within the forces structure. It is necessary to specify the depth
of knowledge of information technologies in the information environment with regard to the level of particular military professional’s, specialist’s needs which will be mentioned in the concept and will define the requirements for personnel specification. The quality and continuous recruitment of armed forces is a task of personnel marketing which will enable the selection of appropriate personnel for the categories of workers required for building capabilities in the field of cyber security. They are as follows:

- Efficient workers to support task accomplishment;
- Workers capable of inventing and implementing new procedures,
- Workers for research and development.

For the second and third category it will be necessary to enlist the personnel with qualities which cannot be attained through training only, namely for time reasons. Education of military professionals in military schools has and will have an unsubstitutable place in relation to the development of information technologies. In the field of information technologies the development of education must also be supported more in the educational and training institutions of the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic. The accredited form of soldiers’ training is realized based on the study programs which have been developed in compliance with the Act on universities of the Czech Republic and is performed at the University of Defence. The non-accredited form of soldiers’ training is carried out in career and special courses for officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers. The non-accredited form of soldiers’ training is carried out at the Military Academy in Vyškov and in military educational and training institutions. In the area of future officers’ training it will be especially the provision of required information qualification for all graduates from the University of Defence who will be capable of accomplishing demanding tasks in the future information environment. In the selection of applicants for the study at the University of Defence one of the criteria of the university entrance examination (in addition to the English language knowledge, physical condition, medical fitness and psychological resistance) will also be the level of knowledge and skills in the field of information technologies. Depending on the gradual development of resources and environment, the cyber security problems should be included in the following areas:

- Curricula at military schools to achieve insight into the conceptual basis and its impact on the development of operational capabilities;
- Curricula and training programs in educational and training institutions with a view to achieve qualification to handle particular hardware and specific operational procedures.

Solving the problems of cyber defence and system security in departments will be realized using personnel and resources of departments, especially at the centre of Computer Incident Response Capability (hereinafter referred to as CIRC), and project and operation security managements. With regard to cyber defence specificity and related system security problems it is necessary to provide high
qualifications for personnel who have sufficient previous work experience in the field of information and network technologies. The objective is to enlist and stabilize personnel with adequate knowledge and attainments (specialists in the field of information technologies whose knowledge also includes the field of system security) that will support the accomplishment of cyber defence tasks.

The main objective in the field of training and education is to provide an integral system of training. It is necessary to create conditions for the preparation, training and education of both specialists in administration and operation in the field of cyber defence and system security and users of information systems. The training of technical staff has to be aimed at the increase in capabilities for preventing, searching and coordinated responding to computer threats and incidents. As to the users of information systems it is required to increase security awareness in their use and to achieve the desired level of knowledge, skills and habits aimed at minimizing security incidents.

**6. CONCLUSIONS**

In connection with the threat of cyber attacks the priority of the government is to provide security and protection of information and communication systems included in the critical infrastructure of the Czech Republic using the government coordinating team for immediate reaction to computer incidents (Computer Security Incident Response Team – CSIRT). This team is a part of the national and international early warning system.

The Czech Republic supports the building of such systems which enable widespread cooperation of all participants, i.e. also those who are not a part of public service and contribute to the exchange of experience acquired in coping with cyber incidents at national and international levels. The government supports legislative as well as non-legislative measures to be in compliance with the principles of information society development and the strategy of cyber and information security. [5]

The government supports uncompromising observance of security standards in information and communication systems operated by public authorities. It also supports further education focused on cyber and information security since the general public may be the most vulnerable element of the entire system. It defines the methods of protecting the sensitive information which is handled in the information systems operated by public administration authorities, namely the information systems required for supporting the state critical infrastructure. The Czech Republic is actively engaged in developing measures against cyber threats within international organizations, namely EU and NATO. It supports the reinforcement of international judicial and police cooperation with the aim to capture cyber attack perpetrators. The Czech Republic also joins the initiatives supporting the creation of international legal standards modifying the problems of cyber security. [6]
REFERENCES

KENYA'S PRE-EMPTIVE AND PREVENTIVE INCURSION AGAINST AL-SHABAAB IN THE LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

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Al-Shabaab terrorist group’s series of kidnappings and cross-border incursions into Kenya threatened security and the lucrative tourism industry in East Africa's largest economy. Towards the end of 2011 events like the kidnapping of two foreigners and the killing of another in the Kenyan resorts on the east coast, the abduction of two aid workers from the Dadaab refugee camp, and the attack against Kenyan soldiers in cross-border raids raised a lot of concern for the Kenyan government. Consequently, the latter decided that the national security interest of Kenya had to be protected. As a result, the decision of the government was to go to war against Al-Shabaab. This prompted the Kenya Defence Forces’ (KDF) incursion to Somalia in a pre-emptive and preventive campaign aimed at flushing out Al-Shabaab from this country. The campaign took off in mid-October 2011 and it was dubbed “Operation Linda Nchi”, Swahili for “Protect the country”. In this article we look at the implication of Kenya’s pre-emptive and preventive incursion against Al-Shabaab from the perspective of international law.

Key words: pre-emptive, preventive, incursion, international law.

1. INTRODUCTION

Kenya Defence Forces’ (KDF) preemptive and preventive actions are justified after the terrorist group known by the name of Al-Shabaab performed a series of kidnappings and cross-border incursions into Kenya, all of which threatened security and the lucrative tourism industry in East Africa's largest economy. [1] Towards the end of 2011 events like the kidnapping of two foreigners and the killing of another in the Kenyan resorts on the east coast, the abduction of two aid workers from the Dadaab refugee camp, and the attack against Kenyan soldiers in cross-border raids raised a lot of concern for the Kenyan government. [2] There was credible intelligence that Al-Shabaab terrorist group would continue to attack Kenya. Therefore, the most appropriate decision on behalf of Kenya was to conduct a military operation to take preventive action to stop such further attack. [3] Because the terrorist group had previously attacked Kenya, preventive action was justified. Given the sporadic nature of terrorist attacks, it appeared that the threat was escalating. Therefore, a decisive opportunity to attack and damage such a group
prior to it launching another attack on Kenya was seized. [4]

The Kenya Defence Forces decided to use a campaign strategy because of the nature of the terrorist group it was difficult, if not impossible, to defeat a terrorist group in a single strike. But in most cases, terrorist groups do not provide the targeting structure to carry out this approach since, for example, most terrorist groups are dispersed across a number of cells with little contact between them. [5] As a result, there may not be enough information to stage a campaign. Consequently, in most situations, governments are reduced to attacking terrorist organizations on a piecemeal basis, using a series of individual strikes. [6]

2. METHODOLOGY

The Qualitative Research method was used in this study. Primary and secondary data were analyzed. One of the researchers being a soldier was able to collect primary data by interviewing and analyzing the narratives and the stories told by fellow soldiers and officers who had been involved in the incursion and those who had not. A total of 115 military officers were interviewed and their views on preemptive, preventive and international law recorded.

Secondary data on the subject drawn from books, journals, newspapers, Conference proceedings, Government/corporate reports, theses and dissertations, Internet and magazines was critically analyzed. The findings and analysis are presented under the sub headings of: preemptive attack, preventive attack and international law.

2.1. PREEMPTIVE ATTACK

The Oxford Dictionary defines “preemptive” as “obtaining or preventing something by acting in advance”. [7] In this respect, Reisman noted that: “The claim to preemptive self-defense is a claim to entitlement to use unilaterally, without prior international authorization, high levels of violence to arrest an incipient development that is not yet operational or directly threatening, but that, if permitted to mature, could be seen by the potential preemptor as susceptible to neutralization only at a higher and possibly unacceptable cost to itself”. [8] A preemptive strike can be defined as use of force by a state against its adversary so as to prevent an attack or to protect its security; it would otherwise be disastrous, if it waits for its adversary to take the first step. According to its advocates, preemption is a strategy to protect a state if there is an “imminent threat” to its security. Mobilization of the adversary’s army, navy and air force has generally been defined as an imminent threat, for which, it is argued, preemptive force is permissible as an act of self defense.

2.2. PREVENTIVE ATTACK

Preventive war is defined as an attack launched on the belief that the threat of an attack, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that delaying such action would involve great risk and higher costs of war. [9] Preventive attack and preventive war designate proactive measures taken by a threatened nation to eliminate an anticipated threat. The preventive measure minimizes the threat by choosing the time, place and character
of an initial attack and thus denies the threatening agent these advantageous choices. Diplomatic or other means of national power should be exhausted before taking preventative action to provide the opportunity for building domestic and international consensus for the preventive action and for legitimizing such action. Anticipatory self-defense or striking an enemy before that enemy initiates his attack, is defined in four ways. The fundamental discriminators in these definitions are the distinctions between imminent and inevitable threats. Preemptive war is launched on the basis of indisputable evidence that an enemy attack is imminent. Distinctively, preventive war is defined as an attack launched on the belief that the threat of an attack, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that delaying such action would involve great risk and higher costs of war. The concept of imminence is therefore crucial to the understanding the distinction between preemption from prevention.

The most often described distinction between preemptive and preventive military activities revolves around the proximity of the threat. For example, according to the United States Department of Defense, a preemptive attack is defined as “an attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent”. A preventive war, on the other hand, is “a war initiated in the belief that military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve great risk”. A possible sum up of the differences between the two phrases is that while preventive war is undertaken when a state anticipates that its enemy may attack sometimes in the future or wants to prevent a change in the power balance at international level it deems as unacceptable, preemption refers to the decision of a state to be the first to take action because it has the firm the conviction that another state has already decided to attack and hence it is about to carry out its plans.

Still, there is a great confusion over the terminology in the academic debate. For instance, Nye claims that preemptive strike occurs when war is imminent. On the other hand, O’Connor means lack of imminence when referring to preemptive. Moreover, the same author, when referring to “force against an imminent threat” prefers to use the term “anticipatory”. Dinstein in contrast, uses the terms of preemptive, preventive, anticipatory in free variation and as examples of not allowable use of force, whereas in order to describe the use of force in a legitimate way the author uses the word “interceptive”. As for Gray, “anticipatory” means nothing but “preemptive”.

The concept of imminence however, has been complicated by the perceived threats that exist today. The issues of terrorism are proving difficult in this respect. The imminence of a terrorist attack is extremely difficult to determine, and, in comparison to the massing of troops along a border, is near impossible to detect.

2.3. PRECEDENCE OF PRE-EMPTIVE AND PREVENTIVE STRIKE

Russo-Japanese had preventive war between 1904 and 1905. Both Russia and Japan were seeking to
expand their influence in Korea. Many scholars would argue that some sort of military conflict between the two countries was inevitable. The conflict did begin and the Japanese initiated it. A comment by a Japanese minister provides a succinct explanation for why the Japanese acted: “We do not want war, for it would cost us so much, and we have nothing to gain even if we win; but by keeping the peace too long we may even lose our national existence”. [21]

Another preventive war is the Pacific War launched by Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor of United States. The Japanese relations had deteriorated steadily in the decade following Japan’s seizure of Manchuria in 1931-1932. They took a sharp turn for the worse with the Japanese-German-Italian Tripartite (“Axis”) Agreement (September 1940) and Japan’s occupation of French Indochina (1940-1941), culminating with President Roosevelt’s decision to impose an embargo on oil exports to Japan and a seizure of Japanese assets in the United States (July 1941). By December 1941, many in Tokyo and Washington believed war to be inevitable. Japan’s decision to go to war was driven in large part by this belief and by fears that the United States oil embargo would impair Japan’s war-making capabilities within months. [22] As a result, it was better to strike sooner than later. Like the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor reveals the difficulty of distinguishing between a preventive war and a simple war of aggression. In the case of the Pearl Harbor, for instance, war was only “inevitable” because Japan was committed to a policy of expansion in China and Indochina unacceptable to the United States.

The preemptive war most written about was the one undertaken by Israel against Egypt and Syria June 5, 1967. The months leading to the Israel cabinet’s June 3 decision to go to war were marked by escalating tension between Israel and its Arab neighbors. [23] Responding to a series of cross-border terrorist attacks, Israel forces launched a brief incursion into Jordan in November 1966. In April 1967, Syrian shelling of northern Israel led to a brief but intensive air strike in which Israel war planes defeated the Syrian military.

In May, Egyptian President Gamal Nasser demanded the removal of UN peacekeepers from most of the Sinai and closing the straits of Tiran that further raised the tension. Nasser’s rhetoric grew more heated as June approached, declaring on May 28 that “We plan to open a general assault on Israel. This will be total war. Our basic aim is the destruction of Israel”. [24] Egypt and Syria moved troops into positions in the Sinai and the Golan Heights. Jordan’s King Hussein visited Cairo May 30, militarily aligning himself with Egypt and Syria a step that raised the specter of a three-front war in Israel. Yet the Israel attacks of June 5 fell short of a strict definition of preemptive war. While most Israel decision makers believed that war with Israel’s Arab neighbors was inevitable, not all believed it was imminent. The decision to attack was largely driven by a belief in retrospect that an early war would catch Israel’s enemies off guard and maximize Israel’s opportunity to inflict a decisive defeat on increasingly hostile and united neighbors. Thus,
the Six-Day War contains elements of both preemption and prevention.

The last example we cite is when the Israel war planes bombed Iraq’s Osirak nuclear facility in June 7, 1981, as a preventive attack. The Israel war planes stroke the incomplete reactor at a site north of Baghdad, fearful that the reactor might be used to create plutonium for an Iraqi nuclear weapons program. While Israel’s strike against the Osirak Reactor may be a clear instance of a preventive strike, it does not represent an example of preventive war. International reaction to the Israel strike, however, was uniformly negative. The Security Council passed a unanimous resolution condemning it as a violation of the Charter (Security Council Resolution, 487 (June 19, 1981). That condemnation helped solidify the general understanding that Article 2(4) is a general prohibition on force.

3. INTERNATIONAL LAW

International law holds that the use of force between states is illegal. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the “threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State”. [25] The two exceptions to this general rule are the Security Council authorization for the use of force to keep peace as provided in Chapter VII of the Charter, and that done in self-defence. Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) Charter, says “nothing shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in exercise of this right of self defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council”. [26]

There should be an armed attack prior to the preemptive strike for Article 51 to be applied. However there is no unanimous interpretation of this provision. The advocates of preemption say there is no explicit mention of any prohibitions and the states have the right to act. Since there is no unanimous acceptance or rejection of whether an armed attack is a necessary pre-condition for preemption, it has generally been accepted that a preemptive strike can be launched irrespective of a prior armed attack.

3.1. THE LAW AGAINST PREEMPTIVE SELF-DEFENSE

The purposes of the United Nations (UN) are enshrined in Article 1(1) of the Charter, the primary purpose being to “Maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace”. [27] Others reject this claim, and argue instead that the words “inherent right” in Article 51 is evidence that the Charter was intended to recognize and continue the customary right that was in place before the establishment of the United Nations. [28] These provisions apply equally to both members and non-members of the United Nations, and prohibit all recourse to force, whether unilateral acts of aggression or multilateral efforts to protect human rights or to
conduct humanitarian intervention. [29]

There are two exceptions to the general rule against the use of force. The first of these relates to acts authorized by the United Nations Security Council. Article 42 of the Charter permits the Council (and by extension UN members) to take any such actions to maintain and restore international peace and security where non-forcible measures would, or have proven to be, inadequate. [30] Without the United Nations Security Council authorization, the use of force would be unlawful, and it is not for individual states to determine when threats to the peace have occurred. Reading the Charter as a whole, it is evident that the prohibition on force was intended by the drafters to be very broad, admitting of only explicit exceptions. This conclusion is confirmed by the drafting history of the Charter. The Security Council alone has legal authority to authorize forcible military actions. [31]

3.2. SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

Article 51 is not the only authority that permits the use of force in self defense. Even though the issue of when an armed attack is justified because of the right to self-defense is still under debate, the Security Council has clarified that “an attack must be underway or must have already occurred in order to trigger the right of unilateral self-defense” unless an an earlier response has already been approved by the Security Council. Therefore, no state can take it as its own right to attack another state on reasons that the latter is hypothetically planning or developing weapons for a likely campaign. The use of force should not involve “anything unreasonable or excessive, since the act justified by the necessity of self-defence must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it”. [32]

The customary right to self-defense, either in anticipation or otherwise, would therefore be valid when the requirements of necessity and proportionality are fulfilled. In this respect, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the 1986 Nicaragua versus The United States of America case stated that “the exercise of this right is subject to the State concerned having been the victim of an armed attack”. [33] Article 51 itself professes that “nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right” (United Nations Charter), the implication being that the customary rules continue “to exist unimpaired after ratification”. [34] The use of force outside such an instance would therefore be unlawful.

3.3. MILITARY ACTUAL COMBAT

The provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter set out that should an armed attack occur, then a state can exert its right to self-defense. Some scholars argue that the right of preemptive self defense, if applied too broadly, could be used by states to “cloak aggression in the mantle of self-defence”. [35] This would in turn provide a dangerous precedent and could provide “justification for Pakistan to attack India and for North Korea to attack South Korea, and so on”. [36] According to the International Court of Justice, in Nicaragua’s case it is only actions of
great gravity could lead to an armed attack as the expression of the right to individual or collective defense. [37] Based on the UN General Assembly’s Definition of Aggression [38] the Court concluded that an armed attack is justified as a result of the “right to use force to repel an attack in progress, to prevent future enemy attacks following an initial attack, or to reverse the consequences of an enemy attack, such as ending an occupation”. [39] “The state acting in self-defense may seek the destruction of an attacking enemy force if that is necessary and proportional to its own defense. The right also includes taking the defense to the territory of the enemy attacker, if that is necessary and proportional”. [40]

The defensive use of force can be delayed, after an unlawful armed attack, depending on the circumstances. Taking a reasonable amount of time to organize the defense is permissible. “Force can be used in self-defense only against a state legally responsible for the armed attack. It is generally not enough that the enemy attack originated from the territory of a state. Rather, legal responsibility follows if a state used its own agents to carry out the attack”. [41]. When using force, the principles of necessity and proportionality must be observed. Thus, the principle of necessity limits the use of force to the accomplishment of military objectives. As for proportionality, the latter rules out that the likely civilian casualties must be weighed in the balance. In case the damages to civil property or the loss of innocent lives are greater than the benefits triggered by objective of achievement, then the attack is to be abandoned.

3.4. CONSEQUENCES ON KENYA PREEMPTIVE AND PREVENTIVE WAR AGAINST AL-SHABAAB

Whether it is a limited war or surgical strike or hot pursuit, Kenyan’s response would be equally serious. If one goes by the statements of its important actors and by Al-Shabaab counter mobilization around Kismayu, and several terrorist attacks in Northern Eastern province, any further action by Kenya Defense Forces will only aggravate Kenya security situation rather than addressing it. [42]

Secondly, will preemptive strike secure Kenya’s interests against Somalia? Presuming that the preemptive strike sought to destroy Somalia’s Al-Shabaab, will the military campaign be able to destroy all of them? If any such strike continues, Al-Shabaab, would not hesitate to escalate its terrorist attack as it has been witnessed in Kenya since some of Al-shabaab members are Kenyan unemployed youths who are not of Somali origin and difficult to identify as Al-Shabaab sympathizers. [43] Another factor which would not help any aggressive Kenyan action is the political equation inside Somalia which is unstable, both inside and outside its parliament. [44]

4. CONCLUSIONS

In order to uphold Kenya’s legitimacy, it is vitally important for this country to undertake a preemptive and preventive war against Al-Shabaab. A right of self-defense that encompasses both actions done in response to an armed attack, and actions done in anticipation of an armed attack, are provided by international law. However, the
extent of the customary rules remains somewhat controversial.

We argue that the notion of imminence should be extended to allow for pre-emptive strikes against terrorist groups. However the dangers that might arise from an alteration of the existing framework are numerous. To extend these requirements too far for example, would leave the notion of self-defense open to abuse, and could give states an opportunity to cloak aggressive military strikes under the mantle of pre-emptive self-defense.

Despite this, the notion of pre-emption is permitted in international law, and therefore, Kenya was justified legally to carry out pre-emptive and preventive war against Al-Shabaab. Kenya should seek to justify its actions in a multilateral setting such as the Security Council, ensuring that it does so with credible evidence. It will also give Kenya an option for pre-emptive and preventive war against Al-Shabaab action that conforms to international law.

After the devastating Nairobi terrorist attacks in August 7, 1998 and November 28, 2002 in Kikambala, Mombasa Kenya “had the right to defend itself against continuing terrorist attacks mounted by the Al-Shabaab. Kenya has no right, however, to invade another state because of speculative concerns about that state’s possible future actions. The current international order does not support a special status for any member or a singular right to exempt itself from the law. To maintain a legal order that restrains other states and to uphold the rule of law, Kenya should continue its conservative commitment to limit the unilateral use of force, and reject a reckless doctrine of preemptive self-defense”. [45] It is its right to suggest that the confluence of international terrorism represents a unique and deadly challenge to Kenya and the international community. The legitimacy of traditional preemptive action is already widely accepted as implicit in the right to self-defense. More assertive measures of preventive action before an imminent threat arises may at times be necessary.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) had advantage when it launched a pre-emptive and preventive war against Al-Shabaab. It chose the timing for the incursion, and it had the initiative. However, those advantages will diminish should the war be more than a single campaign. The incursion will lose momentum over time, and Al-Shabaab may be able to rally, regroup, and counterattack in various ways similar to what happened against Ethiopian military. Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) have achieved rapid victory, it has been fairly common in history for that victory to be marred by “the war after the war”. Hence the need for a proper exit strategy.

B. Kenya Defence Forces’ (KDF) pre-emptive and preventive military action against Al-Shabaab should have the character of a raid, not of an invasion. Strategists should be pragmatic. The issue is not the desirability of conquest, enforced regime change, and societal remodeling, but rather their feasibility and costs. A swamp-draining motive behind the pre-emptive and preventive option is simply not sustainable. This has been confirmed by the Kenyan government admitting to the public
university striking lecturers and public hospital striking doctors that their demand for pay hike cannot be met for the time being because of the cost of war in Somalia.

C. Though judging from its past reactions which advocated for diplomacy, Kenya Defence Forces’ (KDF) pre-emptive and preventive action was rare and it was a justified case. In future, Kenya Defence Forces’ (KDF) cross borderer incursion must be the last resort, not temporally, but with respect to the evidence-based conviction that the non-military instruments of policy cannot succeed. There should be convincing intelligence facts to the

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KENYA’S PRE-EMPTIVE AND PREVENTIVE INCURSION AGAINST AL-SHABAAB IN THE LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW


[26] idem

[27] ibidem


[37] Nicaragua, at paras. 194-95, 211. See infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text for further discussion of when a state is responsible for the acts of groups or individuals, whether amounting to an armed attack or other wrong.


[40] Nicaragua, at paras. 35, 194


ROMANIA’S ANTI - TERRORISM CAPABILITIES:
TRANSFORMATION, COOPERATION,
EFFECTIVENESS

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Fighting terrorism effectively is not a new security responsibility for the security forces in Romania. Terrorism has been a menace to Romania’s national security before 1989, and for years during the Communist regime, Securitate’s anti-terrorist elite force’s acumen had averted terrorist attacks. Yet, Cold War terrorism is different from Twenty-First Century terrorism. What changed after the fall of the Iron Curtain, and chiefly after the atrocious terrorist attacks in the United States (US) on September 11, 2001 (9/11), was the lethality and virulence of terrorists’ intents and goals. Attacks in the US, Spain, Great Britain, and others urged Romania (as much as other countries) transform its overall security system to be able to fight terrorism and terrorist networks, as well as other asymmetric security threats and challenges, effectively and collaboratively. This paper reviews Romania’s security system post-Cold War transformation, in pursuit of effectively averting, countering and combating terrorism.

**Key words:** Romania’s anti-terrorism, Romania’s anti-terrorism cooperation, Romania’s counter-terrorism reform, South Eastern Europe’s anti-terrorism, South Eastern Europe’s security cooperation.

1. INTRODUCTION

Fighting terrorism effectively is not a new security responsibility for the security forces in Romania. Terrorism has been a menace to Romania’s national security before 1989 [1], and for years during the Communist regime, Securitate’s anti-terrorist elite force’s acumen [2] had averted terrorist attacks. Yet, Cold War terrorism is different from Twenty-First Century terrorism. What changed after the fall of the Iron Curtain, and chiefly after the atrocious terrorist attacks in the United States (US) on September 11, 2001 (9/11), was the lethality and virulence of terrorists’ intents and goals. Attacks in the US, Spain, Great Britain, and others urged Romania (as much as other countries) transform its overall security system to be able to fight terrorism and terrorist networks, as well as other asymmetric security threats and challenges, effectively and collaboratively. This paper reviews Romania’s security system post-Cold War transformation, in pursuit of effectively averting, countering and combating terrorism.
2. ROMANIA’S SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

Romania’s security forces include the armed forces (army, navy, air force) under the Ministry of Defense (MOD), police forces (gendarmerie, border, etc.) under the Ministry of Administration and Internal Affairs, and six [3] intelligence agencies.

3. TERRORIST THREAT TO ROMANIA’S SECURITY

Terrorism does not pose a major threat to Romania’s security. Yet, Romania could become a terrorist target for a variety of reasons. First is Romania’s membership (and Eastern Border) in Western collective security institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), whose countries have often become terrorist targets [4].

Second is Romania’s unstable geographical surroundings (neighboring the Black Sea and the Balkans yet not far from the Caucasus and Near East) [5].

Third is the relatively high Muslim/Arabic representation in Romania, which may transform it into a hub for terrorist traffic targeting both Romania and other countries. [6]

Fourth, even without a “direct” Muslim threat, [7] Romania’s friendly relations with the US, the implementation of the relocation of US military bases in Romania since 2007, and its contribution to the international anti-terrorist efforts and peace operations could, as well, make Romania a target.

4. REFORM AND TRANSFORMATION TO FIGHT TERRORISM

Fighting terrorism effectively calls for a modern, agile, resilient, and multi-tasking security system. To this end, especially after 9/11, Romania has channeled its countering and combating terrorism efforts toward improved terrorism prevention, counter-terrorism intervention, and consequence management capabilities. These endeavors have enveloped, inter alia, the following:

- a more robust anti-terrorism (AT) and counter-terrorism (CT) legal framework;
- effective and timely intelligence (organization, structures, personnel [including education and training], quality of analysis, and equipment);
- more agile security forces, increased information sharing, coordination and cooperation;
- improved capabilities of tracking down and weeding out any human, financial, logistic and operational involvement and/or support for terrorist activities;
- strengthened intervention capabilities (capturing terrorists, freeing hostages, reinstating order);
- better guard and protection capabilities and activities; civil emergencies, public affairs, and outreach activities.

4.1. STRENGTHENED ANTI-TERRORISM LEGAL FRAMEWORK

As mentioned earlier, terrorism has long been a security concern for Romania. As a result, its AT/CT legal framework started to develop in the early 1960s, and,
as expected, has undergone some changes after 9/11, as demanded by the new security environment, Romania’s determination to join the international arena in averting, countering, and combating terrorism, as well as by the requirements of NATO/EU membership. Post 9/11 legislation stipulates, besides other provisions, increased anti-terrorism powers and responsibilities for the security sector, and heightened cooperation.

A few of the most relevant AT/CT laws include: all thirteen United Nations (UN) conventions on combating terrorism; UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 (on arm proliferation and ballistic missiles), 1566 (against international terrorism) and 1373 (which set up the Anti-Terrorism Committee); Government Emergency Ordinance 141/2001; Government Emergency Ordinance 159/2001; Law 51/1991 on National Security; Romanian Penal Code; Law 14/1992 (which assigned SRI the main roles and mission with regard to terrorism prevention and countering); Law on the approval of the Government Emergency 1/1999 on the state of siege and state of emergency; Law 535/2004 on preventing and combating terrorism; Law 42/2004 on the armed forces’ participation in missions outside Romanian territory; Methodology of the organization and execution of counter-terrorism intervention of 2006; Strategy of information communication on the prevention and limitation of a terrorist risk and terrorist crisis situation, of 2007; other strategies, doctrines, and rules.

### 4.2. ROMANIA’S NATIONAL SYSTEM ON PREVENTING AND COMBATING TERRORISM

Given the multifarious, easily adjustable, network-style nature of the terrorist groups, it became clear to the Romanian security decision makers that effectively fighting terrorism definitely not be the job of one agency, but rather, the outcome of a concerted action of a variety of security institutions. In this context, in 2001, the National Supreme Defense Council (CSAT), as the strategic coordinator of anti-terrorism strategies and policies, designated the SRI the nation’s main authority (technical coordinator) in AT/CT activities. The SRI is hence authorized to conduct independently or, if needed, in cooperation and coordination with other security forces, anti-, counter- and combating terrorism operations.[8] During the same year, the SRI had established a Department for Preventing and Combating Terrorism (DPCT), featuring a Center of Counter-Terrorist Operational Coordination (CCOA) as a permanent technical coordinator of the interacting agencies within the National System on Preventing and Combating Terrorism (SNPCT) – an integrated structure focusing on prevention and countering terrorist threats, which was, at that time, pending becoming operational.[9] The CCOA is charged with collection, analysis, and field intervention. [10] In 2002 a National Strategy on Preventing and Combating Terrorism was adopted, which regulates the roles of all security institutions, together with a General Protocol on the organization and functioning
Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI). As previously stated, AT/CT transformation after 9/11 has started with SRI’s becoming the anti-terrorism leader in the country. Its Department for Preventing and Combating Terrorism (DPCT) is the coordinator of Romania’s domestic AT/CT efforts, charged with the integrated planning, organization, implementation and execution of all activities involving the prevention, detection, and annihilation of terrorist activities and actions in the country. [15] Its intelligence component is charged with collection and analysis on all national security risks, challenges and threats, including terrorism. [16] DGPCT’s operational

Each SNPCT component has as well undergone transformation in view of better tackling the vagaries of the world’s current security landscape. This paper will further dwell upon the transformation of the security forces’ specific anti-terrorism roles, missions, and capabilities.
component, the AT Brigade (BA), created on the ruins of Securitate’s former Special Unit for Fighting Terrorism (USLA), ensures the AT protection of Romanian and foreign dignitaries, and conducts AT/CT operations in venues under attack or seized by terrorists, being capable to deploy and execute ground, air, and maritime missions everywhere in Romania within two-and-a-half hours.[17]

Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE): The SIE ensures the collection, assessment, and dissemination of relevant threat development (including terrorism) outside Romania’s territory, as well as field intervention. [18] It established an elite intervention unit, trained in the U.S. at Delta bases, and in Great Britain at SAS facilities, which specializes in possible interventions outside Romanian territory, including freeing hostages and ensuring the guard and protection of embassies abroad. [19] After 9/11, the SIE also underwent a transformation and reorganization process, following the model of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Guard and Protection Service (SPP): The SPP is Romania’s agency charged with the guarding and protection of the life and personal integrity of the President, as well as other Romanian and foreign diplomats and leaders. It has collection, analysis,
and field intervention responsibilities and capabilities. Its Anti-Terrorist Intervention Section (SIAT) is charged with the prevention and countering of terrorist risks, challenges, and attacks aimed at the persons/facilities the SPP is safeguarding. [20]

Ministry of Defense: Romania’s Armed Forces are integral part of the SNTP; since the end of the Cold War and especially after the terrorist attacks in the US and Europe, its anti-terrorist units have embarked upon a systematic transformation, to adjust to the new security threats effectively, and become more interoperable with NATO/EU similar structures. The Armed Forces’ AT/CT contribution involves intelligence, operational, and combat actions (and adjacent support).

First, MOD’s General Directorate for Defense Intelligence (DGIA) ensures the military intelligence: the collection, processing, assessment, analysis, storing and utilization of information and data on all security risks, challenges, and threats (military and non-military, domestic and international), which impact Romania’s security from the perspective of national defense; counterintelligence activities; the protection of national, NATO and EU classified information within the MOD; and combat and field interventions and operations. [21] It contributes with Liaison Officers (HUMINT) and analysis to the various UN, NATO or EU operations. [22] The DGIA makes Romania one of the few NATO members to have an Integrated Multisource Collection Capability (IMCC), which receives information from theaters of operation as well as from operational and strategic sources, and uses HUMINT, IMINT, MASINT, and SIGINT.[23] These capabilities have also been used for preventing and combating maritime terrorism at the Black Sea. [24] The DGIA has recently developed a functional cyberintelligence (CYBERINT) structure, charged with the surveillance and collection from cyberspace, aimed to prevent and stop any malicious, hostile and deceptive cyber threats or cyberattacks to Romania’s security. [25] Its overall “INT” capabilities, coupled with the recently adopted system of communications monitoring through satellite (MONSAT) [26] make the DGIA an effective intelligence with regard to asymmetrical threats, including terrorism.

Second, various MOD components have developed modern, NATO interoperable AT/CT intervention capabilities and task forces. The DGIA has a Rapid Intervention Detachment (DIR), charged with: guarding and protection of MOD facilities, assets, leaders, and personnel, both in Romania and abroad (including those in the theaters of operations); technical AT control and CT actions and intervention (in cooperation with its SNPC counters parts); and guarding and protection of all foreign military facilities and personnel operating on the Romanian territory. [27] Under DGIA also functions, since 2011, the Special Operation Force (SOF) Battalion, “Vulturii” for out-of-area operations under NATO or Multinational Forces command. [28] The SOF have a land component (e.g. the 1st SF Battalion and disparate assets [reconnaissance, paratroopers, infantry, mountain troops, NBC, engineers, communications, psychological operations, and
logistical support), a supporting air component (e.g. fighters, bombers, transportation aircraft etc.), as well as a supporting naval component (e.g. SEAL-type elements, and transportation boats).[29] Its combating terrorism operations encompass hostage rescue, recovery or capture of sensitive material, and the targeting of terrorist organization infrastructure.[30] The Navy has two NATO certified SEALS Detachments, whose main AT/CT duties involve defending anchoring places and deep water routes, mine detection and demining, defending oil drilling platforms, and preventing underwater diversions.[31] The DNFOS conduct sea, air and land missions, any time and in any place, and comprise combat incursion divers and command officers, and is part of the Special Operations Force Naval Group (GNFOS). [32] They are multi-tasking, in that, besides divers, they are paratroopers, mountain troops, scouts, and snipers. [33] The Marines have the Infantry Battalion, an intervention unit that conducts commando operations, reconnaissance actions, and other. [34] Third, additional AT/CT efforts reside in the following: Air Force support to CT intervention (e.g. personnel transportation to the immediate proximity of the risk region, combat support, evacuation, etc.); Navy contribution with data and information, transportation to the target, and in certain circumstances, combat support; and, Army contribution with infantry battalions (e.g. paratroopers, mountaineers), military police, NBC, engineers, EOD, as well as logistic and medical support. [35] Ministry of Administration and Internal Affairs: The MIRA has developed intelligence capabilities and AT/CT intervention teams. The General Directorate for Intelligence and Internal Security (DGIPi) is MIRA’s intelligence unit which does collection and analysis on terrorist threats and organized crime. [36] Gendarmerie has a Special Intervention Brigade, “Vlad Tepes”, charged with countering serious and violent street crimes and terrorist activities (hostage rescuing, counter-terrorist operations, sensitive objectives protection, etc.).[37] The Brigade was named after the notorious king Vlad Tepes, whose reign was crime-free, due to the strong hand of his rule. “Vlad Tepes” features, among others, the Special Protection and Intervention Group “Acvila”, which handles protection of dignitaries protection (especially those who received death threats), special police intervention (against individual or organized criminals), and AT/CT intervention (in cooperation with other CT structures). [38] The Border Police has the Security Rapid Intervention Force (SASI) that fights organized crime and terrorism at the border area. [39] Special Telecommunications Service (STS): The STS organizes and coordinates the lawful telecommunications activities for Romania’s public authorities and other users. The institution performs SIGINT functions. With regard to combating terrorism, STS implemented the European emergency call number 1-1-2 in Romania. [40]
4.3. COMBATING TERRORISM IS “EVERYONE’S BUSINESS”

4.3.1. DOMESTIC EFFORTS
The CSAT is the main coordinator of Romania’s security activity. In line with CSAT’s directives, policies, and protocols, and in compliance with a series of interagency cooperation and coordination rules, laws and regulations, all components of the SNPCT have established coordination and cooperation agreements among themselves, with other security institutions, and with international counterparts. In addition, they have also established avenues of communication, information and collaboration with representatives of civil society. All these have paved the way toward information and intelligence sharing, common education and training, mutual support (with regard to personnel, education and training), and joint field and combat operations.

The CSAT issued a cooperation protocol among all security institutions to enable information and intelligence sharing. [41] The intelligence agencies have additional specific protocols on sharing, protection of classified information, SIGINT, and monitoring satellite communications. [42] Anti-terrorist brigades and intervention units of the anti-terrorist system are training together, [43] exchange personnel [44], and act together [45] under the SRI’s coordination.

Since “security is everyone’s business”, the security organizations (including intelligence) have also established communications and information avenues with the civilian decision makers (executive and legislative members), civil society (NGOs, media, think tanks, and academy representatives), and even directly with the population (schools, high schools, and even kindergartens), aiming, on the one hand, at informing the population on the threats and challenges posed by terrorism to Romania’s security, explaining their capabilities to protect the citizens, and, on the other hand, encouraging the citizens to alert the security agencies on potential terrorist threats. Round tables, seminars, meetings, visits to education facilities are but a few efforts in this context, undertaken by the intelligence agencies (and even their anti-terrorist intervention units). [46] These endeavors seem to have served their purposes; not only have the citizens become more aware of the terrorist threats to Romania’s national, regional and international security, but they have also become more willing to notify the security institutions on threats. As former SIE director Ioan Talpes noted, much of the information that contributed to averting and combating terrorist threats in Romania came from the populace. [47]

4.3.2. INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH AND COOPERATION
Romania has also been an active supporter of the global efforts aimed to deny terrorists and terrorist groups the oxygen of evil doing. To this end, immediately after 9/11, Romania fully supported NATO’s decision on the implementation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, allowed U.S. aircraft to utilize its airspace for combat actions in Afghanistan, contributed military troops, police and intelligence personnel for NATO’s missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan,
joined the Coalition of the willing in Iraq, and dynamically engaged in the myriad global, regional and subregional collaborative AT/CT enterprises. [48]

Within the UN, NATO, EU, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), etc., as well as within various international networks of countering terrorist financing (e.g. Egmont Group), Romania’s security agencies have been active participants and positive forces in supporting security and security cooperation.[49] In South Eastern Europe (SEE), Romania has been participating in a variety of either bilateral or subregional collective security initiatives and institutions, including the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) Center for Combating Trans Border Crime, European Network and Information Security Agency (ENSI), European Police Office (EUROPOL), International Bomb Data Center, Balkan Communication Network, numerous Black Sea cooperative initiatives, the Brdo Process, the Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Center (RAČVIAC), and others.[50]

As intelligence agencies are first in line of AT/CT defense, and from the premise of 'fighting networks with networks', Romania’s intelligence agencies have established specific intelligence sharing and exchange mechanisms with foreign partners, on information sharing, mutual support (including financial, acquisitions and procurement), visits, and joint training.[51] SIE, SRI and SPP intervention teams, either based on bilateral agreements, or under the umbrella of the previously-mentioned collective security organizations, have participated in numerous common training programs and exercises with U.S., French, and U.K. counterparts. DIR has been actively participating in all NATO and non-NATO anti-terrorist exercises organized by the Romanian Armed Forces, joint exercises with the 1st Battalion/10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), U.S. Special Operations Command Europe, or with Bulgarian and Serbian counterparts (on border and counter-terrorism issues).[52]

With regard to the armed forces AT/CT cooperation, besides the Romania’s military participation in NATO exercises, relevant, too, are the naval operations “NATO Active Endeavour” and “Black Sea Harmony”, which brought together various South Eastern European countries, and the effective counter-terrorism simulations within the South Eastern Europe Defense Ministerial (SEDM).[53]

On the same note, within the framework of EUROPOL, besides cooperation with EU members, Romania’s law enforcement agencies cooperate and share information with counterparts from various countries and organizations, including countries from SEE countries that are not members of the EU (e.g. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Turkey).[54] Likewise, within the SECI Center’s Anti-Terrorism Task Force Romania’s law enforcement agencies have been cooperating with SEE counterparts, through regular meetings, as well as information and experience exchange and sharing.[55] It is also worth mentioning Romania’s MIRA AT/CT brigades joint training
and exchange of expertise with international counterparts, especially from Germany.

4.4. ANALYSIS OF ROMANIA’S ANTI-TERRORISM EFFECTIVENESS: CHALLENGES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Romania has implemented dramatic changes in its security system since the end of Communism and accession to NATO and the EU to better fight current security threats, including terrorism. Yet, these changes did not happen overnight; they involved a lot of work, efforts, and willingness, and had to face a series of challenges.

First is the challenge of time: it takes time to build professionalism and expertise. With regard to intelligence, for example, the purge of former Securitate personnel (mainly those involved in abuses and transgressions during the communist regime) from the post-communist agencies left a vacuum of expertise in the new structures. Recruiting, educating and training new collection agents, analysts and even intervention personnel has been an onerous process.[56] In the same context, since expertise requires time to build, some of the AT/CT units have become operational and interoperable after a few years since establishment, while others are yet to be fully operational.

Second, parts of the legal framework on security are obsolete, enacted when Romania was not a member of any regional collective security organization, and was surrounded by a different geopolitical context, in which the terrorist threat was not as high as now; these have also obstructed the modernization of some security agencies, including AT/CT transformation.[57]

Third, resources and resource allocation are essential in achieving effectiveness. [58] Some special intervention units are still in need of up-to-date equipment and assets. For example, parts of the deep sea diving techniques within the Military Divers Center where DNFOS and EOD detachments are trained is thirty years old and needed to be replaced a while ago; due to limited resources, upgrading of the technique has been incremental.[59]

Fourth, and most important, even with a rather solid legal framework for cooperation, developing security cooperation (including in the field of anti-terrorism) in Romania has been cumbersome, due to agencies’ rigidified bureaucratic environment (which has delayed and/or hindered information sharing and collaboration), too many intelligence agencies (which fueled dishonest competition and rivalry among agencies, because of redundancy and overlapping roles and missions), politicization, and political infighting. [60] Security and intelligence cooperation/collaboration is still an issue, in that some agencies still prefer bilateral approaches, while others are still reluctant to share information, especially in a multilateral format, unless a crisis comes up.[61]

Fifth, Cooperation at the international level was also difficult at first; Romania remained isolated from the West, as many NATO and Western counterparts were reluctant to share information with Romanian intelligence personnel who had previously worked for the Securitate and remained employed by the
agencies after the regime change in December 1989.[62] In addition, AT/CT cooperation among the countries of South Eastern Europe (including Romania) has been hampered by a series of discrepancies in terms of country development, institution-building, and European and Euro-Atlantic integration; hence different paces of security sector reform (SSR) and transformation, different counter-terrorism and organized crime legislation, resources, capabilities, methods, and equipment.[63]

Sixth, and related to the previous point, problematic too, could be the existence of too many intervention units, which may, at a minimum, become a bureaucratic burden, due to potential overlapping and duplication of responsibilities and missions.

Seventh, the security institutions, in particular intelligence agencies, have been the subjects of various media scandals due to negligence (e.g. avoiding to monitor a Romanian businessman of Syrian origin, charged with terrorism, who later disappeared), malfeasance (using terrorism prevention to wiretap innocent people), leak of classified information (e.g. information involving AT/CT issues), and politicization; these practices have affected the overall security reform process, which also impacted the AT/CT transformation.[64]

In time, Romania’s security agencies have been able to overcome these challenges and, through elaborated transformation endeavors in terms of personnel, structure, organization, resources, and acquisitions, become more effective and more network-like, both internally and abroad. Romania’s counter-terrorism forces have transformed their AT/CT collectors and analysts, revamped and strengthened the interoperability of their intervention and combat units (especially as a result of NATO/EU membership), and deployed professional teams in the theaters, capable to effectively predict, avert, and counter concrete security risk factors and crises.[65]

At the domestic level stand out the numerous AT/CT cases of effectiveness [66], a direct outcome of the robust security transformation, on the one hand, and of improved collaborative [67] actions of the intelligence agencies, police, and other security organizations, seconded by Romania’s willingness to contribute to the international conjugated efforts to stave off terrorism.[68] At the international level (especially in Iraq and Afghanistan), stand out Romania’s effective HUMINT, IMINT and GEOINT capabilities within hostile operational environments.[69]

Romania’s professionalism and expertise has led to the establishment in Romania (as a NATO decision) of a NATO HUMINT Center of Excellence (COE), which ensures HUMINT training, participates in NATO documents development, and other issues related to NATO standardization process.[70] In addition, SPP officers have proved professionalism when conduction guard and protection missions of various UN officials in Sudan, Iraq and Afghanistan, which may lead to the creation of a center of excellence (both training and research and development) in Romania, in support of UN activities.[71]

On the other hand, to overcome challenges to the democratization of the security forces (e.g. intelligence),
and prevent the use of “terrorism prevention” as a pretext for abuses, the Romanian authorities, whether pressured by the civil society and international partners, or following their own will to change, have institutionalized processes to support both the effectiveness of the security agencies, as well transparency and democratic control. [72]

5. CONCLUSIONS

Terrorism is omnipresent and no country (Romania included) is exempt from its threats and challenges; as former SRI Director Radu Timofte once stated, “Al-Qaeda does not wear a ‘visitor’ badge when present in one country or another”. [73] Events like 9/11 were not isolated, one-time, singular actions, but part of a progressive chain of vitriolic terrorist attacks (Madrid, London, Istanbul, Sharm el Sheikh, Mumbai, Bombay, and others). Romania has been a vehement opponent of terrorism and terrorist attacks, as well as an active participant in the international endeavors to curb it.

Since the regime change in 1989, and especially after the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, Romania has embarked upon a comprehensive reform and transformation process aimed on the one hand at the democratization of its security forces, and, on the other hand, at their effectiveness in fighting the post-Cold War security threats and challenges, including terrorism. In time and after having totally or partially overcome a number of challenges, Romania’s security forces are now full and effective contributors to the international fight against terrorism, at national and international levels, as follows: capabilities of collection, analysis, dissemination of relevant and timely information to the national and international decision makers; assets and capabilities of effective AT/CT intervention; team players and professionals in the CT coalitions within various theaters of operations. Their professionalism and effectiveness in the joint fight of terrorism has been repeatedly recognized by foreign counterparts.

Based on the principle of indivisible and cooperative security, Romania’s security forces (with intelligence in the first line) will continue their involvement in the international and regional efforts to stop terrorism.

In South Eastern Europe, Romania is well linked with other SEE countries (which share similar security concerns and challenges) in the fight against terrorism, through several cooperative mechanisms, ranging from bilateral agreements and subregional arrangements, to regional organizations and alliances. The Romanian security forces’ profuse connection with SEE countries involves, on the other hand, habitual meetings, experience and information sharing avenues, common education, training, and exercises on anti-counter- and combating terrorism issues, and, on the other hand, joint AT/CT interventions and missions. Effective AT/CT responses in SEE are due, besides others, to the Romanian security forces’ contribution, too.

Admittedly, challenges have tested and will keep testing South Eastern Europe’s security cooperation. Yet, despite any present or future challenges, SEE’s fight against terrorism will continue to benefit from Romania’s important geostrategic position, good relations
with its neighbors and other regional partners, and reliable AT/CT capabilities. Romania’s security forces will strengthen their AT/CT contribution to NATO, EU (EUROPOL), and the SECI Center, will maintain and improve bilateral and trilateral cooperation and information sharing with those SEE countries that are not (yet) NATO/EU members (while supporting and assisting the membership efforts of SEE NATO/EU aspirant countries), and will deepen cooperation at the Black Sea.

ENDNOTES

[3] Three are independent: Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE), Guard and Protection Service (SPP), and Special Telecommunication Service (STS); and, three ministerial: MIRA General Directorate for Intelligence and Internal Protection (DGIP), MOD Director ate for General Information of the Army (DG1A).
[6] The Muslim/Arab population in Romania is better integrated than in other countries, and, there is a warm relationship between Romania and Arab and Muslim world going back to the Cold War. Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, The Challenges of Intelligence Sharing in Romania. Intelligence and National Security, no. 24, issue 4, August, 2009, pp. 574-585.

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[9] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Romania's Intelligence Community: From an Instrument of Dictatorship to Serving Democracy, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 629-660. The system comprises the following agencies: CSAT; all security forces; Prosecutor’s Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Economy and Commerce; Ministry of Agriculture, Forest and Rural Development; Ministry of Environment and Water Management; Ministry of Transport, Building and Tourism; Ministry of Health; Ministry of Communication and Information; Ministry of Technology; Ministry of Public Finance; Ministry of European Integration; Ministry of Justice; Romania’s National Bank; National Agency for Exports Control; National Office for Preventing and Countering Money Laundering; National Commission for the Control of Nuclear Activities. Profil, no. 8, August 2005, pp. 1-36, www.sri.ro, pp. 1-36 (February 02, 2007).


[34] Discussion with Romanian MOD officers.


[45] SRIDJA assists SPP with AT protection of officials, whenever they face terrorist threats. Some SPP personnel come from the Marines’ Infantry Battalion. Radu Tudor, Romania’s Anti-terrorist Brigade extends co-operation in fight against terror, Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 01, 2002;


[46] With regard to AT intervention, for example, when MOD targets are involved, the main units operating are DIR, SOF “Vulturii” Battalion, and (GNFOS), but only in cooperation with the SRI and, if needed, with other security forces. If the target is a vessel, hijacked by terrorists within the territorial waters, intervention is ensured by SRI’ unit and MOD, under SRI’s command, while if the target is outside territorial waters, MOD forces could intervene, but only with CSAT approval. The MOD, MIRA and SRI have also cooperated in ensuring protection and guard activities for rotation the foreign troop in the Balkans theaters. For more information, see: Vasile Bogdan, Grupul de scafandri de incursiune - structură destinată intervenției antiteroriste /contrateroriste în zona Mării Negre, in Constantin Mostofie, Strategii de apărare și securitate la frontiera răsăriteană a NATO și UE, vol. 1. Bucharest: Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare, 2006, pp. 159-178; Marius Dumitru Crăciun, Operații speciale contrateroriste în Marea Neagră – posibile obiective, proceduri și pachete de forțe necesare”, in Constantin Mostofie, Strategii de apărare și securitate la frontiera răsăriteană a NATO și UE, vol. 1. Bucharest: Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare, 2006, pp. 159-178; Gheorghe Savu, Direcția Generală de Informații a Apărării - prezent și perspective. Infosfera, no. 3, 2009, pp. 13-16; Doru Dragomir, Hackerii Armatei. Ziua, January 23, 2008; Gheorghe Rotaru, Importanța înființării direcției generale de informații a apărării în cadrul procesului de transformare a armatei române. Infosfera, no. 3, 2009, pp. 17-21.

[47] Relevant is the campaign “Terrorism … Near Us” of the SRI (which also involves its AT Brigade). MIRA’s intervention units also go to kindergartens and schools to explain their capabilities (Source: discussion with Romanian police officers, 2009). Also, see Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Romania’s Intelligence Community: From an Instrument of Dictatorship to Serving Democracy. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 629-660.

Apart from combat troops, Romania’s contribution encompasses AT/CT and intelligence units, as follows: in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, with National Intelligence Cells (RONIC), police personnel and divers of the Marines’ Infantry Battalion; in Afghanistan, with a Detachment of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, and SOF; and in Iraq, with a Military Intelligence Detachment. See: Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, The Challenges of Intelligence Sharing in Romania, Intelligence and National Security, no. 24, issue 4, August, 2009, pp. 574-585; Mihai Diac, Misiune “Vulturii” zboară spre est. Armata Română a trimis în Afganistan un nou detășament de forțe speciale. Gandul, October 9, 2007.


Discussions with intelligence, military and police personnel.


[67] Notable are the expedite information and intelligence sharing via a common data based used by all security institutions, and the CSAT-created National Intelligence Community (CNI) set up to foster interagency cooperation and coordination.


AHEAD OF THE GAME:
ADOPTING 21ST CENTURY LEARNING APPROACHES
SUPPORTED BY VIDEO-BASED WEB CONFERENCING
TECHNOLOGY IN A ROMANIAN PROFESSIONAL
TRAINING MILITARY CONTEXT

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Recent major political uprisings are indicating the extent to which social learning Web 2.0 technologies, can influence change in informal learning settings. Recognition and a discussion of the potential of that influence in formal learning settings have only just begun. This article describes a study of an international distance learning project in 2004, using a variety of Web 2.0 technologies, including video-based web conferencing, that sought to initiate and respond to this urgent need for dialogue in the research. Self-selected participants took part in a 5-week English as a foreign language (EFL) program, a joint NATO sponsored Canadian and Romanian Ministry of Defense-supported initiative. Clear evidence of linguistic knowledge construction and of important changes to participants’ learner identities, indicates the power of these technologies to support the kind of learning that can lead to the development of global citizens and the skills they will increasingly require in the 21st century.

Key words: Distance training, 21st Century Learning, Online Learning, Computer-Assisted Language Learning, Learner Identity

1. INTRODUCTION

When Lieutenant General Karlheinz Vierreck, NATO’s top training chief and one of their leading thinkers on technology-enhanced learning and training, made the announcement in the spring of 2011 that NATO militaries will need to rely increasingly on the “unclassified” web as a vehicle for training, it represented at the time, a significant switch in military training policy. In military, especially a NATO-military context, justifiably security obsessed by its very nature, the directive is an about-face trajectory in training away from the limitations of stand-alone secure in-house software programs, to the limitless yet insecure resources available for learning on the world wide web. The move was bold but necessary. It has become evident to an increasing number involved with formal learning that the Internet and the social technologies that this resource supports is having a profound influence on where, what, when, why and especially how learning takes place. One need only consider the phenomenon of the Arab Spring or the Stanford University
professor (Thrun et al. 2012) who has abandoned his tenured position after attracting one hundred and sixty thousand engineering students worldwide to take part in one class he offered online, as just two examples of this influence. Indeed, it is no longer just a question of the kinds of learning that take place on the Internet, but how these events will influence more formal learning and learners.

The attraction and proliferation of social learning technologies and the growing global access to the Internet has led to extensive questioning not only about innovative ways of using technology for learning but also whether the interpersonal interactions they support are changing learners and helping them to adopt the skills they will need to take an engaged role in the 21st Century (Thomas et al., 2012). The study that this paper describes attempts to explore empirical answers to these questions.

2. LITERATURE UNDERPINNINGS

Whether the NATO’s training chief’s decision to move training to the Internet was drawn from personal insight, pragmatism, or a pedagogically informed perspective is unclear. Indeed, questions around the limitations of self-study, stand-alone technology programs are beginning to receive some research notice. Remarkably however, while the technical issues and content issues have traditionally been the focus of this attention, the influences of these technologies on learning and learners have not. Ignoring these critical issues is surprising. Self-study software programs and the technologies that support them continue to be looked upon as economic and resource efficient training savours in countless organizations worldwide. In the field of language training specifically, Nielson suggests: “There is no(sic) existing empirical research on learning outcomes from foreign-language self study using commercially available, stand-alone Computer Assisted Language Learning (CALL) materials.” (Nielson: 2011, p.110). Given the global demand for language training in and beyond militaries and the economic value these programs represent, the lack of sound research to justify their use in terms of learning outcomes is shocking. Nielson’s very recent study of the learning outcomes of 150 US highly motivated federal government volunteer employees who volunteered to use two popular commercial programs – Auralog’s Tell Me More and Rosetta Stone, reported “severe attrition rates”. In the Canadian military context, anecdotal evidence reflects these findings. Retention rates, those military learners that persist with their self-study language learning programs beyond a few weeks, average about 12%. Nielson concludes from her study “this lack of compliance with self-study suggests that despite the logistical ease of providing language learning software, more resource-intensive types of language training are more likely to be effective (p.110). As Benson (2007) in a review of autonomous learning points out “learners do not develop the ability to self-direct their learning simply
by being placed in situations where they have no other option.” (Benson: 2008, p.22).

In quality language learning programs as in many other formal learning settings, the aim of effective training is to develop self-directed life-long learners, learners who will take on the responsibility for their learning beyond the classroom. In an organizational setting, especially a military one, the ability and desire of employees to seek out opportunities for learning well beyond periodic occasions of formal learning, is essential. This is especially true considering the sometimes life-and-death situations that military personnel face, as well as the increasing need for interoperability in global exercises and events around security, especially NATO’s multinational forces. Programs that lead to life-long learning assure an informed and effective workforce and ultimately that the return on investment for training has been met. As Benson’s comment suggests, self-directedness in learners is more than a question of personal motivation.

Bonnie Norton (Norton: 1996, 2000) in her work with highly motivated new immigrants to Canada has shown that studies in learner motivation have fallen short of explaining why language learners fail or persist in their learning. Her work reflected a growing movement in broad educational research towards an interest in the socio-cultural context of learning. She established with her studies, both in informal and formal learning situations, the critical importance of learners’ agency and identity in determining the nature and investment that learners will commit to learning. Her research and the work that has been built on it, shed light on why, in a technological context, many self-study software programs lead to learner attrition. These programs often rely on an information transfer model of learning whereby the diverse knowledge and experience that learners bring to a learning situation are ignored and where learners are offered little or no opportunity to engage in meaning making dialogue (Bakhtin: 1981) and guided interaction with others (Vygotsky: 1981; Werstch: 1985) that have been shown crucial to learning. Warschauer has pointed out, as educators, our choices to use technology in this way with learners, not only influences their learning but also determines the place those learners will assume in the global community. (Warschauer: 2000; Warschauer 2003). Warschauer has shown that in many FL learning sites teachers and institutions all too often are choosing to use computers for drill-and-practice work, information processing and electronic communication (communicating with machines) despite the advent of Web 2.0 technologies. This use of computers, he claims, serves to prepare students for work in their FL in service industries where basic functional skills are needed. On the other hand, using computers, or more specifically the Internet and the social interactive tools available on them, to help students develop communicative, collaborative and critical skills may ensure that the FL learners have the more sophisticated skills required for the better jobs in
society. Acquiring these skills can not only lead to acquiring the financial stability that comes with better employment, but also the potential of having a voice and agency in constructing new possibilities for the future.

In 2004, in the context of a NATO-sponsored, language immersion program offered in Canada, the kinds of opportunities a group of military learners from Eastern Europe had, for constructing their futures that included opportunities for learning English, was a serious concern for the individuals as well as there militaries. This concern, along with the disappointing data that was evolving from the technological choices they were being offered in Canada, as well as when they returned home to their own militaries, led to a decision to conduct a distance language program supported by Web 2.0 social learning technologies. Given the concern and the emerging potential of these social learning technologies to support the kinds of guided interpersonal dialogue that based on Bakhtinian and Vygostkian theory can lead to cognitive change, it seemed critical to study the influence of the online sessions on learners and their learning experiences.

In the next section, I briefly explain the context that existed at the time for one of the groups that took part in the study, nine officers in Romania. I then report on the study, its findings, follow-up applications of the research that resulted from the distance program and in the final section, conclusions and suggestions for further research.

3. BACKGROUND CONTEXT

We look into the future but sometimes forget that many things from the past (which we sometimes consider them as unimportant details) influenced and still influence our life.

(M., a Romanian military participant, field notes, 2004)

I never thought about a plan for the next 5 years. I'm not used to plan things because they never came true. So I live in the present and don't think to (sic) much at the future.

(D. Romanian military participant, written communication, 2004)

In 2004, at the time that the distance learning pilot program was being launched, in Romania as in other former Warsaw-pact countries, there was a sense of anticipation, and at the same time hesitation, reflected in the voices of Romanian military personnel around the possibility of becoming members of NATO. This sense of anticipation and hesitation, historically, politically, culturally and ideologically rooted, had repercussions at many levels. At the macro level, the question whether Romania could meet the standards set for interoperability by NATO, preoccupied the country’s military organization. At the micro level, there was the angst alluded to by M. and D, Romanian military employees, in their comments quoted above, brought on by the weight of the past on their present and outlooks for the future. This angst and the general tensions in the militaries where they worked, might explain the often disparaging views many of the Romanian participants made about
themselves in relation to others, especially those from the West. Learning English was considered an important step in overcoming these barriers at both levels. Yet a system of education during the former regime characterized by rote learning and translation and in many cases inadequately trained language instructors, along with difficulties in gaining approval for English language training in the military, prevented access to opportunities to learn the language, especially to speaking. Many Romanian military personnel reported they were forced to learn on their own using books or self-study software programs paid for out of pocket. Given the high-stakes nature of learning English to many military employees’ present and future careers, not to mention the drive to become “more westernized” characteristic of the post-communist era, these efforts were reportedly seen as imperative.

It is in this context that the offer of an opportunity to take part in a program to learn English with a native speaker and expert teacher from North America using state-of-the-art technology, was apparently appealing to both Romanian military decision makers and to the individual participants themselves.

4. THE STUDY

The focus of the study, an action research project and the major part of the author’s doctoral program, was to examine the influence of digitally-mediated interactions supported by various Web 2.0 technologies on nine Romanian military personnel studying English as a foreign language. Using a qualitative perspective and ethnographic research methods, the experiences of these individuals learning English at the Management Training Centre in Brasov, Romania, were studied. Video-based web conferencing technology as well as other social learning-based technologies supported the interactions during a 5-week period. The guided discussion sessions with the Romanians were part of a larger study involving two other groups of participants – one located at a military university in the Czech Republic and the other a group of former students of mixed nationalities from eastern and central Europe who had attended the Canadian language immersion program. The online sessions with the Romanians were conducted daily over the five weeks, either synchronously through the video-based web conferencing as well as asynchronously through chat and e-mails. Discussion topics were learner-generated; the internet and social media were primary sources for the content. The recognition, along with Kress (2000), of the importance of visual images to communication was the rationale for a video-based connection as well as for the emphasis on learner-generated pictures, videos and other image-based Web media during the sessions. Communication theorists have well-established that non-verbals are integral to interaction in whatever language we speak.

ICIWave Design, a Canadian company researched and developed specialized low-cost videoconferencing telecommunication services specifically for the project. The audio and video
“multi stream” technology allows individuals in multiple sites to connect over the internet (Figure 1). Through this interface, real-time connections between Canada and Europe were made possible. The technology allows for a controlled, yet easy access to the website. Users are equipped with headsets and web cameras. London, England provides a break point and at the same time a location for boosting the transmission of sound and picture thus ensuring a better quality video and audio reception between North America and Europe. A North American server supports the Canadian transmission. The particular interface used in the project permitted up to ten people to be present at the website using individual screens. In the case of the Romanian participants, bandwidth limitations at the time prevented learners appearing on the site together. Instead, only one participant and the teacher interacted at a time in the virtual classroom while the others at the same time watched a projected screen image of the conversations at the Romanian location. In latter stages of the larger study involving a group in the Czech Republic, interactions between the teacher and participants were facilitated with special technical features such as shared desktop and small-group breakout rooms, which ICIWave Design created for this particular application. Also, in follow-up programs, a unique control mechanism allowed individuals with low bandwidth to be included in the distance learning.

The study generated significant data that included audio and video transcripts from participant face-to-face, individual and group interviews and from the online sessions, written text from asynchronous communications and field notes collected by the author during two visits to Romania. In the next section, the major findings from these sources generated from the participants’ perspective and the implications of these findings for educators, learners and policy makers are outlined.

5. RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS

The depth and scope of qualitative research results naturally prevents a full explanation of the influence of
the online sessions on the individual Romanian military participants. These detailed findings have been reported elsewhere (Charbonneau-Gowdy, 2009).

The study revealed first of all that compared to the experiences of groups of participants using only self-study multimedia software programs at an earlier stage of the study, the Romanian military participants’ experiences during the online sessions were more positive. Analysis of data from their perspectives indicated that for virtually all of the participants, the opportunities to meet online with a native speaker, despite the physical distance involved, allowed the main opportunity not only to construct new linguistic knowledge but importantly to negotiate and mediate empowered identities as well. At the beginning of the online discussions, most of the participants, historically shaped by their former learning experiences, displayed fear of speaking and or were apologetic for their level of language. By the end of the study these same individuals expressed their thoughts freely and took risks with the language that led to further construction of knowledge. Both their written and oral communications revealed linguistic progress.

Building on these results, in another doctoral study from a quantitative perspective in a later application of the distance learning sessions, Cechova examined the linguistic changes in a group of military university students who participated in the online discussions in the Czech context (Cechova: 2010). Self-selected participants who took part in discussions supported by the online web conferencing and other social learning technologies in the Czech university setting, made significant linguistic progress in all three skills – reading, writing and speaking based on pre and post NATO military Stanag test results (Cechova: 2010). Qualitative data collected in a further application of the online sessions in a Canadian public service context, where employees met for discussion sessions online similar to the ones held with the Czechs and Romanians, also showed that participants improved in their speaking skills. The cognitive development suggested by such linguistic change when social interactive technologies are employed is not surprising. Indeed, as Sykes et al. have pointed out, “recent research indicates both a qualitative and physiological shift in cognitive processes based on the prolific use of these [communication-based] tools...” (Sykes: 2007, p.529).

Some of the Romanian participants were aware of the changes that were occurring in their abilities to use English. As M. pointed out: “I realize that my mistakes [in English] reduce day by day. I think it is a good thing”. (Online notes, November 2, 2004). The changes to their foreign language identities were less obvious to the participants than the linguistic ones, but arguably profoundly more significant. Something in the nature of the collaborative meaning-making that took place in the discussions guided by a language teaching expert online, led many of these learners to develop more empowered subjectivities. In other
words, these online sessions offered the participants opportunities to negotiate new ways of being in their foreign language. Those participants who were initially silent or reportedly felt embarrassed to communicate either online, or as they attested, in their previous work overseas or with foreigners, by the end of the study were speaking more confidently. There was also evidence to support that they increasingly sought out occasions to use their foreign language beyond the classroom. These findings offer strong indications that through the online sessions, this particular group of learners developed strategies for improving in the language and at the same time were showing signs of being emerging self-directed learners.

More remarkable, are the findings that reveal that in some cases the changes in identities that participants constructed during the online sessions in the context of their language learning, also had an influence more broadly in their personal and professional lives beyond the classroom. Some became more critically aware of their ability to change injustices in their work; one spoke less disparagingly about his country than he had at the beginning and saw hope and pride for its future; another saw a more proactive role for himself as a Romanian citizen to initiate change at the personal level; while another demanded a voice and more respect among his peers.

One of the more vivid examples of the carry-over of what was happening in the online classroom into the participants’ broader lives is demonstrated in the following excerpts from the data:

“I am a civilian, a woman and a blonde in a military system? Who would pay attention to what I have to say?” (M., online discussion, October, 2004)

“The final step will to be to apply to a UN job...So I’m getting busier and busier (and, of course more and more daring) every day. That is why, by the end of 2009 (if I live that long and I’m a little bit lucky) you will be talking to a UN employee working all over the world. No matter what, I’ll struggle. Life is a continuous fight, isn’t it? (E-mail, November, 2004)

Through M.’s words quoted from the beginning of the sessions and then from near the end, we see an indication of the transformations she has undergone over the period of the online sessions, not just in terms of her abilities in the language, but also in her view of her future place in the global community. Finding one’s voice in the global dialogue, developing a critical awareness of oneself and one’s position in that community, seeing hope for and the agency one has in determining a future, are the kinds of skills that are being increasingly recognized in educational debates as critical for the 21st century (Thomas et al.: 2011). Whether the participants who demonstrated emerging and more empowered identities would have done so eventually in other learning spaces is not the point. What is significant is the fact that these kinds of transformations or changes, i.e. learning, were facilitated through the support of technology. The major events and political transformations reported in the last several months in the media are further examples of
how Web 2.0 communication-based technologies, like those used with the Romanians, that support enriched social interaction, are providing a new and powerful space for dramatic and rapid changes to occur, both in terms of learning and identity construction. It should be noted that the Romanian military decision makers who approved the online sessions, the military officers who chose to take part, the educators, IT personnel and all those who supported this very innovative idea at the time, were in a sense ahead of the game.

Being ahead of the game is more than just a sign of an organization’s strategic operational planning and or individual opportunism. Being ahead of the game involves taking risks, breaking away from traditional and predictable ways of doing and acting. This is not easy for large institutions, or even for most educators, or even for learners themselves. Resisting change and clinging to the status quo is considered far easier and more secure. But using 20th century practices for a 21st century globalized world could mean denying learners the opportunities to be critical thinkers when faced with important decision-making. Resisting the option to adopt powerful social learning technologies in learning spaces could deny learners from having the collaborative skills necessary to work and construct knowledge with others. And failing to provide the most effective and efficient ways to learn could deny learners important spaces to negotiate new identities and instead put learners at risk of being marginalized in the global community. The study clearly showed that being able to think critically, to work collaboratively in constructing knowledge with others, to negotiate empowered identities in the global community and to be open to new ways of seeing technology for learning, were the advantages that the Romanian participants gained from the online sessions. Viereck identifies these same skills as the ones that individuals in the NATO military context will have to have to assure the future global security environment. Are they not the same skills that individuals will need, not just from language training but from a broad range of formal educational and training settings to feel secure and valued in this global environment?

**6. CONCLUSION**

The uptake of the study described here has been encouraging. Further examples of research in a variety of areas that looks at the issues addressed in this study, that is the use of Web 2.0 technology tools to support collaborative learning and their influence on learners, have appeared (for example Sykes et al. 2008). More of these studies are needed, especially looking at long term influence on learning and learners of Web 2.0 technologies. Hopefully, this dialogic can lead to more of the kind of changes in formal learning settings that the group of Romanians in this study were able to experience.
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A COGNITIVE APPROACH 
TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
A VISUALIZATION TEST OF MENTAL MODELS 
WITH THE COGNITIVE MAPPING TECHNIQUE

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The idea of this paper is to determine the mental models of actors in the firm with respect to the cognitive approach of corporate governance. The paper takes a corporate governance perspective, discusses mental models and uses the cognitive map to view the diagrams showing the ways of thinking and the conceptualization of the cognitive approach. In addition, it employs a cognitive mapping technique. Returning to the systematic exploration of grids for each actor, it concludes that there is a balance of concepts expressing their cognitive orientation.

Key words: corporate governance, cognitive approach, cognitive mapping, mental models, structural analysis

1. INTRODUCTION

As shown by Charreaux [1], the approaches to a break with the paradigm contract can be grouped under the term “cognitive theories of the firm”. According to the same author, Charreaux, these theories include current behavior [2], evolutionary theory [3], and the theory based on resources and expertise. After briefly characterizing the cognitive approach, our goal is to analyze the contribution of this approach and thus identify its key concepts.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
ON THE COGNITIVE 
APPROACH TO CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE

Langlois and Foss [4] indicate that the majority of studies related to contractual theories of the organization, focusing exclusively on the notion of information asymmetry and conflicts of interest it generates, does not offer an analysis of the process of value creation. Interested only in the distribution of value, this work therefore obscures the productive dimension of building value by the company and does not give their place to levers such as competence, knowledge, the innovation and learning that appear to play an important role in the research of more competitive sources of value creation in a sustainable manner. Cognitive theories focus particularly on creating internal knowledge from organizational learning. In this respect, it is worth mentioning that performance is seen as more of a leader's ability to imagine, innovate, to receive new investment opportunities and act on the environment in such
a way as to restructure existing processes. The firm is seen as a repository of knowledge, not only as a nexus of contracts. Value creation depends primarily on the identity and distinctive competencies of the latter, as well as on its ability to create knowledge [5]. The cognitive approach attaches more importance to the contribution of intellectual capital in creating value. Thus, in the context of the cognitive approach to governance, the cognitive cost optimization is the main lever for value creation.

Contrary to common contractual governance in the current cognitive, the problem is not that of aligning the interests of managers and providers of resources but of qualitative coordination, alignment and patterns of cognitive models anticipation: cognitive adjustments between the various stakeholders. Charreaux [6] then defines corporate governance as the set of mechanisms used to increase the potential for value creation through learning and innovation.

According to Poincelot and Wegmann [7], a cognitive perspective on governance mechanisms must enable the management to inform on how to achieve the objectives assigned to it. This vision includes proactive governance including the behavioral theory of the firm based on the work of Simon and Cyert and March [8], evolutionary theory, theory of organizational learning and theories of resources and skills. In the cognitive vision of governance, the role of the board goes beyond the interests of shareholders; it is a mechanism to ensure the best possible cooperation between managers and shareholders [9].

2.1. THE KEY CONCEPTS OF THE COGNITIVE APPROACH: VALUE CREATION, OPERATING SKILLS, KNOWLEDGE AND ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING

The common cognitive theory has it that value creation comes from knowledge. The source of value creation is linked to elements difficult to imitate and which provide a significant competitive advantage and sustainability. The determinants of value creation as approached by the cognitive theories are of sociological and psychological origin.

The behavioral theory (behaviorist theory) gives more prominence to the psychological dimensions of value creation. Achieving the desired performance requires knowledge of the behavior of actors or groups of actors in an organization. Two assumptions underlie this theory: the rationality of individuals is limited [10], and an organization consists of a coalition of actors with specific objectives which is a source of differences and potential conflicts. Accordingly, the principle of maximizing the satisfaction replaces the traditional principle of maximizing value for shareholders. The decision-making process is interactive and emerges from the possibility of organizational learning.

The theories of organizational learning postulate that competence creating value comes from the knowledge of organizational routines and, in the case of the evolutionary theory [11], from the knowledge of the latter’s development. Routines are
patterns of behaviors and interactions that individuals are able to use to deal with different situations that arise. The construction of these routines is organizational learning (collective). Moreover, they are usually tacit (neither codified nor transferable).

2.1.1. CONTROL MODES OF ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION, EXCHANGES AND TRAINING

In general, cognitive theories are based on emerging modes of control. These control modes aim at coordinating routines and at promoting the emergence of secondary skills by providing detection devices and adequate analysis (the concept of leading indicators) and by facilitating organizational learning through the encouragement of organizational exchanges, communication and training. In addition to this overview, it is interesting to show that certain theories in organizational control, that is to say, theories of performance appraisal and pilot organizations, are part of the cognitive perspective. We present two approaches particularly significant.

Thus, with the uncertainty approach, the company must use other methods of control than those of a disciplinary nature (i.e. checking that the results are up to the goals and that behaviors are in accordance with the requirements of managers).

Modes of control refer to the contractual paradigm, while the informal modes of control enacted through culture and self-control refer to the cognitive paradigm.

2.1.2. COGNITIVE RESOURCES AND GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES

The emergence of a governance model extended to cognitive limitations of the model comes from its explanatory feature [13]. This model seeks to explain the long-term success of firms and, specifically, why some firms are more profitable than others [13]. In this traditional view of governance inherited from the seminal work of Berle and Means [14], the value created is essentially the control over the executive, namely the use of internal mechanisms such as board of directors, audit committee, independent directors, and of external ones like the financial market, labor market leaders, regulators to limit its discretion level in the decision making process. Indeed, shareholders delegate decision rights to their leader and they must ensure that the latter does not use them for his/her exclusive benefit, nor squanders them. In the end value is created from the effectiveness of the mechanisms in place.

However, as noted by Charreaux [15], it may happen that a leader who has achieved good financial results is still overwhelmed with the decisions to be made.

2.1.3. COGNITIVE LEVERS: INNOVATION, CAPABILITIES AND SPECIFIC SKILLS

The vision on legal and financial governance adopted by the stakeholders focuses on the levers that, at a disciplinary level, are expected to provide the distribution that maximizes the value (that is to say that minimizes agency costs).
Thus, the source of value creation is purely disciplinary and linked to the minimization of conflict. If the disciplinary approach is still appropriate in the case of the dispersed corporate managerial capital, recent studies highlight its restrictive nature particularly in the case of innovative firms [16]. Value creation could not be reduced to a simple problem of discipline, but would also include a cognitive dimension, actually centered on the cognitive levers related to innovation and learning, which can create value. As presented by various strands of research in strategy, this approach highlights the central role of knowledge, skills and specific skills of the manager and his team [17]. This knowledge is often tacit. They contribute to both encouraging innovation and strengthening competitive advantage and appear as real vectors of sustainable value creation [18].

Cognitive theories are based on four common dimensions. The first is the current behavior of the firm [19]. Such an approach views the firm as a political coalition and a cognitive institution that adapts and learns (organizational learning). The second is based on the Neo-Schumpeterian economic theory of evolution [20] which defines the firm as an entity made up of activities undertaken in a coherent way, a repertoire of productive knowledge, a system of interpretation which emphasizes the notion of competition based on innovation. The third is based on strategy theories focused on resources and skills (“resource based theory”) that view the company as both a set of resources and an entity formed through the accumulation of knowledge and guided by the vision of experienced leaders. As such, sustainable growth must be supported by the ability to learn and by the specificity of the accumulated knowledge. The fourth is the power of organizational learning [21] which emphasizes the cognitive view on learning organizations.

2.1.4. COGNITIVE THEORY OF GOVERNANCE: A DIFFERENT VIEW ON VALUE CREATION

This theory rejects the assumption of calculative rationality in favor of a so-called procedural rationality. Rationality can be assessed in terms of decisions, rather than in terms of the processes that govern them. In this theoretical approach to governance, value creation depends primarily on identity and skills that are designed as a coherent whole [22].

Similarly, the pattern of creation and ownership of the value that underlies it is different from that underlying the disciplinary theories. In this approach, the organization is seen as a repository of knowledge able to perceive new opportunities, create value in a sustainable manner. The value comes from the emergence of all the opportunities. In addition, particular emphasis is given to the productive capacity in terms of innovation for coordination.

From a cognitive perspective, Charreaux defines corporate governance as the set of mechanisms that have the potential to create value through learning and innovation.

Each of these theories suggests different modes of value creation. If the first two theories have a more static value creation, the cognitive approach gives a dynamic view.
These three theories give a different view on governance mechanisms and, ultimately, to their implementation.

3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1. METHODOLOGICAL TOOLS

I chose to approach the performances of the company by using cognitive mapping, a common technique in cognitive approaches. This is a graphical modeling technique of cognition used in numerous studies in management sciences. The cognitive map is not the only tool for analyzing the managerial cognition, but it is the most popular for the presentation of cognitive structures. Cognitive mapping is a well-established technique that captures the minds of the players about a problem or situation. A cognitive map allows the researcher to view certain ideas and beliefs of an individual on a complex area such as corporate governance. A cognitive map is usually defined as the graphical representation of a person's beliefs about a particular field.

A map is not a scientific model based on an objective reality, but a representation of a part of the world as seen by an individual.

3.2. DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION

To meet the research objectives mentioned above, a survey was conducted among players in a company from Tunisia. I have chosen to employ an exploratory approach using multiple case studies in order to seek a better understanding of the phenomenon. The method of using multiple case studies allows for the study of a phenomenon in its natural setting, as well as for exploring little-known phenomena. Thus, the case studies method allows for multiple accounts of the specificities and characteristics of corporate governance.

The data is gathered from 10 firms. The decision to focus my study on a sample of firms from various sectors is based on the assumption that a variety of issues will be addressed, as well. The output is a cognitive map for actors reflecting their perceptions vis-à-vis the stakeholder approach to corporate governance. The method used to create cognitive maps is the questionnaire.

3.3. PRESENTATION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE

The questionnaire is divided into two parts: the first identifies the company and the second deals with corporate governance. For the second part, related to corporate governance, we interviewed firm stakeholders about corporate governance by providing a list of concepts for each approach with systematic exploration grids and cross matrices.

The systematic exploration of the grid is a technique for collecting materials. Each player is encouraged to explore their own ideas or cognitive representations in relation to their strategic vision. The subject is asked to identify important factors that, in his/her opinion, have an impact on the key concepts related to corporate governance.
Regarding the cross-matrix, it is also a technique of data collection and the basis for the construction of the cognitive map. The matrix is presented in the form of a table with n rows and n columns. Box of index (i, j) indicates the relationship between concept i and concept j. The actors manipulate the key concepts and assign pairs of concepts depending on the nature and degree of proximity sensed between these concepts.

### Table 1: Adjacency matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Concept 1</th>
<th>Concept 2</th>
<th>...</th>
<th>Concept n</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concept 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Concept 2</td>
<td>L21</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Concept n</td>
<td>Ln1</td>
<td>Ln2</td>
<td></td>
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### 3.4. PROPOSAL FOR MODELING COGNITIVE MAPS

When it is difficult to identify the goals, an integrated approach to performance provides a holistic view in which performance is analyzed through the processes that lead actors’ performance. There are two implementation problems with these representation processes: the sharing of actors’ representations and the identification of dominant representations in the organization in order to act upon them.

The construction of this representation necessarily requires a model that allows understanding. Such a model can be defined as “an action of intentional design and construction, for composition of symbols, patterns that would make a complex phenomenon to be perceived in an intelligible manner. In this context, the use of cognitive maps seems relevant because they can take into account the complexity and comprehensiveness of the system in which [the behavior] is embedded, while maintaining access to the analysis” [23]. The value of the tool is instrumental [24] and it allows both improving their actions and making sense.

Cognitive mapping is used as a tool for the representation of an idiosyncratic schema [25] and a pattern is defined as “a cognitive structure that guides the cutting of reality, the interpretation of events, and actions of individuals”, a pattern unique to each individual causing it to have its own behavior.

### 3.5. THE CONSTRUCTION OF COGNITIVE MAPS

First, we will discuss the construction of concepts, as well as the methodological approach. Then we will examine how the maps were constructed.
3.5.1. CONCEPTS

We addressed the issue of corporate governance through the representations constructed by players and by using the method of cognitive maps, a method that can be applied to poorly structured situations. An analysis based on cognitive maps can facilitate the understanding of the structuring process, as the aim of this model is to build or rebuild the mental processes simultaneously. This construction takes the form of a structure whose role is that of clarification. In this respect, the latter helps to identify implementation ways in order to achieve a given goal, as well as to identify the goals justifying the use of such means. Finally, it facilitates communication and negotiation.

There are two major trends in the construction method of the maps: the determination of the concepts can be ex ante, or through subsequent interviews with respondents for whom the maps are built. Komocar [27] links the question of determining nodes - or concepts - to two paradigms: the phenomenological and the normative ones. In the phenomenological paradigm, the universe is largely unknown. The emphasis is on describing the world from the experiences of people. The nodes and links are determined directly by the participants. In this respect, Cossette and Audet [28] advocate that the subject of the investigation should not be deprived of representations. Therefore, the questions should be invitations for the respondent to verbalize his thoughts on what he considers a subject of importance for the research. In addition, the researcher cannot force the subject to consider every possible link because the links must be made spontaneously or in response to open questions, so that the subject constructs his/her own reality [29]. In the normative paradigm, the universe is more or less determined. The focus is on operational definitions and the research plans are reproducible. As a result, the observers and the participants to the research endeavor may determine the relationship between variables and nodes.

Based on a literature review and on an exploratory study based on a questionnaire made up of grids of systematic exploration and cross-matrices, we identified 14 concepts as best describing the stakeholder approach to the field of governance. These concepts are presented in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Key concepts for stakeholders’ approach to governance</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Knowledge (KN)</td>
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<td>2. Creation of value (CV)</td>
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<td>3. Competence (COMP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Organizational learning (LORG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Control (CON)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Communication (COMM)</td>
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<td>7. Training (TR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Cognitive resource (RES COG)</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Growth opportunity (GR OPP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Innovation (INN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Specific capacitance (SP C)</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Rationality (RAT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Patterns of creation and ownership of the annuity (PCOA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Repertoire of knowledge (REP KN)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. MATERIALS AND METHODS OF STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS

The scientific analysis was based on the results yielded by a preliminary investigation into the perceptions of the study subjects from the Tunisian company concerning the stakeholders’ approach to governance.

This investigation was limited to the analysis of a collective cognitive map for all the company prepared on the basis of systematic exploration grids completed by the actors within that company. Furthermore, from the cognitive maps we could identify and qualify the design of the corporate governance. The development and analysis of cognitive maps were made using the Mic-Mac software. Our initial investigation focused on two elements: the relative importance of concepts and analysis of the dynamics of influence / dependence concepts (or variables) in the cognitive universe of players in the company. The relative importance of concepts was evaluated with the help of the aforementioned software. Thus, the Mic-Mac program allowed us to rank the concepts in such a way as to reach “balance” and “dependency”. Consequently, the ideas dominating the cognitive universe of players could be brought to surface.

4.1. OVERVIEW OF THE STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS METHOD

The main objective of structural analysis is to identify the most important variables with a role in determining the evolution of the system. Inspired by graph theory, structural analysis is based on the description of a system using a matrix linking all its components. By weighting these relationships, the method highlights the key variables to changes in the system. As a tool, we opted for the “Mic-Mac” software (cross-impact matrices, Multiplication Applied to Classification).

The first step of the Mic-Mac method is to identify all the variables characterizing the system under study (both external and internal variables). The second step involves the linking of variables in the construction of the matrix of direct influence and potential. Indeed, this approach is supported by the fact that in a systemic approach, a variable exists only through its network of relationships with other variables. It is from this matrix that the key variables are identified. Indeed, we obtain the classification by the direct sum row and column. If the total connections line indicates the importance of the influence of a variable on the overall system (direct motor level), the total column shows the degree of dependence of one variable (level of direct dependence). The ranking against indirect detects hidden variables through a matrix multiplication program applied to indirect classification. Thus, this program allows us to study the distribution of impacts by the paths and feedback loops, and therefore to prioritize the variables in order of influence.

4.2. MATRICES AND PROCESSING THROUGH THE MICMAC METHOD

All the structural analysis matrices above have been established only from the direct relationships between
In the second case, the maps are called strategic and more individuals come together to create a community map. Based on this, the researcher seeks then to map the shared perceptions of a group of individuals on a particular area.

4.2.1. PRESENTATION OF VARIABLES

Table 3: List of variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge (KN)</th>
<th>Creation of value (CV)</th>
<th>Competence (COMP)</th>
<th>Organizational learning (LORG)</th>
<th>Control (CON)</th>
<th>Communication (COMM)</th>
<th>Training (TR)</th>
<th>Cognitive resource (RES COG)</th>
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<th>Patterns of creation and ownership of the annuity (PCOA)</th>
<th>Repertoire of knowledge (REP KN)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

4.2.2. THE INPUT

This step was to compile a matrix of direct influence between these variables in a scoring session. Matrix of direct influence (MID) which describes the relationship of direct influence between the variables defining the system and the Matrix Influences MIDP represents the potential direct influences and dependencies between existing and potential variables. The scoring has developed the input matrix: “matrix of direct influences” (MID).

The influences are rated from 0 to 3, with the ability to report potential influences.
A matrix of direct influence (MID) describes the relationship of direct influences between the variables defining the system.

Table 4: Matrix of direct influences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KN</th>
<th>CV</th>
<th>COMP</th>
<th>LORG</th>
<th>CON</th>
<th>COMM</th>
<th>TR</th>
<th>RESCOG</th>
<th>GROPP</th>
<th>INN</th>
<th>SPC</th>
<th>RAT</th>
<th>PCOA</th>
<th>REP KN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KN</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>P</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>COMM</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>P</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>P</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPC</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAT</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCOA</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REP KN</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. RESULTS OF THE STUDY

5.1. DIRECT INFLUENCES

Characteristic of MID

This table shows the number of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 of the matrix and displays the filling ratio calculated as the ratio between the number of MID values different from 0 and the total number of elements of the matrix.
Table 5: Characteristic of MID

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Size of matrix</th>
<th>No of iterations</th>
<th>No of zero</th>
<th>No of one</th>
<th>No of two</th>
<th>No of three</th>
<th>No of P</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Fil rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>23.97959%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Stability from MID

If it is shown that any matrix must converge to stability after a certain number of iterations (usually 4 or 5 for a matrix of size 30), it was interesting to monitor the stability during the successive multiplications.

In the absence of mathematically established criteria, it was chosen to rely on the number of permutations (bubble sort) necessary to classify each iteration, influence and dependence, all the variables of the matrix MID.

Table 6: Stability from MID

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Iteration</th>
<th>Influence</th>
<th>Dependence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>104%</td>
<td>105%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>105%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7 is used to enter the sums in the row and column of the matrix MID

Table 7: Sum of rows and columns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N°</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Total of rows</th>
<th>Total of columns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Value creating</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Opportunity</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N°</td>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Total of rows</td>
<td>Total of columns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Contract node</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Specific investment</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Potential direct influences

Characteristic of MIDP

Table 8, called “Characteristic of MIDP”, shows the number of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 and MIDP matrix displays the filling ratio calculated as the ratio between the number of MID values different from 0 and the total number of elements of the matrix.
Table 8: Characteristic of MIDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size of matrix</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of iterations</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of zero</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of one</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of two</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of three</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of P</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fill rate</td>
<td>23,97959%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: Sum of rows and columns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N°</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Total of rows</th>
<th>Total of columns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Value creating</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Opportunity</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Contract node</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Specific investment</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Specific human capital</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Responsibility multiple</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Power</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Profit</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Residual claim</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Annuity</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Distribution</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Asymmetric information</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If it is shown that any matrix must converge to stability after a certain number of iterations (usually 4 or 5 for a matrix of size 30), it was interesting to monitor the stability during the successive multiplications. In the absence of mathematically established criteria, it was chosen to rely on the number of permutations (bubble sort) necessary to classify each iteration, influence and dependence, the set of variables. Thus, table no. 9 shows stability from MIDP.

Table 9: Stability from MIDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Iteration</th>
<th>Influence</th>
<th>Dependence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>102%</td>
<td>117%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10 is used to enter the sums in row and column of the matrix MIDP.

Matrix of indirect influences (MII)

The matrix of indirect influences (MII) is the matrix of direct high power influences (MID), by successive iterations. From this matrix, a new classification of variables highlights the most important variables of
the system. Indeed, it reveals the hidden variables through a matrix multiplication program applied to indirect classification. This program allows us to study the distribution of impacts by the paths and feedback loops, and therefore to prioritize the variables in order of influence, taking into account the number of paths and loops of length 1, 2, ..., n arriving on each variable. The ranking is stable in general from an increase in the order 3, 4 or 5.

The values represent the rate of indirect influences.

Table 11: Matrix of indirect influences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KN</th>
<th>CV</th>
<th>COMP</th>
<th>LORG</th>
<th>CON</th>
<th>COMM</th>
<th>TR</th>
<th>RESCOG</th>
<th>GROPP</th>
<th>INN</th>
<th>SPC</th>
<th>RAT</th>
<th>PCOA</th>
<th>REPKN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KN</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LORG</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>62</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>18</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESCOG</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
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<td>48</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sum of rows and columns of MII

This table is used to enter the sums in row and column of the matrix MII.
6. CONCLUSIONS & IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH

Concepts (or variables) structuring the cognitive world of the actors can be projected in terms of influence/dependence. The distribution of the point cloud variables in this plan, particularly in relation to different quadrants is to distinguish four categories of variables.

The first quadrant includes the most prominent concepts in the dynamics of thought of the actors. For the actors of that organization, the concepts of “control”, “communication” and “patterns of creation and ownership of the annuity” are the most dominant in their cognitions reflecting an intention based on a logic that differs from the cognitive discipline of logic. Returning to the systematic exploration of grids for each actor, there is a balance of concepts expressing their orientation. For actor 1, these concepts are expressed through statements such as “competence”, “productive capacity”, “learning process” reflecting an orientation to a productive logic.

The pattern of creation and appropriation of value underlying cognitive theories differ greatly from those underlying the disciplinary theories, in which the productive dimension is either ignored or reduced to aspects incentives [31]. It leads in particular to a different cause of the existence of the firm that not only allows to distinguish the market, but also its competitors, that is to say define an identity. For example, to Foss [32], firms exist because they can more efficiently coordinate the collective learning process.

For Dosi [33], firms are sets of key competencies and complementary assets associated with these skills and the boundaries of the firm must be understood not only in terms of transaction costs but also in terms of learning, path dependencies, technological opportunities, selection and assets complementarity.
The central element is the emphasis on the productive capacity in terms of innovation for coordination. Thus, the problem of coordination can be effectively tackled by defining the firm as a simple information system. From this perspective, the problem of coordination is not only a matter of incentives. Therefore, it should be reformulated with respect to a growth target that is established based on the processing and interpretation of information. With such use information must not be equaled to knowledge. Moreover, defining the firm as an information system implies taking a more complex perspective on the firm as an open system and, hence, the abandonment of the concept of balance in favor of the concept of process.

Efficiency depends not only on technology but also on the motivation and skills of the workforce, on the organizational and managerial supervision, the latter two being based on the institutional structures and routines and cultural norms inherited from the past.

Moreover, the perceptual dimension of the entrepreneurial function related to the ability of management to think, perceive, build new opportunities plays a key role, much more than the restructuring and reconfiguration of the business portfolios of firms in response to changes in the environment. In this respect, it should be reminded that the goal is to ensure sustainable value creation particularly through the construction of growth opportunities.

In summary, the firm as a processor or repository of knowledge is based on the following uses of the cognitive argument: (1) the orientation of the activity in accordance with the vision of leaders, (2) the creation of knowledge that is characterized both as tacit and social and that, as a result of the aforementioned features, is used as a basis for difficult to imitate innovation and investment opportunities, (3) the protection of the knowledge base, (4) coordination of productive activity which involves the dimensions of the construction, operation and transfer of knowledge far beyond the mere transfer of information, (5) conflict resolution, which exceeds the conflicts of interest that only take a cognitive dimension.

The cognitive approach of the firm is to reconsider the role of governance. It must identify and implement cost-effective investments in a dynamic efficiency perspective. According to Demsetz [34], to understand the influence of the institutional framework so that the system of governance is based on dynamic efficiency, we must remember three objectives: (1) the ability to encourage a wide variety of experiences (2) the ability to promote investment for potentially successful experiment and to reject prospective non-bearing investments, (3) the ability to use extensively the new generated knowledge.

The criticism of the financial vision of governance joins this approach: we need to expand this vision in order to consider the quality of the relationship between managers and investors and the potential to increase the efficiency of the firm to identify and build opportunities for growth. In a broader perspective, the cognitive approach led to study the governance systems in terms of their influence on the different dimensions of cognitive processes of value creation.
The cognitive approach also leads to a reconsideration of the traditional financial approach to governance in which the relationship between the firms with financial investors is limited to the provision of capital and the only objective is to secure investment financial discipline. Or, as suggested by various authors, finance also includes a cognitive dimension.

Thus, Aoki [35] believes that in the model of governance associated with venture capital, it is not the venture capitalist’s ability to provide funding, which is the most important factor. On the contrary, on the basis of his knowledge and experience the most important ability is to select the most promising projects, on the one hand, and to deny financing (or refinancing) for the least interesting projects, on the other hand in a timely manner. Similarly, Charreaux [36] offers an interpretation of the funding policy based on cognitive arguments, a policy that explicitly involves the provision of expertise on behalf of shareholders, including the industrial shareholders. Such developments argue for a reconstruction of the financial governance vision extended to the cognitive area.

For actor 2, this orientation is expressed in statements such as “information”, “organization”, “value creation”, “schemas”, “conflict”, reflecting a logic-based cognitive understanding of ownership of the annuity. Cognitive visions focus primarily on the concepts of information and knowledge. From there, the organization is characterized by its ability to learn and generate knowledge: beyond the role of conflict resolution (contractual theories), the company produces knowledge that contributes to the process of value creation. The concepts of learning, building skills and innovation are central. The second quadrant contains the relay variables that are by definition both very influential and very dependent. By analyzing the level of influence/dependence, there are players for the concepts or ideas illustrating the concepts of “organizational learning”, “innovation”, “Knowledge Directory”, “rationality” and “knowledge”. The ideas of the players in the Tunisian firms tend to focus on three basic concepts namely “property”, “investment” and “value creation”. In this sense, the performance results from the creation of wealth that comes from making an investment that creates value. This achievement depends on the ability of each individual involved in the investment process to derive a satisfactory gain.

The third quadrant contains the dependent variables. They are both influential and very little dependent, particularly sensitive. They are the results explained by the variable motor and relay. Thus, a strong dependence of a number of factors such as training variables, and value creation is registered.

The fourth quadrant contains the independent variables that are simultaneously influential and somewhat dependent. The latter are excluded from the dynamics of thinking by the Tunisian company. The influences/dependencies’ plan review shows the existence of a number of independent variables such as the variables related to cognitive resources, opportunity for growth, specific capacity, etc.
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The changes brought to NATO Strategy as a result of the developments in the international security environment is an axiomatic truth noticeable especially during NATO summits and other major events that the authors of the article have tackled in numerous scientific communications and research articles. As a result, the aim of this article is to focus on the concept of “Smart Defense” and on its implementation as detailed during the NATO Parliamentary Assembly organized on 7-10 October 2011 in Bucharest, Romania and attended by 350 Parliament representatives from 28 NATO member countries.

As presented by NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the concepts of “Smart Defense” [1] and “Less Defense” are to be understood as follows: “The concept of Smart Defense refers not simply to increasing expenditures for defense but to their prioritization. Smart Defense can work if it is implemented together. Smart Defense should not be an excuse to lower defense budgets. Our choice is between Smart Defense and Less Defense. We must search for multinational solutions to common problems. A common defense means Smart Defense. If you think that security is money, remember that it is cheaper than insecurity.” As for the concept of Less Defense, its name is...
self-explanatory and, in this respect, the Pentagon warned against the possible consequences of reckless budgetary cuts.

Thus, the choice is a clear one: between Smart Defense and Less Defense. As a result, the Alliance must develop its relationships with other countries interested in cooperation regardless of their geographical positioning within the requirements established by the concept of Smart Defense.

When referring to the same concept, the President of Romania, Traian Basescu [2] made the following statement at the Parliamentary Assembly of November 2011: “Smart Defense is about the mutual use of means in order to meet the increasing demands raised for NATO in an economic context characterized by austerity”.

Romania has constantly focused on the concept of Smart Defense and a sign of its commitment was the meeting between the country’s President and NATO Secretary General that took place on 30 January 2012 with the following items on the agenda: the anti-missile shield, the gradual withdrawal of the troops deployed in Afghanistan, the concept of Smart Defense, as well as the preparation of the NATO summit of May, from Chicago. The complexity of the issues approached during this meeting is evidence enough of the appreciation of Romania’s efforts as a NATO member.

Since the focus of this article is Smart Defense, we have to underline that currently Romania is part of 31 Smart Defense programs (out of the 168 ongoing at NATO level). Moreover, due to its commitment to alliance’s goals the country will get involved in all those programs that involve fewer costs and increased efficiency. In this respect, the statements issued by the two officials upon the closure of the meeting [3] are relevant:

“Romania is a powerful ally. (…) We will continue to count on Romania in establishing relationships with our partners, especially with those in the Western Balkans and with those from Eastern Europe where Romania takes an active role”, declared NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen.

“It is only after Romania’s accession to NATO that we all have the feeling that the country’s security is guaranteed. We certainly know that security is not a gift and that when you are part of a club whose objective is collective security, you must also make your own contribution”, said Traian Băsescu.

As a result of the new NATO Concept, several members have been pooling and sharing resources in order to achieve the objectives they assumed. Such an approach has been viewed as one of the most valuable initiatives [4] in the field since the current NATO Secretary General assumed his mandate because of the benefits it purports: fewer costs and increased efficiency.

It is worth reminding the position taken by Romania’s President on the new concept and its advantages: “Before its accession, Romania pledged to purchase 48 aircrafts compatible to NATO’s. As a result of the Smart Defense concept we, alongside with other nations in the region, will be able to ensure the necessary air capabilities, especially those in the field of air patrol in times of peace, as well as those required in outreach interventions. For the states involved, that actually means sharing expenditures. Thus, let us
just think that instead of purchasing 48 aircrafts, we would buy fewer provided that other state were willing to join us in this acquisition effort aimed at guaranteeing, for the beginning, the region’s air security. During the NATO summit from Chicago we want to approach the antimissile system issue. In this respect, Romania’s objective for the summit is to have the interim capacity of NATO in the field of the antimissile system declared (...)

since Romania signed the agreement and is about to meet its legal commitments concerning the system’s implementation at Deveselu”.[5] In addition, the President reiterated that security is beneficial even though it requires efforts, the financial ones being the most significant.

During the same meeting, some examples related to the application of the new concept were provided. One such example was the Heavy Air Lift Wing within the Strategic Airlift Capability that enables the access of 10 NATO member/partner countries (Romania being one of these) to three C-17 Globemaster III transport aircrafts. Another model of Smart Defense is the agreement in the field of defense signed in 2010 between Great Britain and France. As a result of this, the two states will cooperate in the following fields: air carriers and transport aircraft operation, submarine construction, mine sweeping, communications, air-to-air refueling, passenger transport, UAVs, information security, counter-terrorism, research and development in the field of defense, and the creation of a joint intervention force. Moreover, this Smart Defense model also involves the development of niche military capabilities such as Special Forces, naval demining, human intelligence and cyber security.

Romania is involved in important ongoing programs in the field of Smart Defense. A consequence of its commitment to such a concept is its advocacy for the purchase of multi-role airplanes by states from South-Eastern Europe. The accomplishment of such a goal would ensure the security of Croatia’s, Romania’s and Bulgaria’s air space. On short and even medium term these countries will no longer be able to defend their air space since the MiG-21s will be out of use. Thus, Croatia and Romania stringently need to replace these airplanes. [6]

At the end of the aforementioned meeting, Anders Fogh Rasmussen declared: “Romania is a powerful ally. It has made a valuable contribution to our Afghanistan and Kosovo operations, as well as to the protection of people from Libya. Considering the current economic difficult situation, Romania’s contribution is even more valuable since it acknowledges that our security is priceless. (...) We must form an alliance that is capable to meet current challenges and to guarantee future security. Even though we will not be able to spend more on defense, the expenditures must be well made and must also be shared. That is what we call Smart Defense. Romania is already part of projects in this field and, as a result, will host parts of NATO’s antimissile defense system that will defend two continents against major and ever growing threats. That is an excellent example of Smart Defense implementation”. [7]

All of the above considered, it clearly results that the new Smart Defense concept is an important means of aligning NATO’s strategy.
As a result of the overview of the Smart Defense concept provided by this article, we can only conclude that NATO’s strategy is highly dependent on the changes occurring in the international security environment and hence highly receptive. As a result, it gains efficiency and credibility. Moreover, regardless of the changes made to this Strategy, NATO will remain a defensive organization, as established through the Treaty dated 4 April 1949.

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[18] NATO Summit – Lisbon, 19-20 November 2010

The effects of the economic crisis on European countries has led to serious cuts of the defense budgets and a perceived reduction in the EU’s ability to provide capabilities required by other allies, especially the US. Cooperation, in the form of pooling and sharing may not be an easy and “ready to use” solution to Europe’s defense issues generated by the budget austerity and economic downturn, but it may provide ways to lessen the defense cuts impact on the military capabilities. Nonetheless, the success of the initiative is strongly related to the degree of political and military commitment of the EU countries to put into practice the concept.

Key words: capabilities, budget, cuts, pooling, sharing, cooperation

1. ECONOMIC CRISIS EUROPEAN DEFENSE IMPLICATIONS

The US economic crisis from 2008 generated profound effects on the European countries, triggering a budget deficit crisis, combined with economic downturn. Its effects on the European Union members are complex and of varied intensity, depending on the specific situation of each country, but one common effect has been the decrease of government expenditures (and implicitly of defense expenditures) throughout the region.

The overall data presented by the European Defense Agency (Figure 1) show a general picture of the evolution of the EDA countries economies and defense expenditures (all EU countries, except Denmark, participate in EDA). According to this data, the GDP decreased significantly in the year 2009 (-4.2%), followed by a timid increase in 2010. On the other hand, the defense expenditures followed a decreasing trend, even before the onset of the crisis. This decrease, generated by a variety of factors (including the perception that the European space is a stable place, with fewer security challenges than other areas), was significantly deepened by the budgetary problems and the austerity measures taken by European governments in response to the crisis.

These developments lead to a further increase in the gap between the US and EU defense expenditures. According to the EDA, the US defense expenditures were in 2010 of €520 Billion, while the EU (minus Denmark) spent in the same year €194 billion, meaning a ratio of 2.7:1 (Figure 2) [1]
The difference in defense allocations is also visible when comparing the EU and US defense expenditures as a percentage of the total government expenditures, as the percentage allocated by the US for defense in the first two years (almost three times bigger than the EU percentage) showed a minor increase, while the EU defense expenditures slightly decreased.

The perceived gap between the EU and US contributions to providing defense allocations for ensuring security and generating capabilities, aggravated by the consequences of the economic crisis, lead to an increased pressure from the US in the sense of (from their point of view) a more equitable burden sharing and an increased self reliance of the EU on its own capabilities. This point of view received even more support on the US after the developments in Libya in 2011, when the provision of EU capabilities was considered to be insufficient.

The economic evolution in 2011 and the forecasts for 2012 do not provide reasons for optimism in regard to the evolution of the European defense spending, as the trend of budgetary austerity, economic downturn, uncertainty regarding the future of the common European currency and falling defense expenditures will most
probably continue.

In this context of tight defense budget, combined with the need for more modern, flexible and effective military capabilities, the need for cooperation and specialization become more pressing. In this context the concept of Pooling and Sharing became a subject for intense debate, at the level of the European Union.

2. THE CONCEPT OF POOLING AND SHARING

The need for a closer cooperation at the level of the EU in regard to military capabilities, in order to achieve savings and increase interoperability, is not a new issue. Even before the onset of the economic crisis, the need to improve the European military capabilities was subject to intense debates and the creation of the European Defense Agency in 2004 is directly linked to this issue. Thus, the mission of EDA is “to support the Member States and the Council in their effort to improve European defense capabilities in the field of crisis management...” and to act “as a catalyst, promoting collaborations, launching new initiatives and introducing solutions to improve defense capabilities”.[2]

The economic and financial difficulties generate by the crisis, coupled with the increased pressure from the US to increase the contribution of the European allies in the creation of NATO’s defense capabilities, lead to the emergence of the “Pooling and Sharing” concept, in the so-called “Ghent Initiative” in November 2010. The concept was the result of a German-Swedish initiative put forward in a “Food for Thought” document on the European Imperative Intensifying Military Cooperation in Europe, which states that the “goal of the initiative is to preserve and enhance national operational capabilities – with improved effect, sustainability, interoperability and cost efficiency as a result”.[3]

The document identified three main ways for increasing the cooperation between the European states:

- **Increasing the Interoperability** of those capabilities and support structures the countries are interested in maintaining under national control, allowing the use of flexible modules in specific, case by case, operations;

- **Pooling Capabilities**, meaning an increased “cooperation without creating too strong dependencies”[4], such as in the case of common training or logistic support;

- **Role and Task Sharing**, which presumes the least level of national control over the capabilities, as the national capabilities are put at the disposal of other partners, promoting a higher level of reliance and dependency.

The European countries have currently identified a few Pooling and Sharing initiatives, such as Helicopter Training Program, Maritime Surveillance Networking, European Satellite Communication Procurement Cell (ESCPC), Medical Field Hospitals, Air to Air Refueling capability, Future Military Satellite Communications, Intelligence
Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR), Pilot Training, European Transport Hubs, Smart Munitions and Naval Logistics and Training.

While the EU countries agree that there is a need for increased cooperation in terms of military capabilities and for more efficient and effective use of existing and scarce resources, the initiative is still under discussion when it comes to identifying concrete areas and ways to achieve these goals.

One of the concerns relates to the need to avoid duplication of NATO capabilities and structures, as most of the EU countries are also NATO members and they would be contributing to the development of military capabilities for both EU and Alliance missions. One of the most obvious effects of this duplication would be higher costs and less effectiveness, especially given the austerity environment and the reluctance of many European governments to engage into more defense-related expenditures.

One potential area for increased cooperation relates to the common training of forces and participation to common exercises. An existing initiative in this sense is the cooperation between Belgium and Netherlands. Developed on three main areas, namely “operational steering, workup and training”, “navy military education” and “operational support”, the cooperation also refers to two common capabilities in the field of the Navy, Mine Countermeasure Vessels and Frigates. [5].

The cooperation in the field of defense training as part of the pooling and sharing initiative may take the form of common educational institutions (bi-national or even multinational), exchange programs, harmonization of training contents and curricula (from levels starting from basic training to continued military education), common military exercises, common training facilities or any other agreed form in order to diminish duplication, reduce costs and increase common understanding and interoperability.

Another potential area of cooperation regards the minimization of duplication and increased integration in the area of force structures, command structures and procedures, with the purpose of increasing effectiveness and interoperability. The Belgian Dutch cooperation offers and example in this respect, as since 1996 the part of the defense staff responsible for operational steering and training of the Belgian navy is integrated with its Dutch counterpart in the structures of the Dutch navy. [6] This type of cooperation may bring the benefits of increased effectiveness, interoperability and savings, but it has to overcome difficulties related to national reluctance to relinquish control over part of their armed forces, lack of legal framework, and increase in costs – at least in the first phase - associated to the set-up of integrated structures.

Cooperation under the concept of pooling and sharing may also need to address the correlation and
harmonization of the European countries military requirements, capabilities goals and capabilities development plans. This cooperation may help avoid unnecessary duplication of military capabilities and a more effective identification of the capability shortfalls.

The areas of research and development and acquisitions are also crucial in improving the cost effectiveness of the European Union defense. Pooling and sharing of equipment acquisition may provide substantial benefits in terms of economies of scale, elimination of duplication, freeing funds for the acquisition of more modern equipment, providing the EU countries with access to expensive military systems which would be out of reach for individual countries, due to tight defense budgets.

On the other hand, this kind of cooperation faces serious challenges, deriving from the need to create and harmonize the supporting legal framework, the intense opposition from national defense contractors which would have to face increased competition, without the support of their government and may loose lucrative defense contracts.

3. CONCLUSIONS

While pooling and sharing is not a “silver bullet” answer to Europe’s defense issues generated by the budget austerity and economic downturn, it may provide ways to lessen the defense cuts impact on the military capabilities. Nonetheless, the success of the initiative is strongly related to the degree of political and military commitment of the EU countries to put into practice the concept. There are serious challenges to overcome in this direction, ranging from the reluctance to relinquish (or share) control over national capabilities, issues related to perceived sovereignty and national security challenges, the debate concerns related to the creation of a “tiered” Europe. Other concerns are related to the future of the European Union itself, as the worsening of the economic outlook and the decrease of the living standards may lead to an increase of nationalist sentiment, making an increased military cooperation more challenging.

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APPARENTES TO EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY COLLABORATION IN THE CURRENT ECONOMIC CAUSTITY ENVIRONMENT

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THE POST 9/11 SECURITY PROSPECTS OF AFGHANISTAN

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The multinational efforts directed towards the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan is characteristic of post-conflict military missions. The stages of such missions involve managing the post-conflict situation, as well as the rehabilitation, rebuilding and reconstruction of the area that underwent or generated the conflict. Afghanistan is a case study that underlines not only the complexity, but also the extremely ambitious objectives of the stabilization and reconstruction process unfolded in this country. At the time, the aim of strengthening NATO’s presence in Afghanistan was triggered by the necessity to create a peaceful security climate and to counter terrorism. The part played by Romania in the efforts to counter the global challenges to international peace and security through peace consolidation, stabilization and democratic reconstruction of the area has been characterized as a proactive one.

Key words: stabilization, reconstruction, Provincial Reconstruction Team, multinational effort, interoperability

1. INTRODUCTION

Romania has played an important role in the efforts directed towards countering the new global challenges to international peace and security. As such, it actively participated in the peace consolidation efforts unfolded during post-conflict periods and in the stabilization and democratic reconstruction of areas prone to insecurity and warfare. In this respect, it must be noted that such an approach is part of the country’s view on the tight interconnection between its national security and the regional and international stability. As a result, Romania focuses on its political and military involvement in supporting the post-conflict stabilization processes. From this perspective, such an approach is part of a broader effort towards defining a coherent policy for a greater region including the Western Balkans, the Greater Middle East, Central Asia (Afghanistan included).

Since 1991 Romania has actively participated with a wide range of forces: infantry battalions, mountain and engineer troops, field hospitals, military police, transportation capabilities, military observers, liaison and staff officers in the peacekeeping missions of the UN. The broad spectrum of missions accomplished, ranging from humanitarian ones to reconstruction and combat missions, directly contributed to a better training of the participants and to the implementation of NATO interoperability standards.

Between 2003 and 2011, 19 Romanian military died on duty in Afghanistan.
Focusing on the post 9/11/01 security prospects of Afghanistan, as well as on the way Romania met its commitments to the coalition that took an active part in restoring peace in the aforementioned region, this article will try to highlight the manner in which this country succeeded in defining its part in the global view on security.

2. THE STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION PROCESS IN AFGHANISTAN

Immediately after the Taliban regime was removed from power, a wide array of challenges related to peace, stabilization and reconstruction lay ahead. Afghanistan had been at war for more than two decades and owned the largest mined area in the world. According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 70% of the 22 million inhabitants were malnourished and average lifespan reached 40. However, significant progress was made in the subsequent period as a result of NATO and international community cooperation with Afghan authorities.

The Bonn Process, officially launched in 2001 after the overthrow of the Taliban regime, successfully ended with the organization of Parliamentary elections. Despite the gloomy forecasts, these elections, as well as the ones organized for appointing a President in 2004, unfolded quite peacefully and safely as a result of the support offered by the international community to the Afghan government. Thus, political pluralism gradually developed all over Afghanistan and the elected Parliament members started acting in accordance with their mandate. The government of President Hamid Karzai expanded its influence around the country and succeeded in reintegrating many of the regional power representatives, as well tribal and clan leaders (the so-called warlords) into the political and social life. Even though the process aimed at building the Afghan institutions was a slow one, the latter advanced with the support of the international community. As such, the multinational effort directed towards the stabilization and reconstruction of the country could be characterized as a post-conflict military mission.

The historical perspective has shown that the post-conflict stages involve measures aimed at managing the situation, as well as at the rehabilitation, rebuilding and reconstruction of the area that underwent or generated the conflict. An analysis of the post-Cold War conflicts markedly emphasized that acting on a volunteer basis, in an arbitrary, extreme and intolerant manner had led to situation deterioration in the areas under investigation and, in the end, to conflict. Therefore, taking into account not only the challenges, vulnerabilities, risks and asymmetrical threats emerging at international level, but also the fact that some areas are traditionally prone to conflict, a differentiated approach to such areas was considered necessary especially in terms of the strategies to be employed in countering new threats, terrorism representing the most important one.

With a view to all of the above, Afghanistan is a case study that underlines both the complexity and the ambitious objectives of the stabilization and reconstruction efforts unfolded in this country.
The Istanbul Summit, held between 28-29 June 2004, centered around refining a NATO policy on Afghanistan. In this respect, the statement released by the state and government heads who participated in the North Atlantic Council reunion officially acknowledged that NATO’s main priority was ensuring peace and stability in Afghanistan in order to consolidate a multiethnic and fully representative governance. In order to meet this challenge NATO was to take a two-fold approach: strengthening the military troops and creating a number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). More specifically, the Council decided that NATO would supplement the ISAF troops that were already deployed under UN mandate by about 3500 military, out of which 1300 would be stationed outside the country and deployed only in crisis situations. Thus, the ISAF personnel that at the time totaled 6500 people, reached in the months to come 10000. Moreover, alongside with the Kunduz PRT, ISAF extended its presence in Mazar-e-Shariff, Maymana, Faizabad and Baghlan. The first step in this direction was taken two days after the Istanbul Summit on July 1, 2004. As a result, the teams from Mazar-e-Sharif and Maymana that at the time were under the authority of the coalition led by the US were taken over by NATO.

The strengthening of NATO’s presence in Afghanistan was aimed at creating a security climate necessary for the reconstruction and stabilization of the country, for countering terrorism and for ensuring the organization and unfolding of elections. The latter’s postponement would have represented an obstacle to the Afghan government’s authority consolidation. The aims of ISAF were to encourage cooperation between as many international institutions as possible and the Afghan government, and to cooperate with the Afghan government and with the US led coalition as part of the “Enduring Freedom” operation, as well as with the United Nation’s Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).

The mission of ISAF also included the West and South of Afghanistan. As a result of the ISAF involvement in the PRT project, the former was perceived as a reliable partner supporting the efforts to maintain security and stability. On October 5, 2006, ISAF implemented the final stage in the takeover of the international forces deployed in the East of Afghanistan that had acted as part of the US led coalition. Apart from fulfilling its ordinary tasks, ISAF also supported the reconstruction process, the disarmament of the former combatants, armament storage and the implementation of the measures aimed at ensuring trust in its area of responsibility.

The PRTs represented an administrative unit aimed at providing international aid to Afghanistan. It consisted of an operational basis of various sizes that included a group of people ranging between 60 and more than 1000 military and civil specialists involved in reconstruction projects or in ensuring the security of those involved in such endeavors. A PRT included 3 to 5 civilians and military personnel. The teams were supported by international security forces. Initially, they were formed and used by the American military to facilitate the reconstruction efforts in the provinces outside Kabul. As a result of NATO’s involvement in
Afghanistan the command of the PRTs was handed over to ISAF. The PRTs employed the expertise of all contributing agencies and consisted of military personnel, civil police councilors and civil representatives of the US Foreign Affairs Agencies such as USAID, the State Department, and the Department of Agriculture. As of October 5, 2006, the PRTs became part of the ISAF and hence subordinated to NATO. During the main stages of ISAF missions the number of PRTs constantly increased.

Starting with January 2006, the deployment and command of PRTs were as follows: Baghlan (Netherlands and Hungary as of October 2006), Chaghcharan (Lithuania), Farah (US), Fayzabad (Germany, Denmark), Herat (Italy), Kunduz (Germany), Mazar-e-Sharif (UK, Denmark, Sweden and Germany), Maymana (UK, Norway) and Qala-e-Naw (Spain). As for the PRTs of the Combined Joint Task Force 76, their location and command were: Asadabad (US), Bamyan (New Zealand), Jalalabad (US), Kandahar (Canada), Khowst (US), Lashkar Gah, Parwan, Qalat Sharana (US), Tarin Kowt (Netherlands, Australia).

When ISAF assumed command of the PRTs on October 5, 2006 there were 24 PRTs coordinated by 5 regional command centers: the Regional Command Capital and the Regional Command Centers located in North, West, South and East (within the Combined Joint Task Force – CJTF 76 under the command of the US).

The main goal of the PRTs was to promote a government that was credible and able to expand its influence over the Afghan territory. These teams did not work as peacekeeping units. Their members were quite few and collaborated in an interdisciplinary manner in assisting local authorities, the national government, NGOs, UN agencies that contributed to the efforts directed towards the reconstruction of Afghanistan, the security sector reform, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants.

The PRTs’ military component was subordinated to ISAF and, besides providing security support, also dealt with infrastructure work. Its aims were to facilitate and implement changes, to ensure security, to support information exchange among various groups, to stimulate reconstruction and, in the end, to contribute to the stabilization of Afghanistan. Due to their small size the PRTs ensured security only at local level and were involved in fields like education, customs, infrastructure, agriculture, judicial activities, public health. Once the field developed, they gradually transferred their tasks to the government or to local authorities.

The US and the international community created the PRTs as transitional structures in order to support the elected Afghan government. With an extended mandate related to the reconstruction efforts of Afghanistan the PRTs were supposed: to involve themselves in the communication process with governmental leaders, as well as with the military, tribal and religious heads from the provinces and to monitor and report on the evolution of the political, military and reconstruction processes in due time; to work with the Afghan authorities in order to ensure the security for important events such the Parliamentary
and presidential elections, or the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; to provide specialized assistance and to support the efforts of creating the Afghan national military and police forces; to participate alongside the Afghan government and UN in providing humanitarian assistance.

In conclusion, the PRTs represented a landmark in the stabilization and reconstruction process of Afghanistan. At a conceptual level the PRTs were quite a new structure that underwent criticism during the initial stages of the international military’s deployment to Afghanistan. However, the concept underlying their establishment evolved and they lately have been viewed as an extremely efficient means to provide assistance to the Afghan government in its efforts to expand its influence in the provinces. As mixed teams of military and civilians, varying in size and led by different countries the PRTs were deployed in the capital cities of the Afghan provinces and offered solutions to the problems of the Afghan government. The teams supported numerous reconstruction projects, mediated among parties in conflict, participated in the process of Afghan combatant groups’ disarmament, assisted in the deployment of ANA and national police forces, facilitated the improvement of the security environment as a result of their contact with the population, the Afghan leaders and local authorities. All of the above proved an original method to bring together the military and civil actors in order to accomplish the task of ensuring the external assistance to nation building.

3. ROMANIAN CONTRIBUTION

On October 7, 2001, the American and British forces launched the first air strikes meant to annihilate the Taliban regime from Kabul. On December 2001, the Romanian Parliament approved, as a result of the request made by the Romanian President, the participation of the Romanian forces in ISAF and empowered the Romanian Government to earmark the forces and to establish the means, the financing and the conditions under which these were to be part of the international mission in Afghanistan.

Initially, the Romanian participation in the theatre of operations was based on self sustaining means and involved 15 military doctors and a C-130 Hercules airplane destined for transportation. In case of special requests, Romania was to make available up to 20 military medical personnel, 1 CBRN company of 70 militaries that was to be transported by a third party, as agreed during negotiations, 1 military police platoon of 25 militaries (the latter could be supplemented up to 30 people and was to be trained in accordance with the missions in which they were to participate) to be shipped by the C-130 Hercules, 1 mountain troops company of 170 people ready to go into action 30 days after the request was issued.

Four months later, on April 30, 2002, the Romanian Parliament approved the participation of Romanian troops to the “Enduring Freedom” operation from Afghanistan. For this, the following forces were earmarked to be deployed: 1 infantry battalion of 405 military personnel; 1 CBRN company of 70
people and a reserve of 10 military in case the Romania’s contribution was to be supplemented with liaison and staff officers.

An agreement concerning the deployment of the South – Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG) to Afghanistan was signed on the occasion of the South – Eastern Europe Defense Ministerial – SEDM that unfolded on December 5-6, 2005, in Washington DC. The Brigade acted under the UN mandate and the operational command of NATO and during its mission in Afghanistan was known by the name of Kabul Multinational Brigade IX (KMNB IX).

As a result of the agreement, 233 Romanian military and 2 support subunits participated in the ISAF mission for six months starting with February 2006. Out of the 101 positions within the Brigade, 18 were filled by Romanian representatives. Moreover, Romania supplied 125 military for the general staff company and 90 militaries for the communications company. On August 11, 2006, the Romanian forces that had been part of the SEEBRIG returned from mission. In this respect, it is worth mentioning that this mission was the result of deploying the multinational peace force, established in 1999, in a theatre of operations for the first time and that the force benefited from the participation of military contingents from Albania, Bulgaria, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Greece, Italy, Romania and Turkey.

On April 1, 2006, 39 military from the Romanian Air Force took over the control over the Kabul International Airport (KAIA) from the Greek contingent and filled in positions in the administrative and management structures of the airport. The Romanian detachment conducted their activities as part of ISAF. The main missions accomplished by the Romans for four months were: airport management, daily aerial operations coordination, control of takeoffs and landings, and monitoring of the air traffic in the area. Moreover, they provided meteorological analyses and forecasts in order to ensure the security of flights, maintained communications equipment within parameters and ensured logistic support for airport activities.

In order to eliminate the risks and threats raised by the presence of Taliban combatants and of Al Qaeda terrorist groups in certain areas, especially in the South and East of Afghanistan, NATO and the coalition conducted a number of operations aimed at annihilating them. Thus, between September 2-17, 2006, ISAF launched the “Medusa” operation with a view to reducing the number of insurgent activities in the South of the country and strengthening the stability in the area. The same goals were pursued during the “Achilles” operation launched on March 6, 2007, by ISAF in cooperation with the Afghan forces. The latter was the most important offensive operation ever conducted in the South of Afghanistan, in Helmand, since the fall of the Taliban regime, and the number of military personnel involved in it (5500) was a tell tale sign of its significance. The reasons for launching it can be found in the number of suicide attacks that had taken place in the area as a preliminary to the spring offensive that was to be launched by the Talibans.
Starting with July 31, 2006, Romanian troops of the “Călugăreni” Task Force joined the American troops in the Southern province of Zabul within the Forward Operating Base (FOB) Maizan. Their mission consisted in ensuring base and area security. In an interview, LTC Michael E. McLaughlin, PRT head in Qalat noticed Taliban’s reluctance to launch attacks against Coalition forces in Zabul because of their fear of the Romanians’ 14.5 mm machine guns.

On January 19, 2007, the “Călugăreni” Task Force (i.e. the 2nd Infantry Battalion) was replaced by the 812th Infantry Battalion “Carpathian Hawks” (Şoimii Carpaților) in a ceremony held at the Forward Operating Base (FOB) Lagman from Zabul. During the six months spent in the theatre of operations, the “Călugăreni” Task Force conducted, as part of the Zabul Task Force, conducted missions together the American military from the 1st Battalion, the 4th Infantry Regiment, the C Company, and ANA. As for the 812th Infantry Battalion, the latter conducted during its six-month stay 600 missions in the support of the stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction of the region.

On May 29, 2007, the Romanian military deployed in the Qalat base were visited by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), the American General John B. Craddock. On this occasion, the battalion commandant reported on the security status in the province, on the missions conducted by the Romanians in order to secure highway 1 and its adjacent areas, as well as on the possibility to extend the PRT projects in cooperation with the Zabul Task Force in the Qalat area. At the end of his visit, John B. Craddock wrote in the Book of Honor of the Battalion: “Many thanks for the great mission you are undertaking”.

4. CONCLUSIONS

Romania’s contribution to the stabilization and reconstruction process of Afghanistan was included on the agenda of the meeting between Romania’s President, Traian Băsescu, and the Commander of the US forces in Afghanistan, Lieutenant General Karl W. Eikenberry, which took place at Cotroceni, on February 1, 2007. On this occasion the Romanian President reiterated Romania’s determination to fulfill its commitments to the partners involved in NATO’s mission in Afghanistan. Moreover, he underlined the importance of achieving success on such a mission and also mentioned that Romania will be constantly focused on acting as a loyal and principled partner in accordance with its engagements. During the talks, Lieutenant General Karl W. Eikenberry expressed his appreciation for the Romanian forces deployed in Afghanistan. Also, he reminded that an American company was subordinated to a Romanian battalion in the Zabul province. In his turn, Traian Băsescu underlined Romania’s preoccupation for the improvement of its performance in the theatre of operation through a modernization of the technical capabilities made available to the Romanian forces deployed in Afghanistan.

Romanian troops have been actively participating in multinational military missions unfolded in various theaters of operation under
the NATO and EU command or under the mandate of international organizations. As a result, they have improved their practical abilities and preparedness for planning and taking part in such missions.

Participation in multinational operations, the transformation of the classical concepts on defense into expeditionary policies, a broader role and spectrum of missions for the Romanian military have all contributed to the shaping of a new strategic profile for Romania. As a result, the defense policies have changed from the traditional approach to the security issue as a matter of national territory defense to an approach that views security as part of a coherent policy at multiregional level that focuses on the reconstruction and stabilization of areas outside the European continent.

The role and involvement of the Romanian military in mediation activities, as well as in ensuring security are significant. Consequently, Romania has gradually become a contributor to the regional and global security.

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THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE AND THE ACTORS OF SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

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There is no doubt regarding the importance that south-eastern Europe has gained over the past years in geopolitical and geostrategic terms. Due to its history and considering the changes that have taken place here after the fall of the Iron Curtain, and also as a consequence of the “hot spots” emerged here on ideological, political, economic and terrorist grounds, this part of the continent still is an area of control and interests confrontations orchestrated by the actors that provide the international affairs with a multipolar dimension. All the aforementioned factors lead to various phenomena in which individual or group interests result in regional as well as global consequences.

Key words: security, geopolitical interests, power poles, regional actors, south-eastern Europe.

1. INTRODUCTION

Today’s complex and alert realities have demonstrated the geostrategic interests displayed in south-eastern Europe by actors such as the Russian Federation, Turkey, USA, NATO and EU. All of these are accompanied by the European dimension of China’s politics and all the other regional actors of south-eastern Europe. We have thus approached the issue of strategic competition and global consideration of spheres of influence from the perspective of the policies promoted by the previously mentioned actors.

2. THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

First, we will attempt to define our area of interest from the viewpoint of international politics. Thus, the geostrategic interest refers to the way in which a state or a group of states relates to its social system of values represented by expectations, certainties, conceptions, philosophies, strategies and doctrines.

“EU and NATO do not guarantee Romania the security it hoped for when it joint them, which is why Romania must enhance its sovereignty and build its own politics according to its national interests. The last 20 years have been a nice historical interval, but from now on Romanians themselves must consider their future, although it is sometimes easier to pretend one is helpless and therefore to let others decide upon one’s future”, said George Friedman, the founder of Stratfor. So this is one of the strong reasons why we need to enforce our regional individuality within the world’s strategic arena.

Over the last years and particularly after the collapse of the
Soviet Union and of the communist regimes in general, the geopolitical reality of south-eastern Europe has become more and more sensitive. The main reason is the emergence of new phenomena of a security and economic nature that changed the area’s geopolitical importance and entailed strengthening the international and regional actors’ efforts to approach them according their own interests. However, these state and non-state actors’ interests have often been and still are divergent. Consequently, they transformed south-eastern Europe into an area of geopolitical disputes fueled mainly by the Russian Federation, Turkey, USA and EU.

The 90s have been difficult for all the states of south-eastern Europe as they were dominated by armed conflicts (Yugoslavia, the Russian Federation, Georgia, Moldavia), identity movements (Turkey), diplomatic conflicts and democracy enforcement (Albania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Romania). These countries were like a puzzle of weak and corrupt states having different identities and uneven levels of development placed in a triangle delineated by the Russian, European and Islamic civilizations. By means of internal efforts and external implications most of the problems have been overcome and raised at a level of apparent stability. In spite of the fact that the disputes have not been solved, these “Euro-Asian” states – as Zbigniew Brzezinski called them – chose the western model of development instead of the eastern Russian one. The West decided not to decline their option. Thus, south-eastern Europe changed into a frame of inter-ethnic and geopolitical conflicts that imply unsafe frontiers, weak states and numerous threats to European and international security. The area of the Balkans, Black Sea Area and Caucasus is a critical strategic center for the war against terror and enforcement of democracy.

It is clear that this region has enjoyed different degrees of attention at different moments in time. In the ancient times, it witnessed the competition between the great powers and the sequential domination of the Byzantine Empire, Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire, followed in the end by the Cold War, which isolated it from the rest of the world.

Except for the case of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, south-eastern Europe consisted of Soviet Union satellite states, which placed it in a cone of shadow. The evolution of the global system drew the international community’s attention to these states. Now, for the first time, the region is open to international community. NATO’s and EU’s expansion to the east has changed south-eastern Europe into an area where many international partnerships, programs and project are developed for the purpose of economic development and Euro-Atlantic integration.

South-eastern Europe has a relevant strategic position: the crossroads of Europe and Asia, between great Russia and Middle East and directly connects East to the western Europe and the Mediterranean Sea by the Danube River. Currently, it is also an extension of NATO and EU and links it to the great Euro-Atlantic powers. This position gave birth to the debated theory of Halfrod J. Mackinder related to the concept of heartland or Samuel p. Huntington’s theory of the lines that delineate civilizations.
Above are some of the reasons why south-eastern Europe is a region of a major importance in the equation of security globalization. Moreover, south-eastern Europe is the only significant area that drew the attention of the four of the most important global actors: the Russian Federation, USA, NATO and EU. Its political-military engagements naturally belong to its global conducts. The state and non-state actors we have mentioned have stated their solidarity in the war on terror as a preventive measure at a global scale: security vs. insecurity in south-eastern Europe induces global geostrategic conditions.

Also, the major strategic importance of south-eastern Europe can be superposed on the following geopolitical and geostrategic characteristics: south-eastern Europe is placed at the active confluence of three regions – the Balkan peninsula, Caucasus and Asia, which are all very close to the hot spot of Middle East. This region has a great strategic potential as it borders the south of NATO area, where the great nuclear states’ interests collide. Then, the Black Sea is the access gate to the planetary ocean of Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine and the small trans-Caucasian states. South-eastern Europe is the center of the foreseen routes for the transport of the Caspian oil from central Asia to the strategic consumers from the west, as well as the illegal weapon trafficking and immigration from central and Middle East to the west. The Black Sea also has important amounts of natural resources. The Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea are Russia’s shortest ways to the south and to Africa via the Suez Channel. Last but not least, south-eastern Europe has a large number of civilian and military harbors.

Understanding the strategic role of south-eastern Europe within global stability and security means accepting the existence of a strong link between Euro-Atlantic security and international security with global implications.

2.1. THE MAIN ACTORS IN THE AREA

We are currently witnessing the strategic repositioning of the world’s main power poles in order to set a new international order, on which we next intend to elaborate.

The European Union (EU). The EU’s strategic interest in the major problems of global security started to shape at the end of the last century, when the Yugoslavian crisis broke up with its well-known consequences. The EU’s involvement, which was quite shy and somewhat contradictory in the Balkan context, can be regarded as the first step to assuming a global role. The main trend, formally declared and conceptualized, is the EU birth by integrating the Balkan groups of states, which was seen as the only sustainable step to peace, stability and security in Europe. Formally, the document that stipulates EU’s geostrategic interest is the European Security Strategy approved on 12 December 2003 and elaborated by the representative for Foreign Policy and Common Security of the EU. The document defines this as follows: “Europe has never been so prosperous, safe and free’, whereas “the world is full of new dangers and opportunities”. This precedes the global role assumed by EU, which focuses on: overcoming the threats that jeopardize its development, that is, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts
in its proximity, bankrupt states and organized crime, assuming a growing role in the global effort to manage the new types of risks and threats, promoting a productive policy in the field of conflict prevention as far as its economic and political interests are concerned, building a climate of continental security, preserving international order, advantageously ensuring energy resources for the purpose of the Union’s survival, extending the fields of economic, political and cultural cooperation.

Mention should be made that since the year 2007 EU has been neighboring the Black Sea, a region that enjoys a great deal of attention from Brussels. EU regards the Black Sea as a great global actor and as an opportunity for Europe to assume its conditions as a credible civilizing factor. It all depends on the way in which EU is willing to manage its addition to the Russian energy resources, regardless of where exactly they come from.

On the other hand, EU plays its roles from the stance of its global importance under the present condition of its integrality. This is based on the fact that Europe, by means of its great colonial powers, played such a role for almost half a millennium. This leads EU to the following actions: consolidating security and stability in its proximity, developing its influence in Central Asia and around the Black Sea area, contributing to post-totalitarian enforcement of democracy, materialization of its economic interests in the Far East.

Over the last decade, NATO has enhanced its strategic assets in south-eastern Europe and around the Black Sea area. It has secured partnerships with the Russian Federation and Ukraine without hiding its intentions to expand its borders to the east, that is, the will of Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan to join NATO, which is carefully considered. It is clear that NATO has gone over its initial birth purposes, e.g. collective defense, and it now stand for a security community. The Alliance’s transformation aims at assuming an increasing responsibility regarding the management of global risks. In this respect, it has conceptualized its intent to involve in conflict prevention, crisis management, peace keeping, disaster management and humanitarian aid.

In the geostrategic field, NATO targets the following: involvement in frozen conflicts, development of democracy in former communist countries, dissolving terrorist networks, war on terror wherever the Alliance’s interests call for that, fight against the illegal trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, protection of maritime and energy transportation routes, development of partnerships with states that are not NATO members, consolidation of security in its proximity regions.

At the same time, the Alliance will focus on: Afghanistan’s peaceful and democratic reconstruction, consolidation of the Balkans’ security and stability, implementation of the future security engagement under UN mandate, provision of support to UN for the purpose of keeping peace and security at an international level, development of relations with EU, particularly in the field of security, crisis management, war on terror, civil emergencies etc.

The Russian Federation has returned into the equation of geopolitics by explicitly redefining its expectations in terms of rebuilding the bipolar power balance.
by means of strengthening relations with the EU and China in the form of a sophisticated political-military partnership in the post Cold War era.

Currently, the Concept of national security is the document that identifies and defines the geostrategic interests of the Russian Federation from the perspective of its global role, which naturally include south-eastern Europe. According to it, the Russian Federation’s interests are as follows: applying the principles of proximity and partnership relations with the great powers or organizations having interests in this area; assuming the right to act in a military manner against terrorist groups in any part of the worlds, but particularly in this region; maintaining good relations with EU in exchange with EU dependence on Russian energy resources; exerting domination in the Black Sea Area; rejecting the export of democracy and extension of NATO to the east; proactively developing the Collective Security Treaty; rejecting the placement of the American anti-missile shield, which is regarded as a direct threat to its own security.

As a result of defining its geopolitical status, the Moscow administration argues for the recognition of its sphere of influence in the area of the former Soviet Union and military equivalence with the USA. In terms of the Black Sea area, in spite of its limited direct access to the sea, the Russian Federation claims a major role connected to its military and resource potential in order to preserve the secession triangle represented by Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The Russian Federation’s realities and geopolitical perspectives are delineated by the following objectives: overcoming influences exerted by the USA, EU and NATO; decreasing the impact of the orange revolutions from Georgia and Ukraine; involving in the local conflicts without UN, EU, NATO and Black Sea neighboring countries, including the conflicts from Georgia, Turkey and Armenia; exerting economic and political pressures on Moldavia, Ukraine and Georgia.

The Russian Federation’s significant fleet and its naval bases from Ukraine and Georgia consolidate its role in the Black Sea area, but the most important role in its geopolitical role is played by the neighborhood of NATO and EU, which strengthens the western influence in the region from an economic, political, technological and demographic point of view.

As far as the region bordered by the Azov Sea, Black Sea, Caspian Sea and Volgograd is concerned, it is a passing to south Caucasus. Rich in natural resources, it hosts the pipe from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, where also the oil pipe to Turkey starts. The area is ethnically heterogeneous, as it is the home to more that 50 Caucasian populations, Turkish and Indo-European, Muslin and orthodox. Therefore, this region is hard to control. In fact, north Caucasus has often raised problems for Russia, which has consumed important resources in order to suppress its instability and insecurity.

The United States of America. Its interests are stipulated in the Strategy of National Security, which mentions its role of global superpower and the desire to permanently involve in the most important global issues.

In terms of the matters of south-eastern Europe, USA are interested in: consolidation of democracy and economic independence of these states; general development
of the states within inter-regional cooperation; free access to the resources of the area; solving conflicts by means of negotiations; involvement in solving local conflicts; strengthening NATO and EU philosophy in these countries; opening alternative energy routes; enforcing military presence in the area; war on terror, illegal trafficking of weapons, nuclear materials, drugs and human beings; risk management related to security; creation of active defense centers to be used in case of military actions; opposing the increasing political and economic expansion of China and Russian Federation; reshaping the system of regional security.

The People’s Republic of China plays its global role as a great economic and military power mainly due to its huge demographic potential. It centers its evolution on a massive absorption of western capital as well as on the global development of markets. As the world’s fourth economic power after USA, Japan and EU, China has bee growing at outstanding levels lately, and it aims at: consolidating the strategic and sustainable security of the state; intensifying campaigns against corruption; balancing economic disparities; strengthening the country’s democracy; synchronizing the fight against corruption, economic development and social justice; modernizing the armed forces and defense industry; significant growth of the defense expenses budget.

At the same time, China’s foreign and defense policy focuses on the following: consolidating its role as a global actor; developing its military power; positive management of its relations with Taiwan; decreasing tensions in territorial disputes with the neighboring countries; harmonization of its relations with India, USA, Russia, Japan and EU; development of the Shanghai Organization.

The Republic of Turkey is a complex society with a regime protected by the constitution. Its force and stability result from its strong position within NATO, robust economy, political stability, and secular character of the armed forces. Turkey exerts a strong influence in southern Caucasus and northern Iraq; it hosts the energy routs Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan and the Blue Stream pipe; also, it has joined the Nabucco project. Outside its borders, Turkey has positively managed the conflicts with Armenia, Syria, Iraq and Greece. It also exerts a dynamic influence in Crimea and Caucasus by adopting a moderate attitude regarding Chechnya and Azerbaijan. Moreover, Turkey is aware that it is an essential actors of south-eastern Europe, which sets it close to the superpowers’ block, with an emphasis on maintaining supremacy over the Black Sea straights.

Turkey’s economic, cultural, political and social realities in the 90’s prevented the Turkish populations from being integrated in a “great Turkey”. On the other hand, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation initiative has had a positive impact, particularly because Russia was integrated in this partnership and it thus shares with Turkey its hegemony in the Black Sea area.

2.2. OTHER SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE ACTORS

Over the last century, the political and administrative map of south-eastern Europe has been like a puzzle, with the exception of the Cold War
period. We can therefore say that the present configuration of Europe is the consequence of the geopolitical and geostrategic changes that took place after the Second World War until and after the end of it, with a special role played by the two great poles of power – USA and Russia. In this context, the following actors may be included in the map of south-eastern Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Georgia, Greece, the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Moldavia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia and Ukraine.

Albania is a country undergoing democracy formation, in which the adoption of Constitution was hard to achieve after a long process that came to an end in November 1998. Albania enjoys wide exit to the Adriatic Sea. It gained its independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1912, and after the two world wars it was included in the communist region. In 1990 it adopted the multi-party regime and market economy, but the process was marked by corruption as serious social problems. This led to political chaos in 1997, which required international military intervention in order to enforce public order. At the present moment, Albania is a NATO member and EU oriented.

The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a recent state on Europe’s map (it was recognized in April 1992), and has a narrow exit to the Adriatic Sea. Its population of 4.5 million people consists of three ethnic groups: 40% Serbian, 38% Muslim, and 22% Croatian. However, these percentages are approximate since censuses are hard to perform in an area of high instability. Despite that almost the entire population speaks the same language, their spiritual values and economic desiderata are quite divergent. There is only one convergence in this respect: EU and NATO accession.

The constitution is based on the Dayton Agreement (SUA) signed on 14 December 1995. The collective presidency consists of three members: a Muslim, a Croatian and a Serb. Although this should ensure stability, this artificial form of leadership is hardly a democracy to be born. The three ethnic groups coexist due to the presence of international troops.

The Republic of Bulgaria, whose eastern border is the Black Sea, is a NATO and EU member. It does not recognize national minorities, but only ethnical groups. It has some difficulties dealing with the Turkish Muslim minority (8-10% of the population), as well as with the refugees from Macedonia, whom are assimilated to the Bulgarian population. In the 80’s there was a strong campaign during which other nationality people’s names were changed into Bulgarian names.

Bulgaria’s political trends have displayed interesting features for the last five decades: during the Cold War, Bulgaria was close to the Moscow regimes, whereas after 1990 most of the parties have placed themselves on a western oriented direction. Moreover, in 2001 the government leadership was given to Simeon the 2nd, Bulgaria’s former king.

Cyprus is the third largest island of the Mediterranean Sea after Sicily and Sardinia. Its northern part is known as “the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”, recognized solely by Turkey. The capital city, Nicosia, has a population of approximately 300,000 people, 80,000 of which
being Turkish Cypriots. It was divided between Turkish and Greek parts in 1974, when bishop Makarios expressed his willingness to unite Cyprus and Greece. The Turkish intelligence found out about the plan and the Turkish troops invaded northern Cyprus. This situation persists as what is known as “Cyprus crisis”.

The economy in the Greek part is prosperous, but prone to external shocks. The economic crisis of 2009 was reflected in the number of people visiting Cyprus. On the other hand, the lack of water in the Turkish part of Cyprus is an obstacle to its economic development. Also, the foreign companies are reluctant to invest here, and the Turkish currency is weak on the international exchange markets. To compensate for this situation, Turkey provides support in tourism, education and industry.

The Republic of Croatia is a presidential and parliamentary democracy, in spite of the fact that its founder – Franjo Tudjman, the president of Croatia until December 1999 – adopted dictatorial politics centered on the presidential institution. Tudjman was a nationalist, an anti-Semite and a xenophobe who gave up power at the end of his life. His death allowed for Croatia’s Euro-Atlantic orientation.

Croatia’s economy has developed moderately due to its weak fiscal discipline and lack of reforms.

Georgia is a small state that enjoys outstanding importance in the Caucasian geopolitics as it hosts the terrestrial routes between the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea. Its main problems, which emerged after gaining independence in 1991, are the following: the existence within its borders of two separatist states – Abkhazia and South Ossetia – which militate for integration into the Russian Federation; the Russian military troops are deployed in Georgia under the pretext of peace keeping. NATO’s decision to postpone granting of MAP has discouraged Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration perspectives.

Greece lies in the southern part of the Balkan Peninsula as well as approximately 2,000 islands from the Ionic Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Aegean Sea. It has a capitalist economy in which the public sector brings 40% of the GDP. Greece is one of the major beneficiaries of the EU support since its public debt, inflation and unemployment are well above the European average values. The decline in public finances and its lack of credibility along with the insufficient reforms and measures have led the country to a severe crisis. Under EU pressure, the government adopted a set of measure on medium term: reducing governmental expenses, reducing public sector, reducing fiscal evasion, reforming the health and pension systems, increasing competitiveness in the labor market. However, Greece’s creditors ask Greece to enhance its efforts to harness public sector’s expenses and increase tax collection.

During the Cold War, its geostrategic position played an important role in attracting American capital and economic growth. Therefore, it accessed the European Economic Community in 1981, which overcame the threats to its internal and external conditions.

The province of Kosovo is but one of the concerning symptoms of the dissolution of the international order after the First World War.
The province has been inhabited since ancient times. In the middle ages, Kosovo was the center of the Serbian Empire. Then, the Turks ruled Kosovo for more than four centuries until Serbia regained its territory during the First World War. During the Second World War, parts of Kosovo were placed under Italian ruling, replaced later by the German ruling. At the end of the war Tito’s partisans proclaimed the autonomous republic of Serbia within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In 1974, the Yugoslavian Constitution granted Kosovo the statute of a socialist autonomous republic, which resulted in numerous protests by the Albanian population demanding the province’s total independence. It all reached a climax in 1998, when a bloody armed conflict broke out. The consequences can still be seen nowadays. The independence of Kosovo was recognized by 69 out of 192 NATO states, including SUA and 22 EU countries, Romania, Spain, Slovakia, Greece and Cyprus did not do that, and neither did China and Russia.

FYROM is another state born in the last decade of the 20th century after the collapse of Yugoslavia. It is difficult to state exactly when the Macedonians settled down in this area, but they claim to be the followers of Samuil, who founded the first Macedonian state in 969-1056. The Greek regard the Macedonians as part of their ancient history, whereas the Bulgarians consider the Macedonian language as a dialect of the Bulgarian language.

The Macedonian economy was strongly affected by the UN sanctions against Belgrade, the Greek embargo and the Macedonian-Albanian conflicts, which were close to reaching catastrophic proportions before they were overcome by means of the international community’s support.

The Republic of Moldavia is a small state that gained independence in 1991. As part of the Community of Independent States and GUAM, Moldavia is marked by the absolute energy dependence on Russia and the secession of Transnistria. Both events have influenced the geopolitical conditions in the proximity of the Black Sea. Moscow has offered only two alternatives to the tensions: transforming the republic into a federation or Transnistria’s independence. The internal political arena is determined by the two main political actors – the Alliance for European Integration and the Communist Party. The economic crisis is ever present, whereas the political arena is subject to tensions and disputes generated by differences in values, principles and culture.

Although it has a favorable climate and fertile soil, Moldavia has been undergoing severe economic devolution for it depends almost entirely on Moscow’s support and resources. Transnistria is an autonomous region of Moldavia de jure, but de facto it declared its independence on September 2, 1990. The independence was not recognized by the international except for Russia, which led to the conflict in the region.

In order to respect the political condition of the region, the Moldavian Parliament adopted in July 2005 the law on the Fundamental provisions of the legal status of the area on the left bank of the river Nistru, which refers to advantages such as: the official languages – Moldavian, Russian and Ukrainian, the right to establish foreign relations in the economic, scientific and humanitarian fields.
Montenegro reappeared on the world’s map in May 2006, when it claimed its right to organize a referendum concerning its becoming independent from Serbia. The global financial crisis significantly impacted upon its economy, although it has created a friendly internal environment for business investments. It has the lowest profit taxation in the region (9%) and more than 90% of the state companies have been privatized.

Romania is the largest country in the region, and it has been spared by the segregationist trend that characterized Eastern Europe after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Bucharest is the second largest capital in the Balkans after Athens. Romania has an exit to Black Sea (including the Danube Delta) of 287 km.

The political leaders’ lack of maturity, the slow pace of reform and high corruption caused Romania’s economic downturn during the 90’s. In 1999, Romania ran the risk of economic collapse, but the national banking system managed to avoid that. At the beginning of this millennium Romania found a favorable international situation accompanied by some maturity signs in the political leaders’ attitude, which resulted in internal economic stability. However, the common citizens still have a low level of income, and the level of unemployment is high (6.9%).

Serbia consists of two provinces – Voivodina and Kosovo (although the federal authorities have no control over Kosovo). Serbia’s population is mainly Albanian (92%), particularly due to their high birth rate, but also due to the Serbians’ migration because of the Albanians’ intolerance. An interesting aspect of the Serbian authorities’ politics is the way in which they treat minorities. Thus, the Albanian and Hungarian minorities sometimes enjoyed some rights and even a certain degree of local autonomy, other minorities have been assimilated as they were not recognized and given any rights. A possible explanation is that the Serbian authorities wanted to prevent them from claiming rights, as the Albanian and Hungarians had done before. However, little progress has been done in this respect since the year 2001.

Serbia’s current geopolitical position in Europe has changed significantly, considering its Euro-Atlantic orientation. After 1999, Serbia is still a country with a weak economy, incapable to preserve its neutrality. But Belgrade tries to emphasize and enhance its international prestige by its alliances with Moscow, Beijing and Washington in an attempt to apply the reforms required by Brussels.

The Republic of Slovenia declared its independence in 1991 and has an exit to the Adriatic Sea. It is also a NATO and EU member. In fact, it is the most economically advanced country in the region, which played a significant role in its EU admission in 2004 along with its political stability and coherence. Its political leaders’ pragmatism made Slovenia the only former Yugoslavian state that did not break economic relations with Yugoslavia, which helped overcome the impact of recession by exporting goods and service to the East.

Ukraine is one of the most important state in south-east Europe and it declared its independence from the former Soviet Union in 1991. On the one hand, it adheres to the Euro-Atlantic values; on the other hand, it preserves close relations with Russia.
Its political balance is fragile, and the population is undecided between the two orientations. The reform is declining, diplomacy turns towards Kremlin, whereas the country depends on the Russian energy resources. The tense relations with Romania, Poland and Georgia are fueled constantly, and so are the interethnic and interreligious ones. The strategic impeding of Ukraine’s adherence to MAP is perceived differently by different countries if one considers that France and Germany did not agree with it.

Due to its geographic size, economic potential and military potential, Ukraine is regarded as a regional power. At the same time, Ukraine deprived Russia from the access to the Danube and separated the straight of Bosphorus from Crimea, which consolidates its geostrategic value.

3. CONCLUSIONS

Placing south-eastern Europe and its adjacent areas at the heart of Euro-Atlantic concerns is a sine-qua-non prerequisite for the positive evolution of political situation, as well as regional and world stability and security. The primary responsibility of south-eastern European states is to provide stability to the people in the region, considering their huge cultural diversity, which is both a source of conflicts and a pool of richness. Also, the natural resources give these countries particular strategic importance. Their geographic position makes them a bridge for the various international actors with distinct economic, strategic and political interests. Thus, the concepts of south-eastern Europe becomes a useful tool for understanding the complex dynamics of these phenomena. When talking about the Black Sea, George Cristian Maior said:

“In order to define the security dimension of the Black Sea, I believe that the concept of bridge instead of border should be used more comprehensively. The Black Sea could become a strategic platform used to spread democracy and stability and to promote sustainable development and security from the Mediterranean Sea to Levant, Middle East and Central Asia”.

ENDNOTES AND REFERENCES

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES: SOME CORRELATIONS

PhD Florentin Adrian ILIE

National and international security objectives, as well as the correlations that can be established between them are the tell tale sign of the complexity characteristic of contemporary society. Moreover, as a result of the globalization phenomenon that is changing the physiognomy of humankind and generates an in-depth impact on the current approaches to security in general, these objectives gain new meanings and interpretations. Starting from the axiomatic truth that all national and international endeavors in the field of security need to be focused on the human being and its fundamental rights, it is our firm belief that the analysis of the national and international security objectives can be undertaken only by focusing on the interdependence between them and factors like national interest and human security.

Key words: security, objectives, globalization, military globalization, human security, national interest

The international security environment can be characterized as extremely fluid and unpredictable. Such features have a deep impact on the courses of action taken by contemporary world actors and aimed at preserving the normalcy in the future development of the international community by safeguarding values like democracy, peace, freedom and human rights. As a result, the complexity triggered by any approach to the national and international objectives, as well as to the relationship between them has made us focus in a more thorough and comprehensive manner on the main parameters characterizing the international security environment. Thus, the aim of this article is to ponder over the aforementioned universal values and on their real meaning when it comes to associating them with key concepts like international and national security. In this respect, I would like to emphasize that the opinions expressed in this paper do not reflect any official view on the subject and that they are in line with two famous quotes belonging to Kofi Annan and to Oscar Wilde, respectively: “Peace means much more than the absence of war.”[1] and “When liberty comes with hands dabbled in blood it is hard to shake hands with her”. [2]

The research in the opinions expressed by reputable Romanian and foreign specialists in the field of security, as well as in the official documents in the same field yielded the conclusion that both national and international security are viewed as the reality perceived in a given moment without any further details on how such reality developed. In our opinion, exactly these details need to be investigated in order to understand the role played by states, by international organizations,
by alliances or various groups in creating the necessary framework for the development and maintenance of national and international security. As a result, I believe that the relationship between national and international objectives should be investigated in order to better establish the boundaries of international law concerning peace safeguarding and human security preservation.

The hypothesis underlying this opinion is that the relationship between national and international interests is tightly connected to a political, legal and military framework that should allow for their manifestation without any conflicting standpoints. Moreover, should there be any differences between the two types of interests, the instruments and mechanisms based on which national interests can be adapted to the international ones and further put into practice need to be identified. In this respect, through an analogy to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s aphorism “Freedom is not about what people can do as they will, but about the fact that they should not do what they are not willing to”. [3] and in line with specialists’ opinion that the human being’s system of reference for understanding liberty is the legal framework, I would like to underline that the system of international norms should be used in order to attain national objectives and not viewed as a constraining one.

The most relevant definition of international security, out of a plethora of such definitions, is the one according to which the aforementioned concept “is the way international relationships are organized so that all states are protected against aggressions, threats to use force, use of force, attacks on their national sovereignty, independence or territorial integrity. Moreover, it also encompasses the ever increasing interdependence between military, political, economic, social, technological and geographical factors”. [4]

The opinion I uphold in this paper and that is based on a thorough research in the field is that the national interest is defined as the will of the people, that is the consensus of the majority that establishes and accomplishes national expectations within the broad framework of international laws and regulations. Moreover, I would also like to emphasize that these international norms and objectives are the result of harmonizing national interests with the international ones. Last but the least, it is worth underlining the correlation between the national and international security, as well as the fact that the national interest, regardless of its characteristics, is legitimate. However, for the latter to be met it has to be in accordance with the legal framework.

Globalization influences the systemic correlation between national and international security, as well. In this respect, there are a lot of specialized opinions concerning its negative and positive impact [5]. Since the subject is a broad one, I will only focus on the military globalization and on the debate on that. Thus, there are two conflicting views according to which this kind of globalization does not exist at all, or it is accepted unconditionally. I myself support the second perspective and my opinion is supported by the fact that from the dawn of civilization and until nowadays military power has played a major role in the globalization of humankind’s issues.
What is for sure is that globalization, the military one included, has shaped the physiognomy of the contemporary world. As a result, deep changes have also occurred in the nature and approaches to international and national security, and these are yet to be investigated and accounted for. One obvious consequence of military globalization is global insecurity generated by those opposing to this contemporary phenomenon.

In order to eliminate any confusion, I must make a distinction between global militarization and military globalization. While the former refers to a generalized process of establishing a “world military base” (evaluated against the increasing level of military expenditures, of armament and of the armed forces), the latter is defined by the processes and patterns of interconnection in the military field that go beyond the local boundaries of national states. In my opinion, the main elements that define military globalization are: the globalization of concepts, of culture, of techniques and technologies, of the means and procedures employed in undertaking battles, of the space, risks and conflicts. As a result, this type of globalization is not about the forces and means involved, but about its consequences that more often than not are of a global nature.

Contemporary world evolution has objectively led to an increased preoccupationon behalf of international organizations for peace safeguarding and for accomplishing human security objectives, prerequisites that, in case of failure in meeting them, would make it difficult to anticipate the future of humankind.

To sum up, within the broad context of human security, it is a necessity to analyze the correlations between national and international security objectives. Moreover, the interconnectivity between the former and the latter is more than obvious. In this respect, it must be reminded that the preoccupation for human security dates back to the dawn of humanity. Last but not the least, I would like to reiterate once more the necessity to correlate the political, legal and military frameworks in order to uphold the accomplishment of national and international objectives without triggering any conflicts.

In conclusion, even if it is difficult to cover the subject of national and international objectives in a comprehensive manner in only one paper, I would like to underline their fundamental value for the current world. Moreover, regardless of the number of investigations and studies undertaken in this field, one can never say it is enough given their ultimate beneficiary, that is the human being. As a result, the inherent conclusion of this paper is that all human endeavors should be aimed at serving humankind.
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TRAINING AND EDUCATION
IN THE SERVICE OF MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

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The magnitude and challenges posed by the military transformation process cannot be overcome unless the personnel involved in implementing it is well trained and motivated, for this endeavor requires a set of special skills and knowledge. Therefore, this article attempts to present two possible tools to facilitate this complex process.

Key words: education, training, military transformation, personnel, skills and knowledge.

1. INTRODUCTION

Given the complex nature of transformation in general, and military transformation in particular, the hereby paper argues that education and training are essential for the success of the endeavor. In this respect, two concepts are suggested in order to facilitate the process while keeping the staff motivated: learning organization and total quality management. I support this idea starting from the assumption that the personnel’s permanent education accompanied by the concern to offer high quality services and/or products play a critical role in any organization’s success, the military one included. Since in the case of the military organization one cannot talk about products and services, I shall assume that the military must ‘produce’ security and display professional conduct within the NATO and other international missions in which it takes part.

In order to support my initial hypothesis, I will examine the two concepts and then I will conclude upon the need for the education and training of the staff involved in the process of Romanian military transformation.

2. TWO LEARNING METHODS TO ENHANCE TRANSFORMATION

I would like to mention from the very beginning that the idea of combining the two aforementioned concepts is not new. As McAdam et al. (1998) argue, the two approaches share numerous commonalities in spite of the fact that their synergy has not been exploited in theory or in practice. Since I support their usefulness in our study, I shall start by defining them followed by an analysis related to their contribution to the optimization of military transformation.
2.1. THE CONCEPT OF LEARNING ORGANIZATION

The main characteristic of this concept is knowledge expansion, but not knowledge in its academic meaning. Instead, we refer to knowledge as a central hub of productivity, when learning itself becomes a way of working. Moreover, this type of organization changes continuously and creates all the necessary conditions for its members to learn permanently.

Although it may be regarded as a new trend or fad among many others in management theory and practice, learning plays a critical role in securing an organization’s success and progress, as its employees’ professional standard is the very guarantee of these aspects. In fact, it is all about building a professional and personal philosophy that emphasizes the permanent concern for knowledge and skill acquisition, which can only result in better professional performance, that is, better products and/or services (Hicks: 1996).

Considering the synergetic principle according to which every employee’s professional performance leads to the overall performance of the entire organization, one may assume that this permanent improvement will also result in the improvement of the organizational processes as a whole.

After examining the trends and contradictions displayed by the process of managerial development, Talbot (1997) identifies three elements of the learning process:

- education, which targets the acquisition of knowledge, skills, moral values and an understanding of some general aspects of life rather than a certain field of activity;
- development, which consists of becoming aware of one’s personal skills by means of conscious and unconscious learning such as courses, experience, counseling or mentoring;
- training, which is a planned process of changing attitudes, knowledge or skills as a result of the gained experience, whose purpose is to obtain performance in a certain field of activity.

As far as the organizational learning methods are concerned, they comprise three techniques: case study, simulation and consultancy project (Jennings: 2002). According to the purpose of learning, every method offers advantages and disadvantages. Thus, the case study places the student in a neutral position, when he/she is free to explore certain problems in connection with theory by using his/her own analysis, communication and synthesis skills. On the other hand, case studies pose limitations because they do not present the entire image of an organization and consequently pose the risk of judging simplistically a certain context.

Simulation allows learning from a new situation in the absence of real and unnecessary risks, and also allows gaining some decision-making skills. Furthermore, this technique stimulates research, communication and team work, but displays one
significant drawback: it lacks the realistic dimension.

Finally, the consultancy project involves learning by doing and it takes place outside the classroom. More precisely, the subjects are placed in a real organizational context, and then they are asked to suggest both methods to improve services and/or products and ways to implement them. Projects must be realistic and doable, which means that learning takes place by taking risks and assuming their consequences, based on the idea that problem solving and confronting the related anxiety are viewed as natural elements of learning by doing. Other advantages of this method refer to the awareness of one’s own strengths and weaknesses as well as the strengths and weaknesses of one’s partners. However, there are also shortcomings in this endeavor. First, it is essential that the process organizer and coordinator should know the participants very well in order to accurately estimate their ability to interact. It naturally follows that this method is time consuming and it does not guarantee outstanding results, because the participants may feel frustrated or overwhelmed by the encountered obstacles, which can lead them to superficial solutions.

As one can notice, each of the three techniques has good points and bad points, but one may consider using them alternatively, which may minimize the disadvantages and maximize the advantages of the learning process.

Although I strongly believe that searching for recipes for success in management is at least risky if not impossible, there are theorists who have tried to develop such recipes or models. I consider that their intention was not to find a generally valid template, but rather to offer their own vision and understanding of some organizational phenomena from their own personal viewpoints. In a way, we may regard management theories and models as lessons learned: they are the result of some real experiences and they reflect what the author understood from those situations, whose implications are synthesized and put at the disposal of other people who may find themselves in a similar context.

As Smith et al. (1996) point out, learning is a dynamic concept, and its use illustrates the ever changing nature of organizations, in which globalization and competition are fundamental components. In the authors’ opinion, learning is a strategic capability of paramount importance for gaining competitive advantage. This stance contradicts the previous ones, which claimed that competitive advantage was due to the availability of the organization’s measurable resources – financial, material, etc. – without paying too much attention to the organization’s intangible resources such as intellectual capital or educational potential. Also, there has not been enough emphasis of the need to sustain this advantage in the long run by means of implementing an organizational culture centered on learning values.

Mention should be made that there is no one single resource able
to ensure organizational success. Instead, one should adopt a dynamic and synergetic manner of managing the organization by managing a bunch of its resources.

I cannot conclude this analysis of the importance of learning for organizational success without clarifying some aspects related to the significance of the terms “competitive advantage” and “organizational performance”. If a civilian organization – be it public or private – they are measured by means of profits or product/service quality, a military organization must use different tools. One method to do it is to take into consideration the way in which the Romanian military staff act within international missions, as their performance mirror quite accurately the system’s level of efficiency and effectiveness by mission accomplishment or, in extreme cases, by the number of victims.

2.2. TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT

This is defined as a holistic philosophy of business excellence which covers a wide range of terms such as leadership, strategy, policies, human, material, informational and financial resources, professional satisfaction, customer satisfaction, social impact etc. at the same time, this type of management is based on clear principles: leadership commitment, top-down communication, subordinates’ empowerment, building a real team spirit, collective responsibility and accountability for high service/product quality, and permanent concern for organizational processes improvement (Montes et al., 2003). Moreover, the cultural and structural change management – with clear consequences upon the process of decision-making at all hierarchical levels – is regarded as the main ingredient of organizational performance. We thus can conclude that total quality management is much more than a managerial fad. Next, I will briefly explain the importance of each of them in an attempt to delineate the connection between organizational learning and total quality management, as well as the way in which these two concepts can contribute to the transformation of the military system.

Leadership commitment. According to management literature, it secures the credibility of the entire process. Also, the leader must play two roles: to establish organizational values and to build the change infrastructure (Dale and Cooper, 1994). This has to unfold at every hierarchical level in order to make sure that the system is adopted at a total scale across the organization.

Top-down communication. This ensure the vital connection between the decision-makers and the subordinates, and also the cooperation and mutual support in every organizational process. An important benefit of it is the decrease in change resistance and system inertia caused by the uncertainty and suspicion associated to change.
Subordinates’ empowerment and team spirit. Without these two ingredients, total quality management can be regarded as “humane autocracy” or “backdoor Taylorism”, because this type of management is imposed from the top of the hierarchical pyramid and involves the use of some measurable tools to evaluate one’s work performance. Consequently, total quality management must be based on autonomous and mature employees, able to make decisions and solve problems related to quality. This also leads to a flexible structure consisting of agile teams of professionals.

Collective responsibility and accountability for the work done. Since total quality management implies the permanent improvement of organizational processes, a frequent obstacle to its implementation has been the subordinates’ fear of making mistakes. In order to overcome this barrier, the superiors must accept and tolerate the likelihood for this to happen and consider it a positive learning experience. This can only be done by creating a culture based on efficient and honest vertical and horizontal communication.

Permanent improvement of organizational processes. This is the dimension that completes the imaginary circle of total quality management and removes one of the reasons why employees may reject this type of leadership: the fear of job loss since total quality management could mean more work for fewer employees. On the contrary, by learning and professional improvement, employees become more and more valuable. On the other hand, superiors must devote more time to provide feedback to subordinates in order to correct potential problems.

3. CONCLUSIONS

In spite of the clear complex nature of these management models, as well as the difficulties their implementation entail, I consider that they are a viable solution for organizational process improvement in the military system, particularly if accompanied by organizational learning. In fact, I think that the two concepts have many common aspects, particularly the emphasis on permanent acquisition of knowledge, skills and experience. Both models stress upon the active involvement of the leaders in order to ensure the endeavor credibility as well as on identifying obstacles, making optimal decisions, constructively solving problems, and honestly communicating with peers, superiors and subordinates. All of these mean, in fact, a profound cultural change of the entire system, with a direct impact upon the whole transformation process.
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE

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Successful organizations are the result of effective leadership and organizational culture. These two elements are interrelated; an organization will always reflect the values and beliefs of its founder(s) since they are the ones shaping the cultural traits of the organization. In time, as the organization evolves and its culture develops, this new culture will shape the leader and will influence his actions.

Key words: leadership, organizational culture, performance, change, followers, transformational leadership, ownership mindset.

1. INTRODUCTION

Leadership and organizational culture have been in the center of attention for the last two decades, mostly because of their tight interdependence with organizational performance. While in the past the emphasis was placed upon financial performance, nowadays, non-financial indices such as quality and customer satisfaction can be used to evaluate organizational performance. If an organization wants to improve its performance, it is the leadership style that should be analyzed and adapted to new requirements.

2. LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE

Leadership is one of the buzzwords of management professionals these days and those in charge of organizations would rather be perceived as leaders than managers. So, what is leadership? A short definition could run as “the art of motivating a group of people to act towards achieving a common goal” [1]. If expanded, then leadership is actually a persuasion process on someone’s behalf so that subordinates carry out the tasks needed to accomplish organizational objectives, as well as a visionary endeavor to be communicated to others. Moreover it is a way of creating followers as a result of possessing the right knowledge and skills. Thus, in Peter Drucker’s words: “Leadership is all about results” [2].

Some analysts say that leaders are born, others say that leaders can be made and yet, both sides are right: there are inborn qualities that make a leader but, they alone are not enough. These qualities need to be developed, knowledge needs to be acquired and most of all, experience needs to be accumulated. Effective leadership means the success of the organization.
Effective leadership is sometimes difficult to define since it is built upon many variables and characteristics influencing the way it is measured in order to be considered effective. Leadership implies values, creativity, intelectual drive and knowledge, self-confidence, ethics, courage, charisma, etc. Basically, a good leader has to have a purpose and a balanced personality and skills to put that purpose into action. The leader has the vision, dedication, integrity, is creative and open towards new approaches and towards people, ensures that credit for succes is given to all employees and at the same time he will take responsibility for failures.

Nowadays, the volatile environment, and globalization require a flexible leader that should act as an agent of change and center of gravity [3], someone who can enable people and organization to adapt and be successful while keeping in mind customer satisfaction.

3. LEADERSHIP STYLES

Management literature mentions leadership styles like: autocratic leadership, bureaucratic leadership, charismatic leadership, democratic leadership or participative leadership, laissez-faire leadership, people-oriented leadership or relations-oriented leadership, servant leadership, task-oriented leadership, transactional leadership, transformational leadership.

Each style of leadership impacts organizational performance differently, some of them helping organizations evolve and achieve success, others only hindering their development and being a source of dissatisfaction and demotivation. For example, laissez-faire is a hands-off approach where no one sets any objectives, directions, restrictions etc., hence the lack of motivation, poor work practices and lack of performance. Another leadership style which can have a negative impact upon the performance of an organization is the autocratic style. It is an extreme form of leadership where the leader exerts extreme power upon the staff, offering them very few opportunities of saying what they think or of involving themseves actively in the way the activity is developed. Therefore, the level of performance is very low.

On the other hand, transformational leadership, which is one of the most modern and most successful styles of leading, is the style in which the leader plays the role model, he inspires his followers and challenges them to be more involved in their work. Transformational leaders communicate with their people, delegate responsibility, try to know their staff, to understand their
strong and weak points in order to find the best way to optimize their performance, thus optimizing entire organization’s performance.

Transformational leaders can change an employee from a worker who carries out tasks into a valuable team member. Thus, they can modify the way employees think and feel about their work and the organization by creating an ownership mindset. Transformational leadership can help employees trust the company and its mission, and thus stop questioning the objectives of the organization and work harder to achieve results.

A transformational leader can elicit a stronger sense of commitment from the staff, which will have a positive impact on effectiveness and efficiency of their work and consequently of the organization.

Transformational leaders believe in delegating responsibility, getting the staff involved in important decisions and showing confidence in their ability to make the right choices.

According to Bass, there are four key dimensions of leadership that are used to accomplish the transformation of subordinates, and of the organization: attributed charisma and idealized influence, inspirational motivation, individualized consideration, intellectual stimulation [4]

Attributed charisma and Idealized influence (initially called charisma) is the main feature of this type of leadership and it refers to the leader gaining trust and confidence of others by showing conviction, commitment, ethics, involvement etc.

Inspirational motivation implies communicating the vision positively, with confidence, showing energy and enthusiasm all these in order to create an appealing and convincing vision.

Individualized consideration – transformational leaders see every employee as an individual having specific needs and qualities, having strengths and weaknesses. Transformational leaders value each individual contribution.

Intellectual stimulation – for transformational leaders creativity, continuous improvement and training are the only ways to achieve sustainable competitive advantage. They constantly change and adapt the way of doing things in order to stimulate the others and they also encourage new ideas and suggestions coming from their subordinates.

Transformational leaders can have a strong impact upon those who follow them, their leadership skills can correct poor practices or internal conflicts between employees, they encourage new approaches and the development of their subordinates thus receiving from their followers more than the follower intended to give. What is very important is that transformational leaders encourage their people to take ownership for their work thus making them more attentive and dedicated to what they are doing.

4. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE LEADERSHIP AND PERFORMANCE

As it was said in the beginning of this article, successful organizations are the result of effective leadership but also of organizational culture. These two elements are interrelated; an organization and its leadership style will always reflect the values and beliefs of its founder(s), the founder being the one who sets the
cultural traits of the organization. At the same time, the culture, through its development, will impact the way the organization is led.

This new culture will shape the leader and will influence his actions. This is an ongoing process through which the founder/leader creates and shapes the organization but at the same time the organization (organizational culture) shapes him. The degree to which the values of the culture are shared by the employees and also the degree of alignment with the values implied in the company strategy, in turn, will influence the organizational performance.

![Fig.2. Elements influencing organizational performance](image)

Good leaders can manipulate the organizational culture to their advantage and change it in line with their vision. There is a constant interweaving between culture and leadership since leaders create the context and the instruments for cultural and organizational development, for strengthening the norms and values expressed within the culture. Norms appear and change according to the focus of interest, according to the leaders’ reaction to crises, and to whom they are interested in attracting to their organizations. The features of an organization's culture are developed and instilled by its leadership and eventually adopted by its followers. An organizational culture is usually created from a preconceived cultural scheme that the founders have in their mind.

As a conclusion, the success or failure of an organization is directly connected to the leadership style and the relevance of the founder's beliefs, values, to the current opportunities and constraints confronting the organization at a specific moment. The style of leadership affects performance since performance cannot be achieved in the absence of a leadership that can adapt to the changes and challenges of the environment, that knows how to motivate the employees and that encourages them to take more ownership for their work.

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The concepts of interpersonal communication competence, intercultural communication competence and intercultural competence are prone to frequent misunderstanding as a result of an epistemic field that does not draw clear cut distinctions among the disciplines the former are subject of. With a view to facilitating future research in the fields of the aforementioned concepts, this paper will focus on their operationalization by delineating not only the differences among them, but also their inherent marginal overlapping.

Key words: interpersonal communication competence, intercultural communication competence, intercultural competence, culture, multidisciplinary approach

1. INTRODUCTION

The concepts of interpersonal communication competence, intercultural communication competence and intercultural competence are prone to frequent misunderstanding as a result of an epistemic field that does not draw clear cut distinctions among the disciplines the former are subject of. With a view to facilitating future research in the fields of the aforementioned concepts, this paper will focus on their operationalization by delineating not only the differences among them, but also their inherent marginal overlapping.

In this respect, the first distinction to be made is between interpersonal communication and intercultural communication. Thus, the former is culturally grounded, while the latter completes it and develops based on it.

Moreover, the intercultural dimension of the communication competence does not lead to narrowing the perspective on communication to the intercultural context generating it. On the contrary, it involves extending its definition by focusing on inter and multidisciplinary approaches to a concept that by its dynamic nature becomes difficult to pin down in a static definition. In this respect, Sercu notes that:“The concept of ‘intercultural communicative competence’ is relatively new, interdisciplinary in nature, so widely used and under so many different conditions that, in the end, as Seelye poignantly puts it, „only the reader of any publication of intercultural communication holds its true definition”. Thus, intercultural communication can be viewed as an instantiation of interpersonal communication. However, its features
depend on the context within which communication occurs.

For a clearer distinction between the two concepts, their analysis can be better performed by juxtaposing them on two defining axes: interpersonal communication vs. mediated communication on one hand and interactive studies vs. comparative studies (Assante și Gudykunst), on the other hand. Starting from this, intercultural communication is part of the cultural studies- interpersonal communication quarter.

Fig.1. Intercultural communication framework (apud Ammon, 2005:1675)

In addition, “according to this model, both cross- and intercultural communication are about interpersonal communication. Cross-cultural communication focuses on comparative studies of interpersonal communication in different cultures, and intercultural communication focuses on interaction between persons representing different cultures (and international communication is concerned with mass communication across national media structures). However, there is some terminological confusion here, as the terms intercultural and cross-cultural sometimes appear to be used interchangeably”. (Ammon, 2005:1674).

2. INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION COMPETENCE

A better understanding of the concept of “intercultural communication competence” requires an insight into the meaning of the overall concept of “competence”, as well as into the one of “communication competence”. Moreover, its correct usage imposes an overview of its origins and development. Consequently, this subchapter will focus on all of these.

As far as the concept of “competence” is concerned, the latter refers to the “fitness or ability to perform” (Spitzberg, Cupach, 1989:6) and, more specifically, to the ability of any individual to adequately perform in a given environment. Thus, it is inherently interrelated with the “individual features that are tightly connected to personal values and knowledge” (Levy-Leboyer, apud Şoitu, 2006:58), as well as to the overall anatomical, neurological, neurophysiological and behavioural feedback to the surrounding environment (Larousse, 2006:218). Thus, the concept of communication competence refers not only to the capacity to adapt to the surrounding environment, but also to the physical and psychological features of an individual that enable the latter’s communicative performance in a given environment.

Currently, the communication competence is viewed as adequately performing in a given context and in front of a specific audience. However, the concept has been the subject of
2.1. A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW OF THE COMMUNICATION COMPETENCE CONCEPT

The linguistic perspective on communication established by Chomsky (2006:4) focuses on the ability of an ideal receiver to produce/understand infinity of grammatically correct sentences, but overlooks the pragmatic dimension of the concept. Thus, as Young notices, the linguists view this competence as “the capacity to produce grammatically well-formed utterances in a language – utterances which convey the intended semantic meaning, presumably” (Young, 1996:122).

However, such a perspective is quite a restrictive one and, hence, does not take into account how the interlocutor perceives reality, nor the norms that govern social relationships. As a result, the concept has evolved under the influence of interactionist schools. In this respect, the Frankfurt School, and more specifically Jürgen Habermas, had a notable influence. Starting with 1971 the latter rejects the restrictive notion of linguistic competence as explained by Chomsky on the grounds that it does not account for the cultural interpretation of meanings, nor for their negotiation. As a result, Habermas views the communication competence not in terms of an ideal meaning receiver/producer, but in terms of an ideal speaking situation that requires the receiver’s/producer’s ability to:

1) to enact an ideal communication instance and
2) to use the knowledge and competence required by the role to be played.

Thus, the ideal speaking situation underlies the theory developed by Habermas, while the role played by a speaker is referred to as symbolic interaction and the communication instance is associated with the communication competence.

In 1979, Habermas defines the concept of communication competence as “a speaker’s capacity to introduce a correctly formulated sentence that is in accordance with reality and with the latter’s orientation towards mutual understanding” (Habermas, 1979:29).

Understanding is possible if the actors of the communicative stance simultaneously access the level of inter-subjectivity and the level of the objects upon which they agree. In line with Habermas, Hans-Eberhard Piepho (apud Berns, 1990:97), a specialist in language pedagogy defined communication competence as “the ability to make oneself understood, without hesitation and inhibitions, by linguistic means which the individual comprehends and has learned to assess in terms of their effects, and the ability to comprehend communicative intentions even when they are expressed in a code which the speaker him or herself does not yet know well enough to use and is only partially available in his or her own idiolect”.

Another definition of the concept is provided by sociolinguistics. Unlike Chomsky who focused on the syntactic dimension of communication or Habermas who...
emphasized the semantic view, Dell Hymes (1972:284) takes a pragmatic view to the concept. As a result, it defines communication competence as the knowledge participants to the speech act need in order to interact at a social level and in order to be communicationally successful and that they employ by adapting themselves to concrete communication situations. Thus, the concept is redefined as the linguistic instantiation of the knowledge necessary for interaction within a given context that requires ability for the use of such knowledge. Canale and Swain take the concept even further and define it in terms of three components: grammar competence (similar to the one postulated by Chomsky), sociolinguistic competence (sociocultural and discursive) and strategic competence. Moreover, in 1986, Jan A. van Ek defined the concept as the sum of linguistic competence, sociolinguistic competence, discursive competence, sociocultural competence, strategic competence, and social competence. Lyle F. Bachman (1990:87-97), takes a similar view by criticizing at the same time the static nature of the Canale-Swain model. As a result, the theorist proposes a model of analysis for the communication competence called the communicative language ability (CLA) model focusing on the linguistic and strategic competence, as well as on the psycho-physiological mechanisms of the individual.

A synthetic model presenting the functional relationships among the strategic, actional, linguistic and discursive competences is suggested by Marianne Celce-Murcia et al. (Fig.2). In their later studies (2000, 2008) the authors replace the name of “actional competence” with the one of “interactional competence” and also introduce the overall term of formulaic competence in order to refer the conventional aspects of language such “as the oral speech acts or the written rhetorical moves that function as part of communicative competence” (Celce-Murcia, Olshtain, 2000:71).
According to Henry G. Widdowson, the communication competence is not only a matter of matching different forms of knowledge, but also a matter of complex negotiation of the common knowledge framework within which the linguistic instantiation takes place (2007:25).

All of the above models contributed to the definition of the general competences and of the communication competence, in particular, within the Common European Framework, which represents the nexus of the theories underlying current training programs in foreign languages at the level of the European Union. (2002:5).

2.2. THE CULTURAL FRAMEWORK UNDERPINNING THE CONCEPT OF INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION COMPETENCE

As it results from the brief theoretical background provided in the previous subchapter, the communication competence is made up of two distinct dimensions: a linguistic one and a performing one. Thus, while the former actually covers the linguistic competence, the latter refers to the communication competence. This one involves, besides factual linguistic performance, a communication capacity alongside with the ability to evaluate it. As a result, the communication competence is about interpersonal communication and communication skills that specialists view as “specific components that make up or contribute to the manifestation or judgment of competence” (Spitzberg, Cupach, 1989:6).

The difference between the two is delineated by Spitzberg and Cupach’s dyadic model of the interpersonal competence that is described from a relational perspective. The model actually takes further the terminology imposed by Habermas, Piepho, Hymes, Canale & Swain, Bachman and Widdowson and it views competence as the result of effectiveness and appropriateness, while interpersonal competence is explained as follows: “Effectiveness is pertinent to goal attainment, such as satisfaction, desired change, or creativity. The importance of appropriateness indicates the contextuality, or relation/context specificity. One’s knowledge, motivation, and skills affect the perceived effectiveness and appropriateness, and ultimately influences other’s judgment of competence.” (Wieman et al., 1997:31).

The distinction between competence and communication skills can be viewed from a two-fold perspective. On the one hand, from an inclusive viewpoint that subordinates communication skills to interpersonal competence. In this respect, Hajek & Giles (2003:936) remark: “(...) communication competence has been regarded as social judgement about behavior, in contrast to the notion of communication „skills”, which refers to interlocutors’ specific verbal and nonverbal communicative behaviors.” (Hammer, 1989).”

On the other hand, competence is only a matter of establishing a relationship between effectiveness and appropriateness since “interpersonal competence is intimately bound to the maintenance of mutually satisfying, effective relational systems... In fact, from an interactional perspective, it makes no sense to talk about a person
being competent apart from a specific relationship or set of relationships” (Wieman et al., 1997:26).

The delineations made between the components of competence, in general, and of the interpersonal communication competence, in particular, as well as those between the communication competence and communication skills can contribute to the construction of a functional whole that allows the analysis of those elements that are characteristic of the psychological processes, of the observable activities, of the values that are an inherent part of any individual and, in the end, facilitates the development of the interpersonal communication competence. In this respect, the best model that summarizes the constituents of the interpersonal communication competence is the one described by Wiemann&Wiemann (1992) and presented in Figure 4.

The interpersonal communication competence is, among other characteristics, a matter of a mutual cultural background. The latter, as an instantiation of the cultural identities of communication actors, is the result of a negotiation process between their cultural identities involving both self-perception and the perception and evaluation of the other in a game of identity and status disclosure. Thus, in the context of a new concept’s emergence (i.e. intercultural communication competence) that imposes the alignment of the intercultural communication competence to the cultural background of the communication actors and
not its limitation to its pluri-cultural manifestation, cultural identity gains importance and relevance.

3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION COMPETENCE AND THE INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION COMPETENCE

The intercultural communication competence requires an intercultural system of reference. Concerning this, Hajek şi Giles (2003:937) notice the following: “We generally consider communication to be “intercultural” to the extent that interlocutors perceive their group membership(s) to be salient in any given encounter (see Tajfel & Turner, 1986), but we also acknowledge, and adopt the view, that communication is “intercultural” when the group membership involved pertain to relatively large group of individuals (e.g., national or ethnic groups, with their unique histories, values, artifacts, customs, and communication patterns)”. Thus, intercultural communication allows both a broad and restrictive perspective. In this respect, according to Redder and Rehbein (apud Ammon, 2005:1677), the restrictive view concerns communication within a single society/community in a single language, while the general perspective refers to communication among members of different communities who employ their native language. Thus, once the system of reference allowing for the interpersonal communication to be characterized as intercultural is defined, then one can also employ the terms of efficiency and appropriateness (characteristic of competences in general) to refer to the intercultural communication competence.

Simply put, the intercultural communication competence is defined as the efficient and appropriate communication in a given context (Samovar et al., 2010:384). However, a more complex definition of this type of competence would require viewing it as the ability to act efficiently and appropriately regardless of the cultural context. Hence, it would involve the following psychological profile of the communicator: motivated to communicate; adequate cultural knowledge; sensitivity; character (Samovar et al., 2010:386).

Concerning the psychosocial features, the intercultural communication competence is not a matter of an individual’s availability, willingness and capacity to communicate within the limits of his/her own psychological, cognitive processes. On the contrary, it is characterized by dynamism, interaction, coordination. As a result, this kind of communication cannot be equaled to adaptive availability, nor to communication efficiency within a pluricultural framework, as Samovar et al. (2009:399) put it ”(...) intercultural communication competence is a multidimensional concept comprising the cognitive, affective, and behavioral aspects of human interaction. Intercultural effectiveness represents only the behavioral aspects of intercultural communication competence; it is inconceivable to treat intercultural effectiveness and intercultural communication competence interchangeably.” Intercultural efficiency is easy to develop/train...
and involves resorting to the sum of knowledge and skills that should be put into practice in an intercultural context but which are difficult to use if compared to the strategic competence described by Canale & Swain and Bachman. According to the aforementioned theoreticians, the development of the latter is based on a sensitivity to subtle differences, that is “developing strong intercultural communicative competence means that we have to open our eyes to the tacit differences (hidden dimensions) of intercultural encounters in order to understand why we want to say something, what to say, how to say it, when it is an appropriate time to say it, and to whom we would say it” (Tuleja, 2009:135).

The concepts of efficiency and appropriateness focus on a set of personal skills that involve performing in a communication context. Thus, efficiency is about an individual’s ability to generate the envisaged results by interacting with a given environment (Chen, Starosta, 2008:217). Such a skill is viewed either as a manner of activating knowledge through learning, as well as the socialization of a human predisposition (White, 1959:297-333), or as being developed outside a system of reference with a forming role. “In addition, ideally competent communicators should be able to control and manipulate their environments to attain personal goals. In order to maximize such goals, individuals must be able to identify them, get relevant information about them, accurately predict others’ responses, select communication strategies, implement those communication strategies, and accurately access the interaction result”. (Chen, Starosta, 2008:217).

In this respect, generally speaking, the communication competence can be viewed as a set of personal abilities used in establishing and achieving objectives, in efficiently collaborating with the others and in adapting to varied situations. At a more particular level, this competence can be viewed not only as the efficient and appropriate interaction among different persons, but also as the efficient and appropriate interaction among people who identify themselves with a given physical or symbolic environment (Chen, Starosta, 2008:219). Thus, the intercultural communication competence can be defined as the ability to negotiate cultural meanings while efficiently and appropriately transferring information, namely as the identification and evaluation of multiple identities in a specific communication environment.

The intercultural communication competence is not the result of activating a single type of competence. Thus, the efficient and appropriate interaction is not solely about interpersonal communication, but also involves a certain inherent cultural profile of the actors involved in the communication process. In this respect, Spitzberg and Cupach (1984) identified a set of seven competences that should be enacted when communicating with representatives of other cultures. These competences area as follows: the fundamental competence (the general ability to efficiently adapt to a new environment in order achieve the established objectives); the social competence (empathy, role enactment, cognitive complexity, interaction management); social abilities; interpersonal competence (adequate interaction in order to accomplish
goals and fulfill responsibilities by resorting to communication; linguistic competence (ability to use language); communication competence (knowledge of linguistic norms, of the rules required to enact the latter, namely of the means to adequate to language to the context that generates it); relational competence (related to interactions and involving the correlation of the other six competences by trespassing the limits they involve). Such a perspective as the above characterizing intercultural communication as an event involving the activation of a number of competences renders a complex view. However, without simplifying, it is correct to say that the basic elements of all these competences are actually part of the intercultural communication competences. Aligned with the set of competences described by Spitzberg-Cupach, as well as with the psychological view on the communicator taken by Chen and Starosta (2008:221-229) I suggest a multilevel approach to intercultural communication that captures the interdependence between the processes of adaptation, interaction and communication, an interdependence that can be best explained through three perspectives:

a) intercultural sensitivity characterized by the view on oneself, open-mindedness, nonjudgmental attitudes and social relaxation;

b) intercultural awareness understood as self-awareness and cultural awareness;

c) intercultural adroitness defined through message skills, appropriate self-disclosure, behavioral flexibility, interaction management and social skills.

This perspective is in line with Habermas’ on communication competence and that is based on simultaneous social relations, reality and one’s own identity. This complex delineation of the communication relationships with the Other who belongs to a different cultural environment from the one of the interlocutor can be included in the overall and global concept of intercultural communication competence. The latter includes two types of competences: communication competence and intercultural competence. Such a synthetic two-fold model was suggested by Wen (2004:175). Thus, according to this theoretician, the communication competence includes the linguistic, pragmatic and strategic competences, while the intercultural competence is based on the emotional, cognitive and behavioral levels.

Fig.5. The intercultural communication competence: the Wen model (2004:175)

Apparently, sensitivity, tolerance and flexibility are characteristic only of the emotional and behavioral levels. Upon a detailed analysis, the three components of the intercultural competence also characterize the cognitive dimension and the latter becomes obvious in the logical relationship between the three Wen (2004:175). The relationships between the interpersonal communication competence and the intercultural communication can be viewed from a different perspective, as well.
Thus, the phrase “communication competence” viewed through the theoretical delineations drawn by Hymes – Bachman – Celce-Murcia was further developed by including among its elements the “intercultural competence”. The Usó-Juan – Martinez-Flor views the intercultural competence and the linguistic, strategic and pragmatic competences as equal, directly related to the discursive component and as an integral part of the interpersonal communicative competence. According to this model, the intercultural competence is about “how to interpret and produce a spoken or written piece of discourse within a particular sociocultural context” (Usó-Juan, Alicia Martinez-Flor, 2008:161), namely about simplifying the phrase compared to the Wen model.

4. CONCLUSIONS

The key concepts underlying interculturality as a field of study are: culture and communication. As far as the former is concerned, when relating its to the intercultural field it was used from an anthropological perspective to define those collective cultural experiences characteristic of a nation or of a community. However, the complexity of social relationships characteristic of contemporary life renders such a meaning obsolete for the description of the relationships established by individuals belonging to an increasing number of social groups and, hence, performing a variety of roles imposed by their status within each of these. Thus, alongside the concept of culture, the concept of communication, as operationalized by disciplines like cultural anthropology, communication psychology, sociology, etc. is employed in order to better and more thoroughly define interculturality. As a result, one of the most often used concepts in referring to the intercultural field is the one of intercultural communication that is based on the meanings associated to the related concepts of intracultural communication and cross-cultural communication.

The current article is an attempt at providing a comprehensive and yet brief overview of the most significant theoretical models in the interrelated fields of intercultural communication competence, interpersonal communication competence, and intercultural competence. In the long run, its goal is to offer clear-cut theoretical delineations that can be further used in developing future research projects in the fields of communication (whether of an intercultural or personal nature) or training programs for the people who are likely to establish relationships in intercultural contexts.
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Robert W. White, in Motivation reconsidered: The concept of competence, Psychological Review, nr.66/1959, pp.297-333, suggests the phrase “effectance motivation” understood as the tendency to exploit and influence

the environment. In this respect, White defines interpersonal competence as “the ability to interact effectively with the environment”;


There is a need for a general and thorough approach to justifying, explaining, demonstrating, working, sampling, using, creating real skills in Risk Analysis in any area of the human society. Such a need is embedded in human evolution and it gains importance every time one needs to develop forecasts of future courses of action.

The current paper entitled “Part One - Why Risk Analysis?” represents the beginning of a series that is going to be published in the subsequent issues of the Journal of Defense Resources Management (referred to as Journal from here on). The series will contain topics to enhance understanding and knowledge of Risk and Risk Actions (Analysis, Assessment, Management, etc.). Even though covering this multi-sided field is not a pragmatic goal, the authors to embark on this project series will attempt to approach it from as many standpoints as possible.

The Journal Risk Analysis Series aims at covering both general topics like What Is Risk Analysis, What Fields Does Risk Analysis Apply To, Risk Analysis Specifics for Specific Fields, How Others Do Risk Analysis & Need for Improvement, Risk Analysis & Compared Risk Management, etc., and specific topics such as Defense Resources Management Risk Analysis accompanied by corresponding case studies, intended to represent references for those who wish to develop their skills in Risk Analysis.

Why Risk Analysis? Because:
- humans want to push away, as far as possible from their daily routine, the unknown and uncertainty.
- certainty counts for less than 1% in our lives. However, we still believe it is safe to go on with it.
- people like to play risky but they do not like to lose.
- companies face risk if they move forward, and they face risk if they stand still.
- almost everything we do in today’s business world involves a risk of some kind: customer habits change, new competitors appear, and factors outside any control could delay projects. Therefore, risk analysis and risk management can help assess these risks and decide what actions to take to minimize...
disruptions to plans. Moreover, they can also contribute to deciding whether the strategies to be used to control risk are cost-effective.

- coming down to the societal or organizational levels, the overall security of that entity is at stake when acting without being aware of possible threats or risks calculated, miscalculated or not yet calculated.

- it can be as simple or as complex as one wants it to be, according to several factors such as a person’s level of understanding (that is why risk analysis is performed only form a certain level above by any organizational entity), level of expertise, intelligence, statistical tools available, etc.

- historically, it is embedded in human evolution and actions, whether that was a matter of purposeful action or just reflex. People have always had something they considered valuable (evaluated against a scale ranging from very important, normal or less important) and hence, they granted assessed their fears, concerns, frights or dreads not to lose the things they cared for against such scales of importance. The more intense the feeling, the higher the level of importance they granted to that thing, accordingly.

Thus, in time people started to keep and pass on this knowledge because it was half experienced and half thought of. The half thought was understandable for quite a few, in the beginning, but the experienced half could very easily be transmitted by different means. Historically one can see here oral and written communication using a plethora of means for both oral and written ways, according to the respective level of societal evolution during a certain age.

- one wishes to identify threats.

The first stage of risk analysis consists in the identification of threats looming ahead such as: human – posed by individuals or organizations, illness, death, etc.; operational – emerging from supplies and operations disruption, loss of access to essential assets, distribution failures, etc.; reputational emerging from loss of business partner’s or employee’s confidence, or damage to reputation in the market; procedural resulting from failures in accountability, from internal systems and controls, from organization, fraud, etc.; project – the risks of cost over-run, jobs taking too long to accomplish, insufficient product or service quality, etc.; financial stemming from business failure, stock market, interest rates, unemployment, etc.; technical – advances in technology, technical failure, etc.; natural – threats from weather, natural disaster, accident, disease, etc.; political – changes in tax regimes, public opinion, government policy, foreign influence, etc.

Threat analysis is important because it is so easy to overlook important threats. One way of trying to capture them all is to use a number of different approaches. Firstly, run through a list such as the one above, to see if any apply. Secondly, think through the systems, organizations or structures you operate, and analyze risks to any part of those. Next, see if you can see any vulnerability within these systems or structures. Ask other people, who might have different perspectives.

By following all these “Why Risk Analysis” questions, one actually takes the first step in this episodically developed trip. The result is risk perception.

When perceptions about something are not similar, serious
differences of opinion appear before even starting the very first activity which is to deal with Risk Analysis.

Risk perception is the subjective judgment that people make about the characteristics and severity of a risk. The phrase is most commonly used in reference to natural hazards and threats to the environment or health, such as nuclear power.

Several theories explain why different people make different estimates of the dangerousness of risks. Three major families of theory have been developed: psychological approaches (both heuristics and cognitive), anthropology/sociological approaches (the cultural theory) and interdisciplinary approaches (the social amplification of risk framework).

The study of risk perception originates from experts’ and laymen’ disagreements on defining various risk and natural hazards.

The mid 1960s saw the rapid rise of nuclear technologies and the promise for clean and safe energy. However, public perception shifted against this new technology. Fears of both dangers to the environment, as well as immediate disasters creating radioactive wastelands turned the public against this technology. According to the scientific and governmental communities, the problem was a difference between scientific facts and an exaggerated public perception of the dangers.

A key paper, written in 1969 by Chauncey Starr revealed the preference approach used to find out what risks are considered acceptable by society. The paper assumed that society had reached equilibrium in its judgment of risks, so the conclusions were that whatever risk levels actually existed in society, they were acceptable. The major finding of the paper was that people will accept risks 1,000 times greater if they are voluntary (e.g. driving a car) than if they are involuntary (e.g. a nuclear disaster). This approach assumed that individuals behave in a rational manner, and they weigh information before making a decision. People fear due to inadequate or incorrect information. Hence, additional information can help people understand true risk and lessen their perception of danger. Another question was whether additional information could also deepen people’s misunderstanding about something. While researchers in the engineering school did pioneer research in risk perception, by adapting theories from economics, the latter has little use in a practical setting. Numerous studies have rejected the belief that additional information, alone will shift perceptions.

The psychological approach focused on how people process information. Early works maintain that people use cognitive heuristics in sorting and simplifying information which leads to biases in comprehension. Later work built on this foundation became the so called psychometric paradigm. This type of approach identifies numerous factors responsible for influencing individual perceptions of risk, including dread, newness, stigma, and other factors.

The earliest psychometric research was conducted by the psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, who performed a series of gambling experiments to see how people evaluated probabilities. Their major finding was that people use a number of heuristics to evaluate information. These heuristics are usually useful shortcuts for thinking, but they may
lead to inaccurate judgments in some situations – in which case they become cognitive biases.

Representativeness is usually employed when people are asked to judge the probability that an object or event belongs to a class/processes by its similarity. The results may be insensitivity to prior probability, to sample size, misconception of chance, insensitivity to predictability, illusion of validity, misconception of regression.

Availability refers to events that can be more easily brought to mind or imagined and hence are judged to be more likely than events that could not easily be imagined. The biases result due to ability to retrieve instances, due to the effectiveness of research set, due to the ability of imagination and illusory correlation.

Anchoring and Adjustment occur when people often start with one piece of known information and then adjust it to create an estimate of an unknown risk – but the adjustment will usually not be big enough. The results are insufficient adjustment, biases in the evaluation of conjunctive and disjunctive event (conjunction fallacy), anchoring in the assessment of subjective probability distributions.

Asymmetry between gains and losses: people are risk averse with respect to gains, preferring a sure thing over a gamble with a higher expected utility but which presents the possibility of getting nothing. On the other hand, people will be risk-seeking about losses, preferring to hope for the chance of losing nothing rather than taking a sure, but smaller, loss (e.g. insurance).

Threshold effects: people prefer to move from uncertainty to certainty over making a similar gain in certainty that does not lead to full certainty. For example, most people would choose a vaccine that reduces the incidence of disease A from 10% to 0% over one that reduces the incidence of disease B from 20% to 10%.

Another key finding was that experts are not necessarily any better at estimating probabilities than non-expert people. Experts were often overconfident in the exactness of their estimates, and put too much stock in small samples of data.

The majority of people in the general public express a greater concern for problems which appear to possess an immediate effect on everyday life such as hazardous waste or pesticide-use than for long-term problems that may affect future generations such as climate change or population growth. People greatly rely on the scientific community to assess the threat of environmental problems because they usually do not directly experience the effects of phenomena such as climate change. The exposure most people have to climate change has been impersonal; most people only have virtual experience though documentaries and news media in what may seem like a “remote” area of the world. This is why, coupled with the population’s wait-and-see attitude, people do not understand the importance of changing environmentally destructive behaviors even when experts provide detailed and clear risks caused by climate change.

Research within the psychometric paradigm turned to focus on the roles of affect, emotion, and stigma in influencing risk perception. Melissa Finucane and Paul Slovic have been among the key researchers. These researchers challenged Starr’s article by examining expressed preference –
how much risk people say they are willing to accept. They found that, contrary to Starr’s basic assumption, people generally saw most risks in society as being unacceptably high. They also found that the gap between voluntary and involuntary risks was not nearly as great as Starr claimed.

Slovic and team found that perceived risk is quantifiable and predictable. People tend to view current risk levels as unacceptably high for most activities, as long as it is not their own decision to make. All things being equal, the greater people perceived a benefit, the greater the tolerance for a risk. If a person derived pleasure from using a product, people tended to judge its benefits as high and its risks as low as the level of pleasure they achieved. If the activity was disliked, the judgments were opposite accordingly. Research in psychometrics has proven that risk perception is highly dependent on intuition, experiential thinking, and emotions.

Psychometric research identified a broad domain of characteristics that may be condensed into three high order factors: 1) the degree to which a risk is understood, 2) the degree to which it evokes a feeling of dread, and 3) the number of people exposed to the respective risk. A dread risk elicits visceral feelings of terror, uncontrollable, catastrophe, inequality, and uncontrolled self. An unknown risk is new and unknown to science. This is why it is called risk, in the first place. The more a person dreads an activity, the higher it’s perceived risk and the more that person wants the risk reduced.

As a short review of the second category of theories, the anthropology/ sociology approach posits risk perceptions as produced by and supporting social institutions. In this view, perceptions are socially constructed by institutions, cultural values, and ways of life. Here, the Cultural Theory is based on the work of anthropologist Mary Douglas and political scientist Aaron Wildavsky, and was first published in 1982.

In Cultural Theory, Douglas and Wildavsky outline four “ways of life” in a grid/group arrangement. Each way of life corresponds to a specific social structure and a particular outlook on risk. Grid categorizes the degree to which people are constrained and circumscribed in their social role. The tighter binding of social constraints limits individual negotiation capabilities. Group refers to the extent to which individuals are bounded by feelings of belonging or solidarity. The greater the bonds, the less individual choice are subject to personal control. Four ways of life include: Hierarchical, Individualist, Egalitarian, and Fatalist.

Risk perception researchers have not widely accepted Cultural theory. Even Douglas says that the theory is controversial and poses the danger of moving out of the favored paradigm of individual rational choice of which many researchers are comfortable.

The third branch group of theories deals with the Interdisciplinary approach, main surfacing concept here being Social amplification of risk framework.

The Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF), combines research in psychology, sociology, anthropology, and communications theory. SARF outlines how communications of risk events pass from the sender through intermediate stations to a receiver and in the process serve to amplify or attenuate perceptions of risk. All links in the
communication chain, individuals, groups, media, etc., contain filters through which information is sorted and understood.

The SAR framework attempts to explain the process by which risks are amplified, receiving more public attention, or attenuated, receiving less public attention. The framework may be used to compare responses from different groups in a single event, or analyze the same risk issue in multiple events. In a single risk event, some groups may amplify their perception of risks while other groups may attenuate, or decrease, their perceptions of risk. The main thesis of SARF states that risk events interact with individual psychological, social and other cultural factors in ways that either increase or decrease public perceptions of risk. Behaviors of individuals and groups then generate secondary social or economic impacts while also increasing or decreasing the physical risk itself.

These ripple effects caused by the amplification of risk include enduring mental perceptions, impacts on business sales, and change in residential property values, changes in training and education, or social disorder. These secondary changes are perceived and reacted to by individuals and groups resulting in third-order impacts. As each higher-order impacts are reacted to, they may ripple to other parties and locations. Traditional risk analyses neglect these ripple effect impacts and thus greatly underestimate the adverse effects from certain risk events. Public distortion of risk signals provides a corrective mechanism by which society assesses a fuller determination of the risk and its impacts to such things not traditionally factored into a risk analysis.

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INFORMATION – A POWER DRIVER

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The beginning of the 21st century has witnessed a special stage in the evolution of mankind given the historical major changes that have occurred and led to an information based society that trespasses any frontiers and gradually dilutes any temporal or spatial constraints. Modern armed forces pay special attention to the aforementioned aspects since one of the main aims is to win the information battle given the extended role of information technology and of communications means in the battle space.

Key words: information, intelligence, cyber space, information battle, power

There is no novelty in viewing information as a power driver. Nonetheless, such a perspective has become a multisided one and its consequences (not always beneficial when altered or willingly skewed) have become as important as the complexity of the modern battle space. Information has always been a key element of the military decision making process, especially during armed conflicts. However, nowadays, given the current development of society in general, the role of information has increased. Consequently, information has become a power driver and one of the most important defense resources.

Contemporary military establishments pay particular attention to the role and function of information and view the winning of the information battle as a major goal to be achieved in the context of an ever increasing use of information technology and communication means across the battle space. Nowadays, it is obvious that the digitization of the battle space, as well as of all information related activities is the grand strategy. Moreover, it is common sense to forecast that the wars of the future are to be undertaken in an integrated manner in terms of the forces that will be employed and of the spaces where they will unfold - the term of cyber-space being no longer just a term, but a reality.

The leadership process will only take place in an information-based environment. Moreover, it will be gradually integrated into the armament systems. As a result, to achieve the aims of such a process robots will be used, technologies will be remotely controlled, intelligent ammunitions will be employed, new IT based technologies will be put in place to enable work methodologies that will allow for military actions to be undertaken while monitoring adversary’s performance. The military units engaged in battles will take over, process and rapidly transfer information from across the cyber battle space. Such an endeavor is possible only if a wide array of automated systems and armaments is already in place so that they make up for the physical limits
of the human beings and for the limited technical performance of the classical armament, and optimally coordinate various force categories and armaments given the compressed operational time and the need to preserve human strength so that the latter is only used when necessary or just to consolidate on the success of the mission.

2,500 years ago the great Chinese strategist, Sun Tzu, said the following: “Knowledge allows an intelligent government and military leadership to outsmart the others and to accomplish great things”. [1] Such a statement is valid even nowadays and underlines the necessity to continuously supply information on time and in accordance with the need of the human deeds, regardless of their nature, to become efficient. Actually, providing the decision makers with on time and qualitative information is no longer a goal per se, but a continuous and permanent concern and subject of study for many contemporary disciplines.

Information lies at the core of human knowledge. As a result, to meet their fundamental and superior needs humans require a significant and diversified volume of information.

The complexity of the term “information” has generated an extensive number of nominal definitions, and hence of meanings. As a result, this paper will only look at several of these as recorded by the Romanian language [2]: “communication, news, that brings up to date in relation with a situation”; “All the material used to inform and document, sources”; “Each of the elements considered new as compared with the existing ones and included in the overall meaning of a symbol or of a group of symbols…”.

Besides such definitions, countless others, more or less scientifically grounded, have been formulated in order to better account for the concept of “intelligence”. Some of these describe information as a product, others as a complex process, while the third category of definitions combines the first two views. To better tackle the complexity of such a concept, the science of Information Theory appeared. The latter’s role is to analyze the characteristics of information in various fields such as mathematics, physics, biology, medicine, telecommunications, military, economic, social, etc.

Information lies at the core of the decision-making process. Therefore, instead of providing an overview of the role played by data and information in the development of the defense and security strategy, we believe it is more relevant to quote some well-known experts in the field:

“He who knows his enemy as well as himself (...) is sure to win. He who does not know his enemy (...) will surely lose”. (Sun Tzu)

“Any war is based on information.”; “Nothing will encourage more and clarify better but having precise information on the enemy’s status.”; “Both in imaginary scenarios and in forecasts, the force of the unknown cannot be fully measured.” (Napoleon Bonaparte)

“Any plan and any war related action is based on information.” (Carl von Clausewitz)

“Knowledge is power and our times are definitely dominated by the quest for power.” (Constantine Fitz Gibleon)

“The research data and their accurate interpretation should underlie any situation analysis,
decision-making process and operation planning.” (Marshall G.K. Jukov)

“No commander can underestimate the role of the intelligence service. (...) History has it that no nation can neglect it without damaging its major interests”. (Marshall Bernard Law Montgomery)

“Intelligence is an essential occupation, but nothing more than an occupation. It is an important element of the decision-making process, but nothing more than an element; its usefulness fully depends on the way it is used and guided.” (Walter Lagneur)

In line with all of the above quotes, it is also worth mentioning the words carved on the Mossad’ coat of arms and that sum up, in our opinion, the essence of the information operations: “Ki betahbolot taase leha milhama ...” that reads as “Thou shall conduct wars through schemes...” or “Thou shall win wars through cunning”.

An overview of the military literature on information [3] reveals that the latter may contain one, a series or a group of data recorded by a sensor and conveyed by the same sensor through various means. This is a concrete instantiation of some of the forms taken by information at a specific moment and in a specific place.

In its various forms, information has been a feature of all military conflicts conducted so far. In this respect, military analysts believe that information is as omnipresent as the air and water necessary to sustain life functions, more necessary than fuel, and much more powerful than the most powerful bombs. Generally speaking, information can be viewed as a means of communication, message carrying news about events, objects, processes, actions, phenomena that are to be conveyed, understood and accepted for a well defined goal. Moreover, the term of “information” refers to all the news about the surrounding environment and that are the result of the interactions occurring within it.

Information is not a mere necessity, but a major element of the art of war, a real weapon for the one who holds, protects, processes and efficiently manages it. It allows for a conflict, of a military nature or not, to be won before the visible outbreak of hostilities. Thus, information: drives a review of the operational concepts, as well the integration and harmonization of the fighting means with the previous experience; is important and decisive for the outcome of a conflict or war since it influences the functioning of the systems in place in decision making field; governs actions, helps anticipate and make fast operational decisions.

The quality and quantity of the information held at a certain moment, the ability to efficiently manage and use them in order to make decisions are the key element of information power, which is a fundamental component of strategic power.

Information influences all activity fields and represents a driver for efficiency and power. Moreover, it gives moral strength and increases leaders’ skills since it contributes to conducting and winning operations, shortens wars and, most important, saves lives.

The information gathered for usefulness purposes must be processed and transformed into information and intelligence. Subsequently, it must be disseminated in order to
allow for forecasts about adversaries’ intentions and potential.

The advantages of using information as a weapon are derived from the capacity of those owning it to protect their interests through non-lethal means, on one hand, and to act in a more discrete, efficient and better adapted manner to current international relations without breaking international laws, on the other hand.

In conclusion, intelligence as a product results from the information relevant for the formulation and implementation of a governmental policy in order to promote a nation’s security interests and to prevent the treats from its real or potential adversaries, as well as from information from the military field concerning the adversary’s capabilities and plans for a military action, and the data concerning the activities and the diplomatic intentions of another country in the information field.

The specialized literature of the last 10-15 years used numerous definitions and meanings for the term of intelligence. However, the common thread of all these underlines the use of the term to refer to those actions/activities underlying the gathering and usage of information from various fields, especially for espionage purposes. Without attempting to fully cover all the meanings currently associated with the term of intelligence, we are providing below some of the most significant ones that view it as: knowledge provider that can be coded in order to be kept, processed and later conveyed to an interested beneficiary; product generated by the gathering, processing, evaluation and interpretation of available data related to actions, events and environments of interest; analytical process based on the processing of raw data/information; activity generating synthetic information products based on the analysis of primary or disparate data.

Summarizing all of the above definitions, we can define intelligence as information processing at a cognitive level in order to assign a usefulness value to it from the perspective of a beneficiary’s/decision-maker’s goal.

The concept of value is an important one from the perspective of the events that have been unfolding since the beginning of the 3rd millennium (e.g. the terrorist attacks since 11 September 2001 and 11 March 2004, the media scandals of the Gulf War, and the military interventions in Afghanistan and Irak). As a result, it is obvious that the national and international security field has undergone major changes at the level of the paradigms upholding it and, consequently, has triggered major changes in the academic approaches to the concept of “intelligence”. Moreover, intelligence as information in all its possible forms is one of the weapons used in the new asymmetric conflicts. Therefore, holding and efficiently using it represent these type of conflicts’ most important stake.

In the book entitled The Management of Information Systems, Gheorghe Nicolaescu and Vasile Simileanu [4] define intelligence/information as “the element that can be coded, kept, processed and communicated; the result of available data collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation and interpretation in fields of interest”.

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INFORMATION – A POWER DRIVER
A similar definition is provided by Mireille Rădoi in Intelligence Services and the Political Decisions [5]. The author mentions that intelligence and its usefulness value depend both on its suppliers and users. For information to be operationalized and processed it has to: be real; ensure a multilateral perception from an economic, technical, human and scientific point of view; be synthetic and concise; be precise; be delivered on time; be dynamic; be adapted to the features of the personnel involved in its management.

Thus, intelligence becomes a function of the strategic and security information management and, hence, an essential component of the analytical information knowledge. Its goal is to acknowledge and assimilate within the information flows everything new and of value to a decision-maker focused on acting and using it in order to preserve the major interests of society.

In conclusion, intelligence links the INFORMATION-MANAGEMENT-POWER triad, validating the relationships and interactions among the information systems’ attributes, the processing of information and the decision-making level using it.

Through an intelligence-based approach an integrated overall view is obtained and, as a result, the action framework used to maintain balance between the identified threat and the necessary measure to counter it without wasting any additional energy and human and material resources gains legitimacy. Moreover, that allows matching the response measures to the threat level, and avoiding the imbalances resulting from the employment of methods inadequately chosen to counter the identified threat.

The use of intelligence in the activities of the Romanian General Directorate for Defense Intelligence (DGIA) allows for a cooperation in real time with other intelligence services and with civil society representatives and, inherently, for the development of a security culture and for the promotion of national interests.

The global fierce competition among states and regional/global power centers for the access to/monopol over energy resources, for the development/conquering of resource markets and consumption markets are triggering and will trigger conflicts, challenges and various scenarios aimed at ensuring influence, control and power. In addition to all of the above, there are also the interests of the non-statal actors that make the odds of the power games to become even more complicated and difficult to anticipate. In this respect, it is worth reminding that linguistic, religious, historical (i.e. old conflicts or alliances, neighbourhood relations, territorial claims) criteria, current or prospective economic interests, available resources, competition in fields of major interest (i.e. nuclear, cosmic, oil, gas, access to the sea/ocean), the belonging to military alliances trigger the positions states take towards one another. In such a context, the intelligence activity becomes an essential instrument in getting acquainted with the developments in the field of national security, as well as a major factor used in the anticipation and forecast of the geopolitical and strategic relations, and in the evaluation of possible threat sources and of their likely behaviour. Moreover, the integrating role of this activity, its capacity to capture positive or negative developments
and distinguish the threats emerging at a certain moment makes the forecast of future events possible.

Thus, intelligence activity is validated as a modern capability of maximum use for the "know - how", "know - who" and especially the "know - when" needs. The interdependence, multidimensional character, the novelty of some risks and the contemporary asymmetrical threats (especially those after 1990, and exceptionally after 11 September 2001) are much more different than the classical conflicts (including terrorism, organized crime, human and drug trafficking, illegal migration, money laundering, insecurity, energetic dependence, espionage) characteristic of the beginning and middle of the XXth century show the necessity of approaching events from new and interconnected perspectives.

Romania is subject to the rules of the same game as other states and, as a member of NATO and EU, has to assess the asymmetrical risks, to propose solutions and answers to the contemporary challenges, to gradually reform the activity of its main intelligence services. Moreover, the status of EU and NATO member, asks form Romania to become not only a security beneficiary, but also a security provider. As such, it succeeded in leaving behind risks raised by ethnical and religious conflicts, or by territorial claims on behalf of some of its neighbours. However, the geographical position of Romania does not completely rule out possible future risks posed by the tight relationship between globalization and regional phenomena. In this respect, it is worth reminding the following: Romania’s position on the eastern border of the EU and the cross-border risks derived from this; the sources of latent conflict in the Balkan area (Kosovo, Albania, Cyprus) and in the Black Sea area (Transnistria, Crimea); the relative proximity to the conflicts in the Middle East and the insuccess and inherent risks generated by the failure of the negotiations aimed at creating a Palestinian state; the swift changes occurring in Irak and Caucasian states for the past years as a result of the fight for supremacy over energetic resources and their unpredictable evolution in the future; the actions of states such as Russia, China, India and Iran that trigger anti-American reactions and that impose a multipolar view on the world; the USA-Russia disputes over the antimissile shield installation, over NATO expansion, as well as the difficult to assess consequences of the Russian-Georgian conflict; the complexity of the Iranian nuclear problem, its relation with the position of the Arab states on this topic and USA’s and Russia’s positions on this issue, and the risk of an Israeli-Iranian conflict outbreak with unforeseeable consequences in the pan Arab environment; some European states’ negotiations with Russia and the Caucasian republics about their access to the oil and gas transport routes and the risk for Romania not to have access to such routes; the sprawl and international character of actions undertaken under the "Al Qaeda brand" by terrorist groups; humanitarian crises, illegal migration, drug trafficking, etc.

All of the above are only a few of the most important current and future risks/challenges for the international security environment.

The INTELLIGENCE - COMMUNICATION - STATAL
ACTORS (DECISION MAKERS) relationship has become an essential one in the international and global security environment that is eroded and permanently under the siege of asymmetric risks and threats or subject to the competition among the world’s power poles.

Intelligence alongside with the emergence of the security conceptual systems can contribute to diminishing the differences between security beneficiaries and security providers so that in the end all of these could become security guardians. Moreover, intelligence will qualitatively value the activities unfolding in organizations/systems in charge of security so that, based on the gathering, storage, processing, analysis of information, the right conclusions can be drawn. Based on these, the decision-makers in charge of applying state policies will be able to formulate their strategies to fight back the risks and threats identified.

The efficiency of the measures taken in order to ensure national security, to prevent and counter any type of threat is directly related to the intelligence level and to its performance in relation with the internal and external actors. The efficient management of national security problems should lead to the development of an efficient management of the intelligence sector.

The way human relationships evolve nowadays revolutionizes the communication process and the systems facilitating the contact among individuals and among organizations. As a result of the unprecedented development in the field of communication a state’s information heritage is increasingly subject to information aggression. Within this context, the request for an intelligence system, its use and improvement are essential for any state’s capabilities to counter actions specific to information warfare. As a result, one of the intelligence community’s priorities must be the human resource (HUMINT), since the latter is one of the most efficient tools used in information collection. The human source of information requires coordination. Thus, information collection must be done in one place so that the decisions made certify the best resource saving conduct. However, technical intelligence (TECHINT) is of great help for HUMINT especially when it comes to penetrating terrorist organizations and organized crime structures.

For efficiency and adaptation purposes an intelligence service must focus on reconstructing its analytical means, on developing linguistic programs, on diversifying agent recruitment, on establishing a better connection between information collection from human sources and from signal sources at operational level, between unilateral and liaison operations.

In order to counter asymmetrical and nonconventional strategic threats the collaboration between the public and private sector is essential. Moreover, adopting/adapting the legislation in the field of these new type of risks management is also mandatory. For the future information warfare will require an integrated intelligence support in order to ensure operations security and enemy deception, to support psychological operations and electronic warfare, to prevent any potential adversary from influencing, deteriorating or destroying command
and control capabilities. The more the information age and information war evolve, the greater the challenges in the intelligence field. In this respect, the intelligence structures can outmaneuver an adversary, but they can also become its target.

Intelligence proves that the information warfare has developed a permanent, multidisciplinary and dual nature. Its permanence resides in the development of a global strategy aimed at collecting information, at protecting and managing adversaries’ access to information not only in times of conflicts or crisis. Its multidisciplinarity refers to the interconnected systems, organizations, viewpoints, measures taken to conduct such a war. As for the dual nature of intelligence, the latter refers the faded distinctions between the civil and military fields, to the fact that the violent means of countering enemies are no longer under the monopol of a state’s military and they are more often than not surpassed by information violence that manifests itself not only in the military, but also in the banking, financial, energetic, communications, resource distribution, infrastructure fields. As a result, intelligence is required to offer the means to counter future threats of such a diversified nature.

The goal of any state’s authorities in power is to ensure national security. Consequently, at international level they will act in such a way as to promote a policy of joining the alliance/system of alliances aligned to their goal and to keep under close scrutiny the reactions of their prospective external adversaries. With a view to this, intelligence becomes the main support instrument used in making decisions concerning the choice of external allies and the countering of malevolent intentions of external opponents.

REFERENCES

LOGISTIC SUPPORT PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR THE NATIONAL MILITARY CONTINGENTS PARTICIPATING IN MULTINATIONAL PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

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A judicious planning of the logistic support provided for the national military contingents earmarked to participate in multinational peace support operations must take into consideration the number of contingents to be deployed, their area of responsibility, their mission length, the facilities provided in the theater of operation and their providers. Moreover, such planning involves a thorough knowledge and application of STANAGs. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to focus on some of the fundamental aspects included in the logistic support planning guidance for the national military contingents participating in multinational peace support operations.

Key words: logistic support planning, multinational cooperation, logistic support, theater of operations, mission length.

1. INTRODUCTION

Logistic support planning for multinational peace support missions is based on the decision of the United Nations Security Council that the intervention of an international alliance such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is necessary in order to manage a crisis requiring troops, equipment and material resources. Based on this a joint force commander’s concept of operations is drawn up and leads to on time planning of force generation, to ensuring transportation for the forces to be deployed, as well as to providing logistic support during their activities in the theater of operations.

The activities necessary to be undertaken in order to cover the wide range of logistic activities necessary to support a national contingent deployed on a multinational support mission can be grouped as follows:

– mission global analysis;
– initiation of the logistic support planning process;
– identification of the factors bearing on the initial logistic support planning process;
– elaboration of the logistic concept necessary to ensure logistic support;
– identification of logistic support providers;
– elaboration of the logistic support plan;
– requests formulation, comparative analysis and identification of logistic deficits.

All of the above activities are planned, organized and executed as a result of the planning conferences in the field of logistics attended
by the national contingent. These conferences are organized depending on the stage of the planning process (i.e. preliminary, main, planning review, final) and on the topic of interest (i.e. on transportation issues or on medical matters) and their aims consist of: establishing the C4I logistics structure, assigning responsibilities, identifying the methods needed to ensure logistic support, harmonizing logistic plans, as well as bridging any gaps and clarifying deployment plans.

2. SOME LOGISTIC ACTIVITIES

As mentioned before, the activities needed to support national contingents participating in multinational peace keeping missions can be grouped under seven categories.

The first category, mission global analysis is undertaken at the level of the national contingent and it involves the identification the logistic support needed depending on the nature and characteristics of the missions that are to be conducted. Thus, for instance, in the case of disarmament missions it is required to ensure the storage, recording and destruction of large quantities of materials/ammunition/hazardous materials, while in the case of the surveillance of the main access routes, as well as the in the case of convoys’ and communication means’ protection it is necessary to maintain the technologies available in operating conditions and to ensure the spare parts stocks by planning and transporting the needed materials in due time.

As for the identification of the factors bearing on the initial logistic support planning process, the main activities grouped under this category are: the inventory of the most likely supply capabilities available in the host country, the identification of some alternative supply systems, the analysis of the relationship between national responsibility and alliance responsibility, host nation support, the capabilities of the leading nation, specialized national support, the existence of a Multinational Integrated Logistic Unit (MILU)/ Multinational Integrated Medical Unit (MIMU), Third Party Logistic Support Services (TPLSS), the status and security of communication and supply routes, as well as the identification of alternative supply routes and of the possible combinations in the material distribution system, geographical, cultural and religious constraints limiting the logistic chains and the nature of the logistic products, etc.

The elaboration of the logistic concept depends on the involvement level of each nation participating in operations and hence on the subsequent responsibilities. It consists in establishing the way in which, within the theater of operation, the national contingent accomplishes the supply of goods (by categories of materials), ensures support services and transportation, maintains technology, provides medical assistance and billeting for forces, ensures financial resources and quarters for personnel.

3. LOGISTIC PLANNING

Logistic planning for national contingents deployed in theaters of operations involves:

– establishing the supply of materials needed to deploy the national contingent and to ensure its stay in the theater of operation, as well as the frequency for supplying
these based on criteria like: mission length, number of personnel in accordance with the payroll, average consumption rate for supplies like ammunition, spare parts, medicine, and legal provisions concerning military food ratio, necessary equipment, consumables;

– identifying transportation needs (based on personnel number to be deployed, technology and materials supply), alternatives to these depending on available national/allied partners’ means and submitting transportation requests within the deadlines established through procedures;

– identifying maintenance work to be done by oneself or by ESN;

– personnel immunization, as well identification of the means to ensure medical assistance and medical evacuation;

– establishing forces billeting details, as well as labor and environmental safety measures.

The global specific needs are established by applying specific logistic planning formulas based on mission details: length, logistic effort sharing between the national contingent and ESN (if in place), the number of personnel involved, the technology employed. Once the global needs for materials are established the real costs of the mission can be calculated. The latter must be included in the budget a year prior to the deployment time so that the preparation of the mission can be performed unhindered. Moreover, the logistic planning personnel conduct economic studies in order to identify the most efficient alternatives to accomplish the mission, namely whether it is more effective to supply the goods from the contingent’s country of origin, or from within the theater of operations by resorting to other contingents or specialized companies.

Usually, in the first stages of mission preparation, information concerning the logistic support availability in the TO is collected during the logistic reconnaissance missions of the national contingent.

Before logistic planning begins, the head of Logistics within the national contingent must be knowledgeable/clear about the following:

– mission end state and objectives;

– objectives to be met in order to ensure logistic support;

– the actions to be undertaken and their sequence;

– power centers;

– the way available resources (national/allied) are used and the priorities;

– harmonization of the logistic efforts with the efforts of the national contingent;

– the risks that are considered acceptable and the necessity to maneuver forces and logistic means.

For the logistic structure of the national contingent the logistic planning procedures must be logical and analytical in order to facilitate the decision making process and the successful mission accomplishment in a multinational theater of operations. The logistic procedures and the logistic planning process are identical both in times of war and in peace support operations. Thus, the stages of the logistic planning process for multinational missions are similar to those of a common planning process and they are as follows: initiation; orientation; elaboration of the logistic concept; elaboration of the logistic plan; review of the logistic plan.
The initiation stage of the logistic planning process starts upon the release of the mission order/directive by the higher echelon. The latter is based on a prior orientation undertaken by the commandant of the national contingent within the theater of operations.

In order to initiate the logistic planning process, the head of the contingent’s logistic structure alongside with logistic directorate representatives will analyze: the missions of the national contingent (the logistic ones included); the necessary logistic support and the forces that need it; supply, accommodation, storage, transportation, maintenance and medical facilities available within the contingent’s country of origin and in the TO.

This process involves mission understanding and the identification of matters bearing on the planning process such as: the way the logistic support in the TO will be ensured; identification of the constraints limiting logistic support related activities; logistic support coordination details.

The orientation of the personnel involved in the planning process is undertaken in order to assess the situation from a logistic point of view, to understand the logistic concept based on which the logistic support will be provided by the higher echelon and to ensure planning guidance.

Mission analysis involves the assessment of the situation by the representatives of the logistic structure assigned to the contingent, as well as the understanding of the overall mission context, of the logistic support concept (i.e. responsibilities of the contingent’s logistic structure and of other logistic structures belonging to other allied nations), of the constraints and of other factors with an impact on mission accomplishment. When this activity is over, the head of the logistic structure alongside with logistic directorate representatives must be knowledgeable about the national and the lead nation’s responsibilities listed in the technical agreements. In this respect, a number of documents and orders must be taken into account:

– the endorsement statement- a document that mentions the level of logistic support provided by the lead nation and constrains all planning within the TO;
– the logistic order issued by the higher echelon;
– the planning guide.

Moreover, once the mission analysis is done the head of the contingent’s logistic structure must issue the preliminary logistic orders in order to ensure the logistic support necessary for mission accomplishment and present to the commander the emergency measures that need to be taken, as well as the impact time has on these.

The planning directive as a product of the orientation stage enables the commander the heads of the contingent’s structures to initiate the provision of the necessary logistic support.

The elaboration of the logistic concept is one of the most important stages in the logistic planning process. The latter is based on a thorough analysis of a number of alternatives to providing logistic support in the TO. The sequence of activities undertaken at this stage is as follows:

– situation analysis at contingent level and within the context of the mission;
– a comparative analysis between the logistic means available within the contingent’s country of origin and those within the TO in terms of their efficiency.
– the contingent’s commander participation in the decision-making meeting;
– the logistic concept development in accordance with the best and most efficient course of action identified.

During the analysis of the situation, the logistic structures must take into account the 4Ds: destination, demand, distance and duration.

Destination, namely mission location, influences: transportation means (air, ground, sea or joint), supply alternatives and stock size: for six months or less, strategic communication limits.

The demand is determined by the technical agreements signed among the nations participating in the mission. It refers to the way the logistic support in the TO is ensured. In this respect, on a weekly basis, the national contingent submits, through ESN (see the example of the Afghanistan TO), the logistic report to the Logistics Directorate for information purposes, and to the Joint Logistic Command and to the General Staff of the service to which it belongs in order to obtain the necessary logistic support.

Distance influences the planning, organization and execution of transports, the communication means, the stocks size (both in the TO and in the contingent’s country of origin) and the mission length.

Mission duration influences stock replenishment frequency, equipment replacement necessity, contingent rotation and size of transports.

Based on the analysis of these 4Ds a number of deductions emerge and they lead to the formulation of tasks that are either assigned to the national contingent (e.g. stocks replenishment, ensuring packaging, loading and transportation means), to the higher echelon or to the specialized structures- the Joint Logistics Command. Moreover, as a result of these factors, in the final stage of the logistic planning process the national contingent’s logistic structure draws up The Logistic Support Plan that is annexed to the Operational Plan. During the elaboration of the latter, the head of the logistics office will provide the information necessary to draw up the logistic support concept and, with the heads of the other structures assigned to the national contingent, will elaborate Annex Q of the plan (unless an independent logistic plan is developed). Once the logistic support plan endorsed the order providing for the logistic support to the national contingent is issued. According to this, during the mission preparation stage, the logistic structure assigned to the national contingent undertakes the following:

– establishes the inventory of the goods needed by taking into account the national/allied responsibilities mentioned in the technical agreements, the number of people deployed as listed on the payroll, their food ratios, the time of the year when the mission unfolds and the area characteristics where the multinational operation takes place;
– calculates and requests the necessary funds in accordance with supply priorities and the budget drafted in the previous fiscal year and approved for the current FY;
– supplies the necessary goods released by the logistic structures of the higher echelon or by the Joint Logistics Command;
– stores the goods by their category and takes the necessary measures (i.e. packaging, placing them on pallets/in containers) to ship them;
– prepares the technology and equipment necessary for transport and mission conduct (only if the nation participates for the first time in the mission). If the case of contingent rotation when the technology and equipment are already in place in the TO, during the reconnaissance activities the contingent’s logistic structure elaborates a report on the spare parts needed to make repairs and on the technology and equipment no longer of use;
– undertakes logistic reconnaissance tasks in the TO in accordance with the technical agreements and the facilities offered by the host nation. On a case by case basis, it concludes other agreements, as well as commercial contracts;
– does book-keeping and keeps records of the assets necessary for mission accomplishment;
– supplies food ratios for the personnel deployed in the TO;
– provides equipment and immunization for contingent’s personnel;
– establishes the transport concept and submits the requests for transport modes (rail, road, maritime, air) hierarchically;
– establishes the consumption rate for every supplied good and plans with the ESN the replenishment;
– uses economic criteria to size up the goods and, based on these, establishes replenishment frequency;
– conducts regular assessments of objectives accomplishment in the field of logistics and submits the conclusions to the higher echelon in order to make necessary changes for the future.

Moreover, in order to organize and ensure appropriate travel conditions it is necessary for the contingent’s logistic structure to:
– establish the inventory of necessary goods and their packaging, storage and transport modes;
– analyze the quantity of goods, establish and provide the necessary quantity of packaging materials and craters in accordance with ISO 20 provisions;
– design and manufacture unstandardized packaging materials;
– establish the volume and weight center for every crate (ISO 20);
– do inventory for the materials in the crates(ISO 20);
– calculate the number of wagons for rail freight transport and submit the request to the Financial Comptroller and to the Joint Logistics Command for agreements to be signed with the Railway Authority, for the allocation of a military code and for the release of transport documents;
– prepare the technology to be shipped, check its status, provide temperature monitoring devices and transportation frames for the craters, dye the latter in camouflage colors, weigh them and establish their weight center;
– establish the lists of personnel, technology, goods for each transportation mode;
– draw up the embarkation plan for the railway shipment;
– provide data for the cargo plan to be elaborated by the maritime authority;
– centralize data about craters (crater no. ISO 20, contents, category, weight, packaging mode);
– draw up the general personnel, technology and goods transportation plan to/from the TO.
Another important activity conducted in the pre-deployment stage is the contingent’s logistic evaluation. Its aim is to check the logistic capabilities of the contingent. It takes place 20 days before the deployment in the TO and should last no longer than 72 hours.

The logistic evaluation consists of two stages. Stage 1 covers the static evaluation including the verification of the logistic planning documents, of personnel training, of the logistic available. Stage 2 includes the field evaluation, namely the checking of the way transportation and mission conduct are logistically supported.

For the mission to be accomplished, there should be no vacancies within the military contingent and the following requirements must be met:

– the technology, the essential equipment, the armament and the rest of the assets must be available for the static evaluation;
– the documents testifying the existence and the status of the technology, of the weaponry, ammunition, fuel and lubricants are checked and then the delivery-receiving process in the TO is monitored to make sure that the operational level of the unit meets the standards;
– a tactical exercise unfolds in order to conduct the field evaluation of the contingent. The latter is planned and conducted in accordance with NATO BiSC Exercise Directive 75-3/2007 and national provisions in place.

Evaluation forms are used for the static evaluation and they include the following indicators and sub-indicators:

– C1 - General logistic requirements/ the level of personnel training: coverage of logistics fields; planning ability in the field of logistics; knowledge of command and control procedures; job descriptions in place; operating procedures in place (SOP, SOI);
– C2 - Supply/ knowledge of reporting procedures; identification of supply requests; establishment of priorities; logistic support level by categories;
– C3 - Maintenance: ability to manage maintenance; elaboration of the maintenance plan; existence of spare parts; essential technology and equipment operational status;
– C4 - Transports: knowledge of national and NATO transport documents and requirements; existence of the plan for transport to/from the TO; the existence of the necessary transport means; elaboration of transport requirements to cover gaps; personnel, technology and equipment preparation for transport;
– C5 - Medical support: knowledge of NATO medical provisions; knowledge of the medical situation within the TO – the data base; ability to analyze and use daily medical information; the management of the on mission medical activities; existence of personnel immunization program; medicine and pharmaceutical products availability;
– C6 - labor and environmental safety: organization of labor and environmental safety; legal metrological and technical monitoring management.

Depending on the positive/negative results of the national contingent, the ratings may be:

– EXCELLENT (EX): when results for all functional areas are EX and only one is SATISFACTORY;
– SATISFACTORY (ST): results for all functional areas are EX and only two of these are SATISFACTORY;
– MARGINAL (MA): results for all functional areas are EX, ST, MA and only one indicator is rated as UNSATISFACTORY;
– UNSATISFACTORY (NS): two or more results were rated as unsatisfactory.

If the rating is MARGINAL, the evaluation of the contingent is repeated once the measures to change the situation were taken and the deadlines for these were met.

Once the evaluation process is over, the evaluation report must be finalized in three working days and submitted to the General Staff and to the General Staff of the service the national contingent is part of. The text of the report details any deficiencies identified during the evaluation in order to allow a clear identification of the measures to be taken.

The reanalysis of the logistic plan involves two phases: plan review and plan evaluation/reevaluation.

The review phase is necessary because the situations underlying plans formulation are of a changing nature. The review must focus on aspects, like: new threats and risks in the logistics field, the existence of a reasonable number of logistic forces, their freedom of movement in undertaking activities like replenishments and evacuations, the feasibility of the plan when checked against real events, etc.

The evaluation and reevaluation of the logistic plan involves allocating time for this activity, as well as quantifying results. In case of major changes, the plan will be updated.

In conclusion, a judicious logistic planning must take into account the deployed forces, their area of responsibility, their mission length, the resources and facilities available in the TO, the knowledge and application of STANAGs. In order to better meet the interoperability standard set by NATO, as well as in order to avoid duplication in providing logistic support to a contingent deployed in a multinational peacekeeping operation a nation must adequately balance and coordinate its financial efforts. Moreover, the volatile, unpredictable nature of contemporary conflicts requires logisticians to adapt their efforts in accordance with the inherent changes in their field and, hence, to measure up to the challenges characteristic of multinational theatres of operations.

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JOINT FORCE AND CONTEMPORARY MILITARY ACTIONS

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In the current changing international context, the worldwide power balance along with its inter-dependencies shows that mankind is facing problems and pressures posed by resources limitation (the oil ones being the most relevant), dramatic climate evolution and a decisive impact of technologies. The approach of the armed forces to the national defense related interests, as well as to the asymmetrical and irregular threats underlines the joint force’s capacity to be the most powerful and adequate tool to address all of these.

Key words: joint force, future military actions, irregular warfare, counter-insurgency, non-state actors, cyber space.

1. THE NATURE OF WAR

The fundamental nature of war has not changed too much over history and it will not change in the foreseeable future. War is a political act and its political dimension will continue to be a characteristic of the 21st century, even though currently it is predominantly a consequence of non-state or transnational groups’ actions.

Besides the political dimension of contemporary conflicts, human nature will also play a significant role, as wars are all social phenomena. People react in many different ways when facing unexpected experiences. Therefore, they are supposed to be disoriented, ignoring the essential aspects of these events. Moreover the human tendency is to consider the simple hypothesis as actual facts, failing to admit that the opponent is able to learn as well. As history recorded many times, when different cultures clash the adversaries will react in unpredictable manners. “Know your enemy and know yourself; in one hundred battles you will not be endangered”.[1]. The solution to tackle such type of contemporary conflicts at international level is to resort to a joint force. The latter is the operational or strategic entity composed of units and structures belonging to different armed forces categories, acting jointly under a unitary command in order to accomplish a mutual goal.

2. FUTURE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR JOINT FORCE

The ability to fight and win battles has always been the basic mission of the joint force. Moreover, within the circumstances already described, the joint force’s basic mission will also encompass the ability to deter conflicts. For this, the joint force will have to maintain a deterring posture and the capacity to operate in order to prevent and win wars. Thus, future joint force’s missions will include: national defense, deterrence of the potential enemies and fighting and winning wars, when necessary.

Since for the future the use of armed forces will be a political
matter, the commanders along with their staffs will have to understand the strategic and political objectives of the military actions environment, first of all. Current predictions show that for the next twenty years the joint force will be involved in conventional or irregular conflicts.

For the joint force planners a tremendous importance is given by the scenarios in which the force will be involved. Presently it is commonly admitted that the threat of a major war between two or more worldwide powers or Alliances is negligible. Nevertheless, history lessons are still relevant in this respect; therefore a logical conclusion might be that of maintaining credible military capabilities as the sole approach to deter a conflict. The Roman dictum “If you want peace prepare for war” is still valid as this approach ensured Rome’s survivability as the major military power for over a thousand years. Nonetheless, Mike Mullen recently said: “If you prepare for war you’d better do it properly” [2]. Thus, to some extent the long-term joint force approach toward conflicts should be war deterrence. However, if the respective deterrence does not show its results, the armed force efficacy on the battle field will be crucial.

On the other hand, the present Middle East war poses a real challenge to joint force, namely the irregular warfare. Within an irregular warfare the joint force’s opponents have proved a massive capacity to adapt and learn, even better than the conventional forces, both on the battle field and on the political scene. Therefore, the joint force must have a spectacular adaptability capacity. For this, joint force planners have to take into account two great limitations: logistic support and projection capacity. From the joint force perspective, the logistic support refers to issues related to long distances forces movement, oil and lubricants delivery and the like. The failure to provide a joint force with all of the above mentioned items means a disaster in terms of military actions, as a common military American adage says: “Without logistic we cannot move our forces an inch on the ground” [3].

From another perspective, the future war categories will pose particular challenges to a joint force. Thus, the force might expect its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance as well as command-control capabilities to be attacked. In addition, it should be mentioned that joint force opponents in an irregular warfare would not be limited by inherent planning bureaucratic processes, nor by the obligation to obey all rules, international treaties and conventions related to armed forces’ intervention. Moreover, the past irregular conflicts are indicative of the need of the joint force to thoroughly understand its adversaries, namely the cultural, ethnic, politic and religious environment. In an irregular conflict like the one from the Middle East, there are no decisive operations leading to a rapid final conclusion. Instead, a joint force might gain a victory over its opponents only through a sustained prolonged engagement in order to support a unitary and coherent strategic and political approach.

Another aspect of a paramount importance for the joint force is “the capacity to innovate during peace time and to adapt during the war” [4]. Moreover, apart from a force’s adaptability and innovation, the joint
force planners must ask the right questions at the right moment. In this respect, one way of finding the answers should consist in resorting to the armed forces’ history.

3. FUTURE MILITARY ACTIONS AND JOINT FORCE

An analysis of the military phenomenon evolution from a historical perspective may lead to the conclusion that the dramatic events of the 20th century (the two world wars) are relevant for two reasons: they led to a change in the course of history and they were the result of a clash between ideologies. In this respect, World War Two meant a war against Fascism and Nazism, and hence against ideologies responsible for millions of deaths. Moreover, the Cold War meant a war against communism, while the end of the Cold War recorded a struggle against the African genocide. Meanwhile, counter-insurgency has entered the world in an entire new era, the age of total war [5].

At present, the fast evolving technology pace shows the future war profile. Many irreversible relevant military transformations have been put into practice. These evolutions along with the economic, geopolitical and demographic factors appear to make the nowadays world a more dangerous and less stable place than before.

First of all, the United States Armed Forces lost the monopoly of high precision ammunition and weapons. Currently China is releasing ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as other ammunition types posing a major threat to the American military bases from Pacific. Similarly, Iran acquires technology that allows it to produce intelligent ammunition. Moreover, the non-state actors pose real threats. For instance, the Hezbollah organization launched against Israel more than 4,000 rockets and shells, leading to the evacuation of more than 300,000 Israeli citizens. As a result, as the guided ammunition proliferation spreads the asymmetric war will massively transform the characteristics of war.

However, the biggest challenge comes from the cyber space. The most exposed targets are the high developed countries with a relevant cyber infrastructure as this structure is quite hard to be efficiently protected and those triggering the attacks to be identified.

In conclusion, while the challenges against global order diversify and increase, the means to counter them have not been fully developed so far. In the present austerity stage, states affected by economic crises allot fewer resources for their own armed forces development. For instance, the world’s biggest budget – the Pentagon’s – will be cut by over $400 billions, for the next decade. However, neither the budget allotted to the military structures of the European Union, nor the military budgets of the newly emerging powers like India and Brazil are not yet able to match the budget of the aforementioned superpower in the long run.

Nowadays powers, among them the United States as the most relevant in terms of military capabilities, will try to maintain their dominant posture maintaining a high technology development pace. In this respect, USA have recently recorded significant progresses in the domain of directional energy, such as lasers, robotics, air vehicles. On the other
hand, other states, such as China, manage to keep the pace with the Americans, or even to surpass them in niche domains.

In the future, the devices using artificial intelligence and cutting edge technology, will have to be easier to camouflage in order to decrease the deployed forces’ vulnerabilities and make them harder to be attacked by insurgents. One might say that the great powers’ technology advance in terms of military capabilities will constantly lose its relevance, against the new threats to the global security. As a result, if these threats will not be efficiently countered by using proper means, such as diplomatic, politic and civil tools, they will tend to break the balance of the international system, with incalculable consequences for the world peace and security.

Based on all of the above details, it results that one of the most relevant aspects for the joint force used in modern military actions is its ability to innovate during peace time and to adapt during war. In peace time the military organizations cannot replicate with accuracy the real combat conditions, especially when the opponents try by all means to destroy the engaged forces. Therefore, the joint force’s training must focus on: relevant historical facts studies, tactical, operational and strategic situation analysis based on case studies, the use of war games and simulation exercises, and last but not least the efficient use intelligence concerning the opponents. Moreover, for the joint force to be used as a tool for conflict resolution, the training sessions and exercises should never end with a conclusion such as: “All objectives have been fulfilled”. On the contrary, as the historical events have proven, the above mentioned conclusion could only lead to a disaster in real combat. Thus, even though all objectives may be realistic, confrontation in real time will always yield unforeseen and hence unplanned situations for the joint force involved in action.

Another relevant aspect refers to military efficacy, which is often assimilated with a high technological level. Nothing could be so far from the truth. On the contrary, in order to be effective, one does not have to posses the most developed weapons systems or the best equipped soldiers, although these aspects are relevant to some extent. At war, military efficacy means the ability to recognize if the hypotheses formulated before the outbreak of hostilities are still valid or not. In case their validity becomes questionable, their immediate change/dismissal is mandatory.

To conclude, today’s lessons may not be so relevant tomorrow, no matter how well recorded and institutionalized they are. The enemy is human and hence will learn and adapt. If military diligently learn and know the war tactics and techniques, the enemy will definitely do the same.

REFERENCES

[2] * * * Foreign Policy, January/February 2012, p. 66;