

POST-CRISIS PROSPECTS FOR THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION

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Humankind has constantly evolved for the past two millenia. Even though the term development may suggest a smooth and ascending trajectory, the serious economic problems confronting countries nowadays prove otherwise. Thus, the economic forecasts seem to point out that in the 21st century environmental and resource constraints are to halt the global economic growth. As a result, austerity will reach the military budgets as well, even though the security challenges, both intra and extra-territorial, will remain more or less unchanged, for the next period.

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1. G2 - THE REAL CRISIS WINNER

The next decade will be a period full of unpredictable events. First of all, Asia will become the leading continent from the economic growing rate perspective, with China and India as main leaders. However, the experts warn us about the instability concerns that usually follow a vast period of steady economic growth. At the same time, the Western countries will go through a period of smooth economic growth. The United States will remain the main world economic and military

power, even though the distance between America and its followers, China and India, will lessen.

As the world tends to approach a certain point where the crisis effects will diminish, it seems clearer and clearer that the real winners of the economic crisis are the so-called “G2-group”, consisting of United States and China. There are a number of reasons supporting such a statement and some of them are to be presented below.

First of all, China is maintaining its amazing economic rate even though the rest of the world is encountering serious economic troubles.

Second, the other winner, the USA, derives its power mostly from its high posture as an international security defender. Even though the “distance” between United States and its followers will decrease, America will remain the main economic power and the leader of the Western world. The present international security threats request the presence of a leader like the United States, despite the fact that the rest of the world dislikes the United States’ involvement in all kind of crises.

Thus, to some extent, one can say that the real crisis’ winner is G2. Besides, in the near future, one may witness the establishment of a new strategic partnership including these two states, along with their economic treaties and understandings.

2. LISBON 2010 A NEW BEGINNING

The Lisbon Summit from 2010 might mean a new beginning both for NATO and other relevant defense and security bodies.

First of all, the Alliance tries to develop both a new strategic concept and a new relation with the Russian Federation, as well as new approaches towards Afghanistan stability operations. In this respect, it should be underlined that the Lisbon Summit was a moment when a new

strategic consensus emerged that may adjust the structural differences between NATO states members.

Second, new partnerships and global missions were issued. Most importantly, the Lisbon Summit may be the one when the Alliance went back to territorial defense and power balance concept.

Besides all of the above, the NATO-Russia cooperation in Afghanistan gave new dimensions for the Alliance’s partnerships. Moreover, the comprehensive approach was the main lesson NATO learnt in Middle East.

All of this tends to emphasize some misunderstandings regarding the complex relationships of the Alliance. Some tendencies were to see NATO as an organisation aiming at Russian Federation and its sphere of influence. In this respect, it should be said the NATO enlargement was a powerful engine of transforming not only the military structures but also the national security cultures. Besides, NATO’s role as a strategic balancer, renewed at the Lisbon Summit, will ease the tensions between some Eastern European countries and the Russian Federation.

On the other hand, the solidarity among NATO’s member states has always been a issue of huge debates, due to the fact that this kind of solidarity has been seen in different

ways among the respective countries. For instance, for USA and Canada, solidarity means to share costs and operational risks and threats, namely to share money and actions. On the contrary, for some Eastern European countries solidarity is a matter of trust, in other word the answer to the question: "Who may care for my territorial defence and security?" The solution lies in the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, as well as in trends set forth by the Lisbon Summit to renew the territorial defence main issue.

All in all, it seems that NATO may need a new kind of engagement. The 2010 Summit tried to adjust the solidarity deficiency among NATO states members.

The NATO new Strategic Concept focuses on solidarity, while also establishing a new approach to the Alliance's partnership with the Russian Federation.

3. POST-CRISIS PROSPECTS FOR THE MILITARY ORGANISATION

The present economic crises have shown that to be strong in defense terms does not mean to allocate more resources and to build bigger systems.

However, being cleverer in defense matters might mean to reduce costs. Indeed, there is a need for a

better allocation and use of resources. The key is not only the simple change, but the re-design and re-thinking. The Armed Forces of the world need to be re-organized and better equipped with soft power tools in order to counter the emerging threats of today and tomorrow. In the new interconnected war the soft power is better than the hard power and moreover, the military rivalries may be replaced by economic rivalries in the future.

Under the present circumstances, it is most improbable for huge armies of tanks to fight each other in a foreseen conflict since the modern war has become faster and more complex.

The biggest problem at the moment is posed by conventional armies facing the fact that they are organized to fight big wars and, hence, they encounter big difficulties when they are supposed to fight small armies.

The necessities of the big wars made these armies to be based on few big units and not on a lot of small units. For instance, the United States Army has only 10 active divisions and Marines only 3, whereas the Maritime Forces has only 11 groups of carriers. Worth reminding, about 1.5 million people are members of the US Armed Forces.

These underlines the following issue: the US Armed Forces has

a “proper-size” problem, and that makes them unable to follow small targets with small units. The situation in Vietnam was almost the same, when decisional factors forced the Americans to carry on a war with big entities against small insurgents groups. The final outcome is well-known: over 500,000 soldiers deployed in South-East Asia, billions of dollars spent and a lost war.

Nevertheless, some small steps have been already taken to implement the so-called “*more and small ones against the few and big ones’ strategy*”. Beginning with 2006 a different operational approach has been in place: 5% of the total 130,000 soldiers in Afghanistan have been disposed in about 100 forward operational posts, consisting of no more than 50 military. That was a spectacular change leading to a decreased level of violence. That was possible due to the fact that the created interconnected network of platoon-level posts was able to interact better with local civilians.

On the other hand, in the second Iraqi War it seemed that the enemy waited for the Coalition forces to arrive and then they ran away, beginning an insurgency based on “hit and run” tactics and attacks with improvised explosive devices.

In current and future conflicts the enemy should be identified first, and

then defeated. This was the case in Vietnam and the history has remained more or less the same in Afghanistan and Iraq. In an interconnected war, the massive armies have to adapt themselves from an organization configured to shoot into a more “sensorial” one. This might mean that identification is better than direct attack.

The solution might be the set-up of searchers interconnected groups into the adversary territory, which eventually will co-operate better with the civilian population that hide and protect insurgents.

Terrorists, who know they will never be successful against a regular army, in terms of number, have created a sort of war that allows them to fully benefit from their limited resources. This was called swarming.

Swarming is a tactics of simultaneously attacking from different directions using small units, against one or more targets. After 9/11, Al-Qaeda simultaneously hits targets in Turkey, Tunis and Saudi Arabia, through wave campaign in order to overwhelm the target capacity to react.

Not surprisingly, this kind of tactics, swarming, was used by Russian Federation in Georgia, when federal troops attacked at the same time different targets both on the combat field and in cyber space.

The result was the blocking of Georgian command and control system in several hours. Moreover, the basic services for Georgia's population were blocked within hours using swarming by Russian troops alongside with "friendly" Georgian militia.

Nowadays, the deep implication of swarming could be to adapt the military structure to fight on the combat field with multiple units composed of few trained soldiers. The goal is to trigger rapid attacks, in great number in order to hit enemy in multiple vital points at the same time.

4. CONCLUSIONS

Some contemporary studies underline the similarities between the present world and the one of the year 2025, far beyond the time when the current crisis will lessen its effects. Another relevant aspect emphasised in these forecasts is that the Armed Forces will continue to play a vital role.

New methods of performing asymmetric military actions will be cheaper and affordable. When an unforeseeable conflict cannot be avoided the response will be a key factor in achieving success. Concepts such as: fluid situation, fluid combat actions and fluid battle space will become more common and accessible as part of future military doctrines.

The military structures downsizing will continue in the post-crisis period along with the military cuts in expenditures. However, the efficiency and proficiency of the military structures will increase at the same time. Under the new circumstances, the military combat disposal will be less rigid and will become more asymmetric and fluid.

The new combat space will no longer be uniform and static. On the contrary, this will become more unpredictable and in permanent progress and change.

The military organization will become modular in order to face the combat space digitalization and to be successful in the information and psychological warfare.

As for the military organization as a whole, from the new warfare perspectives to be fluid means to gain mobility, speed and efficiency, to achieve maneuverability and to dominate the adversary battle space. Fluidity also means simultaneous actions in all three battlespace environments: land, maritime and air, performed through joint national/multinational operations. The means used to accomplish these missions will deliver surgical precision attacks benefiting from high value intelligence provided in real time.

In the near and foreseeable future the armies will decrease, some

weapons systems will be forbidden and new arms categories will be implemented. At the same time, both at operational and strategic level, these new systems will be requested to see and strike deep the enemy's decisive points and centers of gravity.

The post-crisis prospects for the military organisation reside in facing the new challenges posed by two future types of confrontation. The first one is that of imposing a new model of world order and globalisation. The other confrontation refers to rejecting the new world order using all available means, from the classical protest to informational warfare and asymmetric retort.

Even though the entire society blames the war and its consequences, the Armed Forces will continue to be prepared for current warfare, but mainly for the future one.

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